Cadieux v. Montreal Gas Co.

TASCHEREAU J.-I am of opinion that this appeal should be dismissed. When the statute says that if any person neglects to pay any rate, rent or charge due for gas, it is lawful for the company to stop the gas from entering the premises of any such person (d'em- E pecher gaz de s'introduire dans les idifices telle personne), I do not feel at liberty to hold that it does not mean what it says; when it says les idifices, it means tous the premises, all the premises. To restrict this enactment as the appellant contends should be done, would be legislation, not interpretation of the law.

The judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench is clearly right.

J.-The appellant is applying for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent to supply him with gas at his private residence, number 282 St. Charles-Borrommbe Street, in the City of Montreal. The Superior Court (Mathieu J.) granted the petition, but in appeal, this judgment was reversed for two reasons:-First, the agreement of the fourth of May, 1887, under which the respondent undertook to furnish gas to the appellant, contains an express provision that and that such notice was served upon the appellant; and secondly, the appellant having failed to pay his bill for gas supplied, upon his order, to premises known as number 1125 of Notre Dame Street, occupied by a tenant of the appellant, the respondent was justified, under se -tion twenty of its charter, (12 Vict. ch. 183), in cuting off their supply of gas from number 282 St. Charles-Borrommbe Street, where he was not in default.

It is not necessary to express any opinion as to whether under the contract of the fifteenth of November, 1895, with the City of Montreal, the respondent could enforce the power to cancel stipulated in the agreement of the fourth day of May, 1887.

It is sufficient to say that the respondents were in duty bound CAEUx to supply the citizens of Montreal with gas, unless duly relieved from that duty by contract or its charter; as to the contract, we have come to the conclusion that the stipulation above quoted does not apply.

When the respondents cut off the gas they did not intend to enforce it in the present case.

No notice in writing was ever given to cancel the contract with the appellant. Witness Burke, one of the clerks in the office of the respondents, says that

Another similar notice was sent on the second of

December, 1895, and, appellant having paid no attention to it, the gas was shut off on the fifth of the same month.

The collector of the respondents, Darling, corroborated this statement.

He notified, verbally, the appellant, that unless the account was paid immediately on the Notre Dame Street premises, the gas supply would be discontinued at number 282 Saint

Charles-Borromm6e Street.

It is therefore plain, that no notice to cancel the contract was given or even intended to be given, and that the notice sent was the one contemplated by section twenty of 12th Vict. ch. 183.

By that section it is enacted that:- [VOL. XXVIIl. service pipes or lamps of any such person, company or body, by cutting off the said service pipe or pipes, or by such other means as the said company shall see fit, and to recover the said rent or charge due up to such THE time, together with the expenses of cutting off the gas, in any competent MONTREAL court, notwithstanding any contract to furnish for longer time, and CoMPANY. in all cases where it shall be lawful for the said company to cut off and take away the supply of gas from any house, building or premises Gironard J. under the provisions of this Act, it shall be lawful for the company, their agents and workmen, upon giving twenty-four hours' previous notice to the occupier or person in charge, to enter into any such house, building or premises, between the hours of nine o'clock in the forenoon and f6ur o'clock in the afternoon, making as little disturbance and inconvenience as possible, and to remove, take and carry away any pipe, meter, cock, branch lamp, fittings or apparatus, the property of and belonging to the said company.

The reading of this clause brings us to the con- 'sideration of the second reason advanced by the Court of Appeal in support of their judgment.

We do not attach any importance to the use of the word tdijices in the French version of the statute, to arrive at the true meaning of the word "premises"

used in the English version.

We believe that the word ddi/ices here simply means lieux where the gas is consumed and not paid for, and not distinct buildings or premises where no fault exists.

" Premises"

cannot mean ,6difices only, as gas may be, and is in fact consumed out of edifices or buildings, for instance, in the open air, gardens and grounds, parks, streets and avenues. Exorbitant powers like those conferred by section twenty must be construed strictly, and if ever intended to cover all the buildings or premises of the same proprietor, or occupant, when in default with regard to -one of them only, must be granted in clear and no ambiguous language. The express provision contained in that section that the notice to cut off must be given ' to the occupier or person in charge," plainly indicates that only premises so occupied and in default must suffer.

Clause six of the contract of the respondents with the city of Montreal, containing a stipulation that they will " collect and receive the several cex sums of money at any time due by the gas consumers

TE from the latter only," and not from the city, conveys the same idea. Cutting off the gas is the most efficient mode. of collection and must therefore be enforced Gio ud against the consumer, that is the occupant only of the premises in default. To allow a different interpretation of the words of the statute would lead to the most absurd consequences, as for instance, when the proprietor has ordered gas meters for several premises occupied by different tenants in the same or separate buildings, or when a corporation like the city of

Montreal neglects to pay its gas bill on its buildings, or some of them, but not on its streets. These results must be avoided if a reasonable construction of the statutes would permit us to do so.

We believe that the interpretation given by the Superior Court is not only reasonable, but that it is the only one contemplated by the legislature.

Sheffield

Waterworks v.

Carter (1); In re The Commercial Bank of Canada and

The London Gas Company

For these reasons we are of opinion that the appeal should be allowed and the judgment of the Superior

Court restored with costs in all the courts.

and KING JJ. concurred.

Appeal allowed with costs.*

Lajoie.