the judgment of the Superior Court and declared the sale null and of no effect, on the ground that, as the property was situated in the parish of l'Enfant JAsus, a parish duly erected for all civil purposes, the property could only be sold at the church door of the said parish of l'Enfant JAsus, but the Supreme Court of Canada did not express any opinion on this point, as there was another reason sufficient to declare the sale null and void, and as this point had since been settled by legislation (1).
The evidence bearing upon the case sufficiently appears in the judgments hereinafter given.
Mr. Laflamme Q. and Mr. Loranger Q. C., for Appellants:- Q.
The appellants submit that the property was rightly sold at the Sheriff's office in Montreal. The judgment appealed from is based exclusively upon the Sheriff having sold the property in question at the wrong place. If this decision is a sound one, hundreds of other Sheriffs titles, besides appellant's, will be invalid, as sales of property situate in the city and banlieue of Montreal have always been advertized to take place, and been held, at the Sheriffs office in Montreal, both before and after the subdivision of that parish: The learned counsel entered into a lengthy and elaborate argument to show that the banlieue of Montreal was recognized by legislative anthority, although no edict or law creating it can be found, and referred to a number of authorities, but as this point has since been settled by legislation and the judgment of the Supreme Court decided the case on other grounds, no further reference to this branch of the argument need be made.
The Court below was unwilling to reverse the judgment of the Superior Court on any of the other grounds taken. These grounds of nullity are three in number viz:
1st.-As to several lots being sold en bloc, there is no law requiring them to be sold separately, or forbidding the sale en bloc. On the contrary, the Code distinctly contemplates several lots being sold together by the Sheriff for one and the same price.
Vide Art. 785, Code of Procedure. Common sense dictates that there should be no unbending rule.
2nd.-As to no demand of description of property being made by Bailiff on defendant, or refusal by him to give one. The procds-verbal of seizure shows that the seizing officer made the demand on defendant for description of his immovable property, at defendant's domicile, speaking to a grown person of his family; and that he seized the real estate mentioned in said procds-verbal such as described by the defendant, speaking as aforesaid, and after having himself ascertained its correctness on the spot.
Art. 637, Code of Procedure, does not require any personal requisition on the defendant; and the seizing officer fully complied with it. It is evident also that if there had been any non-observance of its requirements, it is only the defendant who could complain of it, not the present appellants, and the 'defendsut could do so by opposition a fin d'annuler; brt only if the description in the procds-ve-bal was inexact. Vide Dupuis vs. Bourdages and Bourdages opposants
3rd. -As to there being no indication of street range or concession.
The description is in accordance with Act
2168 of the Civil Code. The Coteau St. Louis is given, the parish and the cadastral numbers of the lots, which Art
2168 declares to be the true description and sufficient in any document whatever. It is also specially stated that the Sheriff shall so describe immoveables in his notices of sale. If appellants had fyled an opposition on the ground that the property was on a street and that it ought to be so described, they would be required to allege and prove the fact. Now, they have not alleged the lots to be upon any street, nor have they produced any evidence proving it.
There is no allegation as to the lots being on Robin
Street or any street; and the only witness who speaks as to their situation is the defendant, David Gauthier, who states that the lots are upon Robin Street, Coteau St.
Louis, parish L'En/ant Idsus, and that there is a sign board with the name of the street, and that it is known by that name, and in the village of Cotean St. Louis.
This is altogether insufficient evidence to prove the existence of a legal street, such as the Sheriff would be justified in stating the lots seized to be situated upon. Respondents prove the village to be incorporated, and should have produced the proper municipal officer to prove that Robin Street was a duly homologated legal street acquired by the corporation and paid for, otherwise the Sheriff would expose himself to a demand by the purchasers to set aside the dicret, or for a reduction in price, if the " street " proved to be merely one of sufferance, or a projected one (of which there are many in Montreal) the ownership of which was in private hands, and which the corporation would have at some future time to acquire and assess the costs upon those interested; no one in the meanwhile being responsible for repairs, drainage, etc. There is documentary evidence in the record which goes to establish that this so-called street was in fact private property. In the deed of sale from respondents to defendant the lots in question are described as sub-division numbers of official No. 167 of Cote St. Louis and fronting on Robin Street, which is itself described, in parenthesis, thus " (No. 52 du No. 167)." Now, the fact that this " Robin Street" had a cadastral number proves that it was not a road or street in the eye of the law, but private property, cadastral numbers not being given to public streets. Vide 85 Vict., c. 16, sec. 2 Q.
The Code of Procedure does not set aside Sheriff's sales for informalities in the seizure which could be set up by opposition; on the contrary, it says that non-observance of the essential formalities prescribed for the sale shall have that effect; these formalities are set forth at length in Art. 665 to 689 0. C. P., and a violation of these, in some essential part, would be good ground for setting aside the sale, there being no other remedy open to the party aggrieved, as, of course, no opposition could then be fyled.
