Murphy v. Labbé

Hazardous occupation-Arts. 1053, 1064, 1071, 1626, 1627, 1629 C. C.

To rebut the presumption created by article 1629 of the Civil Code of Lower Canada it is not necessary for the lessee to prove the exact or probable origin of the fire or that it was due to unavoidable accident or irresistible force.

It is sufficient for him to prove that he has used the premises leased as a prudent administrator (en bon pire de famille), and that the fire occurred without any fault that could be attributed to him or to persons for whose acts he should be held responsible.

Judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench for Lower Canada affirmed, Strong C. J. dissenting.

APPEAL from the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench for Lower Canada (appeal side) (1), reversing the decision of the Superior Court, which dismissed the plaintiff's action and condemned him, upon defendant's incidental demand, to pay damages for the loss of rent of premises destroyed by fire with a reservation to the defendant, incidental plaintiff, of his recourse by a subsequent action for further damages. The respondent leased from the appellant certain premises in the City of Montreal described in the deed of lease for the purpose of carrying on the business of manufacturing and importing furniture, the property :-Sir Henry Strong C.J. and Gwynne, Sedgewick, King and Girouard JJ.

(1) Q. R. 5 Q. B. 88.

at the time consisting of vacant lots upon which the buildings to be occupied by the respondent as a furniture factory were to be erected by the appellant. The lease was for ten years and two months from the 1st of March 1889, and the rental, to be determined by the value of the buildings so to be erected, was definitively fixed at $4,175 per annum, plus a certain amount for municipal and school taxes, to be paid on the 1st November of each year. The lease provided that the lessee should pay to the lessor all extra premiums of insurance which the latter might be called upon to pay the insurance companies above the minimum rate in consequence of business carried on by the lessee, and in addition to the ordinary stipulations concerning the keeping of the leased premises in good condition and repair, etc... it was agreed that the respondent should pay the appellant $3,500 as a guarantee for the carrying out of the obligations of the lease, the said sum to bear interest at 7 per cent per annum which was to be set off against the rent, the principal to be imputed in payment of the balance the last year's rent.

The respondent took possession of the leased premises and occupied them until July, 1894, regularly paying the rent, taxes and extra insurance premiums up to that date.

On the 25th July, 1894, a fire broke out aniongst some bales of tow or jute stored in the basement of the leased premises and almost completely destroyed the buildings occupied by the respondent. These buildings having become uninhabitable, the respondent brought his action for the resiliation of the lease and reimbursement of the sum of $2,500.35, being the difference between the said $3,500, with certain amounts of interest, and the sum of $1,060.90 representing three months' rent due on 31st July. The appellant, relying on art. 1629 of the Civil Code, answered the respondent's claim by stating that he held him responsible for the damages resulting from the fire and required him to reconstruct the buildings which had been destroyed, in default whereof he would himself reconstruct them at the expense of the respondent and hold him liable for all damages resulting from the fire; and further pleaded that in virtue of a stipulation contained in the lease, if the lease were dissolved before the end of the term in consequence of the non-fulfilment by the lessee of any the obligations mentioned in the lease, the said sum of $3,500 and interest accrued thereon should be forfeited and should belong to the lessor as damages for the dissolution of said lease; that the fire in question was caused by the fault and negligence of the respondent or his employees so that the lease was dissolved by the non-fulfilment of the respondent's obligations and consequently the said sum of $3,500 became forfeited to the appellant.

The appellant also by an incidental demand alleged that the fire caused him damage to the extent $12,897.79, and claimed that sum from the respondent. The respondent replied by a general answer that the fire did not occur through his fault or the fault persons for whom he was responsible, but that as far as ascertained it was purely accidental, and by a plea to the incidental demand containing substantially the same reasons as those of the declaration in the principal action.

In addition to the facts already stated the evidence taken at the trial shewed facts from which the appellant claimed that the respondent was guilty of acts of negligence in leaving dangerous matter such as tow in the basement which was frequently resorted to by the workmen for considerable periods of time without supervision, and that they used to sit or lounge about on the bales of tow while waiting to get into the closet which was situated in the basement.

