Price v. Roy

P. was proprietor 7of certain lumber mills and a bridge leading to them across the River Batiscan.

The bridge being threatened with destruction by the spring floods, the mill foreman called for volunteers to attempt to save it by undertaking manifestly dangerous work in loading one of the piers with stone. While the work was in progress the bridge was carried away by the force of the waters and one of the volunteers was drowned. In an action by the widow for damages:

, that the maxim "volenti non fit injuria" did not apply, as the case was one in which both the mill owner and deceased were to blame, and that, being a case of common fault, the damages should be divided according to the jurisprudence of the Province of Quebec.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench for Lower Canada, appeal side (1), affirming the judgment of the Superior Court, District of Three Rivers, by which a verdict had been entered in favour of the plaintiff for damages incurred in consequence of the death of her husband.

The facts are sufficiently stated in the above headnote, and in the.judgment of His Lordship Mr. Justice Gironard.

:-Taschereau, Gwynne, Sedgewick, King and Girouard JJ.

(1) Q. R. 8 Q. B.

J.--I do not dissent, but, had the result of this judgment depended upon my conclusions, I would have greatly hesitated before reducing the R. amount given to the respondent by the courts below. The appellant's right to have the damages reduced by saying, " it is true I ordered the deceased to go upon that bridge, but he should have disobeyed my orders," seems to me doubtful.

If as now held he, the appellant, was guilty of imprudence in ordering the deceased to go upon that bridge on the occasion in question, it seems to me that the judgment should stand for the whole amount.

Should he not be estopped from invoking the obedience to his orders as a ground to oppose wholly or partly the respondent's claim ?

J. (dissenting.)-However much entitled to sympathy the family of the brave young man who lost his life when exposing it to such manifest danger in the interest of the appellant is, I do not, with great deference, think that the case can be regarded as raising any question of negligence on the part of the appellant, or of contributory negligence on the part of the deceased.

The case is rather one in which the deceased quite voluntarily, at the suggestion of his father, who was in the employment of the appellant, exposed his life to very manifest danger by entering upon the bridge which was perishing by the force the waters of the stream over which it was built, in the forlorn hope of preventing its absolute destruction. He may have been guilty of rashness but not of negligence.

The latter term is not applicable to the case.

The risk he was running was quite apparent to himself and to every one present, but he was under no obligation whatever to undertake the Tisk and expose himself to such manifest danger. The case, in my judgment, is a plain case for the application of the principle volenti non fit injuria, and therefore the appeal should be wholly allowed with costs, and the action in the court below dismissed.

J.

J-I am opinion that the appeal should be in part allowed by reducing the judgment as specified in the judgment prepared by Mr. Justice Girouard.

I concur with him also as to the disposition of the costs.

J. concurred in the judgment reducing the damages to nine hundred dollars with interest from the 22nd of April, 1898, and with costs incurred in the Superior Court, and also that each of the parties should bear their respective costs in the Court Queon's Bench and the Supreme Court of Canada. J.-II s'agit encore de la responsabilit6 du patron envers l'ouvrier.

L'appelant est propri~taire d'un moulin A scie et d'un pont sur la rivire Batiscan, dans la paroisse de Saint Stanislas.

Lors de la d6bbcle en avril 1897, l'eau est mont6e A une hauteur qu'on n'avait jamais vue depuis pris de trente ans. Le 27 avril, la glace avait fait des d6gits consid6rables au pont qui menagait d'6tre emport6 par le torrent. A la vue de ce danger, les repr6sentants de l'appelant demandent A des hommes de bonne volont6, g6n~ralement employds A leur 6tablissement, de venir sauver la proprit6 de leur maitre, en consolidant un des piliers. Trois hommes s'offrent, entr'autres Gd6on Trudel, le fils du contre-maitre qui dirigeait les travaux. Ce fut pendant que cet ouvrage se faisait, le 28 avril, que le pont fut emport6 et que tous les travaillants furent pr6cipit6s A l'eau. G-d~on Trudel y perdit la vie.

L'appelant est-il responsable de cet accident ? est admis que l'ouvrage 6tait dangereux, mais tout le monde connaissait le danger, le defunt comme les autres. L'appelant 6tait certainement en faute d'autori- *. ser un pareil ouvrage; le defunt l'tait davantage en exposant sa vie.

C'est donc le cas de faute commune et de diviser le dommage souffert selon la jurisprudence hautement equitable de la province de Quebec. La cause de 1'accident fut la faute du patron; celle de 1'ouvrier n'en a t que la cons6quence imm6diate. Je ne crois pas que l'on doive appliquer ici la maxime volenti nonjit injuria. Sans avoir t forc6 A ce travail dangereux, I'on- peut difficilement dire que 1'ouvrier s'est expos6 de son chef; il ne s'est pas offert sans requisition ; son pare 1'envoya chercher; il aurait pu refuser, mais il voulut faire preuve de son d6vouement auxint6rits de son maltre, et par mime mieux assurer la continuation de ses services dans son &tablissement.

Je suis d'avis d'accorder 1'appel et de r~duire le jugement de la Cour Sup6rieure A neuf cents piastres avec int6r~t A compter du 22 avril, 1898, et les d6pens encourus devant la Cour Sup6rieure.

Vu que 1'appelant n'a rien offert et a contest6 toute la demande, je serais aussi d'avis de laisser chaque partie payer ses frais tant devant la Cour du Banc de la Reine, que devant cette cour.

Appeal allowed in part with special directions as to costs.