Farwell v. The Queen

the judgment of the Privy Council in the " Precious Metals Case." (2)

That the said court had no jurisdiction to entertain an action, the gist of which is the direct impeachment of a provincial crown grant.

That if the whole matter of the appellant's title by conveyance from Prevost was resjudicata, and the court had jurisdiction, then the respondent was barred from bringing this action by reason of the former recovery.

Hogg Q.C. for the rsspondent, on the question of jurisdiction, cited and relied on 50 & 51 Vic. ch. sec. 17, ss. (d) ; British North America Act, sec. 101. As to resjudicata the decision of this court in the former action of Farwell v. The Queen concludes the TE appellants (1) ; also see hitty on Prerogatives (2); Dynes v. Bales (3) ; Harkin v. Rabidon (4) ; Truesdell v. Cook (5) ; Shaw v. Ledyard (6) ; Keefer v. Mackay (7) ; Manning's Exchequer Pr. (8),; Cons. Acts of B.C., 1888, ch. 67, secs. 13, 18, 20, 31, 54, 74 and 89; Story's Equity Jurisprudence (9); Ont. Industrial Loan and Investment Company v. Lindsay (10) ; Charlton v. Watson (11) ; Re Bobier 4- Ont. Investment Association (12) ; Ftower v. Martin (13); See also argument for plaintiff in 3 Ex. C. R. p. 279 et seq.

THE am of opinion that this appeal should be dismissed for the reasons given in the judgment of Mr. Justice King.

J.-I have also come to the same conclusion.

J.-I have doubts on the question of jurisdiction of the Exchequer Court on this information. On the merits, I concur in the dismissal of the appeal upon the grounds set forth in the judgment of the Exchequer Court.

GWYNNE J.-I am also of opinion that this appeal should be dismissed.

KING J.-By the judgment of the Exchequer Court the appellant (the defendant below) was ordered to execute to the Queen, in right of Canada, a surrender or conveyance of the unsold portions of certain lands in British Columbia.

These lands are within what is known as the railway belt, a tract of land transferred to the Dominion by King J. Act of British Columbia, 47 Vic. ch. 14 (1883).

It was so held by the Supreme Court of Canada, (1) and the defendant was put out of possession on 6th January, 1892.

Prior to the filing of information of the intrusion, i.e., in March, 1885, Farwell began to take steps to secure for himself a certificate of indefeasible title under the ' Land Registry Act " of British Columbia, and upon the lapse of the statutable period of seven years, sought to peifect his title under the land laws of the province by applying to the registrar of titles for certificate of indefeasible title. The effect of this, if granted, would be to prevent any purchaser from the crown in right of Canada from obtaining registry his title, and to put a blot upon the title of the crown;

As to the first point : Where the parties (themselves or privies) are the same, and the cause of action is the same, the estoppel extends to all matters which were, or might properly have been, brought into litigation.

Where the parties (themselves or privies) are the same, but the cause of action is different, the estoppel is as to matters which, having been brought in issue, the finding upon them was material to the former decision. Here the rights of the province and the Dominion were before the court, not as a matter collateral or incidentally cognizable, but as material, upon the pleadings, in the determination of whether there had been an intrusion or not.

Mr. Justice Burbidge has, however, explained these passages satis- J. factorily.

Perhaps a reference to other passages in confirmation may not be superfluous.

In the St. Catherines Milling Co. v. The Queen the same learned Lord who delivered the opinion of the judicial committee in the " precious metal case," speaking of the efect of the Imperial Civil List Act of 1840, in relation to the crown lands in Canada, says:- And then, speaking of the distribution of property under the British North America Act:- Then in the case under consideration, the " precious metal case," (2) the same principles are stated in their application to the territorial rights of the crown on the one hand, and to the prerogative rights of the crown in connection with such lands on the other. In the one case, as in the other, the title is in the Sovereign; but whilst, prior to the act of 1883, the entire beneficial interest, both as to the territorial and the prerogative rights of the crown, was in the province, and subject to the control of the government and legislature of the THE province, the effect of that act was to sever the beneficial interests, and to assign or appropriate the bene- King J.

ficial interest in the crown's territorial rights to the - Dominion, retaining to the province the beneficial interest in the jura regalia or prerogative rights of the crown in connection with such lands.