That while thus waiting there was danger that the workmen might smoke or commit acts which might kindle a fire. That the tow was so kept without the appellant's knowledge and that respondent did not take the necessary precautions to prevent a fire breaking out in this inflammable substance. That no water buckets were kept in the basement ready for emergency in case of fire, although such buckets were provided in all other flats of the factory. That cotton waste, (rags and refuse saturated with oil, varnish and turpentine) was put into barrels after it had been used in the factory and was allowed to be carelessly removed by boys.

That the message to the fire station was not by telephone although there was an instrument in the factory and that the respondent had not accounted for his actions at or about the time of the commencement of the fire.

The respondent's proof in rebuttal of the presumption established by article 1629 was in substance as follows:- The fire broke out in full daylight between 1.15 and 1.30 in the afternoon.

Three or four of respondent's employees were in some manner witnesses of the beginning of the fire.

There was no fire in the establishment with the exception of two or three gas jets in the basement attached to posts, carefully covered with tin. The watercloset was in this basement and all the employees of the establishment except those in the office had access thereto.

At about 1.15 a witness (M) who went to the cellar, passing quite close to the spot where the fire broke out, saw no fire; he was not smoking as he never smoked, and had no matches, other explosive or combustible materials on his person, and as he was leaving met another witness going in the direction of the closet.

D entered the closet' and at the moment perceived through a crack in the door the fire which arose in puffs from the bales of tow.

At the same moment another employee, going to the closet when within 15 feet of them, saw that the door was closed and at the same time saw the fire rising between two bales of tow. Thereupon the alarm was given and a messenger ran to call the firemen at a station within about a hundred yards, but the fire spread rapidly. There was no water tap in the basement.

All the employees of the establishment swore positively that neither they nor the respondent did anything which could have caused the fire. Smoking was strictly prohibited in the establishment, and employees were not allowed to fill their pipes in the place nor to smoke on the side-walk along side of the factory.

The establishment was kept in the most irreproachable manner and was considered a model establishment.

The judgment of the Superior Court declared the lease cancelled, reserved the appellant's recourse for the loss of rent which he might suffer from May 1st., 1894 to May 1st., 1899, dismissed the respondent's action and allowed the appellant on his incidental demand the sum of $640.90 ; the decision being based on the ground that the respondent had failed to prove the origin of the fire as required by art. 1629 of the Civil Code, and that he was consequently responsible for the damages resulting from the fire.

On appeal the Court of Queen's Bench reversed the judgment, holding that the evidence destroyed the presumption against the lessee and showed that the fire had not been caused by his fault or by that the persons for whom he was responsible.

From this latter decision the present appeal is taken.

The legal question involved, is as to what kind evidence must be adduced by the tenant, in order to constitute proof that the fire was not caused by the fault of himself or his subordinates. The principle adopted by the Court of Queen's Bench, judged from the notes of Chief Justice Lacoste filed in the cause, is that " so soon as the lessee shall convince the mind of the judge that he is not in fault, by whatsoever proof he does it, he ought to be exonerated.

There is no need for him to prove the cause of the fire, nor even the impossibility of establishing it otherwise than by a fortuitous event; it would be enough for him to establish by the circumstances of the case that there is not an act of negligence or imprudence attributable to him."

If the tenant is not bound to prove the precise cause of the fire, he must shew beyond question that it was due to fortuitous event or irresistible force, as otherwise he is to be presumed responsible. .amieson v. Steel (1); Evans v. Skelton

In the case of the Seminary Quebec v. Poitras (3) the defendant proved more than respondent has done in this case, yet the court held that, " in order to destroy the presumption declared in article 1629 it is not sufficient for a tenant to show that he acted with the care of a prudent administrator, and that the fire which destroyed the premises leased could not be accounted for; he must show how the fire originated, and that it originated without his fault."

