the judgment of the said Court of Queen's Bench, but from the judgment rendered by the honorable Judge Maguire, and that such appeal to this honorable Court is allowed only from the judgment of the Court of last resort in the Province where such judgment has been rendered, and in the present cause, from the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench, which is the court of last resort in the Province of Quebec, according to section eleven (11), cap. 11, 38 Vic., and that an appeal lies directly to the Supreme Court from the judgment of the court of original jurisdiction only by the consent of parties, according to section twenty-seven (27) of the said chapter, and that such consent has never been given by the respondent or his attorney ;
" Whereas, by and in virtue of the laws of the Province of Quebec, no appeal lies in matters concerning municipal corporations and municipal offices, as provided by the articles 1033 and 1115 of the Code of Civil Procedure of Lower Canada, and that the mandamus in this cause has been issued against the appellant in his capacity of municipal officer, and to force him to fulfil .
the duties and obligations inherent to a municipal office, and that no appeal lies before this honorable Court from the judgment rendered by the honorable Judge Maguire, and that, even if such an appeal to this honorable Court did lie, this present appeal could not be maintained, having been brought after the delay mentioned in section 25th, cap. 11, 88 Vic."
Mr. Cockburn, Q. C., supported the motion. Mr. .Mc- Intyre, contra.
This is a motion to quash an appeal pursuant to sec. 8 of the Supreme Court Act. The appeal is from a judgment rendered in the Superior Court of Lower Canada under the following circumstances. The Municipal Council of the municipality of which the appellant was the presiding officer, having passed a by-law in which the respondent had an interest, the latter obtained from the Superior Court for the District of Rimouski a writ of mandamus, in order to compel the appellant to sign the minutes of the meeting of the Council in which the by-law had been passed. After service of the writ the appellant signed the minutes. The Superior Court, or a Judge thereof in Chambers, on the 6th May, 1877, gave judgment adjudging the present appellant to pay the costs. From that judgment the appellant appealed to the Court of Queen's Bench for the Province of Quebec, and that Court, on the 8th of Sept., 1877, rejected the appeal for want of jurisdiction, holding that the judgment of the Superior Court was final and in last resort. The appellant has now appealed to this Court from the judgment of the Superior Court. A motion having been made by the respondent to quash the appeal for want of jurisdiction, it was argued during the session of this Court in January, 1878, and re-argued during the last session. . By section 11 of the Supreme Court Act it is (inter alia) enacted:
And when an appeal to the Supreme Court is given from a judgment in any case, it shall always be understood to be given from the Court of last resort in the Province where the judgment was rendered in such case.
The 17th section is as follows:
Subject to the limitations and provisions hereinafter made, an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from all final judgments of the highest Court of final resort, whether such Court be a Court of Appeal or of original jurisdiction now or hereafter established in any Province of Canada, in cases in which the Court of original jurisdiction is a Superior Court ; provided that no appeal shall be allowed from any judgment rendered in the Province of Quebec in any case wherein the sum or value of the matter in dispute does not amount to $2,000 ; and the right to appeal in civil cases given by this Act shall be understood to be given in such cases only as are mentioned in this section, except Exchequer cases and cases of mandamus, habeas corpus, or municipal by-laws, as hereinafter provided.
Section 23 enacts that:
An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court in any case of proceedings for or upon a writ of habeas corpus not arising out of a criminal charge, and in any case of proceedings for or upon a writ of mandamus, and in any case in which a by-law of a municipal corporation has been quashed by rule of Court, or the rule for quashing it has been refused after argument.
The clear meaning of section 17 is, that the right to appeal is given from final judgments only, and, in Quebec, from final judgments, where the matter in dispute amounts at least to $2,000, except in Exchequer cases and matters of mandamus, habeas corpus and municipal by-laws, in which judgments not final may be appealed from. By this construction, which makes the exception apply to the provision regarding final judgments, and not to the Court appealed from, sections 11, 17 and 23 stand well together, without any repugnancy, and it is the primary and natural meaning of the lan- MAuva. guage in which the law is expressed. The exception cannot be read as applying to the proviso limiting the amount appealable in Quebec cases, for there would be no meaning in excepting Exchequer cases to which that proviso can have no application.
