City of Quebec v. The North Shore Railway Co.

Vic. c. 87, s. 3 (D.); 48 & 49 Vic. c. 58, s. 3. (D.)-45 V. c. 20

By a deed made in August, 1882, the appellant ceded to the Government of Quebec, who subsequently conveyed to the respondent, an immovable described as part of lot no. 1937, in St. Peters Ward in the City of Quebec, situated between the streets St. Paul, St. Roch, Henderson and the river St. Charles, with the wharves and buildings thereon erected.

Of the lands which the respondents entered into possession by virtue of said deeds they remained in possession for twelve years without objection to the boundaries.

They then brought an action to have it declared that, by the proper construction of the deeds, an additional strip of land and certain wharves were included and intended to be transferred.

They contended that the description in the deed was ambiguous, and that Henderson street as a boundary should be construed as meaning Henderson street extended, and they sought to establish their case by the production of certain correspondence which had taken place between the parties prior to the execution of the deed of August, 1882. Held, reversing the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench for Lower Canada, the Chief Justice and King J. dissenting, that the words " Henderson Street " as used in the deed must be construed in their plain natural sense as meaning the street of that name actually existing on the ground; that the correspondence was not shown to contain all the negotiations or any finally concluded agreement, and could not be used to contradict or modify the deed which should be read as containing *PRESENT :-The Chief Justice, and Gwynne, Sedgewick, King and Gironard JJ.

Bench for Lower Canada (appeal side), reversing the judgment of the Superior Court for the District Quebec, which had dismissed the plaintiff's action with costs.

The property claimed by the respondent is not comprised in the deed of 21st August 1882, between the Quebec Government and the present appellant. We contend that the description means the lot bounded towards the west by St. Roch Street, towards the south by St. Paul Street, towards the east by Henderson Street, and towards the north by the river St. Charles.

According to the respondent's construction of the deed the river St. Charles would not be a boundary, and there would not be a boundary given to the lot on the north side.

The correspondence does not explain the deed, it merely shows that the parties were not agreed as to what the bargain should be; the deed alone must be looked at to discover the final arrangements, and the proper interpretation is found in the execution of their intentions by the delivery of the station grounds, Caron wharf, etc., to respondent, and the absence of any change of occupation of the property now in dispute. Each took possession of and continued to occupy their respective portions of the block no. 1937 for over 12 years prior to this suit. It is absurd to interpret the deed as actually including the " Palace Harbour," navigable waters, which the city could not convey in any event for private uses. The act 45 Vic. ch. 20 confers no power on the appellant to sell the property claimed. The legislature of Quebec had no right to grant such power. rights of the appellant over "Palace Harbour" are not rights of proprietorship, but of trust and administration for public purposes, therefore they cannot be compelled to transfer the property.

Should it be held that the property claimed by the respondent is comprised in the deed between the appellant and the government, still the respondent company has no right of action as it is in fact defunct and has ceased to have existence by the accomplishment of the purposes and object for which it was formed (Quebec Act 45 Vic. ch. 20), and all its the property and rights of every kind are now vested in the Canadian Pacific Railway Company by virtue of Dominion Acts 46 Vic. ch. 24, sec. 6 and ch. 54; Vic. ch. 8, sec. 3, 48 & 49 Vic. ch. 58, sec. 3; and 54 & 55 Vic. ch. 11; art. 368 C. C. and the dealings had between the respondent and the Canadian Pacific Railway Company. Langelier Q. C. for the respondent. The respondent company was not dissolved by the acts mentioned; the effect of the instruments referred to was merely to transfer the stock to persons interested in the Canadian Pacific Railway Company. The North Shore Railway Company has never become subject to any such conditions as would involve dissolution, but still holds title to the lands, notwithstanding the arrangements effected with the Canadian Pacific Railway Company, and is the only proper party to bring the present action.

The lands were subject to alienation notwithstanding the public trust involved; see R. Q. art. 5164, clauses 3-8.

The deed gives us, as the northern boundary, the main channel of the river St. Charles and all doubt as to the property intefided to be surrendered to the gov- ciry ernment of Quebec is removed by the clear intention of the parties shown by their correspondence immediately preceding and leading up to the execution of the deed.

We must regard the deed merely as giving effect to the bargain the parties had already made, through those negotiations.