See also Bdlanger v. McCarthy (1); and specially the remarks of Johnson J. at p. 182.

The lessee has been held responsible under art. 1733 C. N. even when there were defects in construction; Zichitelli v. Gille et al.

It is not enough for the lessee to say that as no fault has been proved against him, the fire must be attributed to a fortuitous event or irresistible force; Compagnie d'Assurance Nord, v. Carrier et al.

Even where the fire is incendiary the lessee must exculpate himself; Compagnie Nationale Pelcot (4) ; Qompagnie

Durand ; Compagnie d'Assurance l'Orlianaise v. pagnie d'Assurance Urbaine

See also Pothier, Louage no. 194; Marcad6 sur l'art. 1733; 4 Aubry & Rau, par. 367 and nn. 20-22. The case of La Compagnie Nationale v. Chartrain cited by Mr. Justice Bosse in the appeal judgment, does not support his theory; the appellate court there held that:

In the case cited by Boss6 J., du Moulin du Chlteau-Narbonnais v. Societd Industrielle du Sud- Ouest decided by the Court of Toulouse, the tenant was condemned, so the judgment evidently cannot be an authority against us. The question now in dispute did not present itself in that case, and no legal proposition applicable to the present controversy, was either required or intended to be laid down; the foot note shows no modification of opinion on the part of Dalloz. In fact, the note shows he never entertained the opinion he is supposed to have modified.

Our article 1629 is not in conflict with art. 1200, which alone is sufficient for our purpose, as it requires for the exculpation of the debtor the allegation and proof of fortuitous event.

On this point see 24 Dem. no. 562; 28 Dem. no. 769; 25 Laurent, no. 284. Our code merely declares in general terms what the Code Napoleon expresses in detail.

Article 1239 C. relieves us from making any direct proof of special negligence.

We rely on the uncontradicted legal presumption against the tenant, that the fire was caused by some act or fault by him or his employees which neither he nor they are willing to acknowledge.

They will not voluntarily accuse themselves but the law places on the i'espondent a burthen and he has failed to exculpate himself. See art. 1071 0. C.; DeSola v. Stephens ; The Canadian Pacific Railway v. Pellant

The tenant in the circumstances was under the necessity of using extraordinary care to protect the premises against fire and *.

in this obligation he made default.

Sirey, Code an. art. 1733 no. 56.

And in case of doubt the inference is against the tenant, upon whom has been laid the onus probandi.

This is not a case where the trial judge has found facts which ought to be accepted in appellate courts; he merely has drawn inferences which are subject to the appreciation of the judges of the higher courts. The trial judge was mistaken in supposing that our Civil Code, art. 1629, corresponds with the Code Napoleon, art. 1733; our article is far less restricted than the French law, and consequently the rigorous interpretation given by French jurisprudence to the presumption there established against the lessee cannot be applied in construing the provisions of the Qubec Code.

Even in France the rigorous application of art. 1733 C. N. has been modified by the courts. See Sirey, Code an. no. 41 and the authorities there cited. The respondent has disassociated himself from the facts attending the origin of the fire and has established in his evidence that he used the premises only for the purposes leased and with all care required of a bon pare de famille (art. 1626 C. and has thus made such rebuttal of the presumption under art. 1629 C. C. as excuses him from civil responsibility, and shifts the onus to the plaintiff, who is bound to prove negligence to sustain his case. Evans v. Skelton He has failed to do so.

On the other hand he not only leased but actually built the premises for the purpose of leasing them to the respondent for the risky purposes of a furniture factory and knew the risk so well that he stipulated in the lease for the payment by the tenant of the extra-hazardous fire insurance rating due to the character of the trade carried on in the building. If a loss by fire exceeded the amount of Vthe insurance the appellant is the party to be blamed. La Conpagnie Royale d'Assurance v. Grandal et al. (1). The landlord must also be held responsible, under these circumstances, for the effects of any overcrowding or want of accommodation in the building as a defect of construction, for instance for inadequate provision in the closets for the number of workmen employed in such an establishment, or for want of facilities for extinguishing incipient fires, all of which he might easily have foreseen and provided for when erecting the factory buildings.