So far from these being grounds which could be set up after a Sheriff's sale in order to set it aside, it has been held that an opposition setting up such grounds should be fyled to the first execution under writ of fieri facias, and would be too late if opposed to the sale under the venditioni exponas ; vide Abbott vs. The Montreal and Bytown Railway Company fortiori, it would be too late after the sale: Berthelet vs. Guy (2). Mr. Doutre, Q. for respondents-after arguing that the sale was properly made at the Sheriff's office in the City of Montreal, continued as follows:
The other grounds of opposition on which the respondents rely also are:
These four lots, bearing each a separate cadastral number, 20 and of the subdivision of No. 167, were four different immovables and should have been sold separately. The law is not so precise on this point as it is on the other; but it ought to be interpreted, and, as a matter of fact, it has generally been interpreted, in a common sense way, in the interest of all parties, which consists in obtaining the most possible from judicial sales,-the plaintiff and other creditors in getting paid, the defendant in being released of his indebtedness. In the audience, at a sheriff 's sale, there may be a number of persons capable of purchasing a house and lot and unable to buy four. The fact proved, that these houses were under one roof, in order to justify the sale of four houses in one lot, cannot go far to justify the very unusual proceeding of selling four houses in one lot. In every large city or town, there are terraces, containing fifteen or twenty houses, apparently under a continuous roof, but belonging to different owners.
The reason why they were sold in one lot, is given by the Sheriff's officer who made the sale, Mr. Vilbon, as follows: " Before putting up the property for sale, the defendant requested me to sell it by lots, and Mr.
.
(2) 8 C. I.
Arthur Desjardins, who was the attorney ad lites for the plaintiff, objected to this; I then referred the matter to the Sheriff and to the Deputy Sheriff, and these gentlemen decided that the property should be sold bloc; they consulted Mr. Lacoste, who was there, and they decided that the sale should be made in one lot only. Now we find that the property was adjudged to the same Mr. Arthur Desjardins, for the appellants, for the sum of $450!
Article 2167 of the Civil Code says:-Each lot of land shewn upon the plan is designated thereon by a number, which is one of a single series, and is entered in the book of reference to designate the same lot. Article 668 of the Code of Civil Procedure says that every bid must indicate, amongst other things, the immovable bid upon. The word " immovable " is in the singular number, implying thereby that one immovable only should be put up to sale at a time.
(2). Then also, contrary to article 688 of the Code of Procedure, section the minutes of seizure did not indicate the street in which the immovables seized were situated. This is aiswered by art. 2168 of the Civil Code, where it is said that " the number given to a lot upon the plan and in the book of reference is the true description of such lot and is sufficient as such in any document whatever, and any part of such lot is sufficiently designated by stating that it is a part of such lot and mentioning who is the owner there-f and the properties conterminous thereto."
The Civil Code came into force on the 28th June, 1866; the Code of Procedure on the 28th June, 1861. By all the rules of interpretation the last statute prevails over the former one.
Carrd4. Chauvea4 (1) say that in these matters, the II.]
law muat be observed strictly and no latitude of interpretation is admissible.
In the official cadastre of which this Court can take judicial notice, Robin street is well marked and described. The deed of sale which has been fyled in the case mentions the fact that this property is situated on Robin street. The provisions of the law have not been complied with, and it was for the appellants to show by authority that some of the formalities prescribed could be omitted.
Mr. Q. in reply:- The evidence clearly establishes that it is usual for the Sheriff to sell en bloc an unfinished terrace built on four sub-divided lots. The law gives the Sheriff a discretionary power.
J.:-Must not that discretionary power be exercised at the time of the seizure and not at the time of the sale?]
Yes, but the seizure in this case does not specify that the seizure was of four separate lots, but it is specified here in one description as four lots of land.
As to the omission of the name of the street, this objection should have been taken before the sale and, moreover, it will be seen that there is no evidence of the legal existence of a street, and by referring to the amended agdastre, it will be seen that this property is not bounded by the street
J.
Les intim6s devant cette
Cour, opposants en
Cour inf6rieure, ont demand6 la nullit6 du d6cret d'un immeuble saisi et vendu ' la poursuite de Moise Courtemanche contre Pierre Gauhier, leur d6biteur d'uW6 dt~ance hypoth6caire.