The rules of construction require that we should have recourse to the correspondence to explain so much of the deed as is ambiguous. The correspondence leaves no doubt that the government intended to acquire, and the appellant to transfer, all the Palace Harbour property still owned by the appellant, that is to say, not already transferred either to the Gas Company or to the Government. There is nothing in the correspondence from which one may suspect that the appellant was desirous of reserving any of the property; and that is what the parties intended, unless the deed is clearly to the contrary. Now, not only does it not contain anything contrary but it scarcely admits of any other construction. By the deed, the Government is to have all that is owned by the appellant, down to the river St. Charles, between St. Roch and Henderson Streets. By the construction of the respondent, the Government would not have acquired the property as far as the river St. Charles between these two streets nor any of the wharves, not even such as are admitted to have passed by that title. The only construction in accord with the correspondence and the balance of the deed, would make the deed to read as follows: " All that belongs to the corporation between St. Paul Street to the south-east, the river St. Charles to the north-west, and Henderson Street continued to the river St. Charles to the north-east." With that description, the respondent is entitled to the two wharves claimed in this case.

As to the conduct of the parties and actual possession by each of respective parts of the Palace Harbour properties, it is against all rules of evidence to interpret a written instrument by the conduct of the parties; Taylor on Evidence, 9 ed. secs. 1204, 1205 and as a matter of fact, that reasoning would work against the appellant. The appellant allowed respondent to take possession of all the wharves in Palace Harbour, except the two of which we now ask possession, and never protested nor pretended to have reserved any interest or claim in them, thus showing by their conduct in delivering a part of the property north of Henderson street to us, that weywere entitled to all their lands and wharves in that quarter. THE CHIEF JUSTICE.-I am of opinion that there is no error in the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench which is the subject of this appeal. Upon the point principally insisted upon by the appellant, namely, that the description contained in the notarial deed of the 21st August, 1882, entered into between the Hon. Henry Starnes, the Provincial Commissioner of Railways, and the Mayor of Quebec, included the property sought to be recovered by the respondent in the present action, I am entirely of accord with the Court of Queen's Bench, and concur in the reasons given in the opinion of Mr. Justice Cimon. It is shown by the deposition of Mr. Baillairg4, the City Engineer of Quebec, that the properties in question form, and always formed, part of Palace Harbour (Havre du Palais), a lot or parcel of beach ground and premises which by that denomination the Crown had, by letters patent of the 22nd November, 1851, granted to the City of Quebec, and all of which, at the date of the notarial deed before mentioned, remained vested in the city, with the exception of so much as had been previously expropriated by the Provincial Government for the purposes of the railway, and the portion sold to the Gas Company.

The seventh clause clearly recognises that all the property thus remaining vested in the city was intended to be sold to the Government.

This appears conclusively from the words:

This so clearly demonstrates what was the intention of the parties that it cannot possibly be controlled by any subsequent ambiguity and inaccuracy in the definition of the boundaries contained in the second paragraph.

Without repeating the reasons of the Court of Queen's Bench and the argument in support of them, contained in the able opinion of Mr. Justice Cimon, I may say that I regard those reasons as unanswerable, and adopt them as the grounds of my judgment.

There is nothing in the point that the property in question has under certain contracts entered into between the North Shore Railway Company and the Grand Trunk Railway Company, between the Grand Trunk Railway Company and the Dominion, and between the Government and the Canadian Pacific Railway Company, become vested in the latter company. The first of these contracts, upon which any title in the Canadian Pacific under this pretended cession must depend, does not vest any property belonging to the respondent in the Grand Trunk Company, but merely embodies an agreement that the Grand Trunk shall have the control of the respondent's line of railway, and the direction of the traflic carried on upon it. The respondent was not a party to the subsequent agreements, and therefore is unaffected by those contracts. The legislature merely confirms the several contracts.

The objection that article 2098 of the Civil Code applies is destitute of foundation.

The words " without effect" in that article manifestly apply to the registration of subsequent deeds made by the party making the acquisition of property, and not to the cession to him or to the title acquired by him under it.

An unregistered deed is perfectly good and valid between the parties, and is only affected by non-registration when the vendor cedes the same property to a subsequent party who registers before the first purchaser has registered his deed.

It is contended in the appellani's factum that the respondents have become extinct as a corporation. There is no proof whatever of this.

The Letters Patent of the 22nd November, 1851, by which the Crown granted Palace Harbour to the City of Quebec, contained a clause prohibiting the alienation of the property granted by the city.

Assuming such clause of prohibition to be valid it would not, I think, apply to an alienation such as that contained in the notarial deed of the 21st August, 1882, inasmuch as that was virtually a reconveyance to the Crown itself. For these reasons I am of opinion the appeal must be dismissed.

