Quebec Cental Railway Co. v. Lortie

L. was the holder of a ticket and passenger of the company's train from Levis to Ste. Marie, Beauce.

When the train arrived at Ste. Marie station the car upon which L. had been travelling was some distance from the station platform, the train being longer than the platform, and L. fearing that the car would not be brought up to the station, the time for stopping having nearly elapsed, got out of the end of the car, and the distance to the ground from the steps being about two feet and a half, in so doing he fell and broke his leg which had to be amputated. The action was for $5,000 damages alleging negligence and want of proper accommodation.

The defence was contributory negligence. Upon the evidence the Superior Court, whose judgment was affirmed by the Court of Queen's Bench, gave judgment in favour of L. for the whole amount.

On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada:

Reld, reversing the judgments of the courts below, that in the exercise of ordinary care, E. could have safely gained the platform by passing through the car forward and that the accident was wholly attributable to his own default in alighting as he did and therefore he could not recover.

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APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench for Lower Canada (appeal side), confirming the judgment of the Superior Court.

This was an action for $5,000 damages for loss of a leg through the alleged negligence of the Company (appellant.) By his declaration the respondent (plain- *PRESENT.-Sir Henry Strong C. J., and Fournier, Taschereau, Gwynne and Sedgewick JJ.

tiff) alleged that on the 13th May, 1891, he was a passenger by appellants' express train from Levis to Ste. Marie de la Beauce.

That on arriving at Ste. Marie the train was stopped in front of the station in such a manner that the loco- COMrANY motive was in front of the platform and the passenger cars, including that in which the plaintiff was riding, were left a distance from the platform; and that no stool was furnished to assist the passengers in disembarking.

That the distance between the lowest step of the car and the ground was very considerable; that plaintiff was obliged to get down at that place, and treading a round stone broke his leg in such a manner as to necessitate amputation, and claimed $5,000 damages.

Appellants filed two pleas:

1st. An express denial of the allegations of plaintiff's declaration.

2nd. That if plaintiff met with an accident and suffered any damage, it was attributable entirely to his own negligence and fault and not to any negligence fault on the part of the appellants or train employees.

That proper accommodation, suitable to the requirements of the place, is furnished at Ste. Marie to enable people to embark on and disembark from the trains.

That if plaintiff chose to alight from the rear end the car on to the street which there crosses the railway, he did so at his own risk.

That if plaintiff had passed through the car he could have alighted on the platform as other passengers did, but, in broad daylight he chose to step down into the street, and the injury he sustained in so doing is entirely attributable to his own negligence.

The Superior Court, upon the evidence, found as a matter of fact, that the company had stopped the car upon which the respondent was riding at some distance from the platform of the station and had allowed passengers and the respondent to alight in a dangerous place, and that the company was thereby guilty of teeygit negligence and liable. This judgment was affirmed unanimously by the Court of Queen's Bench.

The facts brought out in the evidence upon which the appellant company relied as proving that the accident was attributable to the respondent's own fault are the following

The platform at the village of Ste. Marie not being so long as the train on the day of the accident, part the baggage car, the whole of the second-class car, and nearly the whole of the first-class Q. C. R. car were alongside the platform when the train stopped. The front end of the Boston and Maine car and the rear end of the first-class Q. C. R. car were on a street crossing and within five or six feet of the station platform.

Respondent and one Vallerand, a resident of Ste. Marie, and well acquainted with the locality, were riding in the B. & M. car without objection from the conductor, who, however, did pass some passengers (ladies) into the car forward.

Respondent was told by this witness Bois that this car was a through car going to Boston and that his place was in the next car.

When the train stopped respondent crossed over from the platform of the B. & M. car to the rear platform the Q. C. R. car, and there alighted a distance of about two feet, seven inches from the ground having in one hand an overcoat and a " portmanteau " or valise, and so jumping and falling on a round stone broke his leg.

The carrier of passengers is only liable for his negligence.