Cet immeuble est d6crit dans le proc~s-verbal de [VOL. IHl. saisie et dans les annonces de vente faites par le sh6rif, comme suit:
LO
" Quatre lots de terre ou emplacements situ6s au Oateau St. Louis en ia Paroisse du St. Enfant Jsus, faisant ci-devant partie de la *
Paroisse de Montr6al, dans le District de Montr6al, 6tant connus et FAEEx. d6sign~s aux Plan et Livre de Renvoi officiels du village du Coteau St. Louis de Ia dite Paroisse de Montr6al, sons les num6ros dix-huit, dix-neuf, vingt et vingt-et-un de la subdivision du num6ro cent soixante-et-sept (167) des dits Plan et Livre de Renvoi officiels- Avec quatre maisons en bois et d6pendances sus 6rig6es."
Ces quatre lots ont t6 vendus comme n'en formant qu'un seul.
Dans leur opposition, les intim6s all6guent qu'ils ont sur cette proprit6 une cr6ance de bailleur de fonds au montant de $3,880.95, et que la vente qui en a 6t6 faite est nulle pour les raisons suivantes :
lo. Parce que I saisie des dits immeubles a 6t6 faite en violation des dispositions de la loi, lesquelles sont toutes & peine de nullit6: § 1. Plusieurs lots de terre ayant 66 saisis en bloc; § 2. Le DWfendeur n'ayant pas refus6 d'indiquer ce qu'il poss~dait d'immeubles et le Sh6rif les ayant ainsi saisis en bloc, sans indication on d~signation founaie par le Dfendeur, et sans refus de sa part de indiquer on designer (1); § 3. La description des immeubles saisis:i'indiquAnt pas I rue, le rang ou la concession de la paroisse oAi dits lots sont d6clar6s 4tre situ6s (2).
Les memes causes de nullit6 sont ausEi invoqu6es contre les annonces de la vente et contre lin vente ellememe. Hs all~guent en outre que :
§ lo. Chaque immeuble ou lot de terre devait Atre vendu s6par6ment (3)
§ 2o. Le DWfendeur a formellement requis le Sh6rif de mettre s6par~ment en vente les dits lots de terre, et cela n'a pas 6t6 fait; § 3o. mise en vente en bloc constitue le dol et lea artifices mentionn6s en Part. 714 du C. P. C.; § 4o. L'adjudicataire qui a substitu6 Ia dite Compagnie " The Montreal Loan and Mortgage Company " A lui-m6me au bureau du Sh6rif et apris la vente 6tait lFavocat du saisissant, et tout ce qui pr6cde 6tait & sa con. naissance.
Les intim6s ajoutant de plus, que la cone6quence des (1) Art. 637 C. P. C.
(2) Art. 638, § 3, C. P. C. (3) Art. 668, C. P. C.
VOL. Il.] SUPRHE COURT OF CANADA.
proc646s ainsi faits en violation de la loi a 6t6 de faire vendre la propri6t6 en question A vil prix, et par l de leur faire perdre toute occasion d'8tre pay6s de leur prix de vente.
L'appelante a li6 contestation par une r6ponse all&guant que la nullit6 du dbcret ne peut 6tre demand6e par opposition, mais qu'elle doit 1'6tre par une requ~te libell~e conform6ment A 1'art. 715 du Code de Proc&dure Civile; elle maintient la 16galit6 de la saisie et des annonces et ajoute que la propri6t6 en question, 4tant situ6e dans la paroisse du St. Enfant J6sus formant autrefois partie de la banlieue de Montrial, dont elle a
.60 d6membr6e, devait 6tre vendue, non A la porte de l'glise de cette paroisse, mais au bureau du sh6rif comme 1'ont toujours 6t, avant et depuis le Code de
Procdure, toutes les propri6t6s situ6es dans la banlieue de Montrial.
Les intim6s, comme cr6anciers hypoth6caires du saisi,
Gauthier, ont indubitablement, en vertu de Particle 714 du Code de Proc6dure Civile, le droit de demander la nullit6 du d6cret. Mais on leur objecte que cette demande ne peut 6tre form~e par voie d'opposition, mais qu'elle doit .1'6tre au moyen d'une requate libell6e, signifi6e A toutes les parties int6ress6es comme le veut
Particle 715 du Code de Procdure Civile. La pi6ce de proc6dure que les intimbs ont d6sign6e sous le nom d'opposition contient en r6alit6 toutes les all6gations d'une requate libell6e; elle a aussi t6 signifi6e A toutes les parties int6ress6es suivant les dispositions de Particle
Pour en faire une requate en tout conformeA cet article, il suffirait d'en changer le nom. Les proc6dures et les actions n'ont point de noms particuliers par lesquels elles doivent 6tre d6sign6es.
I suffit pour leur validit6 qu'elles contiennent des all6gations suffisantes pour justifier 1'octroi de leurs conclusions.
