In November, B. by means of a contre lettre became interested in certain real estate transactions in the city of Montreal, effected by one P.
In December, brought an action against P. to have a sale made by the latter to one Barsalou, declared fraudulent, and the new purchaser restrained from paying the balance due to the parties named in the deed of sale. A plea of compensation was fyled and pending the action a sequestrator was appointed to whom Barsalou paid over the money. In September, another action was instituted by against P. asking for an account of the different real estate transactions they had conformably to the terms of the contrelettre.
To this action plea of compensation was also fyled. The Superior Court dismissed the first action on the ground that had no right of action, but maintained the second action ordering an account to be taken.
The Court of Queen's Bench affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court dismissing the first action and P. acquiesced in the judgment of the Superior Court on the second action.
appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada from the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench dismissing the first action :
Held, reversing the judgment of the court below, that the plea of compensation was unfounded, having the right to put end to P. M's. mandate by a direct action, and therefore until the account which had been ordered in the second action had been rendered the moneys should remain in the hands of the sequestrator appointed with the consent of the parties.
APPEAL from the judgment rendered on the 26th November, 1892, by the Court of Queen's Bench for Lower Canada (Appeal side) which confirmed a judg- :-Strong and Fournier, Taschereau, Gwynne and Sedgewick JJ.
ment rendered on the 8th September, 1890, by the Superior Court sitting in and for the District of Mon- 'M
' treal, whereby one of two actions brought by the appellant against the respondent was dismissed. The general circumstances connected with the institution by the appellant against the respondent of the two actions in question, the second of which (no. 1043) was maintained, while the first (no. 1894), with which alone the present appeal is directly concerned, was dismissed, are as follows - The appellant on the 18th of November, 1882, by deed passed before Mtre H. P. Pepin, notary, sold to the respondent the north-west portion of lot no. 615 of the cadastre of St. Mary's Ward of the city of Montreal.
By a counter-letter under private signature of the same date, it was declared that they had a common interest in the said property and it was agreed that if the respondent should sell the same for a price exceeding $10,470 the surplus should be divided equally between them and the price to the said amount be applied as follows : 1st. $3,699 or about that sum to Selkirk Cross ; 2nd. $1,200 to the plaintiff for the purpose of paying the Muldoon estate; 3rd. $2,642 to the defendant, Peter Murphy; and 4th. $2,629 to the plaintiff; and that if the price should be less, than said amount of $10,470, the 3rd and 4th items should be shared between them pro rata.
The property was sold to one Barsalou for $13,382.65 and the deed to Barsalou showed that the whole $13,382.60 was payable to respondent and others, there being nothing whatever mentioned in it as coming to the appellant.
Appellant then brought an action against the respondent and while reserving his recourse upon an action of account against respondent prayed that by a judgment of the court the deed should be rectified in accordance with the terms of the contre-lettre and that the mis en cause, Maurice Barsalou, be ordered to retain in his hands or to deposit with the treasurer of the Province, the balance of the price due by him, until the amount coming to the plaintiff shoiild have been determined upon a settlement of account between him and the defendant, Peter Murphy.
The action of account was subsequently taken. To the first action the respondent denied the right action and the alleged fraud, and also pleaded compensation; and to the second suit he pleaded that the suit, althQugh well founded in the abstract, had become unnecessary on account of the pleas by him produced in the first action in which he had incorporated the account now sought to be obtained, and renewed his account and prayed for a judicial declaration of its correctness as well as for a dismissal of this second suit.