If it is said that its object is to except appeals in matters of mandamus, habeas corpus and municipal bylaws from the provision in the first part of the 17th section, limiting appeals to those from the highest Court of final resort, and to set such cases entirely at large as regards the Courts from which an appeal can be brought, the effect would be to cut down the general provision of the 11th section, by introducing an exception as regards the class of cases spoken of in the latter part of section 17, and in section 23. But we are not to give the general provision of the 11th section such an interpretation, unless it is absolutely requisite. Then, what are the cases in which the 17th section gives the right to appeal ? They are judgments of the highest Court of final resort in the Province in which the Court of original jurisdiction was a Superior Court. The exception of Exchequer cases would be without meaning here; they would be senseless, idle words, as applying, by way of exception, to the judgments " of the highest Court of final resort " now or hereafter to be established in any province." There is no sensible way of reading this exception but by treating it as distinguishing between a class of cases -ordinary civil actions and suits inter partes, in which an appeal is to lie from a final judgment only, and those enumerated in it-cases in the Exchequer, and those of mandamus, habeas corpus and municipal by-laws, in which it is clearly intended that the appeal shall not be restricted to final judgments, but may be taken from decisions on motions for rules and other applications not final in their nature, as well as from the ulimate determination. This is confirmed by sec. . 23, which expressly gives appeals in cases of mandamus, habeas corpus and applications to quash municipal by-laws, " in any case of proceedings for or upon a writ " of mandamus," &c., as well as in any in which a bylaw has beeni quashed, or the rule for quashing it has been refused after argument.
Again, section 68, which regulates appeals from the Exchequer, is quite consistent with this interpretation, since there is nothing in that clause confining appeals from that Court to a recourse against final judgments only, the word used being " decision," which is applicable as well to rules and orders not final as to final decisions.
This construction harmonises with all the provisions of the Act, and makes the several sections 11, 17 and 23 read consistently with each other, without suppressing any words as redundant, or reading any into the Statute by way of necessary implication. Appeals in ordinary civil suits between party and party are, therefore, governed by section 17, whilst appeals in matters of mandamus, habeas corpus, and municipal bylaws, are regulated by section 23 read, as regards the Court from which an appeal lies, subject to the interpretation clause, section 11 providing that an appeal shall always be understood to be given from the court of last resort in the Province. This disposes of the argument, that the effect of this exception of mandamus and cognate matters in section 17 was to emancipate those cases from the limitation as to the courts to be appealed from contained in the interpretation clause section 11. I think it right to say here that by the allusion which I have made to the words " final judgment " in the 17th section, I by no means assume that those words indicate anything more than the meaning attached to them by DAxou the interpretation given in the 11th section, which I take to be final as regards the particular motion application, and not necessarily final and conclusive of the whole litigation.
The next enquiry is, what is the meaning to be attributed to the words "Court of last resort" in section 11 ? I think it clearly means the highest Court of appeal in the Province in which the suit, action, or other proceeding has arisen. This conclusion is thus arrived at. The object of the 17th section is, as I have already attempted to establish, to limit appeals in civil suits and actions to final judgments, as these words are interpreted in section 11, and in Quebec cases to actions in which the matter in dispute is above the specified amonnt. As regards the Court from which the appeal is to lie, there is no reason to infer that the Legislature intended to make any difference between the class of cases particularly dealt with by section 17, and those to which the general provisions of the interpretation clause would apply. It is not to be arbitrarily assumed that the Legislature, by the words " highest Court of final resort," meant a different Court from that indicated by the words " Court of last resort in the Province," in section 11. Then, we may regaid the definition of the Court from which an appeal is given in section 17 as intended to repeat with more fullness and particularity, and by way of explanation, the provision of section 11 on the same subject. We are, therefore, to consider the two expressions " Court of last resort " and " highest Court of final resort," as convertible and equivalent in meaning. " Acts of Parliament," it is said by a late writer (1) "are frequently framed in varying phraseology without any intention of conveying a different meaning. In their progress through Parliament, alterations and additions from various hands are made, and thus present the style and language of D different authors.
In such cases, the more precise and determinate expression is regarded as fixing the meaning of that which may be conceived in language more general or ambiguous."
It follows that the appeal, in cases of mandamus under sec. 28, is restricted by the application of sec. 11 to decisions of "the highest Court of final resort." Then, the prefix "highest " entirely shuts out the possibility of the construction which would assign to the words " Court of final resort;" the flexible and varying meaning of Court of last resort in each particular caie, as it might, or might not, happen to be subject to appeal to the ultimate Appellate jurisdiction in the Province, and fixes the true meaning as that of last Court of Appeal in the Province, without reference to the particular case; for, though there may be Courts of last resort in different degrees for different cases, it is clear there can only be one highest Court of final resort in a Province.
Therefore, it appears plain that an appeal will not lie from any Court in the Province of Quebec but the Court of Queen's Bench.
Article 1033 of the Code of Civil Procedure of Lower is as follows: " An appeal from any final judg- "ment rendered under the provisions contained in this chapter, lies to the Court of Queen's Bench, except in "matters relating to municipal corporations and "offices, provided the writ of appeal be issued within "forty days from the rendering of the judgment ap- "pealed from."