L'objection faite A la proc6dure adopt6e par 1'intim6 OF
[VOL. I. n'est cons6quemment pas fond6e. La Cour Sup6rieure et la Cour du Bane de la Reine ont 6t unanimes A la re*eter
Une autre objection, bas6e sur le d6faut d'interpellation faite an d6fendeur de donner nne designation de ses immeubles, ne me parait pas fond6e non plus. Le procs-verbal de saisie constate que 1'huisaier s'eat adress6 & une personne raisonnable de la famille du d6fendeur, et que parlant A cette personne, " il aurait "somm6 le d6fendeur de lui donner une dbaignation de "sea immeubles." Le d6fendeur 6tait sans doute absent de chez lui lors de la saisie; mais son absence ne pouvait aucunement emp~cher les huissiers de proc6der. La loi n'exigeant pas que cette sommation soit faite personnellement au d6fendeur, elle peut I'6tre a son domicile, et il est constat6 qu'elle a 6t6 faite de cette maniare. La v6rit6 de ce fait ne pett 6tre mise en question, car le procas-verbal en fait une preuve authentique qui ne pent Atre contredite que par la voie de 1'inscription de faux A laquelle on n'a pas jug6 A propos de recourir. Le d6fendeur Gauthier n'a pas dA d'ailleurs tarder A 6tre inform& de cette saisie, et de la sommation qui lui avait t6 faite, puisqu'un double du procks-verbal contenant cette sommation a 6t laiss6 A son domicile. Le paragraphe 4 de l'article 638 du Code de Procdure Civile dit qu'un exemplaire du proc6s-verbal sera laiss6 an saisi, personnellement on A son domicile r6el on 16gal. On doit done consid6rer 1'interpellation comme ayant en lieu suivant la loi.
Quant a la pretention que les quatre lots saisis devaient Stre vendus a6par6ment, la preuve A cet 6gard est contradictoire, bien qu'il en ressorte certainement le fait que ces maisons inachev6es 6taient destinbes A faire des habitations s6par6es les unes des autres; mais 6tant d'avis que les Opposants ont raison sur un autre point, .et qu'ils doivent obtenir leur conclusion, je me dispenserai d'analyser cette preuve. Je m'abstiendrai aussi de me prononcer sur une question qui a 6t6 l'objet de beaucoup de recherches de la part des savants avocats des parties :-c'est celle de savoir si la vente aurait dfi tre faite A la porte de 1'6glise du St. Enfant JIsus, au lieu de l'Atre au bureau du sh6rif. La raison de mon abstention est que cette question a 6t0, depuis que cette cause est sous consid6ration, r6gl6e par un statut de la dernibre session de la l6gislature de Qudbec. II est vrai qu'il fait exception des causes alors pendantes.
Il reste maintenant & consid6rer la question de savoir si la description de l'immeuble donn6e par le shbrif dans ses annonces de vente est conforme a la loi, et si l'observation des formalit6s A ce sujet par le Code de Proc6dure sont A peine de nullit6.
L'article 648 du Code de Procedure Civile oblige le sh6rif & donner dans ses annonces de vente la description* de l'immeuble telle qu'ins6r6e au procks-verbal de saisie.
D'aprbs Particle 638 la saisie est constat6e par un proc6sverbal qui doit contenir d'aprbs le paragraphe 8 de cet article, " la description des immeubles saisis en indi- "quant la cit6, ville, village, paroisse ou township, ainsi
"que la rue, le rang ou la concession oii il sont situbs, et "le num~ro de 1'immeuble, s'il existe un plan officiel
"de la localit6, sinon les tenants et aboutissants."
Le langage de cet article suffit pour faire voir que les formalit6s qu'il prescrit sont A peine de nullit6. O'est dans la forme imp6rative que s'exprime le Code, " la saisie "des immeubles est constatge par un proces-verbal qui doit "contenir."
Les formalit6s prescrites ont-elles 6t6 observ~es dans le cas actuel ?
D'abord, quant A la situation, on voit par le procds-verbal que les emplacements en question sont situbs au
Coteau St. Louis, en la paroisse du &t. Enfant
Qu'est-ce que le Cotesu St. Louis? est-ce une cit6, ville ou village ? Pour le savoir il faut recourir A la preuve,
L'acte de vente des opposants qui conformement & Particle 1,210, paragraphe 2, fait preuve 16gale des 6nonciations qu'il contient, d6clare que les lots en question sont
Le d6put6 et le premier commis -du sh6rif entendus comme t6moins d6signent cette localit6, 1'un sous le nom de " Oe St. Louis " et l'autre sous cehui de " Coteau St. Louis." Le d6fendeur entendu comme t6moin dit que la propri6t6 est dans les limites du village du Coteau St. Louis.
