Canadian Pacific Railway Co. v. Chalifoux

the judgment of the Superior Court by which the appellants were condemned to pay four hundred dollars damages for injuries resulting to the respondent caused by the derailment of a train on the appellants' railway through the breaking of a rail.

In January 1884 the respondent was a passenger on a regular passenger train of the Canadian Pacific Railway running between Ottawa and Montreal, and when the train was approaching Calumet Station the train through the breaking of a rail was wrecked and the respondent was seriously injured.

The action was for damages in consequence of the injuries received by the respondent through the appellants' fault and negligence. The appellants pleaded that the accident was caused by the breaking of a rail, which formed part of a consignment of steel rails of the best procurable description, purchased from competent manufacturers by the Government of the Province Quebec which was, at the time of the purchase, the proprietor of the line of railway ; that the rails were made specially for the purposes for which they were required, in accordance with specifications made by a skilled engineer then in the employ of the Government who was specially entrusted with the preparing of the specifications ; that all due skill and care were used by the agents of the Government in the selection, inspection and testing of the whole of the consignment of rails ; that at the time of the accident the roadway and rails were in good order and condition; that in accordance with the practice of railway companies generally the same had always been kept under regular and careful supervision, and proper and careful examination had been made of the roadway and rails immediately previous to the accident ; that the rail in question appeared to be strong enough for the purpose for which it was required, and that its breaking was unavoidable, and was due to no defect either in the manufacture, purchase, or use of the rails; and that the accident in question was not caused by any wantlof care or diligence on the part of the appellants.

At the trial it was proved that on the days preceding the accident the weather had been very cold but that the day on which the accident happened there had been a sudden change of temperature and it was much warmer;

that the insufficiency of the rail was not manifested by any exterior sign, and that it presented all the appearances of good manufacture having formed part of a consignment of rails ordered by the Quebec Government Railways and had been accepted and used by the

Company after the ordinary tests and it was also proved that the portion of the road in question had been inspected carefully previous to the accident; and that in fact Muldoon, the section-foreman had passed over the very spot where the accident occurred twenty minutes before, and found the rails and roadbed in perfect order.

The broken rail, although examined by two or three employees of the company immediately after the accident, was not produced at the trial.

The principal question which arises on this appeal is whether or not a railway company is responsible for damages caused to a passenger through the breaking a rail without fault on its part, and this. question depends upon the interpretation to be placed upon articles 1053 and 1675 of the Civil Code.

We contend that the appellants, as carriers of passengers, are only liable for damages caused by their fault or neglect, while the respondent,whose contention was maintained by the judgment of the courts below, contends that they are absolutely liable, at all events under the latter article, unless they prove that the damage was caused by a fortuitous event or irresistible force.

In other words, that railway companies are responsible as carriers of passengers in the same degree that they are responsible as carriers of goods.

The evidence conclusively shows that the accident has been the result of a sudden change in the temperature and that there has been no fault or negligence shown against the appellants.

We submit therefore on behalf of the appellants that not only is there no fault or negligence shown against them but, on the contrary, it is affirmatively proved that there was none and that in fact every possible care and skill was used in the manufacture, selection, testing and laying of these rails, and all possible care and diligence in their inspection. That under such circumstances the company was not liable see the following authorities: B6darride des chemins de fer (1); Sourdat, De la Responsabilit6 (2); Readhead v. Midland Railway Co. (3); Wrig.rht v. Midland Railway Co. (4); Stokes v. Eastern Counties Railway Co. (5); Christie v. Griggs (6); Taylor on Evidence (7); Quarez chemin du Nord ; Huston v. Grand Trunk Railway ; Dalloz (10).

I admit the law of England is contrary to the decision of the courts below but this case must be decided by the civil law of the province of Quebec. §

Under our civil law carriers of passengers are virtually insurers of life except if the accident is caused by fortuitous event or irresistible force as provided in art. 1675 C. C. All the French cases decided and the opinion French warrant the I for, that the liability is the same whether for carriage The following cases and authorities were cited and relied on: Chemin fer du midi v. Chambrelent (1) ; Yeuve Raymond v. Burnet ; Demolombe ; Grand Trunk Railway Co. v. Meegan (4).

The case in Dalloz 82-2-163 cited by appelants is not applicable ; the author in a note says the law on this point in France is regulated by another law.