1st. That the piece of land to recover possession which this action is brought is not comprised in the deed of the 21st August, 1882, between the Quebec Government and the appellant; and

2nd. That whatever right, title or interest in the said piece of land, if any, did pass by the said deed to the Quebec Government the same is vested in the Canadian Pacific Railway Company, and the plaintiffs have no right, title or interest therein, nor any claim whatsoever thereto.

The piece of land surrendered by the appellants to the Quebec Government by the deed of the 21st August, 1882, is therein very explicitly described as being that part of lot no. 1937 in the ward of St. Peter in the City of Quebec, which is situated between the streets, Paul, St. Roch, Henderson and the river St. Charles. A reference to a plan produced in evidence shw s that the piece so described is bounded on the west by St. Roch Street, on the south by St. Paul Street, on the east by Henderson Street, and the north by the river. The language is free from ambiguity that all that was surrendered was that part of the lot of land known as no. 1937 which was within the boundaries above named; the quays and buildings which were erected within those boundaries were also expressed in the deed to be surrendered. The sole question involved in the present appeal is as to the construction to be put upon the words " Henderson Street " as used in the deeds.

The northern limit of Henderson Street was, prior to and at the time of the passing of the deed of 1882, and still is in point of fact, the southern limit of a street or highway in the City of Quebec shown as "Orleans Place."

Of a portion of the lot 1937 immediately north of and abutting on the northern limit of Orleans Place a company called the Quebec Gas Company has been seized and possessed by title from the corporation since 1847.

In the year 1875 the corporation of the City of Quebec entered into an agreement with the Gas Company for the sale to them of another portion of the said lot 1937, lying north of and contiguous to the piece of which they were already seized.

On the 30th March, 1875, the said company paid the city the .

sum of $6,000.00, the purchase money agreed upon for the said piece of land. Many years prior to 1875 the City Corporation had constructed on the beach of the river St. Charles adjoining and along the western, J. northern and north-eastern limit of the said pieces of land a quay and breakwater extending into the river St. Charles in a north-westerly direction from the northern limit of the said pieces of land. No deed of sale of the piece of land agreed to be sold by the corporation to the company and for which the company paid.the purchase money in 1875 appears to have been executed until November, 1887.

By an act of the Legislature of the Province of Quebec passed on the 18th of May, 1887 (50 Vio. ch. 57, sec. 22) it was enacted as follows :- On the 26th November, 1887, the Mayor of the City by deed expressed to be made and executed by him under the authority of the said act did sell and assign unto the said Gas Company with guarantee against all troubles the said piece of the said lot no. 1937 so purchased and paid for by the company in 1875, described as being situate on said Orleans Place in the City of Quebec and measuring one hundred and fiftyeight feet and six inches on the south-easterly line, two hundred and sixteen feet and two inches on the north-easterly line, one hundred and seventy-three feet on the south-westerly line and thirty-six feet and five inches on the north-westerly line.

Now the piece of land for which this action is brought is the quay or wharf and embankment which the appellants had constructed on the beach of the river St. Charles extending from the northern limit of the said Orleans Place in a northerly direction along the westerly and northerly limit of the said pieces of land of which one had been so long in the possession of the Gas Company and the other sold to them in 1875 and extending from the northern limit thereof in a north-westerly direction into the river St. Charles. It is perfectly obvious and this is not disputed that " Henderson " Street as it was known to exist always prior to and at the time of the execution of the deed of August, 1882, did not at any point abut upon or bound the said quay or wharf and embankment or any part thereof.

It never extended further north than the southern limit of said Orleans Place. The words "Henderson " Street as used in the deed must be construed in their plain natural sense, as meaning the street of that name as actually existing on the ground, and so construed, the piece of land for which the action is brought is plainly not within the limits which are assigned in the deed as bounding the piece-of land thereby surrendered.