Art. 1627 C. leads up to art. 1629 and shews that the lessee is permitted to rebut the presumption of fault or negligence.

We have repelled the harsh presumption by evidence the credibility of which is not even attempted to be impeached, except by mere supposition or suggestion of human weakness as an obiter dictum by the trial judge (2) which can have no effect before this court. See remarks on the evidence by Boss6 J. in the report of the Queen's Bench judgment.

On the evidence no fault or negligence can be imputed to the respondent or to his employees, and in consequence he cannot be held liable in damages. THE CHIEF am of opinion that the judgment of the Superior Court was in all respects free from error.

There can be no doubt of the application of art. 1629, the plain language of which required the respondent to displace the privnd facie presumption which the law raises against him.

That the respondent did not destroy this presumption is, in my opinion, the inevitable conclusion from the evidence.

It has indeed been proved that the fire ThChief was first observed in a bale of tow in the cellar, but Justice.

there was nothing to show how the fire was communicated to the tow; it must therefore be presumed that the tow became ignited through some negligence or default of the respondent himself, or of persons for whom he is responsible.

There is an entire absence of evidence sufficient to shift the burden of this presumption; it therefore follows that, unless we are altogether to ignore the provisions of this art. 1629, embodying what I admit to be a very harsh rule of law, we must give this lessor the benefit of it. I am of opinion that the appeal should be allowed and the judgment of the Superior Court restored with costs to the appellant in all the courts.

and concurred in the judment of Mr. Justice Gironard.

J.-De toutes les r6gles de notre Droit Civil, il n'y en a peut-6tre pas qui aient donn6 lieu A autant de prochs et de divergences d'opinions que celles qui d6terminent la responsabilit6 civile. Le principe g~n6ral est cependant simple:

Mais 1'application en a toujours t6 fort embarrassante, car il n'est pas toujours facile de savoir quand il y a faute.

C'est IA plut6t une question de fait qui est laiss~e A 1'appr6ciation des juges de premiere instance. Rgle g6ndrale, c'est A celui qui allgue la faute A la prouver.

Il y a cependant des exceptions A cette r6gle, et la responsabilit6 du locataire envers le locateur en cas d'incendie des lieux lou6s en est une.

Elle nous vient du Droit Romain elle 6tait pour ainsi dire une n~cessit6, vu que 1'assurance y 6tait inconnue. Cependant, elle n'y recevait pas 1'application svere que l'ancien droit frangais et le Code Napoleon lui out donn~e.

Le locataire n'6tait responsable de ses domestiques que dans le cas il aurait t6 lui-mame en faute d'avoir pris h son service ou requ chez lui des personnes de la part desquelles il y avait lieu de craindre do pareils accidents. Pandectes de Pothier, (1) ; 11 Toniller, n. 167, 168; Pothier, Contrat do Louage, n. 193; Rousseau de La Combe, vo. Incendie, n. 8 ; Guyot, vo. Incendie, L'ancienne France qui ne connut 1'assurance contre le feu qu'aprbs le milieu du dernier sidcle, adopta tout naturellement la r~gle du Droit Romain. Les pays do droit 6crit, regis par le Droit Romain, n'eurent pas d'objection h la suivre; elle faisait partie de leur droit commun; m~me les pays de droit coutumier, sans attendre l'intervention 16gislative, n'offrirent aucune r6sistance qui vaille la peine d'tre mentionune. Il est vrai que Bouvot, vo. Brulement, et Guyot, vo. Incendie, citent plusieurs arrts qui semblent annoncer que les parlements de Flandre et de Dijon taient contraires. Parmi les auteurs dont l'opinion faisait autorit6, on cite Bouvot, Henrys et Voet, et quelques autres moins connus, tels que Bertrand, Christin et Mascardus, qui soutiennent que c'est au propri6taire A faire la preuve de la faute du locataire. Mais Bretonnier, le savant annotateur d'Henrys, nous dit que son opinion a 6t6 rejet6e par la jurisprudence bien 6tablie du Royaume de France. Cette jurisprudence alla mime plus loin que le droit Romain. Saligny et d'autres auteurs rendirent le locataire responsable de la faute " tres 16gire "; mais Godefroy, Balde, Denizart et Rousseau de La Combe, entreprennent de d~montrer que cette opinion 6tait mal fond~e.

