Majority
Canada dismissing the suppliant's petition of right. The suppliant, Coombs, on March 31st, 1893, was in Moncton, N.B., where he saw posted up a notice by the Intercolonial railway authorities containing the following: "Excursion return tickets will be issued March 30th and 31st and April 1st, inclusive, at firstclass single fare. Tickets are not good going after April 1st."
Wishing to go to Chatham Junction he bought an excursion ticket which had printed on its face " good on date of issue only," and " no stop-over allowed."
He did not read what was on the ticket, and his attention was not called to it when he purchased.
He started from Moncton on March 31st, and when he got to Harcourt, about half way to Chatham Junction, he left the train and stayed there all night. On :-Sir resuming his journey next day his ticket was refused by the conductor, and refusing to pay his fare again he was ejected from the train, for which he claims damages from the crown. His petition of right was dismissed by the judgment of the Exchequer Court, from which he appeals.
Orde for the appellant. The advertisement of the issue of excursion tickets at a reduced rate is a feature in the contract made with every purchaser of a ticket, and its terms are binding on the crown. Parker v. JUSTICE.-I am not prepared to overrule cases of authority decided by the courts in Ontario which have stood unimpeached for many years, and are decisions of very able judges. In Craig v. The Great Western Railway Co. where the right of a traveller to stop over on an ordinary ticket was in question, Draper C.J. says:
Judgment of the Court
In Briggs v. Grand Trunk Railway Co. in which the same question came up on demurrer, the same learned Chief Justice says:
In the case of Cunningham v. The Grand Trunk Railway Co. the Superior Court of Lower Canada had in the first instance decided the other way, on the ground that although it was the custom of the railway company to insist on a continuous journey they had recognized the act of their conductors in allowing passengers to infringe this rule, but this judgment was unanimously reversed by the Court of Queen's Bench, thus bringing the law of Lower Canada into accord with the Ontario decisions.
So there is perfect unanimity of opinion as to the law on this question so far as the two old provinces of Canada are concerned, and (speaking for myself only) I would not presume to overrule the decisions referred to.
Moreover, on principle, apart from authority, when a person buys a ticket it is reasonable that it should only give him a right to a continuous journey, and in addition, in this case, the plaintiff had a plain warning on the ticket itself "good on date of issue only," in the face of which he should never have brought this action. The case is very different from that of Bate v. The Canadian Pacifir Railway Co. where there were very good reasons why the purchaser should not be bound by the conditions of the ticket she bought, inasmuch as being unable to read from defective eyesight, she asked the ticket issuer for an explana- TE ion of the undertaking she was required to sign, and was told by him that it had reference to a matter entirely different from the condition relied on by the company.
We therefore do not call upon counsel for the respondent. The judgment of the Exchequer Court was quite right, and the appeal should be dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed with costs. Solicitors for the appellant: McKeown, Barnhill & Chapman,
Solicitor for the respondent: J. Belyea.
Bench for Lower Canada (appeal side), affirming the judgment of the Superior Court by which a petition by the appellant for leave to intervene in a cause before the court was dismissed.
A case of Hamel v. Hamel was pending in the Superior Court, the action having been brought by one executor of an estate to have the other removed. Eugene Hamel was brought into the cause as mis-encause and being desirous of taking proceedings for the removal of both executors he presented a petition to the court asking to be allowed to intervene in the cause. The court dismissed his petition holding that being already in the cause as mis-en-cause he could not come in as intervenant, but must bring a separate action for the relief he wished to obtain. The judgment dismissing the petition was reversed by the Court. of Review but restored by the Court of Queen's Bench, and the petitioner having taken an appeal to this court a motion was made by respondent to have his appeal :-Sir Drouin Q.C. for the motion. There is no appeal in this case.
No amount is in controversy, and it is not a case which is appealable because future rights are involved. It is therefore exactly within the decision in O'Dell v. Gregory (1).
Moreover, the proceedings here were only interlocutory and there is no final judgment to appeal from. Belcourt contra. The appeal is from a final judgment in a judicial proceeding which gives the court 'jurisdiction. It is a special proceeding and not governed by the money limitation.
See Ross v. Ross ; Mitchell v. Mitchell
Judgment of the Court
J.- This is a motion to quash an appeal taken from the judgment rendered by the Court of Appeal of the province of Quebec.
The appellant filed a petition praying to be permitted to intervene in a case of Hamel v. Hamel, pending before the Superior Court at Quebec. It was allowed by Mr. Justice Andrews in the usual manner, but the moyens or grounds of intervention were never furnished as preliminary issues were raised by the plaintiff in the original suit. He attacked the petition for permission to intervene by several pleas alleging more particularly that Eugene Hamel, the petitioner, who was already in the case as mis-en-cause, had no right to intervene, and that his petition should be rejected.
To save costs the parties filed an admission of certain factsand the following reservation was made- The petitioner examined one witness, and the issue thus joined was argued before Mr. Justice Larue who dismissed the petition. The Court of Review reversed his judgment and allowed Eugene Hamel to intervene, and permitted " him to proceed to final judgment in J. the usual manner." The Court of Appeal reversed this judgment, and restored the judgment of the Superior Court.
All these judgments, it seems to me, are only of an interlocutory nature. The code of procedure of Quebec permits an appeal to the provincial courts from interlocutory judgment in certain cases, but the Supreme Court Act has not conferred the same jurisdiction upon this court. The policy of the Act is to prevent a multiplicity of appeals in the same instance and to limit our jurisdiction to final judgments only.
The judgment appealed from is merely on a petition to be permitted to intervene, and is clearly interlocutory, and it is the well settled jurisprudence of this court that there is no appeal in such a case.
The motion to quash is therefore granted with costs.
Appeal quashed with costs.