Le doute que peut causer cette preuve sur le v6ritable nom de la localit6 est facilement tranch6 en r6f6rant & la proclamation qui 1'a 6rigbe en municipalit6 de village. Cette proclamation, dont nous sommes tenus de prendre judiciairement connaissance, 6tablit que la d6signation donn6e dans l'acte de vente des opposants est correcte. Dans ce cas il est clair que la localit6 n'a pas d6sign6e dans la saisie et les annonces de vente comme le veut Particle 638. On a omis une d6claration essentielle pour faire facilement reconnaitre et identifier la propri6t6-celle que lea lots en question 6taient situ6s dans " le village de la Oe St. Louis," nom sous lequel cette localit6 a 6t6 6rig6e en municipalit6 de village par proclamation en date du 14 octobre 1846. est aussi en preuve par l'acte de vente que ces lots sont situ6s sur la rue Robin. Ce fait est aussi prouv6 par le t6moignage du d6fendeur et par 1'acte de vente. Pae un seul des t6moins entendus par l'appelante n'a prouv6 le contraire.
Cette dernibre qui avait int6r~t A justifier l'omission de la mention du nom de la rue n'a fait aucune tentative A cet effet devant la cour inf6rieure.
Le d6faut de transquestions au d6fendeur, soul t6moin qui, A part de 1'acte de vdhte, constate 1'existence de cette rue, semble indiquer que 1'appelante 6tait satisfaite de la v6rit6 du fait.
Ce n'est que devant cette cour qu'elle a essay6 de rem6dier ? l'insuffisance de sa preuve A cet 6gard, en produisant devant cette cour une copie du plan officiel fait en vertu de 'art. 2175, au moyen duquel elle pr6tend faire la preuve du fait qu'il n'existe pas 16galement une rue d6sign6e sous le nom de rue Robin,
Ce n'est pas devant cette cour, en appel, mais devant la Cour Sup6rieure lorsque cette cause 6tait A 1'enquate que cette preuve devait 6tre faite. II n'est plus temps de la faire ici. Ce serait changer la position des parties devant la cour de premibre instance et d6cider la cause sur une preuve diffirente de celle qui a servi de base au jugement en cette cause.
I est bien vrai que le plan officiel que 1'on offre de produire doit fairie une preuve authentique de la description des propri6t6s,-mais ce n'est pas une preuve de la non existence A 1'6poque de la saisie d'une rue qui pouvait ne pas exister lors de la confection du cadastre, mais qui peut bien avoir 6t6 16galement ouverte depuis.
Dans tous les cas, c'est une preuve susceptible d'4tre contredite par une autre preuve d'6gale force, et elle devait pour cette raison 8tre produite comme toute autre preuve en temps et lieu convenable devant la
Cour de premisre instance.
Cette Cour ne peut done prendre connaissance de cette preuve,-elle doit d6cider ce point de la cause sur la preuve qui a 6t6 faite en cour de premisre instance et sur laquelle la cause a t6 d6cid6e.
La preuve faite par 1'acte de vente cit6 plus haut et par le t6moignage du D6fendeur, me parait suffisante MoNT=m pour prouver 1'existence de la rue Robin. Ainsi, il est 6tabli que deux formalit6s essentielles pour la validit6 de la saisie et des annonces out 6t0 omises, savoir: celle FAw ws. de la mention du nom du village, et celle du nom de la rue. Quoique la decision de l'Hon. Juge en chef, Sir A A. Dorion, ne repose que sur la question de la banlieue, il a cependant exprim6 son opinion dans laquelle je concours pleinement, sur 1'effet de l'omission de ces formalit6s. Je ne peux mieux faire que de la citer textuellement :
L'article 638 du Code de Proc6dure veut que la saisie des immeubles soit constat6e par un prochs-verbal qui doit contenir, entre autres choses : " Ia description des immeubles saisie, en indiquant " la cit6, ville, village, paroisse ou township, ainsi que la rue, le " rang ou la concession oi& its sont situds, et le numdro do Il'immeuble, " s'il existe un plan obiciel de la localid, sinon les tenants et abou- 16 tissants." Les plans officiels auxquels r6fre cet article sont ceux mentionn6s dans Particle 2168 du Code Civil. II n'y en a pas d'autres qui soient reconnus comme tels, et quoique ce dernier article porte que lorsque ces plans auront t4 d6pos~s et qu'avis en aura t6 donn6, le num6ro de chaque lot indiqu6 A ces plans et au livre de renvoi correspondant, sera la vraie description de ce lot et suffira dan tout document quelconque, cela ne peut s'appliquer que lorsque la loi n'exige pas d'une mani~re expresse une plus ample d6signation.