But the contention of the respondents is, and this contention appears to have been adopted by the Court of Appeal at Quebec, that the deed is to be read as if Henderson Street was extended northerly across Orleans Place and through the pieces of land sold to the Gas Company and beyond the northern limit thereof; so extended it would leave a strip of land purchased by the Gas Company lying between the western limit of Henderson Street so extended and that portion of the quay or wharf for which this action is brought lying west of and contiguous to the Gas Company's lands. Such an extension could not in point of fact by possibility be effected except by purchase of sufficient land from the Gas Company for the purpose, and no principle can be urged upon which the deed should be construed as assuming that to be done which could not be done at all without the assent of the Gas Company who were no parties to the deed. The only suggestion upon which this construction is based is that it is necessary for the purpose of giving effect to an intention which is said to be apparent in certain letters which passed between the Quebec Government and the Corporation containing negotiations for the purchase by the Government of the piece of land which they required to be surrendered by the corporation, but these letters contain no stipulation in terms that the piece of land for which this action is brought should be. included in the surrender, nor any finally concluded agreement, and we must read the deed as containing the matured conclusion at which the parties to the negotiation contained in the letters had finally arrived. It appears to me, I confess, inconceivable that the corporation after their sales to the Gas Company in 1847 and in 1875, and receipt of the purchase money for land which it is but natural to assume was enhanced in value by the quay wharf and embankment which are the subject of this action, when describing the piece of land surrendered as bounded on one side by Henderson Street could have contemplated that they should be understood as meaning not Henderson Street as it existed the ground but as extended indefinitely across Orleans Place and through the pieces of land sold to the Gas Company from the southern to and beyond the northern limit thereof. The manner in which the partie& to the surrender of 1882 have dealt with the property expressed to be surrendered is strong proof, as observed by the learned judge in the Superior Court, that the Corporation of Quebec did not intend to surrender nor Ta the Government to acquire the piece of land for which this action is brought.

For these reasons we cannot I think adopt the construction put upon the deed of surrender by the Court of Appeal at Quebec.

The appeal therefore must be allowed upon the first of the above grounds .J. as urged by the appellants. While it is therefore unnecessary to determine the second point I think it clear that whatever right, title or interest if any ever was acquired by the plaintiffs in or to the piece of land in question, has by force of the Acts of Parliament referred to in the case passed to and become vested in the Canadian Pacific Railway Company; but as already stated this point is immaterial as the piece of land in question did not pass by and is not included in the deed of surrender.

The appeal must be allowed with costs.

J.-I concur in the opinions expressed by my brothers Gwynne and Girouard.

I think that the appeal should be allowed with costs for the reasons stated in their written judgments.

J.-I dissent and, for the same reasons as the Chief Justice, I am of opinion that the appeal should be dismissed with.costs.

J.-L'appelante a soulev6 plusieurs questions par cet appel; mais la principale, et la plus importante, est celle de savoir si la propri6t6 revendiqu6e par l'intim6e est comprise dans l'acte d'ali6nation du 21 aofit 1882 consenti devant Mtre A. G. Tourangeau, notaire, par l'appelante au gouvernement de Qu6bec. Par cet acte, l'appelante chde et abandonne au dit gouvernenent tous les droits de propri6td et autres qu'elle a et peut avoir sur cette partie de 'iimeuble maintenant connu et d~sign6 sur les plan et livre officiels de renvoi du cadastre pour le quartier Saint-Pierre de la dite cit6 de Qu6bec, sous * le numdro (1937) dix-neuf cent treat e-sept, situde entre les rues Saint- Paul, Saint-Roch, Henderson et la rivibre Saint-Charles, avec quais bdtisses sus erigs, le dit gouvernement s'engageant h faire draguer au bout des et entre quais du havre du Palais, et 1 mettre les quais Girouard j. en bon ordre d'ici au trente novembre mil huit cent quatre-vingttrois.

Par un autre acte, pass6 le mime jour, devant le mime notaire, le gouvernement de Qu6bec c~da les dits droits de propri6t6 A l'intim6e dans les termes suivants : Tons les droits de propridt6 on autres transport6s par la corporation de la cit6 de Qubbec an dit gouvernement, en vertu du dit acte de convention, ici sus nentionnd, dans on sur Pimmeuble connu et d6sign6 dans le plan du cadastre et dans les livres du quartier Saint-Pierre de la cit6 de Qubbec, sous le numro officiel 1937, situ6 entre les rues Saint-Paul, Saint-Roch et la rue Henderson et la rivibre Saint-Charles, avec tous droits quaiage, taxes et revenus, la compagnie du chemin de fer du Nord s'obligeant elle-maie h faire creuser le havre entre dits quais, draguer et mettre les dits quais en bon ordre de rdparation, entre ce jour et le 30 novembre

Le havre du Palais 6tait une propri6t6 A l'usage du public dans le port de Qu6bec depuis plus d'un demisibcle, et par cons6quent bien connu en la cit6 Qu6bec. Elle devait l'tre particulibrement de 1'intimee, qui en poss6dait une tris grande partie depuis le 4 mars 1882; d'ailleurs la loi pr6sume que l'acqu6reur a une exacte connaissance de l'immeuble simplement d6sign6 par sa situation et ses confius (1).