Both suits were conducted pari passu in the court of original jurisdiction, the proof adduced being common to both, and were finally decided on the same day by Mr. Justice Wurtele. The first action was dismissed and an account ordered to be taken in the second action. The respondent acquiesced in the judgment -of the second action, but the appellant appealed from the judgment in the first suit and the Court of Queen's Bench affirmed Mr. Justice Wurtele's judgment. Barnard Q.C. for appellant, contended -that George Bury had never lost his proprietary rights in the property sold, and if so the action had been wrongfully dismissed, citing and relying on Pothier, Mandal (1); Laurent ; Guyot vo. Acte Conservatvire (3); Ferribre, Dict., vo. Acte Conservatoire ; Pigeau, Proc. Thurber v. Holland, (1) ; Wyatt v. Senecal ; Henderson v. Tremblay (3) ; Prince v. Jones Laurin XU-V Cryan v. Cryan ; White v. Murphy (6); Barnard Molson (7); Taylor v. Wallbridge (8); Faulds v. Harper (9); Barton v. Muir
F. D. llonck Q.C. for respondent contended that the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench for Lower Canada should be affirmed.
1st. Because, by the terms of the memorandum in writing 6f the 10th November, 1882, and the sale of the same date, the appellant had a personal recourse only against the respondent and noljus in re entitling him to follow the property into the hands of third parties and sequestrate its price.
2nd. Because, even if the fraudulent acts alleged by appellant had existed, he could not obtain relief in the manner he has sought to do by the present proceedings, but should have conformed to Title I of Book II of the Code of Civil Procedure of Lower Canada.
3rd. Because appellant has totally failed to prove the acts of fraud by him alleged.
THE concurred in the judgment Mr. Justice Fournier.
J.-Cet appel est d'un jugement rendu le 26 novembre 1892, par la cour du Banc de la Reine, si6geant A Montr6al, en appel, confirmant un jugement rendu par la cour sup6rieure, A Montr~al, renvoyant l'action en cette cause.
Le demandeur, appelant, all6guait dans son action, que le novembre
1882, par acte pass6 devant Mtre Pepin, notaire, il avait vendu au d6fendeur la partie nord-ouest du lot no 615 du cadastre du quartier Sainte-Marie de la Ville de Montr6al, mais que la dite vente 6tait accompagn6e d'une contre-lettre contenant ' la transaction r6ellement intervenue entre les parties, laquelle est comme suit:
J. Comme on le voit cette contre-lettre d6clare que malgr6 la dite vente les parties, appelant et intim6, out un int6rit commun dansla diteproprit& Ellesdclarent de plus que dans le cas l'intim6 trouverait un acqu6reur, le prix serait distribu6 entre 1'appelant et l'intim6 de la manibre sp~cifibe dans la dite lettre. La propri6t0 fut vendue a Barsalou pour $13,382.60, mais an lieu des $5,000 au moins qui d'apr~s la base de la contre-lettre aurait di revenir A 1'appelant, la vente faite h Barsalou fait voir que tout le prix de $13,382.60 6tait attribu6 A 1'intim6 et a d'autres personnes y d~nommbes, et qu'aucune somme quelconque n'tait mentionn~e comme revenant & l'appelant. La transaction fut effectue de la maniere suivante Perry, un prAte-nom auquel l'intim6 avait d'abord vendu la proprit6 pour un prix nominal, la revendit ensuite h Barsalou et en recut en apparence la somme de $1,382.60, comptant, tandis que en r6alit6 le montant fut pay6 A l'intim6. La balance de $12,000 payable par j'^"r
Barsalou en cinq ans devait aller comme suit: $8,500 A *
Rea un autre prite-nom, dont la reclamation n'6tait tout an plus de $4,206.68 et $564 A Elizabeth Lane, et la J. balance $2,936, A 1'intim6 lui-m6me qui n'avait droit en vertu de la contre-lettre qu'd la somme de $2,642. I] ne restait rien du prix de vente pour 1'appelant. Celni-ci ayant r6clam6 sa part du prix de vente que l'intim6 lui refusa, il intenta sa pr~sente action all6guant qu'il avait un jus in re daus le prix de vente, et que la v6ritable position de Perry et de Rea 6tait telle que ci-dessus all6gu6, et ayant mis en cause toutes les parties int6ressies, il concluait h ce que son droit A une partie du prix de vente fut reconnu, qu'il fut d~clar6 que Rea n'avait droit qu'h $4,206.68, et de plus qu'il fut ordonn6 A Barsalou de retenir le Prix de vente entre ses mains jusqu'd ce que le montant pr~cis lui revenant. d'apris la contre-lettre fut dtermin6 sur un compte rendu 16galement.