But even if the liability should depend upon the question of fact whether there has or has not been negligence on the part of the company, I contend that the prim( facie evidence of negligence by the fact of the accident having occurred has not been satisfactorily rebutted. In this case the rail was not produced at the trial and it was impossible to ascertain whether it hador had not any defect which ordinary skill, care or foresight could have detected.

Under art. 1053

C. C. the respondent is entitled to succeed.

Sir W. J. .J.-In this case it seems to me that the utmost care and skill were exercised which prudent men are accustomed to use under similar circumstances. The road was examined by a proper person from time to time and within twenty minutes of the time of the accident, and found to be in good order, and more than this I do not think the. law exacts from carriers of passengers for hire. I think this was a pure accident against which the railway could not have provided and a risk incident to the mode of travel which passengers take.

In Readhead v. Midland Railway Co. (1) it was distinctly decided that the defendants were not liable for an accident owing to a latent defect in the tire not attributable to any fault on the part of the manufacturer and which could not be detected previously to the breaking, and that there was no contract either of general warranty or insurance (such as in the case of a common carrier of goods) or of limited warranty or insurance (as to the vehicle being sufficient) entered into by the carriers of passengers, and that the contract of such a carrier, and the obligation undertaken by him, are to take due care (including in that term the use of skill and foresight) to carry passengers safely. I do not at all wish to be understood as impugning the position that in every contract for the conveyance of passengers by rail there is an implied undertaking for the safe condition of the road as well as the vehicle, so far as the carrier can insure it by the utmost care and diligence.

The servants of the company must examine it and make sure that the rails are in good order and properly secured. But no recovery is allowed for damage done by a defective rail or rotten bridge where negligence is not proved.

In McPadden v. New York Central Railway Co. reversing the decision of the general term of the Supreme Court, (3) Earl C. said:

Lott Ch. C.

It was shown by undisputed evidence, of witnesses competent to

THE judge, that the rail in question was, previous to its being broken, a sound rail of the usual and a good size and of good, sound and solid

PAcI'lc iron, and that the breaks were new and perfectly, bright, and no fracture or crack was discovered in the pieces that were broken off, that the end of the rail made a good joint, was perfect, not battered down, and in good order, that the chair was good, that the ties were good, Ritchie C.J. sufficiently thick to support the rail, that there was a sufficient number of them, that they were sufficiently close together to give a good bearing for the rail, that the road was well ballasted with gravel around the ties.

This accident occurred early on the morning of the 5th day of

January, 1864, about half a mile west of Brockport, and it was shown that the morning was very cold, that good and perfectly sound rails will break in cold weather when the track is in perfect order, and it was testified, by several witnesses having experience as engineers on railroads, that they knew of no way of preventing it.

The night watchman on that section of the road testified, that he had, on the morning of the accident, left the depot at the Brockport station and went west about three o'clock, that a train followed him west about four o'clock, that he went three miles west and came back over the place of the accident a little before six o'clock ; that he went over the track, carrying a lamp with him, to see if everything was clear and to see if any rails were broken or misplaced; that he walked in the middle of the track, looking at both tracks, examined the rails and found the track all right.

Leonard C.:- There was no defect in the iron of the track in the case under consideration.

There was no dispute on this point.

The iron was good, and no crack or flaw appeared.

The break was caused by the exceeding cold weather. This was the result of a vis major, against which no prudence could have guarded.

In the present case no defect existed, or if it did exist for a few minutes no human diligence or foresight could have discovered or prevented it. An impossibility is not demanded by the law.

* * *

The carrier is not liable for an injury to a passenger by the action of the elements, where no care or foresight, skill or science, could have guarded against the accident which occasioned it.

Chief Justice Lawrence delivered the opinion of the court as follows:

PACIFIC

The instruction, in its strict sense, is open to this objection, the true rule being, as said by this court Tuller v. Talbott (2), that the carrier shall do all that human care, vigilance and foresight can reasonably do, consistently with the mode of conveyance and the practical opera- Ritchie C.J. tion of the road. A company cannot be required, for the sake of making travel upon their road absolutely free from peril, to incur a degree of expense which would render the operation of the road impracticable.

It would be unreasonable, for example, to hold that a road bed should be laid with ties of iron or cut stone, because in that way the danger arising from wooden ties subject to decay would be avoided, but on the other hand, it is by no means unreasonable to hold that although a railway company may use ties of wood, such ties shall be absolutely sound and road-worthy.

Heazle v. Indianapolis, 4c., Railway Co. (3).