L'intim6e prit donc possession d'une certaine lisibre de terre et d'un quai projetait dans la rivibre, conuu sous le nom de Quai Carron, et d'autres quais bordant la riviere, en vertu des actes du 21 ao it 1882, et en reput tons les fruits et revenus jusqu'au 26 juillet 1894, c'est-A-dire, durant (1) 24 Laurent, no. 1S7.

pris de douze ann6es, lorsque pour la premire fois, elle s'apergoit qu'il lui manque,- Elle en fait alors demande de livraison et le 14 aoit J. 1894, elle intente une action contre l'appelante et demande les dits quais et terrain en faisant partie, on $50,000, et de plus $20,000 pour les revenus du pass&. Ces quais et terrain sont vulgairement connus sous le nom de " Quais du Gaz," et sont indiquis aux plans produits par l'intim6e sous lesnoms de "Eastern Wharf " et " Breakwater."

Le croquis sur la page suivante, extrait des dits plans, montre la situation des lieux qui font l'objet du present litige.

L'intim6e a purement et simplement all~gu6 ses titres et une certaine correspondance ant~rieure, sans allusion h aucune ambiguit6, omission, ou erreur de description. Aucune demande n'est faite pour corriger l'inexactitude de cette description.

Ce n'est qu'A la plaidoirie orale devant le juge que l'omission on 1'ambiguit6 apparait pour la premiere fois.

L'intimbe soutient que la correspondance qui a prc6d& imm6diatement les actes du 21 aoxt 1882 fait voir que 1'intention des parties 6tait de transf6rer tout ce qui restait de la propri6t du Havre du Palais, avec tous ses quais, et plus particulierement le Quai Caron et le Quai du Gaz, et qu'd l'aide de cette correspondance, il faut corriger la description notari6e, en prolongeant ]a rue I i enderson jusqu'A la riviere Saint-Charles, par une ligne imaginaire A travers une place publique, appel6e Place d'Or- 16ans, et la propri6t6 contigue de la Compagnie du gaz, laquelle ligne est trac6e sur les dits plans par l'intim6e. L'honorable.juge Andrews a t6 d'opinion que l'ambi- .I. .Vrq ,3Ron e . armwr_ fttion Tard 11D guit6 devait s'interprter contre 1'intimbe A raison de sa conduite et de son long silence depuis le jour de son '^~ acquisition

OF Considering that the validity of this contention turns upon the .

NORTH interpretation to given to the description or designation of the real estate intended to be conveyed by said deeds; that is, whether such designation by the metes and bounds therein given does or does not include therein the said wharf

Girouaid J. Considering that by their conduct the parties have themselves solved the said question ; for that they have-the defendants retaining and not making delivery of the said wharf and by collecting for the twelve years which elapsed between the execution of the said deeds and the month prior to the bringing of this suit all the revenues of the said wharf, and the plaintiffs by never during all that time making aliv claim thereto-interpreted the said ambiguous designation description in said deeds not including the said wharf, La Cour d'Appel, compos6e de Blanchet et Hall JJ., et Bourgeois et Cinon JJ., ad hoc, a recherch6 1'intention des parties dans la correspondance ant~rieure A 1'acte notari6, et infirm6 le jugement de la Cour Sup6rieure:

Considirant que quais et terrain, tel que ci-dessus dicrits, trouvent compris dans la cession que ]'intimi6e a faite au gouvernement de Quibec le aoiit par acte devant Mtre Tourangeau, notaire, et que le dit gouvernement a ensuite le mime jour, par acte devant le mime notaire, faite .4 Pappelante, etc.

M. le juge Cimon, qui a prononc6 le jugenent de la Cour, dit:

Cette correspondance ant6rieure ii Pacte notarie-qui constitue une preuve 6crite-contient, pour ainsi dire, le mandat que les reprisentants des parties out rempli, en signant cet acte du aoat 1882; elle fait voir Pintention commune, vritable des parties, et trbs clairement. Tons les auteurs et la jurisprudence sont d'avis que les crits antirieurs imands des parties peuvent 6tre invoquis pour expliquer on interpriter le contrat, vide Demolombe, nos. ; 16 Laurent, no. 508.

D'ailleurs qu'y a-t-il de plus fort que des 6crits ? Or, que cette correspondance dimontre clairement, c'est que cit6 de Quibec consentait de c4der tout havre du Palais, toutes les propri6tis qu'elle avait les bitisses, les quais et aussi tons les revenus du havre du Palais: et le gouvernement ne voulait pas avoir Je puis la de du TNO juge. Les principes qu'il invoque sont incontestables, mais ne s'appliquent pas 1'esphce.

Je ne puis admettre que la correspondance ant6rieure suffit pour d6truire on contredire un contrat, on y suppl6er, A J moins qu'il ne soit prouv6 qu'elle fait partie du contrat, on du moins qu'elle contient toutes les n6gociations, et c'est ce que l'intimbe n'a pas fait.