Thus, at page 302, it is said:- In British Columbia the right to public lands, and the right to precious metals in all provincial lands, whether public or private, still rest upon titles as distinct as if the crown had never parted with its beneficial interests; and the crown assigned these beneficial interests to the Government of the province, in order that they might be appropriated to the same state purposes to which they would have been applicable if they had remained in the possession of the crown. Although the Provincial Government has now the disposal of all revenues derived from prerogative rights connected with land or minerals in British Columbia, those revenues differ in legal quality from the ordinary territorial revenues of the Crown. It therefore appears to their Lordships that a conveyance by the province of 'public lands,' which is, in substance, an assignment of its right to appropriate the territorial revenues arising from such lands, does not imply any transfer of its interest in revenues arising from the prerogative rights of the Crown.

Again at page 305:- The expression 'lands in the 11th article of Union admittedly carries with it the baser metals, i.e. 'mines' and 'minerals' in the sense of section 109 of the British North America Act. Mines and minerals, in that sense, are incidents of land. But jura regalia are not accessories of land ; and their Lordships are of opinion that the rights to which the Dominion Government became entitled under the 11th article did not, to any extent, derogate from the provincial right to 'royalties' connected with mines and minerals under section 109 of the British North America Act.

It is thus abundantly (and perhaps unnecessarily) shown that the beneficial interest in the crown's territorial rights, as distinguished from thejura regalia, are appropriated to and held by the Dominion as fully and effectuallyi-and by the same tenure, as the same had been previously appropriated to and held by the province. The title is in the Sovereign in right of the Dominion, in the same sense (as to territorial rights) as it was in the Sovereign in the right of British Columbia J. before the act of 1883.

Mr. Justice Burbidge has effectually disposed of the suggestion that, upon a sale of the lands by the Dominion, the grant is to be passed under the great seal of British Columbia on application of the Dominion.

The rights of the crown, territorial or prerogative, are to be passed under the great seal of the Dominion or province (as the case may be) in which is vested the beneficial interest therein, otherwise they cannot be said to be enjoyed by it, or under its control.

It is further contended that the Exchequer Court has no jurisdiction to entertain an action to impeach a provincial crown grant. But the effect of this action is to restrain an individual from making use of a provincial grant in a way to embarrass the Dominion in the exercise of territorial rights which a statute of. the province had previously vested in the Dominion. Having taken his provincial grant with knowledge of the Dominion's. rights, and having put a blot on the title of the Dominion in the registry of titles in British Columbia, he is required to remove the blot, and so give unrestrained effect to what the province had agreed to do.

It is then said that the crown should have sought this remedy in the action for intrusion. This is also dealt with effectually in the judgment appealed from, and, on principle, there is nothing requiring dissimilar rights to be enforced at the same time.

The remaining objection is that the Parliament of

Canada had no power to give to the Exchequer Court original jurisdiction " in all actions and suits of a civil nature at common law or equity in which the crown is plaintiff or petitioner."

It is contended that the V* power of Parliament, in the establishment of courts, is limited by the British North America Act to the establishing of a court of appeal or other courts for the better administration of the laws of Canada. But "the King has the undoubted privilege of suing in any court he pleases."

Ohitty on Prerogatives. (1) And where the matter in suit in another court concerns the revenue, or touches the profit of the King, he has the right to remove the suit into the Exchequer. See the illustrations given of this in Cawthorne v. Campbell (2).

This privilege is said to be " without the least mixture of prerogative process; or whether it is a proper subject for prerogative process only to act upon or not, that is not an ingredient." It follows, in my mind, that the crown, by and with the advice and consent of the Houses of Parliament, must have the right (a right which it would need clear words to take away) to enact that all actions and suits of a civil nature at common law or equity, in which the crown in right of the Dominion is plaintiff or petitioner, may be brought in the Exchequer Courtthe right to establish which with its other branches of jurisdiction is undisputed and indisputable.

Agreeing with the judgment 'of Mr. Justice Burbidge I think the appeal should be dismissed.

Appeal dismissed with costs.