Le Code de Procedure, qui n'est devenu en force qu'apras le Code Civil, a d6rog6 & Particle 2168, en exigeant que le proces-verbal de saisie et les annonces du sh6rif indiquent le nom des rues sont situ6s les immeubles saisis et le num6ro du plan officiel, on les tenants et aboutissants, s'il n'y a pas de plan officiel. Il semble done qu'lil ne suffit pas de donner le num6ro soul du plan officiel, il y a d'excellentes raisons pour cela. Ce que la loi veut, c'est que les int6ress6s soient inform6s que les immeubles sur lesquels ils ont des droits ou des r6clamations ont 6t6 saisis et doivent 4tre vendus par le sh6rif. IA d6signation par le num6ro de F'immeuble, qui dans un coutrat de vente on d'6change serait suffisante, parce que les parties connaissent ce qui fait Fobjet deleur transaction, ne Pestpas toujours pour porter & la connaissance des tiers la situation exacte d'immeubles saisis. C'est, sans doute, pour cela, quo le Code do Proc& dure Civile exige quo Pon donne le rang ou la rue est situ6 1immeuble saisi, outre son num6ro, qui n'est Id, que pour remplacer II.]
Pour ces motifs je suis d'opinion que le jugement de la Cour du Bane de la Reine de la province de Quebec doit 6tre confirm6 avec d6pens.
OHIEF concurred.
J.:- I concur in the judgment of my brother Fournier, and also in that of my brother Taschereau, so far as it holds the Sheriff's sale void for the insufficiency of the advertisement; but I cannot agree that the sale is null on the ground of fraud and artifice.
J.:- The sale of the lands in question in this case is contested, and sought to be set aside by the opposants on several grounds.
1st,-that the sale should have taken place at the door of the Chapel of the Parish of L'enfant Idsus, and not at the Sheriff's office in the city of Montreal. 2nd,-that the sale en bloc of four separate and distinct houses, although one tenement, was illegal under art. 687 C. C. P. 8nd,-that in the notice of sale the description of the property seized did not indicate the street, range, concession, or parish, where the lots were alleged to be situated, as required by art. 638, sec. 8, C. C. P. After what has already been said by my learned brother Fournier, and the views I entertain as to the third objection, I do not consider it necessary to refer particularly to the two preceding ones.
In reference to the first I may say, however, that although the existence of the banlieue may have been sufficiently shewn, it may be, that when the parish before mentioned was established, any portion of the banlieue included within the boundaries of the parish. would be effectually separated from the city of Montreal for all purposes. In that case the sale, I think, ^^R "should have taken place at the chapel door of the parish.
As I did not intend to found my judgment on either that point or on the second objection, I do not consider it necessary to decide it.
The Legislature having, since the proceedings herein were commenced, validated all such sales except those then in litigation, our judgment on the point is not necessary.
I think, however, the sale was irregular and void because of what I consider a defective notice. The terms of the Code seem to me to the last degree imperative. It requires that the street which the lands adjoin shall be designated in the notice, which was not done, and I think the evidence is sufficient to show the legal existence of the street upon the side of which the lots in question are situated. It was named long before the sale, and the name of it was indicated on a sign board stuck up on it.
I therefore concur in the conclusion that the appeal herein should be dismissed and the judgment appealed from afirmed with costs.
J.:- In a case of Courtenanche vs. Gauthier, the plaintiff, having obtained judgment against the defendant, seized the latter's immovable property, and caused it to be sold by the sheriff. The Montreal loan Company were the highest bidders at this sale, and the property was adjudged to them.- A third party, Fauteux, who was a creditor of Gauthier, the defendant, and who had a mortgage on the immovable property so sold by the Sheriff, by an opposition demands that the said sale to the Montreal Loan Company by the Sheriff be set aside and annulled,upon, amongst others,the following grounds:- 1st. Because this seizure in the said case and sale was of several lots en bloc, the opposant alleging, that the selling en bloc constitutes fraud within the terms of Art 714 of the Code of Procedure, because the property was adjudged to a Mr. Desjardins, who was the plaintiff's attorney at the sale and bought the said property for and in the name of the said Montreal Loan Company, the said Dey'ardins having the said sale made en bloc, so as to get the property for the said company at a price far under its value, in consequence whereof the opposant, Fauteux, got nothing from the proceeds of the sale, and lost the amount of his mortgage.
I will consider immediately this part of the case.
The Montreal Loan Company joined issue with the opposant and fyled pleas, equivalent to a general denegation, to this ground of the opposition. Of the fact, that
Desjardins was the bidder at the sherifl's sale, and only substituted the Montreal Loan Company's name as adjudicataires after the sale, there seems to me to be ample proof in the record, though in the factum, the appellants, the said Montreal Loan Company not only deny it, but state that the sheriff's procsverbal of sale establishes the contrary. Now, this is an error. It appears by the minutes of the biddings at the sale, returned by the Sheriff with his procs-verbal, that Desjardins bid twice in his own name, and that it was only at the the lait bid that he gave the company's name, whereupon the adjudication was made to the company.