Si tel 6tait le fait, il lui 6tait facile d'etablir que la correspondance produite forme toute la correspondance et toutes les n~gociations qui out pr&c6d les actes du 21 aofit 1882. Sans cette preuve, je ne puis accepter cette correspondance pour juger de 1'intention des parties.

S'il y avait erreur on lacune dans la description de l'immeuble et de ses accessoires, elle aurait l'all& guer et la prouver par les moyens ordinaires. Sans cette preuve, je ne me sens pas dispos6 de mettre de c6t6 le contrat et d'accepter A sa place la correspondance ant~rieure.

Je dois supposer qu'au dernier moment, les parties out modifi6 leur volont6 et que l'intention qui doit d6cider des droits des parties est celle qui est manifestbe au contrat.

Nul doute que la correspondance produite d6montre que la premibre intention du gouvernement 6tait'd'acqubrir tout ce qui restait du havre du Palais, moyennant consideration qui, A l'origine, ne me paralt pas avoir th bien comprise

Dans une lettre an maire, A la date du 17 aofit 1882, M. Wtrtele, le tr6sorier de la province, demande A acqu6rir " tous les droits qu'elle (la Cit6) peut avoir sur le havre du Palais, et les pro. prits connues sous le nom du Palais," et A payer $50,000 & la ville " pour Pabandon par celle-ci des revenus provenant du havre du Palais."

Le lendemain, 18 aoilt, le maire r~pond qu'il consent & la " cession du havre du Palais et des terrains qui l'avoisinent," et il demande $100,000 "pour retour de 1'6change des propri6t6s du Palais, an lieu de $50,000 que vous offrez." Le m~me jour, M. Witrtele r6plique que les conditions de 1'arrangement seraient d6finitivement comme suit: Entr'autres de la part de la Cit6 : " Cession du havre du Palais et des terrains qui l'avoisinent avec les J. bAtisses y 6rig6es," et " paiement d'une somme de $75,000 en retour de l'6change des proprit6s du Palais, an lieu de $50,000.

Puis, lorsqu'on arrive 6 la passation du contrat, trois jours plus tard, le aoit, ce n'est plus le havre du Palais et tout ce qui en d6pend qui sont c6dds, mais simplement " tons les droits de propri~t6 et autres qu'elle (]a Cit6) a et pent avoir," sur cette partie du num~ro 1937 du cadastre, " situde entre les rues Saint- Paul, Saint-Roch, Henderson et la rivibre Saint-Charles, avec les quais et batisses sus 6rig6s."

Le gouvernement s'engagea de payer $75,000 "en consideration de la cession par la dite corporation des revenus du havre du Palais c~d6s par les pr~sentes."

Les parties avaient 6videmment modifi6 leur intention, et, pour une raison on une autre qui n'apparait pas, la cession de la part de la cit6 6tait consid6rablement rdduite.

Cette modification & la dernibre heure n'a rien d'6tonnant; bien an contraire.

Durant le cours des nkgociations qui ont pr6c6d6 ces actes, de nombreux changements out 6t6 faits. En lisant la section du chapitre 20 de la 45 Victoria, sanctionn6e le 27 mai 1882, le gouvernement de Quebec avait en vue des modifications importantes A son premier contrat avec la Compagnie du chemin de fer du Nord et la Cit6 de Qu6bec.

Ces modifications devaient tre complt6es le, on avant le 27 aoAt suivant, aux termes du statut. Le 17 aoftt, M. Witrtele ouvre une correspondance cielle avec le maire de Qu6bec; A la dernibre hcure, il a pu et a dft consentir A prendre moins do terrain, sans E.

pr~judicier aux int6rts du gouvernement qu'il reprsentait; car il stipule dans les deux actes du 21 aoit 1882, que " le pr6sent arrangement est sujet a la ratification du lieutenant-gouverneur en conseil."

Giiouard J.

Le 18 ao-ht, le maire do Qu6bec demandait $100,000 " pour retour de 1'6change des propri~t6s du Palais, au lieu de $50,000 que vous offrez."

Le inme jour, M. Witrtele consentait A donner $75,000 " en retour de 1'6change," et il demaudait une r~ponse " au plus t6t." La correspondance produite finit IA. Quand I'acte fut sign6 trois jours apres, la cit6 accepte $75,000 " en consideration de la cession des revenus du havre c6d~s par les pr6sentes ; " et elle r~duit Ia quantite des propri6t6s qui lIi etaient d'abord demand~es.