The Court of Queen's Bench quashed the appeal to that Court, on the ground that this article applied, and that it had no jurisdiction; for the same reason this Court must, in my view, hold that the present appeal is also inadmissible in this Court.
SUPREME COURi OF CARADA.
Vo1. iI, The interpretation which I have applied to the language of the Supreme Court Act, has appeared sufficient to warrant the conclusion arrived at without calling in aid any extrinsic arguments.
There are, however, reasons of policy and convenience which show that every presumption should be made in favor of a construction which would refuse an appeal from the decision of a Superior Court of first instance, which the
Provincial Statutes have declared to be final and in last resort, and not subject to revision by the Provincial Court of Appeals.
Without touching on what may hereafter come to be an important . constitutional question, that regarding the powers of Parliament to confer appellate jurisdiction in particular cases or classes of cases on this Court, and the right of the Provincial Legislatures to withhold it, it would not, I think, be possible to attribute to the terms in which jurisdiction is conferred by the Supreme Court Act in the 11th section already referred to, even if it were read as an isolated enactment without any light from other parts of the Statute, a construction which would embrace appeals in cases in which the Provincial laws had precluded resort to the Provincial Court of Appeals. It must be presumed that the Provincial Legislature, in denying the right of appeal, designed to subserve the ends of justice and the requirements of good policy, and it must equally be presumed, in the absence of express words, that Parliament did not intend to subvert those laws, and. thus to annihilate Provincial legislation regulating the finality of law suits concerning property and civil rights. These observations have no reference to the constitutional question which would arise if Parliament was to give an appeal in a case in which the Legislature of a Province had expressly denied it, but they are only intended to show how strong an influence such considerations ought to have in favor of a construction ov which would avoid such a conflict. Had the ambigu- . ous words "Court of last resort" stood alone, this weighty presumption would; in my judgment, have been by itself sufficient to have impressed upon them the same meaning which I have derived from reading them in the light afforded by other provisions of the Statute.
It may well be remarked that no stronger instance of the impolicy of opening this Court to appeals shut out from the Appellate Court in the Province could be afforded than the present case.
We have here an appeal respecting a mandamus granted against a municipal officer, who complied with the complainant's demand before the judgment was given, whose term of office has long since expired, and who appeals only for the sake of getting rid of the costs, which primd facie his compliance with the demand after the writ was granted shows he was properly ordered to pay.
I think it also right to add that, although in strictness, we may not have it in our power to decline to entertain appeals for costs only, yet that such appeals ought, in my opinion, to be always regarded with the utmost disfavor, that the appellant should not, even though successful, be awarded costs, and that it may be found possible to make him pay costs. - In my judgment the motion must be granted and the appeal quashed with costs.
FouNIER, J.,:
Cette cause est maintenant devant la cour sur une motion demandant le renvoi de l'appel pour d6faut de juridiction, et d6faut de cautionnement.
Le pr6sent appel origine des faits suivants: Joseph Dayjou, 1'appelant, pr6fet de la premiare divi- DAsou sion municipale du comt6 de Rimouski, ayant refus6 de V. signer le procs-verbal des d61ib6rations d'une assembl6e du conseil de cette division, tenue le 31 ao^ t 1876, fut poursuivi devant la Cour Sup6rieure pour la province de Quibec, district de Rimouski, A 1'effet de le faire contraindre d'attester le dit proc6s--verbal par l'apposition de sa signature.
Aprbs contestation li6e, preuve et audition au m6rite, la dite Cour Sup6rieure, si6geant ' Rimouski, le 26 mai 1877 a rendu le jugement suivant:
ne s'agit pas maintenant du mbrite de ce jugement, mais seulement de la motion demandant le renvoi de 1'appel pour les deux motifs mentionn6s plus haut. Quant au second, savoir, le d6faut de cautionnement, comme il a 6t6 r6gl6 lors de 1'argument, je m'abstiendrai d'en parler. Il ne reste actuellement pour la consid6ration de la cour, que le premier motif, fond6 sur le d6faut de juridiction, savoir: que le jugement dont I'appellant vent appeler, ayant 6t6 rendu en matibres municipales, n'est pas susceptible d'appel d'aprbs les arts. 1038 et 1115 du C. P. C. de Qudbec.
La Cour du Banc de la Reine, devant laquelle cette cause a t port6e en appel, a donn6 gain de cause 'a 1'Intim6 en se fondant sur les deux articles ci-dessus cit6s.
Le pr6sent appel n'est pas de ce dernierjugement, mais de celui de la Cour Sup6rieure si6geant a Rimouski, en on date du 26 mai 1877, comme 6tant la cour jugeant en dernier ressort dans cette cause. Cette proo6dure a soulev6 l'importante question de savoir, si l'appel a cette cour existe d'un jugement en dernier ressort rendu par une autre cour que la plus haute cour de dernier ressort, dans la province de Qubec-c'est-A-dire la Cour du Banc de la Reine.