Mr. Justice Scott, delivering the opinion of the court, said :

On the night of the 20th February, 1872, the passengers cars on defendant's road were thrown from the track, at a point a short distance from east of Mahomet station, by which plaintiff was severely injured. The accident was caused by a broken rail.

The proof is: the track was in good repair.

No negligence in this regard is shown.

On the contrary, it is proven the trazk inspector or walker had just been over the road.

It was found to be all in order and the track safe, so far as anything could be discovered,

Although plaintiff has suffered very great injury we see no ground on which to base a recovery. It was through no fault of defendant, or its agents or servants.

They omitted no duty imposed upon them by law, or by a due regard for the safety of passengers. Everything connected with the train was in good order, and it was managed by skilful and prudent operatives.

The track had been constructed with skill and care, and, in the opinion of a competent engineer, the road was as safe as it could reasonably be constructed. It was patrolled, at frequent intervals, by a careful inspector, and found to be in order, with no defects discoverable.

The injury to plaintiff must, therefore, be attributed, if not to his own want of care for his personal safety, to one of those accidents that sometimes occur in extremely cold weather, (1) 56 Ill. 142.

which no engineering, however skilful, and no management, however observant, could foresee or guard against.

T THE Ingalls v. Bills others (1).

Hubbard J. says:

RAILWAY The result to which we have arrived, from the examination of the case before us, is this ; that carriers of passengers for hire are bound to use the utmost care and diligence in the providing of safe, sufficient Ritchie C.J. and suitable coaches, harnesses, horses and coachman, in order to prevent those injuries which human care and foresight can guard against; and that if an accident happens from a defect in the coach, which might have been discovered and remedied upon the most careful and thorough examination of the coach, such accident must be ascribed to negligence, for which the owner is liable in case of injury to a passenger happening by reason of such accident.

On the other hand, where the accident arises from a hidden and internal defect, which a careful and thorough examination would not disclose, and which could not be guarded against by the exercise of a sound judgment and the most vigilant oversight, then the proprietor is not liable for the injury, but the misfortune must be borne by the sufferer, as one of that class of injuries for which the law can afford no redress in the form of a pecuniary recompense.

Negligence is the ground of liability on the part of a carrier of passengers. In the breaking of this rail by the action of frost or a changing temperature I can discover no want of the utmost care and attention by the exercise of which the accident could have been avoided.

The court of first instance found " that this breaking of the rail appeared to have been caused by the sudden change of the temperature, the days preceding the accident being very cold, and the day of the accident being more soft (doux)" and the evidence amply supports that finding. To hold, as the court below did, that the defendants could and ought to foresee this change of temperature and were bound to procure rails sufficient to resist the action of the climate, is to require the defendants to do what it is clear is practically impossible.

No doubt if an accident happens to a passenger in a carriage on a line of railway either by the carriage breaking down or running off the rails, that is primd facte evidence from which the jury may infer negligence on the part of the railway company and must be rebutted by evidence on the part of the defendants. On this point see Pollock C. B. in the case of Dawson v. Manchester, Railway

To exact all that plaintiffs counsel claims should have been done in this case would simply make railway transportation impracticable. Assuming the rule does require that the highest degree of practical care and diligence consistent with the mode of transportation should be used, was it not shown in this case that such was adopted? For as said by J. Cockburn in Pyn v. Great Northern Railway " Railway Companies are not insurers of the passenger's lives. They are only bound to use care and caution which may be reasonably expected by reasonable men." In conclusion, on the facts and the law of this case, I will merely add: Was not the accident occasioned not by a latent defect in the railway, that no care skill on the part of the defendants could detect, but by reason of atmospheric changes which could not be foreseen, and against which no care or skill on the part of the railway could provide ? The carrier of passengers is not an insurer and there was no contract of general warranty or insurance as in the case of a common carrier of goods.

For these reasons I am of opinion the appeal should be allowed.

J.-I am of the same opinion.

It is clear that there was no proof of negligence. The judgment of the court below proceeded upon the ground that the responsibility of railway companies as carriers of passengers is, under the law of the Province of Quebec, co-extensive with their liability as carriers of ' goods, which, subject to certain well-known exceptions, makes them liable as insurers of property entrusted to them for carriage. In other words, the Court of Queen's Bench applies to the carriage of passengers the liability of common carriers of goods under article Strong J. 1675 C. C.

I do not think that article applies to passengers at all; it is confined to the carriage of goods.

The liability of carriers of passengers for hire depends entirely, in my opinion, on article 1053 C. and therefore proof of negligence is required as in the

English law. This appears to be the modern French law also.