He is not an insurer of the safety of his passengers, nor responsible for injuries suffered by them from any cause other than the negligence or fault of himself or of persons employed by him. Daniel v. Metropolitan R. Co. ; Readhead v. Midland R. Co. (2); Sherman and Redfield on Negligence (3); Crofts v. Waterhouse (4), quoted by Chief Justice Ritchie in The Queen v. McLeod

The passengers themselves must exercise reasonable care.

He was not obliged to get off at that place, and no official of the company invited him to do so.

It is however, quite manifest that there could be no danger in a man of plantiff's age stepping down a distance of two feet seven inches, if he exercised ordinary care.

None of the cases relied on by respondent bear any resemblance to the present. But see Siner et al v. The

Great Western Railway Co. (6); Cockle v. The London

& South-eastern Railway Co. ; Rose v. North-eastern Railway Co. ; Eckerd v. Chicago & North-western Railway Co. (Iowa)

Moreover under the French law, when the proximate and sole cause of the accident was the respondent's own negligence, he cannot recover.

Quod quis ex culpa sua damnum sentit, non intelligitar damnum sentire."

See Sourdat (10).

In this sense is the judgment in Recullet v. Chenin du Nord (11).

The learned counsel also relied on Moffette v. Grand L.R.4Ex.

Trunk Railway Co. (1); Periam v. Dompierre (2); Allan v. Mullin (3); Charbonneau v. The Corporation of St. Martin (4) ; Ware v. Carsley ; Allan v. La Cie d'Assurance Marine des Marchands du Canada (6) ; Mainville v. Hutchins (7); Central Vermont Ry. Co. v. Lareau ; Desroches v. Gauthier ;

Gray v. Mayor of Quebec (10) ; Richelieu and Ontario N. Co. v. Desloges (11).

As to whether respondent should have gone through the first class Quebec Central Car and alighted from the south end of same on to the platform, it is proved that the express train stops but a few minutes at Ste. Marie station, that a good many passengers get off and on the cars there, that the trains only stop for a very short time, that if people start to go from one car to another so as to get off on the platform, they are exposed to be carried on past the station. Vallerand, who spends the summer season at Ste. Marie, swears that for the last twelve or thirteen years, he was obliged more than twenty-five times to get off where respondent alighted, for fear of being carried beyond his destination.

On this point I will cite Robson v. The North-eastern Railway Co. (12); Rose v. The North-eastern Railway The obligation of common carriers seems to be stricter in the French law than the English law, for not only are they, according to the former, obliged to carry the holder of a ticket to his destination, but they are insurers of his safety.

Article 1675 of the civil code, which comes under the heading carriers " is as follows

They (carriers) are liable for the loss or damage of things entrusted to them unless they can prove that such loss or damage was caused by a fortuitous event or irresistible force, has arisen from a defect in the thing itself."

The authors are unanimous in declaring that this article applies to the carrying of persons as well as things.

Troplong, Louage, (1) ; Sourdat, Responsabilit6, (2) Curasson, Comp6tence des Juges de Paix, (3) ; Alauzet, Commentaire du code de commerce, (4); Duvergier, Louage d'ouvrage, (5); Dalloz, Repertoire, Vo. " Commissionnaire," (6); Wood v. South-eastern Ry. v. Lawrence Nay. ; Boulanger v. G.T.R. (9); Boulanger v. G.T.R

Chalifoux v. C.P.R.

This last case was reversed by the Supreme Court, (12) but only on the ground, as far as can be judged from the short report, that the breaking of the rail was a fortuitous event caused by climatic influences. If, as we contend, the carrier here was an insurer the safety of the passenger he was bound to carry him safely and to see him landed safely in a place where there was no danger of an injury. Any negligence the part of the appellants would render them liable QUEC for the injury.

Foy v. The London Brighton and South Coast Railway and Gee v. Metropolitan Railway THE was of opinion allow the appeal.