Les clauses de l'Acte 38 Vict. ch. 11, A consulter pour la solution de cette question, sont les 11e, 17e et 23e. La 11e est une clause d'interpr6tation fixant la signification de certaines expressions employ6es dans 1'acte. La 17e donne 1'appel dans les causes civiles seulement qui y sont mentionn6es, et en excepte les causes de la Cour d'Echiquier, celles de mandamus, d'habeas corpus ou concernant des rbglements municipaux pour lesquelles des dispositions sp6ciales sont faites par la sec. 23. Cette dernibre section est celle qui donne 1'appel dans les causes soustraites A 1'effet de la 17e.
[L'honorable juge lit la 17e clause de 'Acte 38 Vic. c. 11.] L'appel dans ces causes a sans doute t6 except6 des effets de la sec. 17, parce que ces causes, n'6tant pas appelables avant la passation de l'acte de la Cour Supr~me, elles 6taient alors jug6es en dernier ressort par les Cours Sup~rieures de 14re instance dans toutes les provinces de la Puissance, except6 celle de Qu6bec oil, dans certains cas, le Code de Procedure admet
'appel. II eut 6t6 bien 6trange de d6clarer que l'appel dans ces causes n'aurait lieu que du jugement de la plus haute Cour de dernier ressort, quand il-6tait certain que ces causes n'6taient pas susceptibles d'y 4tre port6es. Pour donner A cette clause une pareille signification, il faudrait done supposer que le parlement qui a donn6 'appel sans condition, en a cependant sous-entendu une, qui d6truirait son owuvre: c'est-i-dire, que 1'appel l ha Cour Supr6me n'aurait lieu que si une loi locale rendait ces causes appelables i la plus haute Cour provinciale afin qu'elles puissent parvenir jusqu'ici. Mais pourquoi supposer sans raison une condition si contraire au texte de la loi ? Le droit du parlement f6d6ral de rendre ces causes appelables, nonobstant toute 16gislation au contraire existant alors 4ans les provinces, n'6tant pas douteux, il me semble que cette disposition devrait recevoir son plein et entier effet.
Les procedures mentionn6es dans la section 23, 6tant de la nature des appels, comme appartenant aux pouvoirs de surveillance et de revision exerc6s par les cours sup6rieures sur les juridictions inf6rieures, n'6taient pas, du moins pour la plupart d'entre elles, sujettes A 'appel, comme je 1'ai dit plus haut. C'est aussi, sans doute, A raison de leur nature particulibre qu'elles out 6t6 soustraites A la n6cessit6 d'un appel interm6diaire. II 6tait done logique de dire simplement qu'il y aurait appel A la Cour Supreme, comme le dit si clairement la section 23.
Pour limiter 1'effet de cette dernibre section, l'Intim6 s'appuie fortement sur la section 11e, fixant la signification de certaines expressions dans 1'acte. - II pr6tend qu'elle a r6gl6 cette question, en d6clarant, que lorsque 1'appel est donn6, c'est toujours de la Cour de dernier reseort dans les provinces oil le jugement a 6t6 rendu dans telle cause
On remarquera d'abord que dans cette clause, sans doute en vue de 1'appel sp6cial donn6 par la section 28, l'on ne trouve pas comme dans la 17e le mot " highest," la plus haute Cour, il est seulement dit " la Cour de dernier ressort dans la province."
Le mot " highest " a sans doute 6t6 retranch6 afin d'6viter la contradiction qu'il y aurait eu en d6clarant d'un ct6, qu'il y aurait appel des causes jug6es en dernier ressort par les Cours Sup6rieures, et de l'autre que cet appel ne pourrait avoir lieu que de la plus haute Cour de dernier ressort dans la province, A laquelle ces causes n'6taient pas alors susceptibles d'etre port6es.
Le sens clair et 6vident de A . cette clause est que Pappel existe du jugement de la Cour qui prononce en dernier ressort par rapport A telle cause.
Il n'est pas ici question de la plus haute Cour, et ces termes doivent s'appliquer sans restriction A toute Cour si6geant en dernier ressort, pourvu qu'elle soit une Cour d'appel, on une Cour de juridiction sup6rieure jugeant en dernier ressort.
Si toutefois les termes pouvaient avoir la signification que leur donne 1'Intim6, on pourrait encore r6pondre que la section entibre (la 11me) n'a pas d'application A la question sous consid6ration.
En effet, il y est d6clar6 en termes formels que, A moins que " le contraire ne soit prescrit, on que le con- "texte s'exige 6videmment une autre interpretation," les expressions y mentionnees auront la signification qui leur eat donn6e.