Ce ne sont plus toutes les propri6t6s du Palais, mais seuleient cette partie qui est d&crite dans l'acte, qu'il aurait 6t6 si simple de d6crire comme, dans Ia correspondance, si telle 6tait encore 1'intention des parties, savoir: tous les droits de propriet6 et autres do la Cit6 dans le havre du Palais avec le nunimro du cadastre.

Mais il y a plus. Le 18 aofit 1882, M. le maire est autoris6 A conclure avec le gouvernement.

Cette autorisation est par r6solution du conseil de la ville de Qubec, comme suit:- Risol,-Que d'tre et pr~chde immndiatement l'acte du 21 aofit, qui en fait une mention expresse.

Or, cette r~solution ne dit pas que l'acte sera fait conformbmnent A la correspondance du 17 et du 18 aofit entre le maire et le tr~sorier de la province, mais " aux conditions incorpor~es dans le rapport du comit6 des finances qui vient d'tre unanimement adopt6 par le conseil."

Quelles sont ce6 conditions ? Sont-ce celles mentionn6es dans la correspondance ant6rieure ? Le comit6 a-t-il accept6 $75,000 au lieu de $100,000 pour le retour des proprit6s que les parties se proposaient d'changer ? On bien, a-t-il Girouard accept. cette r~duction de la soulte en consideration de la r~duction de la propri6th a ceder ? I est impossible de le dire.

L'intimbe, dont le devoir 6tait de produire tonte pice essentielle de sa cause, n'a pas produit le rapport du comit6 des finances; et AL d6faut de cette preuve, il est impossible, suivant moi, d'aller chercher I'intention des parties ailleurs que dans le contrat. L'appelante a invoqu6 1'obligation contract~e par le gouvernement de Qu6bec A faire draguer an bout des et entre les quais du havre du Palais et A mettre les quais en bon ordre, etc.," (et non pas seulement " entre les dits quais," c'est-h-dire, les quais c~dds, ainsi que le d&clare 1'acte consenti par le gonvernement h l'intimbe), comme une preuve on au moins une forte pr&somption que tons les quais du havre du Palais ne lui 6taient pas cAdds.

Si 1'appelante, en effet, ne devait plus jouir d'un seul quai, elle n'avait aucun int~rt particulier h imposer cette condition.

Il me semble qu'il y a lieu de presumer que le but de ce dragage 6tait d'augmenter la facilit6 de la navigation aupris de tons les quais du havre du Palais, afin d'accroltre par les droits de quaiage perceptibles par ]a Cit4 sur le quai on les quais qui lui restaient.

M. le juge Cimon ne pent accepter ce raisonnement. Oni, des revenus du havre " c6d~s par les pr6sentes," c'est- -dire, tels que d6finis par la description des propri~t6s c6d6es, et non pas des revenus de tout le havre, qui ne sont pas c6d~s.

Le savant juge continue:

Draguer quais'-ce L'acto d~clare seulement que les quais des propri&6s d6crites sont c6d~s et rien de plus.

L'acte entre le gouvernement et la Compagnie du Chemin de Fer du Nord contient dans la description des expressions qui ne se trouvent pas dans 1'acte entre le gouvernement et la cit6 de Qu6bec, savoir: " avec tous les droits de quaiage, taxes et revenus Mais fussent-elles dans ce dernier acte, elles ne penvent s'entendre que des " droits de quaiage, taxes et revenus," provenant des propri~t6s d~crites et cd6es, c'est-h-dire, tant du quai Caron, qui projette dans la rivibre, que des quais qui bordent la rivibre Saint- Charles.

Mais, observe l'intin~e, a moins de prolonger la ligne de la rue Henderson, a travers la Place d'Orl~ans et les immeubles de la Compagnie de Gaz, jusqu'd la rivibre Saint-Charles, la proprit6 c~d~e ne pent avoir cette rivibre pour confiu, et la Compagnie du Chemin de Fer du Nord n'a droit A aucun quai, pas m~me au quai Caron. La question soulev6e par 1'action de 1'intim6e n'est pas de savoir si elle a droit 5, d'autres quais, mais uniquement si le Quai du G-az est compris dans le contrat, et sur ce point je n'ai aucun doute que ses pr6tentions sont mal fond6es.

Si jamais nous avons A nous prononcer sur une action en d6limitation on en bornage, co sera alors le temps de d6finir les bornes de l'immeuble. Cependant, je ne vois pas que cette d6limitation puisse presenter des difficult6s s6rieuses.

On ne devra pas tirer une ligne droite de l'extrmit6 de la T rue Henderson pris de la Place d'Orlans & la rue Saint-Roch.