Voir Guyot, vo. Incendie.

Tous enseignent cependant que le locataire est responsable de ses domestiques et de tons ceux qu'il a sous son con- J. tr6le; plusieurs arrits vont jusqu'A exiger de sa part la preuve de 1'origine de 1'incendie; mais il faut avouer que certains jurisconsultes se contentent de demander comme le Droit Romain, que le locataire 6tablisse que 1'incendie a eu lieu sans faute de sa part on des gens de sa maison.

Ajoutons ici que l'Angleterre, qui a connu 1'assurance contre le feu pris d'un sibcle avant la France, n'a pas adopt6 la prisomption du Droit Romain.

Le propriftaire est tenu de prouver la nigligence du locataire comme dans les cas ordinaires. II en est de mame en Ecosse et la Louisiane, le Droit Romain forme pourtant le droit commun, surtout en matire de responsabilit6 civile. L'article 2723 du Code de la Louisiane dit en toutes lettres que le locataire n'est responsable de 'incendie, que lorsqu'il est prouv6 qu'il a en lieu par sa faute on celle de sa famille. A 1'6poque de la promulgation du Code Napol6on, an commencement de ce sikle, l'assurance contre le feu en France 6tait encore A son enfance, et il n'est pas surprenant qu'il ait reproduit 1'ancienne jurisprudence. L'article 1733 se lit comme suit:

Comme 1'observent le juge en chef Lacoste et .1. le juge Boss6, la doctrine et la jurisprudence en France out r~agi contre une interpr~tation litterale de cet article. Analysant les arr~ts et les commentateurs, les savants juges trouvent que pas moins de trois systimes diff6rents ont des d6fenseurs distingu6s et que deux de ces systames out pour but d'adoucir, je dirais presque de modifier, la rigueur du texte du Code Napolon. Anjourd'hui que le propri~taire a toute la protection d6sirable dans une police d'assurance contre le feu, a des prix minimes qu'il peut entrer dans le prix de la location, l'esprit de justice s'est presque r6volt6 contre Girouard J. la s&v&it6 de Particle 1733 du Code Frangais et un projet de loi fut pr6sent6 dans le but de 1'abroger. La commission charg6e de

'examiner se prononga contre, il est vrai; mais son rapport fait voir que l'6tat actuel de la jurisprudence en France est loin de la doctrine enseign6e par Toullier, Marcad6 et d'autres jurisconsultes non moins 6minents:

Ici, comme partout, dit la commission, les cours et tribunaux ont accompli leur ceuvre. N'est-il pas de jurisprudence aujourd'hui, nonseulement qu'il n'est pas necessaire que le locataire tablisse la cause pr6cise de 1'incendie, non-seulement qu'il n'est pas besoin que la force majeure soit d~terminde et sp6cifibe, mais mime que 1'appriciation des faits qui peuvent constituer une faute de la part du preneur on qui peuvent, au contraire, mettre sa responsabilit6 h couvert, appartient souverainement aux juges de fait. 'Et,' ajoute Guillouard, vol. 1, no. 270; ' D6sormais le sens de 1'article 17;,3 est fixe, et il n'a maintenu dans notre 14gislation qu'avec cette interpritation.'

Le locataire prouve p6remptoirement qu'on ne pent lui imputer aucune faute par imprudence ou par negligence; cela ne suffirait pas. Il faudrait encore que pour 6chapper a la responsabilitd qui phse sur lui, il prouvAt la cause pr6cise de Pincendie. Pourquoi cette exigence 1 Nous comprenons que le 14gislateur demande au locataire, comme 4 tout ditenteur de la chose d'autrui, la preuve que la perte de la chose qu'il dtient est arrivie sans sa faute.