The arrit reported in Dalloz in 83,

164, shews that the article of the French Code 1784, corresponding to article 1675 C. C., Quebec, does not apply to carriers of passengers, but that the responsibility of a railway company in such cases depends upon the general law embodied in article 1382 C. N., corresponding to article 1053.C. C. of the Province of

Quebec.

The law of England is now the same, though' it does not seem to have been finally so settled until the decision of ReadIead v.

The Midland Railway Company. (1) That case was carried to appeal, and the decision of the Exchequer Chamber distinctly settled the law as it now stands, viz: that, as carriers of passengers, railway companies are only responsible for negligence or breach of duty. The only authority which throws the least shadow of doubt upon the point is the decision of the Privy Council in an appeal from Upper Canada. Some of the language there used seems to imply that there is liability apart from negligence, and that a railway company is to some extent to be considered a guarantor to pas- Q.

sengers carried by it of the safety of its roadway, rolling stock and appliances used in their transportation. But the language of the judgment does not clearly show that it was intended so to decide, and the decision can be supported on other grounds and is probably to be referred to the rule of evidence relating J. to the onus probandi; but be this as it may, the later authorities are clear that there can be no doubt now that the case of Readhead v. The Midland Railway Company (1) contains a correct exposition of the law, and it has been followed without question. In a case in the New York Court of Appeals, 1cPadden v. The New York Central (2) the facts of which resembled those of the present case, the court held the law to be precisely the same as in England. The case of Meier v. The Pennsylvania Railroad Company, where the decision was to the same effect, may also be mentioned- There being no evidence to show, or from which it could be inferred, that the accident in this case was the result of any want of care upon the part of the defendant company I am of opinion that we must reverse the decision of the Court of Queen's Bench and allow the appeal.

FOURNIER, J.-L'appelante all~gue qu'elle a agi avec toute la diligence et le soin possibles, et que 1'accident dont a souffert l'intim6 n'est arriv6 que par suite de la rupture d'un rail, caus6 par un vice cach6.

L'honorable juge Mathieu, dont le jugement a t6 confirm6 en appel, s'est appuy6, pour la d6cision de cette cause, sur le principe incontestable du droit francais qui, en cela, est conforme au n6tre, queles compagnies de chemins de fer sont responsables des vices de leur matriel, qu'elles le connaissent ou non.

Apris avoir plaid6 que l'accident 6tait di & un vice cach6 qui avait caus6 la rupture du rail, 1'appelante a (1) Q.

(2) N.

essay6 de changer sa position en faisant motion (art. 320 C. P. pour faire coYncider sa defense avec les faits prouv6s, en retranchant son admission que l'accident 6tait A un vice cach6, et en invoquant comme excuse le changement subit de temp6rature et son effet sur les rails.

Quelle que soit la cause de la rupture du rail, la compagnie appelante est responsable de la suffisance de son mat6riel, A moins qu'elle ne prouve que l'accident est arriv6 par cas fortuit ou force majeure.

L'article du code qui ragle la responsabilit6 des voituriers, n'est pas Particle 1053, mais bien 'article 1675.

Le premier est d'une application g6ndrale & quiconque cause du dommage par sa faute, soit par son fait, soit par imprudence, n6gligence ou autrement.

Le second ne s'applique qu'aux voituriers qui ne sont exempts de responsabilite que par le cas fortuit et la force majeure.

Nul do.ute que dans les qui s'616vent au sujet de

Particle 1053, c'est , la partie qui se plaint A prouver la faute on n6gligence on inhabilit6 de celui qui a caus6 le dommage.

en est autrement pour les voituriers, et c'est Particle 1675 dont la Cour du Banc de la Reine a fait application dans le cas actuel.

Cet article se lit comme suit:

A L'appelante a pr6tendu que cet article ne s'appliquepas aux passagers, et que son effet doit 6tre restreint an transport des marchandises.

Mais cette pr6tention est insoutenable en pr6sence de 1'article 1673, d6clarant que

L'article 1676, concernant les avis des voituriers, '-~ limitant leur responsabilit6, fait aussi voir que toute la section III sur les voituriers s'applique aussi bien aux personnes qu'aux marchandises.

La responsabilit6 des voituriers est donc d6finie par cette section, et la preuve de n6gligence pour les rendre responsables n'est pas n6cessaire:

Le f6vrier 1865, un train partant de Paris pour la Belgique a 6prouv6 un grave accident.