Les deux conditions qui rendent en certains cas cette clause d'interpr6tation inapplicable, ne se pr6sentent-elles pas dans la question actuelle ? I Le contraire de la pr6tention que 1'appel n's lieu que de la plus haute cour de dernier reasort, n'est-il pas prescrit par la section 28 donnant l'appel sans condition. Le contexte de la mgme section ainsi que celui de la section 17 n'exige-t-il pas une autre interpr6tation que celle qui aurait pour effet d'aneantir le droit d'appel si clairement donn6?
Si
'on admet que la section 11 doit contr6ler l'appel donn6 par la section 23, n'en devrait-il pas tre de m6me pour la section 49. Par cette section toute personne trouvee coupable de haute trahison, de f6lonie ou de d6lit devant une Cour Sup6rieure de juridiction criminelle, peut, lorsque la con- .
viction a 6t6 confirm6e par une cour de dernier ressort, en appeler A la Cour Supreme du jugement de confirmation.
La Cour d'Erreur et d'Appel d'Ontario qui eat le plus haut tribunal de dernier ressort de cette province, n'a pas de juridiction d'appel en matibres criminelles. Si 1'on fait aux causes criminelles application de la dernibre partie de la section 11, savoir: " et lorsque l'appel A la "Cour Supreme eat permis a 1'6gard d'un jugement "dans aucune cause, il sera toujours sens6 tre permis "A l'6gard du jugement de la cour en dernier instance "dans la province oi le jugement a 6t6 rendu dans la "cause," il en r6sulterait qu'un appel ne pourrait pas avoir lieu A cette cour d'une conviction on sentence prononc6e par la Cour du Banc de la Reine de cette province, cette dernibre n'6tant pas la cour en dernibre instance dans la province d' Ontario. Est-ce A dire que pour cette raison 1'appel donn6 par la section 49 ne pourrait pas avoir lieu ? En faisant ainsi application de la clause d'interpr6tation, 'on d6truirait une des dispositions lea plus importantes de 1'acte. Mais je ne pense pas qu'une telle interpr6tation serait admise. On r6pondrait A cette objection que la Cour du Banc de la Reine eat une Cour Sup6rieure et en meme temps une cour de dernier ressort dans la province pour lea causes criminelles, et I'appel serait sans doute admis. Le meme argument, a'il eat valable dans ce cas, eat 6galement applicable A cehui dont il s'agit. La Cour Sup6rieure de la province de Qu6bec eat, comme 1'indique sa d6nomination, une cour sup6rieure de premiere instance, en meme temps qu'une cour de dernier ressort en certaina cas, comme en matibres municipales, d'apr~s lea arts. 1033 et 1115 du Code de P. C.
quelque maniere que j'envisage la question, je ne puis trouver la confirmation des pr6tentions de lIntim6 dans la sec. 1Ie i laquelle, suivant moi, 'on D donne une interpr6tation trop rigoureuse et une port~e qu'elle ne devrait pas avoir. Ma manibre de voir & ce sujet est appuy6e sur lea autorit6s suivantes :
Regina vs. the Justices of Cambridgeshire ; Regina vs. the Justices of Shropshire. Regina vs. the Justices of Gloucestershire. (1).
Dans ces causes lord Denman, a la page 491, s'exprime ainsi sur 1'effet des clauses d'interpr6tation:
De plus, d'aprbs lea r6gles d'interpr6tation, la sec. 23 contenant une disposition particulibre ne peut pas 6tre contr816e par la disposition g6n6rale de la sec. 11:- Cette section (23me) n'est aucunement en contradiction avec 1'esprit de l'acte, et ne peut avoir l'effet d'en rendre aucunes dispositions incompatibles, ni d'en d6truire lea effets. Elle peut exister sans affecter aucune des dispositions de 1'acte, pas m~me la section 11me qui contient la d6claration sp6ciale qu'elle ne s'applique pas dans le cas oA le sens de l'acte ne s'y pr6te pas. En rAsum6, la sect. 23 me parait avoir un sens trbs clair: elle donne le droit d'appel dans des causes oil la loi provinciale ne 1'admettait point. Frapp6 des d6veloppements consid6rables des affaires municipales dans ces dernidres ann6es, surtout depuis que lea corporations se sont engag6es dans les entreprises de chemins de (1) & fer pour bien des millions, le parlement f6d~ral a sans D&jou doute pens6 qu'il 6tait de ,1'int6r~t public, de soumettre EnquIs. A la juridiction d'appel de cette cour les jugements des cours de 16re instance d6cidant ces affaires en dernier ressort. Le pouvoir exerc6 de cette manibre n'6tant pas contestable suivant moi, je suis d'opinion que 1'on doit donner effet A la sec. 28, en recevant 1'appel en cette cause, La majorit6 de la cour en d6cide autrement.