As to the fact that Desjardins was also the attorney of the plaintiff in the case, it is established by the sheriff's officer who made the sale So much for these two facts.
I will now consider the points raised by the appellants on this ground of the opposition. They conteid, first, that the respondent should have fyled an opposition to stop the sale, and that they cannot be allowed now to ask that the sale be set aside for the reasons by him given. Well, it must be remarked, that here the respondent attacks the sale, because the sale itself was irregularly made en bloc. Now, could he, before the sale, complain of the sale itself and of the manner in which it was made? How could he know before the sale, that each lot would not be put up separately? Though the seizure had been made en bloc, could not the Sheriff put up each lot separately'? Then, though the judgment debtor himself is deemed to have acquiesced in the proceedings, if he did not complain by an opposition before the sale, within the delay fixed by law, this does not apply to third persons, who were not parties to the record; and not a single authority has been cited at the hearing applying to third parties the rule which binds the judgment debtor in such a case.
The appellants further contend, and this seems to be the ground upon which they insist the most, that this property could not be sold separately, because it was an undivided building. They have examined three witnesses to this fact, Bielle, Decary and Bdlair, whilst the respondent has also brought three, Gauthier, reux and Trudelle.' A careful perusal of the evidence on this point has left no doubt whatever in my mind that the defendant's property consisted of four houses built on four separate official lots. Gauthier the defendant, who built them, says so positively, Gdndreux, a contractor and inspector of buildings, who specially inspected this property for another Loan Company, says,that these houses were built to be separate houses, that each house was forty feet and corresponded with each of the lots, which by the deed of sale are forty feet each. Trudelle, another inspector of buildings, and who also examined this property for a loan company, swears positively that these houses could be sold separately. So much for the respondents witnesses.
Now, when I come to the appellants witnesses, I see that Rielle, a provincial land surveyor, thinks that this block was to form only one building, but he is contradicted here by the man who built it, and being cross-examined, to the question, "Were these h6uses built to be sold separately, "so that each purchaser knew what he was buying ?" rAU'TEw he answers, " It is possible." This witness corroborates, in fact, the respondent's proof. Decary gives a description of the property when the houses were building,and were in an unfinished state, and does not think that they were to be sold separately, yet, he cannot swear that such a sale was impossible. And Belair, the appellant's third witness as to this fact, on cross-examination, positively says that it would have been easier to sell this property, house by house, contradicting all that he had said before on the subject. When I take into consideration,that one of the respondent's witnesses to establish that there were four separate houses on four different lots is the man himself who built them, and that the two others are inspectors of buildings, who, as such, examined this property for loan companies, and when I consider that these last three witnesses gave such positive, clear and logical testimony, and are uncontradicted to any extent, I am bound to place full reliance on it.
Now, as to the facts upon which the respondent relies to urge that this selling en bloc was a fraud or artifice employed, with the knowledge of the purchaser, to keep persons from bidding they are briefly as follows.
It is established, and to my mind conclusively proved:
1st. That
Desjardins was the attorney of the plaintiff, who had the property sold and seized. 2nd. That he bought the property for the appellants, the Montreal Loan Company, at the Sheriff's sale, and that the said company were not creditors of the defendant, and had no mortgage or interest on the said-property. 3rd. That a few minutes before this sale the defendant asked that his property should L'G be put up and sold lot by lot, separately, and not en bloc. 4th. That Desjardins, who was there, as was then supposed, as the plaintiff's attorney, and to direct and watch the proceedings as such, positively refused this demand of the defendant, and ordered the Sheriff's officer to make the sale en bloc, which was so done. 5th. That this property was then sold to the Montreal
Loan
Company, the same
Desjardins bidding for them, for the sum of four hundred and fifty dollars. 6th. That these lots, with the buildings thereon, were worth from four to six thousand dollars. 7th. That had each lot, with each house thereon, been put up separately, they would hav been certainly sold at a higher figure.