Le bandage d'une roue s'6tant rompu, puis les chaines qui reliaient aux autres wagons le wagon train6 sur la voie se sont brisbes an bout d'un certain temps, amenant la dislocation du train en deux parties et un dbraillenent qui ont fait appeler la compagnie du Nord devant le tribunal de la Seine, Cotelle, L6gislation des chemins de fer. (1)

Quatre voyageurs blesses ont form6 des demandes en dommages et int~rts. Quatre jugements i'endus con tre eux et la compagnie out t r6form6s sur leur appel par la Cour Imp6riale de Paris.

En premibre instance il avait td jug6 que l'accident n'6tait pas le r~sultat d'une faute quelconque dont la compagnie du chemin de fer du Nord devait 6tre tenue responsable.

Deux faits ont t6 discut6s: la rupture du bandage d'une roue, et l'absence d'une corde de communic4tion qui doit r6unir la voiture de queue avec le siffliet de la machine.

Le principe d'oi partait le tribunal consistait A admettre que les demandeurs avaient a 6tablir une faute de la compagnie pour la rendre responsable. Il y avait une d~fectuosit6 dans la fabrication du fer de ce bandage; mais il 6tait certain que cette d6fectuosit6 n'6tait pas visible ext6rieurement, ce qui excluait le reproche possible d'un d6faut d'attention et de pr6caution lors de la ruption et dans l'emploi de ce

T ~ mat6riel.

I ne fut attach6 aucune importance A l'absence de la corde de communication.

. En r6sultat, 1'accident ne pouvait Atre consid6r6 comme un cas de force majeure, dont la compagnie Fournier J. n'etait pas responsable.

Sur 1'appel, la cour a completement chang6 le point de d6part de l'application des faits de la cause.

En principe, suivant elle, le voiturier r6pond de

1'avarie des choses A lui confies, A moins qu'elles ne prouvent qu'elles ne sont arrivbes par cas fortuit on force majeure.

Ce principe, dit la cour, s'applique d plus forte raison au transport de personnes et protege sicurit6 des voyageurs. Mais c'est A la compagnie qu'incombe 1'obligation de prouver les faits qui la d6chargerait de sa responsabilit6.

Maintenant, le d6raillement du 18 f6vrier a t6 caus6 par la rupture du bandage d'une roue; et cette rupture a t occasionn6e par une d6fectuosit6 dans la fabrication du fer de ce bandage. Or, il r6sulte des documents produits par la compagnie que les spires dont ce bandage etait form6 n'avait pas int6rieurement toute l'adh6rence necessaire, que leur soudure n'6tait qn'A la surface et masquait le vice int6rieur de la pi~ce; l'accident a donc eu pour cause un vice du materiel dont le voiturier devenait responsable.

En effet, bien que cette d6fectuosit6 ne fut manifest~e par aucun signe extbrieur, bien que le bandage, pr6sentant toutes les apparences d'une bonne fabrication, eeit t recu A la suite des

6preuves d'usage; les circonstances ne constituent ni cas fortuit, ni cas de force majeure: c'est un simple vice du mat~riel A la charge du voiturier. L'absence du cordeau reliant la derniere voiture A la machine fut consid6r6e comme une importante infraction au r~glement. Il a en consequence t jug6 que la compagnie 6tait responsable envers les appelants, non seulement de la confection vicieuse de son appareil, mais, en outre, d'une faute r6sultant de l'inobservation du r6glement. Co7r'st

Voici les motifs qu'invoquait la cour de Paris dans son arr~t du 27 novembre 1866 :

Tous les consid6rants de ce jugement sont cit6s au long dans le rapport de cette cause an 146me volume de la Revue l6gale, dans les notes, p. 151.

Ainsi qu'on le voit, le principe de la responsabilit6 des voituriers, d'apris 'article du code Napol6on, no 1784, correspondant A 1'article 1675 de notre code, rend les voituriers responsables de l'avarie on de la perte des objets qu'ils transportent, A moins qu'ils ne prouvent le cas fortuit on la force majeure; ce principe s'applique au transport des marchandises tout aussi bien qu'aux personnes, si le transport des voyageurs fait partie de leur trafic accoutumb, comme dit l'article L'appelante fait 6videmment ce trafic et le principe doit s'appliquer A elle pour le transport des personnes.