J.:- In this case, a motion was heard to dismiss the appeal, on the ground that it was not a case within the meaning of the Act providing for appeals to this Court. It is an appeal from the decision of a Judge of the Superior Court in the Province of Quebec, in a case of mandamus before him, to compel the appellant to sign his name as warden of the Municipal Council of the first division of Rimouski to certain acts and deliberations of the Council, in accordance with his duty as such warden, and which he refused to do. There was a decision for costs only against him. The judgment was against him on the merits, but, as the appellant had, in the interim between the application for the mandamus and the hearing, done what the mandamus would have required him to do, no order for it was made; but the appellant was condemed to pay the costs of the application. From that judgment an appeal was first had to the Court of Queen's Bench, in appeal, but that Court properly, I think, decided there was no appeal thereto. The appeal to this Court was consequently taken.
A question might be raised as to the power of the Dominion Parliament to provide for an appeal, under such circumstances, to this Court. I will first endeavor to dispose of that question.
By the provision of the British North America Act, 1867, sec. 101, " The Parliament of Canada is given Dxou authority," from time to time, " to provide for the constitution, maintenance and organization of a general Court of Appeal for Canada." The right to " provide for the Constitution " of the Court without any terms of limitation, must, in my opinion, confer upon th'e Parliament of Canada the exclusive power of providing for appeals to this Court, from the highest to the lowest Courts in the Dominion; but, of course, in such a way as not to interfere with the procedure in the several Provinces, which is given for regulation to the Local Legislatures. No Act of the Parliament of Canada can affect the powers of the Local Legislatures in regard to appeals from one Court to another in any Province, but, when not so affecting such appeals, the Parliament of Canada, I hold, had, and has, the right to decide what cases shall come to this Court from the judgment or decision of any other Court.
Having disposed of that question, we must next enquire whether, by what Parliament has enacted, an appeal lies to the Court in the present, and similar cases. Sections 11,17 and 23 are those by which, it is said, we must be governed.
Section 17 provides for the cases in which an appeal shall lie. It enacts thus: "S ubject to the limitations and provisions hereinafter made, an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from all final judgments of the Court of final resort, whether such Court be a Court of Appeal or of original jurisdiction, now or hereafter to be established in any Province of Canada, in cases in which the Court of original jurisdiction is a Superior Court *
*
* And the right to appeal in civil cases given by this Act shall be understood to be given in such cases only as are mentioned in this section, except Exchequer cases, and cases of mandamus, habeas corpus, or municipal by-laws, as hereinafter provided."
[voL. Section contains the only provisions to which the terms " hereinafter' and "as hereinafter provi .ed" can be applied. Section cannot embrace the provisions section for they are in reference to section neither " hereafter " nor " as hereinafter provided."
Section 17 in its last clause clearly exempts from its own operation "Exchequer cases, and cases of mandamus, habeas corpus, or municipal by-laws," and in so many words says that in all those cases, as provided for in section there shall be an appeal. What then does section 23 provide?
" An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court in any case of proceedings for or upon a writ of habeas corpus not arising out of a criminal charge, and in any case of proceedings for or upon a writ of mandamus, and in any case in which a by-law of a municipal corporation has been quashed by rule of Court, or the rule for quashing it has been refused after argument."
As I said before, from the stand point of section 17 we are told to look to section 23; and to invert our vision to section 11, would be looking backwards for the light we are ordered to look forwards for; we would, in fact, be looking toward the west for sunrise. If, however, we did look at section 11, we would find its provisions do not affect the construction we should put upon sections 17 and 28, for by its terms the enactments in sections 17 and 23 are clearly excluded. It commences thus: " Unless it is otherwise provided, or the context manifestly requires another construction," certain words therein mentioned shall have a prescribed meaning, and the section ends with these words: " and when an appeal to the Supreme Court is given from a judgment in any case it shall always be understood to be given from the court of last resort in the province where the judgment was rendered in such case." Were it not for the opening expressions used in the first part of that section, it would be in direct opposition to the provisions of sections 17 and 23, but by them the provisions of those sections at variance with those of section AoU 11 are to prevail, because by them it is without question . " otherwise provided," and "the context manifestly requires another construction." Under section 23 there must of course be a judgment, order, or decision to appeal from, but, when there is, that section.provides for an appeal to this Court. In regard to the proceeding for or upon a writ of mandamus, the section makes no limitation; but in the case "in which a by-law of a municipal corporation has been quashed by rule of Court, or the rule for quashing it has been refused after argument," the appeal is, as regards a municipal bylaw, on conditions thus stated. It is allowed only in one case where the by-law has been quashed by rule of Court, or the rule for quashing it has been refused after argument. No such limitation as in the latter case iA provided in regard to proceedings for or upon a writ of habeas corpus or writ of mandamus. I feel bound to conclude, from a careful study of the whole case, that, an appeal lies in the case in question to this Court, and that our judgment on the motion to quash it should be for the appellant.