L'intim6 plaida 5. cette action que l'appelant n'avait aucune reclamation.
Qu'ainsi qu'il apparaissait par le compte offert par 1'intim6, le plus qu'il pouvait r~clamer en vertu de la contre-lettre 6tait $3,727.40, tandis que 1'intim6 avait contre lui une r6clamation de $15,593 qu'il offrait en compensation.
Ce plaidoyer n'a jamais 6t6 d6cid6.
Un semblable plaidoyer fut oppos6 A l'action en reddition de compte et renvoy6, 'intim6 acquiescant an jugement.
Dans ce plaidoyer l'intim6 admet que Perry n'est qu'un prite-nom, et qu'afin de ne laisser aucune balance comme lui revenant, il a stipul6 que le prix de vente serait payable partie pour les taxes, partie au dit sieur Rea, et partie 5. lui-m6me; qu'il a tonjours t pr~t et l'est encore 6, rendre compte dudit prix de vente aux termes de la contre-lettre.
Le plaidoyer -all~gue aussi que la r6clamation originaire de l'appelant a 6t6 6teinte par les diverses transactions cit6es dans son plaidoyer, lesquelles ont en 1'effet de le constituer d6biteur de 1'intim6 pour un montant beaucoup plus 6lev6 que celui qui pouvait lui revenir, et qu'en cons6quence il n'6tait plus cr~ancier, et n'a pas droit de demander le s~questre du prix de vente.
C'est alors que 1'appelant a porte contre l'intim6 une action en reddition 'de compte qui est encore pendante.
L'intim6 a contest6 cette action sur le principe que cette action 6tait inutile puisqu'il avait d~jh rendu compte sur la premibre action, le plaidoyer de compensation produit contre cette action fut offert de nouveau contre la seconde action.
Le jugement dont se plaint l'appelant a renvoy6 la premi6re action; celle dont il s'agit sur le pr~sent appel 1'a 6t sur le principe que l'appelant en s'en rapportant A 1'intim6 pour la vente de sa propritd, en le constituant son prte-nom, a perdu ses droits de proprit6 dans le prix de vente et n'a plus maintenant qu'un recours personnel contre l'intim6,-qu'en cons6quence il n'a pas droit de prendre contre Barsalou, mis cause, des conclusions de la nature d'une saisie-conservatoire.
Qu'ayant perdu ses droits dans la propri6t6 du prix, il a aussi perdu ses droits -A 1'exercice d'un procd6 conservatoire.
Mais est-il vrai que par Ia vente qu'il a faite A Murphy l'appelant ait perdu ses droits de propri&t sur le prix de vente'? L'acte de vente intervenu entre eux n'est que la convention apparente, la convention secrete contenue dans la contre-lettre est la convention veritable entre eux, qui est la contre-lettre.
1'6gard de 1'appelant Murphy 1'acqubreur apparent n'est qu'un mandataire dont les droits et obligations sont r6gis par la loi du mandat.
Comme mandataire, il n'a aucun droit de propri6th A 1'encontre de l'appelant (1).
Il est declar6 par la contre-lettre que le vendeur et l'acqu6reur ont un int&rt commun dans la proprit6 vendue.
Le jugement de 1'honorable juge Wurtele sur 1'action en reddition de compte reconnatt les droits Fournier J. de l'appelant A propri6t6, en d6clarant qu'il considire l'appelant et l'intim6 comme des associ~s anonymes dans cette propri6.