Mais une fois cette preuve faite, que peut-on lui demander an del& ? Ni les rbgles des contrats, ni les principes de la responsabilit6, si 6tendue qu'elle soit, ne pourraient justifier une pareille exigence et rien u'autorise 4 croire qu'elle ait t dans la pens~e des ridacteurs du code. Guillouard, no. 269.

Il y a lieu de s'6tonner que le Code de la province de Qu6bec, qui a td adopt6 en 1866, ait consacr6 le principe de la pr6somption 16gale contre le locataire en cas d'incendie des lieux lou6s. Il est vrai que la jurisprudence qui 'a pr&c6d6 Atait dans le sens litt6ral de 1'article du Code Napolon, que 'on consid6rait comme l'expression de 1'ancienne jurisprudence frangaise, et il Bi.

faut bien avouer que les arrts rendus depuis vout aussi loin. Simiaire de Qudbec v. Poitras, (1) ; B6lan- Girouard J ger v. McCarthy, (2).

Evidemment dans ces causes et autres, les tribunaux out t6 entrain~s par la doctrine ancienne et le Code Napol6on.

Je dois dire de suite que je ne puis accepter leur interpr6tation de Particle 1629 du Code Civil. Cet article est d'une nature p6nale et je ne puis lui donner que le sens et la porthe que les expressions de cet article comportent.

L'esprit de justice de nos gens s'est presque r6volt6 contre la rigueur de cette loi, puisque presque toujours les propri6taires y renoncent sans mime tre requis de le faire ; les blanes imprimbs des notaires out minme une renonciation pr6paree d'avance.

L'article 1629 du Code se lit comme suit:

Lorsqu'il arrive un incendie dans les lieux louis, il y a prisomption 16gale en faveur du locateur qu'il a t6 caus6 par la faute du locataire on des personnes dont il est responsable ; et h moins qu'il ne prouve le contraire, il ripond envers le propridtaire de la perte soufferte. Et ici, je ne crois pas pouvoir mieux exprimer ma pensee qu'en citant ce passage de I. le juge Boss6:- On est done fix6 en France, sur ce point ; et si l'on y juge maintenant ainsi, aprbs une longue exp6rience de Papplication de Particle 1733, h plus forte raison, devons-nous, au Canada, faire de m6me, sous Pempire d'un texte bien plus large et en appliquant une loi qui, au contraire du Code Napoldon, libbre en termes exprbs le preneur, s'il prouve le contraire de la prisomption de faute 4tablie par le texte, sans limiter cette preuve h des faits ou des causes particulibres, mais lui laissant sans restriction facult6 de prouver que Pincendie n'a eu lieu ni par sa faute ni par celle de ceux dont il est responsable. Le savant juge en chef considare que la faute du locataire dont il est question dans l'article 1629 est celle " du &lit on quasi-d6lit prsumb chez ce dernier." L'article 1629 dit plus que cela; il consacre un prin- (2) 19 L.C.Jur. 181.

cipe de droit p6nal qui doit recevoir une interpr6tation stricte et rigoureuse.

Le savant juge est d'opinion que le locataire est responsable de la faute " tris l6gre," aux termes de Particle 1053.

Sans admettre que la faute " tr~s 16gbre " soit celle qui est en vue dans 'article 1053--je ne puis accepter cette doctrine. L'article 1053 n'a jamais en l'intention d'6tablir des rgles concernant les d6lits et quasi-d6lits pr6sumbs ou 6tablis par la loi, mais seulement les d6lits et quasi-d6lits r6sultant du fait de l'homme.