Now, what it the reasonable inference from these facts ? To me it seems clear that, if this property, worth at least four thousand dollars, was bought by the appellants for four hundred and fifty dollars, it is by the contrivance and device of Desjardins, their agent, and whose acts are their acts, in having this property sold in one lot, and so keeping from bidding other parties who, however desirous they. may have been of buying one house and one lot, would not and could not think of buying four houses and four lots. I saythen, to use the terms of art. 714 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that, at this sale, with the knowledge of the purchasers, or of their agent, fraud and artifice were employed to keep persons from bidding, and that such being the case, the respondents, being creditors and interested persons, are entitled to have the said sale vacated. Such being the conclusion I have come to upon this ground of the opposition, I might perhaps refrain from going into the other parts of the case, since, whatever views I may take upon them, it cannot affect the result that the appeal must be dismissed, in my opinion. I will, however, say a few words about the ground taken by the respondent in his opposition, as to the insufficiency of the Sheriff's description of the property to be sold, in not indicating the street on which the property was situated. On this, Art. 688 of the Code of Procedure is positive. The seizure of immovables is recorded by minutes which must contain *
W * a description of the immovables seized, indicating the city, town, village, parish or township, as well as the street, range, or concession in which they are situated. In the case submitted, the street, range, or concession is not given. That there is a street seems to be denied by the appellants, but I find ample evidence of it. 1st. In the deed of sale -to the defendant of this property, where the property is sold as situated on Robin street.
2nd. In the deposition of Gauthier, who swears that it is situated on Robin street, that this street is known as
Robin street, and is so marked as streets are usually marked. Now, in the absence of contrary evidence, this seems to me to establish clearly, that such property is situated on Robin street. And not a tittle of evidence to the contrary is to be found in the record. At the hearing before this court the appellants have fyled certain plans, in which they desire us to find the proof, either that no Robin street exists, or that this property is not situated on Robin street. Surely no additional proof can be made before this court. This evidence was not given before the lower court, and it therefore cannot be received here, in my opinion, and I cannot look at it. The appellants have also denied the respondents' right in law, to invoke now such a ground of nullity against the sale. I can only repeat here what I have said on the -same objection, when taken to the ground of the seizure en bloc. It is the judgment debtor which the cases cited have held to be bound to invoke such nullities by opposition afin d'annuler before the sale, not third parties out of the record. These third parties are not bound to act till they are aggrieved; even if they are aware, before " I the sale, of such grounds of nullity, they are not obliged then to invoke them. It may be, that the sale will bring a sum sufficient to satisfy their claim, and they can wait till such sale takes place. It is quite time enough for them to move,when they find that they suffer. The law would be hard if it obliged them to do so, when they cannot tell whether their interests will be affected or not by the result of the sale. I even doubt if they could stop the sale by an opposition ain d'annuler upon such a ground. Art. 657 grants them that right if they have an actual interest in the seizure and sale. How can they be said to have an actual interest, before they are aggrieved ? It is true that in Berthelet vs. Guy (1) third parties seem to have been allowed to fyle such an opposition, but I remark that they were cessionnaires of the defendant, also that this point of law was not raised, and moreover, by the judgment of the Superior Court, that they specially alleged that the property, in which they were interested, would bring a higher price, if the irregularities they complained of were remedied. I may also state, that in the Province Quebec oppositions afin d'annuler, for informalities in the seizure, by any other than the party whose property has been seized, are not often met with. However, it is unnecessary for me here to decide whether third parties interested have the right to fyle such oppositions upon such grounds. All that I say is, that they are not bound to do so to protect their rights, that they may wait till the sale, and then ask its nullity if they suffer from it.
Is this a fatal irregularity ? is the next question. I hold that it is so.
The minutes of the seizure of an immovable property must contain the description of such property, as indicated and ordered by art. 688 of the Code of Procedure, which is imperative in its terms. Sheriffs are bound to follow strictly the formalities ^ required for the seizure and sale of property, and the court cannot sanction a relaxation of the stringent rules laid down by the law in such matters. If, in one case, the omission of the street was declared to be of no consequence, there is not one of the details required by art. 688 which could not be so declared, upon such a precedent. Sales by which the rights of third parties are swept away must be made in that way, and in that way alone, in which the law has ordered them to be made. Upon this principle, the tribunals of the Province of Quebec constantly maintain oppositions afin d'annuler by defendants, based upon the want of some of the formalities required by the said article 638. The nullities that a defendant can invoke by an opposition afin d'ansuler, third parties interested can invoke by a demand en nullitd de ddcret, and I think, in the present case, that this point is well taken by the respondent in his oppoisition.
The judgment appealed from has annulled the Sheriff 's sale and I am of opinion that thi said judgment is right, and that this appeal must be dismissed.
Another reason urged by the respondent against this sale, and the only reason upon which the Court of Queen's Bench has vacated it, is, that the sale took place at the Sheriff's office, instead of at the door of the parish church where the property lies. Since thejudgment of the Court of Queen's Bench, and in fact since the case was heard before us, the Quebec Legislature has passed a statute by which all doubts upon this question are removed, and all Sheriff's sales so made are declared good and valid. So, though pending cases are not affected by this statute, by a special provision thereof, I deem it unnecessary to consider a question