L'intim6 Murphy a vendu A Perry comme prite-nom, la propri6t6 commune des deux parties, et Perry Pa .ensuite revendue Barsalon; mais l'intim6 a admis et reconnu que cette vente est simulke et faite par lui par l'interm6diaire de Perry et comme on 1'a vu plus haut par les d6tails de cet acte de vente, an lieu de 5,000 an moins qui aurait dd revenir 6 1'appelant d'apris la contre-lettre le montant entier du prix de vente $13,382.60 fut entibrement attribu6 A 1'intim6 et A d'autres personnes, ne laissant absolument rien pour l'appelant.
Cette distribution du prix de vente est violation directe des termes de la contre-lettre et donne un droit d'action A 'appelant pour faire d6clarer qu'elle sera faite suivant les termes de la contre-lettre qui contient la v6ritable conivention entre l'appelant et I'intime.
Mais comme A 1'6gaid des tiers, les contre-lettres n'ont point d'effet et que c'est la convention apparente ici, l'acte de vente par Perry a Barsalou qui regle leurs droits, ce dernier aurait t6 justifiable de payer le prix de vente suivant la distribution qui en est faite par son acte d'acquisition, si l'appelant n'avait, en le mettant en cause, inform6 le dit Barsalou, de ses droits de propriet6 dans une partie du prix de vente et demand6 la suspension du paiement jusqu'A ce que la cour ait d6finitivement prononc6 sur les droits respectifs des parties dans le dit prix de vente. Mais les parties ayant de consentement r6gl6 cet incident il ne reste alors a la cour qu'd! leur donner la sanction judiciaire. En cons6quence, 1'appelant a droit aux conclusions qu'il a prises contre Barsalou an sujet du paiement du prix de vente.
Je suis d'opinion que 1'appel doit tre allou6. J.-The respondent's plea of compensation was under the circumstances totally unfounded in law.
If he had been paid by Barsalou and was sued by the appellant for his share of the price then he might have pleaded compensation.
But such is not the appellant's action, and could not have been for the good reason that the price of sale was yet unpaid and still remained in Barsalou's hands when it was instituted. The appellant had a perfect right, it seems to me, to say to Barsalou, putting Murphy, respondent, cause, " a part of that price of sale belongs to me, and I ask the court to so declare and order that you pay it to me."
He asks less than that, that is to say, he merely concludes by a prayer that Barsalou pay the money in to court or in to the Treasurer's hands, till it has been ascertained what, as between him and the respondent, is his precise share of the price of sale. To this the respondent says : True it is that a part of that price sale belongs to you, but you owe me a great deal more, and I ask that Barsalou pay me the whole amount so that I get paid for what you owe me.
It is thus clear in my opinion that it is the respondent who tries to get in a side- way a seizure of what Barsalou has in his hands belonging to the appellant. The appellant merely revendicates his property. The respondent wants to be paid upon that property, but he has no lien nor privilege upon it, and he cannot, having admitted that it was for part appellant's property, prevent Barsalou from paying it or handing it over to the appellant upon the mere pretence that appellant owes him a debt totally unconnected with it. The court below rightly dismissed that plea, but upon what ground they also dismiss the action I cannot understand.
Of the two actions it is the second, it seems to me, that was the least necessary; the court J.
under the circumstances should have ordered it to be joined to the first to be proceeded upon as a separate issue between the appellant and the respondent, the first remaining in abeyance till it was determined what amount, if any, is due to the appellant by the respondent.
Had the appellant chosen he certainly might have allowed Barsalou to pay the respondent and then taken a personal action against respondent. But he was not obliged to let Barsalou so pay to respondent his share of the price. He had the right to put an end to respondent's mandate by a direct action as he has virtually done.
There is no saisie conservatoire in this.
By a consent order these moneys are now in the hands of the cashier of the Bank Jacques Cartier. The appellant thus got from the court below all he asked for plus the dismissal of his action.
Of this last part he, in my opinion, has reason to complain, and I think that the appeal should be allowed with costs in the three courts against Murphy.
The parties will probably agree as to the form in which the judgment is to be entered. As the moneys are now in de Martigny's hands the judgment will have to be I presume that they remain there till final judgment on the other action.
and concurred in allowing the appeal.
Appeal allowed with costs.