D'ailleurs, Particle 1626 du Code indique hors de tout doute le degr6 de la faute du locataire dont fait mention Particle 1629. Cet article lui permet " d'user de la chose lone en bon pare de famille " et 6videmment il ne peut tre en faute tant qu'il se tient dans la limite de son droit. Tel me parait tre le sentiment des commentateurs et en particulier de Laurent, (1) :

? Or cet article 1728 correspond & Particle 1626 de notre Code et Particle 1137 A notre article 1064. Domat, liv. 1, tit. 4, sect. 2, no. 4, n'exige rien de plus : Le preneur est responsable de toutes fautes " o ne tomberait pas un pare de famille soigneux et vigilant."

Merlin, au mot " Incendie " du R6pertoire de Guyot enseigne la mime doctrine :

...... kgre Merlin ajoute que ce sont les termes des lois romaines et qu'elles s'appliquent an locataire.

Je considbre done que le mot " faute " qui se trouve dans 'article 1629 r~f~re & 1'obligation impos6e au loca- J taire par Particle 1626, et vent dire pratiquement contravention aux obligations que cet article d6crte. C'est A lui A 6tablir qu'il n'y a pas en contravention de sa part, qu'il a joui des lieux louds en bon pare de famille et qu'il n'a rien fait qui pfit 6tre la cause de l'incendie. C'est une question de fait qui est laiss~e A l'appr&ciation du tribunal.

L'appelant invoque deux d6cisions de cette cour h I'appui de ses pr6tentions ; Tamieson v. Steel oii, dit-il, cette cour d~cida en 1878, Henry J. dissident, que le locataire 6tait responsable "as he had failed to account for the fire according to articles 1627 and 1629 of the Civil Code." La cause n'est pas rapport~e. J'eu trouve une mention plus pr6cise dans le 2e tome du Digest de Stephens, p. 457: " Held, confirming the judgment of the Queen's Bench, that having failed to establish that the fire occurred without any fault of his or of his men, in accordance with the terms of art. 1629 of the Civil Code, he (le locataire) should be condemned to pay the damages caused to the premises leased by him, and moreover that respondent (le propri6taire) having proved that it was through the negligence of appellant that the fire occurred, he was liable under art. 1630 of the Civil Code for the damages to adjoining premises." C'est pr6cis6ment la doctrine que j'ai essay6 d'6tablir.

La d6cision de cette cour a tb non pas que le locataire devait prouver l'origine du feu, ou m6me l'impossibilit6 qu'il eut pris par son fait ou celui de ses employ~s, mais simplement que le locataire n'avait pas repouss6 la pr~somption de faute. le juge I3eaudry, qui avait rendu le jugement de la Cour Sup6rieure avait exprim6 Ia mime opinion 16gale, mais avait diff6remment appr6ci6 les faits. Suivant le r6sum6 de M. Cassels, car son jugement n'est pas rapport6, le savant juge 6tait d'opinion " that the weight of evidence was that no fault could attach to the J defendant or his employees."

En appel, cette appr6ciation de la preuve fut rejethe, Ramsay et Tessier JJ., dissidents. Il ne faut pas oublier que les juges Beaudry et Ramsay ont pris une large part A la confection du Code.

L'autre cause est celle de Evans v. Skelton, L'interpr6tation de 1'article 1629 donna lieu A une savante plaidoirie de la part des avocats; mais le jugement de la cour fut bas6 sur une clause du bail qui disait que le locataire, A son expiration, serait tenu de rendre les lieux en aussi bon 6tat qu'il les avait regus, " reasonable wear and tear and accidents by fire excepted."

La majorit6 de la cour, compos6e de Strong, Fournier et Gwynne JJ., d6cida que ces expressions suffisaient pour constituer, de la part du locateur, une renonciation & la pr~somption consacr6e par Particle 1629 du Code, Ritchie J. C. et Taschereau J. dissidents. ne me reste qu'a examiner la question de fait. Le juge de la Cour Superieur 'a d~cid6 contre le locataire, mais il suppose qu'il 6tait tenu d'expliquer 1'origine du feu: " II (le locataire) a bien prouv6 ofi et A peu pris quand le feu a pris, mais rien n'explique comment il a pris."