La rivibre Saint-Charles doit 6tre l'une des limites de la proprit6 et IA oil elle 1'arrose au point le plus rapproch6 de la rue Henderson, cette limite commence et se continue le long de la gr~ve, jusqu'C la rue Saint-Roch, et comprend &videmment le Quai J. Caron et les autres quais qui bordent la rivi6re sur tout le parcours de cette limite.

Elle ne comprend pas le Quai du Gaz qui touche la propri6t6 de la Compagnie du Gaz, une construction de ce genre ne pouvant 6tre consid&re comme la rivibre elle-mame qui se trouve couverte et remplie; et si le doute 6tait possible dessus, il suffirait de lire le contrat pour se convaincre que, dans 1'esprit des parties, les quais et la rivibre ne signifient pas la mame chose, mais au contraire, sont deux choses distinctes.

Je ne puis 1donc accepter la ligne imaginaire de l'intim6e prolong~e sur la Place d'Orl~ans et les propri~t~s de la Compagnie du Gaz, jusqu'au chenal de la rivibre Saint-Charles.

C'est d'ailleurs l'interpr6tation que les parties ont donn~e A 1'acte par la prise de possession de l'intimbe; et si sa conduite post6rieture ne constitue pas un aveu parfait de sa part que son titre exclut le quai du Gaz, elle est suffisante pour 6tablir une forte pr~somption contre elle, qu'il est libre au juge d'appr~cier d'apris les circonstances, conform6ment aux articles 1238 et 1242 du Code Civil.

M. le juge Andrews a consid6r6 cette pr6somption comme concluante contre l'intime, et A d6faut de preuve pour la d6truire, mais bien au contraire, en pr6sence des faits et circonstances qui la confirment, je suis de son avis. La regle qu'6nonce Demolombe regoit ici son entibre application:

Il faut encore mettre au rang des rigles les meilleures d'interprdta- tion, quoique notre Code ne la mentionne pas, celle que fournit I'ex- 6cution qui a donn~e par les parties de la clause de leur convention, dont le sens est maintenant controver.- entre elles.

H II

L'ex~cution de la clause, c'est 1'interpritation vivante et animie C'est, en quelque sorte, 1'aveu de la partie ! et h moins qu'elle ne prouve que P'ex~cution, qlu'elle y a donnde, a 6 le resultat d'une erreur, il est logique et 6quitable qu'elle ne soit pas, en g~ndral, Gironard j. admise h revenir contre son propre fait

Talis enim prcesumitur titulus, qualis aparet usus Tels sont les termues, dans lesquels on pourrait, d'apris Dumoulin, poser notre rLgle. (Comin. sur la Cout. de Paris, § 68, no. 23; comp. Merlin, Quest. de Droit, t. II, pp. 232 et 238 ; Toullier, t. III, no. 320 D. alph., vo. Obligations. No. S65).

Enfin reste-t-il encore quelque doute, qu'il soit impossible de dissiper?

La regle de droit, 6nonc6e A 1'article 1019 de notre Code Civil, devra ktre notre guide: "Dans le doute, le contrat s'interprite contre celui qui a stipul6, et en faveur de celui qui a contract6 1'obligation."

En France, en imatiare de vente on d'change, tout pacte obscur on ambign s'interprete contre le vendeur on 1'6changiste qui chde.

C. N. art. 1602, 1707. Dans le systeme de notre Code, art. 1473, 1599, nous suivons les principes ordinaires, ceux 6nonc6s en Particle 1019.

Dans cette cause, c'est 'appelante qui a contract6 1'oblig-ation de livrer ce qu'elle a vendu on 6change, et c'est en sa faveur que le doute doit s'interprater. L'intim~e, et dans sa plaidoirie devant nons et dans son factum, admet qu'il y a ambiguit6 dans la description de la chose vendue on change.

All the difficulty in the case." dit-elle, " comes from the ambiguous manner the notary, who has drafted the deed of the 21st August 1882, has described the property sold by the appellant to the Government. Je suis d'avis qu'en 1'absence de tout autre moyen de d6couvrir la v6rit6, 1'ambiguit6 doit tre interprte contre 1'intimbie, et en faveur de Pappelante, et ici je ne crois pas ponvoir mieux conclure qu'en rappelant ii l'intimbe ce passage de Demolombe dans ses commentaires sur cette rigle d'interpr~tation:

Ponr toutes ces raisons, et sans me prononcer sur les autres moyens de l'appel, je suis d'opinion de renvoyer la demande de l'intim6e d'infirmerle jugement de la Cour d'Appel, avec d~pens devant toutes les cours. - Appeal allowed witl costs.