TAsOHEREAU, J.
This case is before us on a motion to quash the appeal. Marquis, the respondent, sued out a writ of mandamus against the defendant, (appellant,) on the ground that the said appellant had, as warden of the County of Rimouski, illegally refused to sign certain proceedings of the County Council, in which he, the plaintiff, had an interest. The writ was allowed by a Judge in Chambers,and made returnable before him in Chambers, and the whole of the proceedings, including the judgment complained of, took place before a Judge in Chambers, sitting in vacation, under sections 10, 23 et seq. of the Code of Procedure. By this judgment, the' D wou defendant (appellant) was declared to have illegally .
acted, in refusing to sign immediately the proceedings in question, but as it appeared that, since the return of the said writ, he had signed them, he was condemned only in the costs of the proceedings. The defendant appealed from this judgment to the Court of Queen's Bench, but this appeal was dismissed on motion, as by article 1033 of the Code of Procedure no appeal is allowed on mandamus in municipal matters. This judgment is reported
It was undoubtedly correct, and it can hardly be seen how the defendant could have brought such a case before the Court of Queen's Bench in the face of the article of the Code, and the constant jurisprudence of the Courts in the matter (2). He now admits this error, and appeals to this Court, not from the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench, dismissing his appeal, but from the judgment given against him at Rimouski by a Judge in Chambers, as just mentioned. We have now to determine whether the appellant has an appeal to this Court from this last mentioned judgment.
Three clauses of the Supreme Court Act have to be examined on this question : the eleventh (11th), seventeenth (17th) and twenty-third (23rd). The eleventh, which is the interpretation clause of the Act, reads as follows:
and Appeal; and when an appeal to the Supreme Court is given from a judgment in any case, it shall always be understood to be DAxrou given from the Court of last resort in the Province where the judgment was rendered in such case.
M"Qngl. The 17th clause is in the following words:
Subject to the limitations and provisions hereinafter made, an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from all final judgments of the highest Courts of final resort, whether such Court be a Court of Ap. peal or of original jurisdiction, now or hereafter established in any Province of Canada, in cases in which the Court of original jurisdiction is a Superior Court; provided that no appeal shall be allowed from any judgment rendered in the Province of -Quebec in any case wherein the sum or value of the matter in dispute does not amount to two thousand dollars; and the right to appeal in civil cases given by this Act shall be understood to be given in such cases only as are mentioned in this section, except Exchequer cases and cases of mandamus, habeas corpus or municipal by-laws, as hereinafter provided. And the 23rd clause enacts that :
An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court in any case of proceedings for or upon a writ of habeas corpus not arising out of a criminal charge, and in any case of proceedings for or upon a writ of mandamus, and in any case in which a by-law of a municipal corporation has been quashed by rule of Court, or the rule for quashing it has been refused after argument.
The contention of the appellant is that this last clause entitles him to his present appeal.
Certainly if it was to be applied as it reads alone, and independently of the other parts of the Statute, the appellant would be well founded in his contention. But if, on the one hand, a well settled rule on interpretation of Statutes is, that the interpretation clause is not to be strictly construed, on the other hand, it is a rule equally clear and well established that the intention of the law giver is to be deduced from a review of the whole and of every part of the Statute, taken and compared together (1).
The interpretation clause must receive a liberal construction, it is true, but it is equally true, in my opinion, that it cannot be altogether (1) Potter's Dwarris on Statutes p. 110.
thrown aside in the interpretation of a particular D,iou subsequent enactment.
Quite the contrary, it overrides the whole Statute, and, in the very terms of K-* section 11 of the Supreme Court Act, unless it is other wise provided, or the context manifestly requires another construction, the meaning given to a particular word in the interpretation clause attaches to that word throughout the whole Statute.
Now, this section 11 positively enacts that, when an appeal to the Supreme Court is given from a judgment in any case, it shall always be understood to be given from the Court of last resort in the Province where the judgment was rendered in such case.