Il n'6tait pas tenu, suivant moi, de faire cette preuve. Les t6moins Major, Brien-Durocher et Martineau, les seuls employ6s qui 6taient dans la cave avant et au commencement de 1'incendie, ont vu le feu A son origine dans les balles d'6touppe qui 6taient dans la cave; ils ne peuvent l'expliquer, mais ils jurent positivement qu'il 6tait impossible qu'ils aient pu causer 1'incendie. L'honorable juge ne jette aucun discr6dit sur le t6moignage de ces ouvriers; il ne dit pas qu'il ne les croit pas; mais il observe que s'ils ont commis quelque imprudence on acte coupable, il n'est pas raisonnable de supposer qu'ils viennent s'en accuser.

La Cour d'Appel, A 1'unanimit6, a 6t d'un avis contraire.

M. le juge Boss6 observe:

Je suis aussi de cette opinion.

L'appelant signale particulierement cinq ou six faits comme autant de fautes de la part de 1'intim6.

Mais A qui la faute ? L'appelant n'avait pas mime plac6 de robinet dans la cave pour y prendre de 1'eau.

Le locataire 6tait-il tenu d'y garder des seaux d'eau pour pr6venir un incendie? Je ne le pense pas.

L'intim6 n'a pas pris le soin n~cessaire des d~chets de coton satur6s d'huile.

En supposant que la preuve justifierait cet avanc6, bien que c'est le contraire qui est prouv6, ces d6chets n'ont eu aucun rapport avec 1'incendio.

L'intim6 laissait ses employ6s attendre dans la cave leur tour d'aller au cabinet, mime de s'appuyer on s'asseoir sur les balles d'etonppe qui out pris feu. A qui la faute ? si ce n'est & 1'appelant qui a jug6 qu'un seul cabinet d'aisance suffisait dans une usine se trouvaient quarante ou cinquante ouvriers.

C'6tait, a mon avis, un vice de construction de la part du propri6taire.

n'a pas t6 examin6 par 1'appelant et il ne pouvait offrir son t6moignage dans une cause purement civile.

Les t~moins Martineau, Major et Brien-Iurocher jurent qu'il n'y 6tait pas.

6tait en effet en dehors, vaquant A ses affaires, et il ne faisait qu'arriver A son bureau an moment de l'incendie, an dire d'autres t6moins.

La bitisse avait t6 non seulement loude, mais construite par 1'appellant pour 'intim6 dans le but avou6 d'y avoir cette manufacture et il avait m~me stipul6 an bail que son locataire paierait tout exc6dent de prime que les compagnies d'assurance exigeraient A raison de la nature de son metier, et de fait il lui a pay6 cet exc6dent, presque le double de la prime ordinaire. En mettant ces balles d'6toupe dans la cave, il n'a fait qu'user du droit que lui garantissait son bail et Larticle 1626 du Code Civil. Toutes les pr6cautions possibles ont &t6 prises pour empAcher la communication du feu A ces balles d'6toupe. Un passage avait t6 minag6 pour permettre aux ouvriers de se rendre an cabinet; le gaz 6clairait toute la journ6e A divers endroits de la cave pour en faciliter l'acces; et les becs de gaz 6taient soigneusement enclos dans du fer blanc on du zinc.

Personne ne fumait dans toute la bitisse et les t6moins qui out vu commencer l'incendie jurent qu'ils n'ont rien fait pour le causer. L'incendie a eu lieu d'une maniare inconnue, mais non imputable A l'intim6 on A ses employ6s.

C'est la conclusion A laquelle en est arriv6e la cour d'Appel A 1'unanimit6 et A moins d'erreur manifeste de sa part, la jurisprudence de cette cour et celle du Conseil Priv6 ont 6t6 de ne pas intervenir sur une simple question de fait. Gravel v. Martin, (1) Canada Central Railway Company v. Murray (2); McGuaig v. Keith (3); Arpin v. The Queen (4) ; S. Santandarino v. Vanvert

Appeal dismissed with costs.