FoURNIER J.-La seule question dans cette cause comme dans celle de Chalifoux v. La Compagnie dw Pacifique Canadien est au sujet de l'tendue de la. responsabilit6 des voituriers qui font traffic de transport des personnes.

Les principes qui doivent d6finir cette responsabilit6 sont ceux du droit frangais et particuli6rement du Code Civil de la province de Quebec, dans laquelle l'accident dont il s'agit est arriv6. Cependant, dans la cause de Chalifoux, Ia majorit6 de cette Cour s'appuyant sur le droit anglais et la d6cision des tribunaux anglais a dbcid6 qu'il 6tait n~cessaire de prouver la n6gligence pour rendre le voiturier responsable, tandis que d'aprbs notre droit, art. 1675 C. C, il est responsable A moins qu'il ne prouve que 1'accident est arriv6 par cas fortuit on force majeure.

La preuve de Ia n6gligence est requise dans le cas de l'art. 1053, mais ici il s'agit de 1'art. 1673 concernant les voituriers et cette preuve n'est pas n6cessaire. L'intim6 6tait passager dans le train rapide allant de Qu6bec A Boston. que le train fut arrth 6 Ia station de Ste-Marie, Beauce, il se rendit sur le plate-forme & l'extr6mit du char dans lequel il avait pris place pour descendre.

Ce char se trouvait en dea du quai de la, gare. L'intim6 en sautant du marchepied (une hauteur de 21 A 3 pieds) se cassa la jambe et dut se la faire amputer quelques jours aprbs 1'accident.

L'Honorable Juge en Chef, Sir Alexandre Lacoste, a decid6 cette cause sur le principe que les r~gles concernant le transport des marchandises par les voituriers, s'appliquent mutatis mutandis au transport des C'est aussi sur ce principe que la Cour du Bane de la Reine avait d6cid6 la cause de Chalifoux v. Le Pacifique Canadien

En France on applique an transport des personnes, aussi bien qu'au transport des marchandises, la responsabilit6 6tablie contre les voituriers par l'art. 1784 N. Un arrat de la Cour Imp. de Paris de novembre 1866 in re Compagnie du nord dit A ce sujet: " L'article 1784, qui les rend responsables de 1'avarie on de la perte des objets qu'elles transportent A moins qu'elles ne prouvent le cas fortuit et la force majeure, s'applique a fortiori au transport des personnes.

La protection due A celles-ci ne peut 6tre moindre celle que l'on accorde aux marchandises.

C'est ce que d6cide avec raison, un arrat de la Cour de Paris le novembre 1866 (Droit du ler dicembre 1866).

Le premier consid6rant de cet arrt est ainsi congu Sir Alexandre Lacoste avait done raison de dire que les regles concernant le transport des marchandises par les voituriers s'appliquent au transport des voyageurs.

On doit en dire autant an sujet de l'art. 1675 de notre code qui est presque textuellement le mime que l'art 1784 U. N.

Mais ceci est rendu plus 6vident par l'art. 1673, qui applique toute la sec. III des voituriers au transport des personnes, aussi bien qu'au transport des marchandises. Cet article dit (les voitnriers) sont tenus de recevoir et transporter aux temps marqu6s dans les avis publics toute personne qui demande passage, si le transport des voyageurs fait partie de leur trafic accoutumb; et tous effets qu'on leur offre A transporter ; a moins que dans l'un on l'autre cas, il n'y ait cause raisonnable et probable de refus.

Le trafic de transport des passagers fait aussi bien o.

partie du trafic de l'appelante que 10 transport des marchandises.

Fournier J.

Dans la cause ci-dessus cit~e, Cotelle, Lgislation des chemins de fer fait les observations suivantes sur ce jugement:

L'accident, ainsi qu'il est dit plus haut, est arriv6 parce que le train dans lequel se trouvait 1'intim6 tant beaucoup plus long que la plate-forme de la station, le char dans lequel il 6tait, ne put aborder la plate-forme pour y faire descendre ses passagers.