L'appelante, comme on l'a vu plus hant, a essay6 de modifier son admission au sujet du vice cach6 du rail et cherch6 a prouver que le rail qui avait caus6 l'accident s'6tait rompu & raison du changement de temp6rature.

Feu l'honorable Sir A. A. Dorion, juge en chef, fait an sujet de cette preuve les observations suivantes: Les tdmoins de la compagnie disent qua'il avait fait trbs froid quelques jours avant Paccident, mais que le jour de Paccident la tempira- ture 6tait plus douce, et ils attribuent A ce changement la rupture du rail.

Si c'est l la cause de Paccident, il est 6vident que le rail avait

PACIFIC dd 6tre cass6 depuis plusieurs jouts, puisque le fer se casse en se refroi- RAILWAY dissant et non en s'chauffant, et la compagnie a commis une n6gli- C P gence en ne remplagant pas de suite rail.

Si n'est pas la geleCHALIFOUX. qui a fait casser rail, c'est qu'il 6tait d6fectueux, et la compagnie Fournier J. 6tait 6galement en faute.

L'honorable juge en chef a consid6r6 cette preuve comme insuffisante pour 6tablir qu'il y avait en force majeure.

Car si c'est le froid qui a caus6 l'accident, il est 6vident, d'apris lui, que le rail avait dd ftre cass6 depuis quelques jours, et que la compagnie avait commis une n6gligence en ne remplagant pas ce rail.

Gette negligence la rend responsable.

Au sujet de la force majeure,- La loi, dit Laurent, (1) ne ddfinit pas la force majeure, ni le cas fortuit.

De l les difficultds dans Papplication du principe.

La jurisprudence s'en tient A la d~finition des lois Romaines : un

6v6nement que Pon ne peat privoir et auquel on ne saurait r6sister, quand mme il serait pr6vu. Il nous semble que mieux vaut s'en rapporter S la prudence du juge. L'article 1147 lui donne une rgle, c'est que le d6biteur n'est d6charg6 de la responsabilit6 qui luiincombe que s'il justifie que 1'inexicution de lobligation provient d'une cause

6trangtre qui ne peut lui 6tre imputie. Tout dpend done du point de savoir l'v6nement alligu par le ddbiteur a on n'a pas eu pour effet de d6truire l'imputabilit6, qui est une question de fait.

La jurisprudence se montre trbs svire daus Pappr6ciation des faits.

La preuve ne constate pas qu'il ait fait un froid excessif la veille ni dans la unit pr6c6dente.

Le jour de l'accident le temps s'6tait consid&rablement adouci.

L'inspecteur de section Muldoon pr6tend avoir inspect6 les rails vingt minutes avant l'accident et ils 6taient en bon ordre.

Bien que le temps 6tait doux alors, ce n'est done pas le froid qui a caus6 l'accident, mais plut6t la qualit6 cassante du fer de cette esp~ce de rails.

Muldoon dit que les rails E. V. sont plus cassants que

(1) T. no 264, 325.

les autres espices.

La compagnie serait alors responsable de la d6fectuosit6 de son matriel.

Il n'y a pas eu une preuve compl6te de l'inspection des rails, et cedx qui oat donn6 lieu & l'accident en cr question n'ont jamais 6t0 produits.

6tait du plus simple deVoir de la compagnie d'appeler la partie int6ress~e un examen contradictoire de ces rails. Au lieu de cela, elle a pr~fr6, dans son int6rt, sans doute, d'en faire faire un examen ex parte par ses employis, dont elle a tir6 un t6moignage qui, toutefois, ne la justifie pas de l'inex&cution de son obligation.

La preuve n'a nullement 6tabli le cas de force majeure.

L'accident, au contraire, est dfi & 1'insuffisance du mat6riel de la compagnie et elle doit en porter la responsabilit6. Cette cause doit 6tre d~cid~e non d'apres le droit anglais, mais d'apris notre droit qui en diffbre sous ce rapport. Jo suis d'avis de confirmer le jugement de la Cour du Banc de la Reine.

GWYNNE, J.-I am of opinion that this appeal must be allowed.

The accident which has unfortunately caused so much damage to the plaintiff appears to have been due rather to the severity of our climate and the sudden and great variations in the degrees of temperature in winter than to any want of care upon the part -of the defendants.

The damage to the rail which caused the train to leave the track cannot upon the evidence be said to have been something which the defendants should have foreseen, and their not having foreseen and provided against it cannot be imputed to them as negligence; the evidence failed to shew any negligence in the defendants, and in the absence of negligence the action cannot be sustained.