On one part of his argument at the hearing before us, the appellant, far from denying the bearing of section 11, or section 23, invoked it, if I understood him well, but argued that, in his case, the judgment he appeals from is the judgment of the Court of last resort, quoad him, as he had no appeal to the Court of Queen's Bench. But it seems to me that the words of this section 11 clearly say that no appeal is given in any case, except from the Court of last resort in each Province. The words " whether such Court be a Court of original jurisdiction or a Court of appeal," in this section and in section 17, cannot be interpreted so as to give an appeal either from the Court of original jurisdiction or from the Court of Appeal in the Provinces where there are Courts of Appeal; but, it seems to me, only mean that in the Provinces where there are no Courts of Appeal, the appeal to the Supreme Court shall lie from the court of original jurisdiction, (provided the court of original jurisdiction is a Superior Court,) and in the provinces where there exist Courts of -Appeal, the appeal to this Court shall lie from that Court of Appeal; in all cases giving an appeal to this Court only from the Court of last resort in each Province. This distinction was most wisely made in the Act, as it is well known that in New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and some of the other Provinces, there are no Courts of Appeal. Cases come before us directly from the Courts of original jurisdiction, because for such Provinces they are the Courts of last resort. But is the appellant here, putting the question in the very words of section 11, appealing from a judgment given by the Court of last resort in the Province where the judgment was rendered in his case?
Clearly not. The Court of last resort in the Province of Quebec is the Court of Queen's Bench; he appeals from the Superior Court.
The appellant, in another part of his argument, tried to get rid of this sec. 11. of the Act by relying entirely on sec. 23, and reading it by itself, and as not ruled by the said sec. 11.
I have already laid down the clear, fair and well established principle that the intention of the law-giver is to be deduced from a view of the whole and of every part of a Statute, taken and compared together.
" It is an elementary rule," says Maxwell, "that construction is to be made of all the parts together, and not of one part only by itself" (1). Now, taking the whole of this Act together, it appears to me that, even in criminal cases, the intention of the Dominion Parliament has been to give an appeal to this Court from the Courts of last resort in each Province only, and from no other Courts. As I have said already, if the Court of last resort in a Province is a Court of original jurisdiction, then the appeal is given from that Court of original jurisdiction ; if, on the contrary, in another Province, the Court of last resort is a Court of Appeal, then the appeal to the Supreme Court is given from that provincial Court of Appeal.
And what would be the consequences for the Province of Quebec, if we were to give effect to this 23rd clause, as it reads by itself and without reference to (1) p.
see. 11 of the Act? Virtually, to abolish the Court of Review and the Court of Appeal in all cases of habeas corpus (not arising out of a criminal charge), and in all cases of mandamus, in other than municipal matters. In such cases, under the Provincial laws, there is anappeal to both these Courts under certain restrictions Now, if section 23 of the Supreme Court Act is to be construed independently of sec. 11, in all these cases an appeal would be given to the Supreme Court directly from the Court of original jurisdiction, without obliging the parties to go to review or to appeal in the Province. It may be doubted, if the Dominion Parliament has such a power: whether it can in any case take away directly or indirectly the jurisdiction that each Local Legislature chooses to give to its own Provincial courts; whether under section 101 of the B. N. A. Act it has the power to give an appeal to the Supreme Court from any other but the Court of last resort in each Province. But I need not enquire into this; in my opinion, it has not done so in section 28 of the Supreme Court Act, because I hold that this section is ruled by section 11, and that, under both, no appeal to this Court lies in any case except from the Court of last resort in each Province. Another anomalous consequence of the interpretation that the appellant gives to this clause would be that, in the Province of Quebec, an appeal to this Court would be in some cases from the Circuit Court. For, this section 23, gives also an appeal to this Court in all cases in which a by-law of a municipal corporation has been quashed by rule of Court, or the rule for quashing it has been refused after argument. Now, in the Province of Quebec, under the municipal codes, all such cases are brought before the Circuit Court, and, if the appellant's contention was admitted, could be appealed from that Court here.
By holding that there is no appeal except from the Court of last resort in each Province, . we avoid making the Statute give an appeal to this Court direct from the Quebec Circuit Court, which I believe was not the intention of the Parliament to give. Then, with this interpretation, in cases concerning the quashing of municipal by-laws, as in mandamus and habeas corpus in civil matters, and all other cases, the parties have to go to the local Court of Appeal before coming here (1).
" Before adopting any proposed construction of a passage susceptible of- more than one meaning," says Maxwell, on Statutes (2), " it is necessary to consider the effects or consequences which would result from it, for they do very often point out the genuine meaning of the words. There are certain objects which the legislature is presumed not to intend, and a construction which would lead to any of them is therefore to be avoided."
Applying these remarks to this case, and believing that it was not the intention of Parliament to give in any case an appeal to this Court directly from the Circuit Court of the Province of Quebec, I cannot read this section 23 so as to have an effect which Parliament did not intend.
Another possible objection to this appeal is that it is from a Judge in Chambers, and not from the Superior Court.
In certain cases, an appeal to the Court of Queen's Bench or to the Court of Review, is given from a Judge in Chambers, but only when a special enactment allows it. So it was held by the Court of Queen's Bench, in Beliveau v. Chevrejils ; see, also, of treal,
Statutes and regulations cited
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Unresolved citations
- the Constitution