Le train 6tant un express qui n'arrate que quelques instants, les passagers de crainte d'6tre emmends 6, une autre station se pr6cipitent tous aux extr6mitis du char et souvent s'apergoivent que le char n'est pas vis-a-vis du quai. leur faut rebrousser chemin on aller plus loin, contre le courant des passagers on bien sauter du marchepied.

Ce mode n'est pas sans inconv6nient, mais la compagnie ne peut pas leur reprocher un risque -qu'ils ont couru pour ne pas 6tre emmen6s A la station prochaine, chaque marchepied est pour le voyageur, une invitation A descendre, et l'arr~t est g6ndralement trop court pour qu'il refuse la premibre chance qui lui est offerte de laisser le train.

Il est prouv6 qu'il y a toujours beaucoup de voyageurs 6, cette station; il y aussi preuve que plusieurs ont 6t6 entrain6s aux stations voisines parce que le temps d'arrat est trop court.

L'intimd qui voyageait pour affaire, craignant ce r6sultat, sauta du marchepied A une hauteur de 2{ i 3 pieds de la derniare marche, mais malheureusement h quelque pieds de li se trouvait une grosse pierre dont la forme 6tait ovale sur laquelle il mit le pied, tomba et se cassa la jambe. L'in- Fournier J. tim6 n'est pas le seul qui a pris cette direction pour sortir du char. Le t6moin Vallerand dit que plusieurs passagers les out suivis, et entre autres une Dle Noonan, qu'il a descendue dans ses bras parce qu'elle ne voulait pas sauter

I1 ajoute, elle aussi aurait pu traverser 'autre char, mais elle trouvait le voyage trop long.

Il est anssi prouv6 quo la plate-forme est trop petite, qu'il y a beaucoup de voyageurs i cette station et que la compagnie a un terrain qui lui permet do 1'agrandir facilement.

Elle est coupable de n6gligence en ne faisant pas cette amblioration si n6cessaire.

Les observations suivantes'de Sir Alexandre Lacoste an sujet du soin que doit apporter le voiturier pour prot6ger ses passagers sont parfaitement correctes. Le voiturier est tenu d'user de la plus grande vigilance pour protiger ses passagers, contre les pirils du voyage, tandis qu'il ne peut exiger d'eux que la prudence ordinaire.

Si, par sa nigligence, il soumet un voyageur h quelqu'inconv6nient, il doit s'attendre que celui-ci prendra les moyens que sa discr6tion lui suggirera pour se tirer d'embarras, et pour cela il encourra mi6me un certain risque s'il le faut, et le voiturier sera responsable de Paccident qui surviendra, a moins qu'il ne pronve que le voyageur a agi avoc une imprudence inexcusable.

Toute compagnie de chemin de fer est tenue de procurer h sea voyageurs un d6barcaddre convenable.

S'il n'y a pas de quai, elle doit pourvoir & un autre moyen facile de descente et indiquer aux voyageurs il devront dibarquer, si chars d4passent le quai. D'apris le droit frangais, la responsabilit4 de la compagnie ne parait pas douteuse, car l'imrudence mime du voyageur n'excuse pas les torts du conducteur.

Dalloz, Vo. Responsabilitb no

Par tons ces motifs, et pour les raisons donnbes par Sir Alexandre Lacoste, C.J., je suis d'avis que le jugement doit Atre confirme.

TASCHEREAU J.-I would allow the appeal.

GWYNNE, J.-The case is, in my opinion, free from all doubt. I cannot see anything whieh can be pronounced to be negligence of the company.

The accident is attributable wholly to the plaintiff's own default in alighting as he did. Every man travelling by rail, in this country, must have known that it was not the way he should have alighted or by which there was any necessity for his so alighting or was ever intended that he should alight.

SEDGEWICK, J., was also of opinion to allow the appeal.

F lorris.