King v. McHendry

answer was given in a former suit practically between the same parties, (Aper v. McBean), in a judgment .

rendered by the Superior Court and confirmed by the - Court of Appeal which was accepted by them as chose G

Jugee, and also in the present case.

Evidently no other conclusion can be arrived at under articles 1739, 1740, 1742 and 1975 of the Civil Code, and I have no hesitation in dismissing the present appeal for the reasons fully set forth by Mr. Justice Hall in his elaborate opinion.

the judgment of the Court of Review, at Montreal, and restoring the judgment of the Superior Court, District of Montreal which maintained the action with costs.

The female plaintiff's parents were married at Montreal in 1845 and resided there under the regime de la communautM until her father's death in 1846. The entire assets at the time of dissolution of this community consisted of bare necessaries of insignificant value within the class of chattels exempted from seizure under execution.

The widow made no inventory or procds-terbal carence, and subsequently, in 1848, married the defendant, Patrick King, and they together continued the business of hucksters on the Montreal Market, which had been previously carried on by the widow and her first husband. The second marriage was also subject to the regime de la communaute and was dissolved by the death of the wife in 1895, the property of the consorts being then of considerable value.

After receipt of a share of her mother's estate devised to her, the female plaintiff brought the present action, against her step-father and the children of the second marriage, asking for an account and demanding a share of the common property in virtue of a continuation of the community under the first marriage and consequent tripartite community between her, her deceased mother and the second husband. The defences raised were, (1) that there had been no continuation of community; (2) that as continuation had not been demanded during the lifetime of the deceased consort there could be no tripartite community ; and (3) that the assets in possession of the consorts at the death of the first husband were insufficient to constitute an estate of which the law required M . N an inventory to be made.

The action was maintained by the Superior Court, Doherty J., but on inscription in review this judgment was annulled, Sir Melbourne Tait, A. C. J. and Taschereau J., (Curran J. dissenting), on the ground that the demand for continuation of community ought to have been made during the lifetime of the consort who survived the first marriage and that the demand by the action came to late.

On further appeal the Court of Queen's Bench reversed the judgment of the Court of Review and rendered the judgment from which the present appeal is asserted.

Lebrun, Communaut6 (1); Pothier, Communaut6, nn. 778, 786, 787; Pearson v. Spooner (2); Dalloz Rep. vo. "Scell6 et Inventaire," n. 1; art. 240 C. de P.; art. 1343 C. C.

The surviving consort was not required by law to establish the absence of property by means of an official return, procds-verbal de carence. The law imposing a penalty on the consort who neglects to make an inventory of the common property must be strictly construed.

As the first community possessed nothing the essential condition was wanting, and to require this to be shown by procds-verbal de caren would be to add to the law and impose a new obligation.

The admission that there was no property does away with the necessity of a procds-verbal de G carence. Exacting procds-verbal de carence where no **cH property exists would be contrary to elementary principles of equity.

See the Lordonnois Case decided by the Parlement de Paris, in 1731, Lebrun (2 ed.) 1764, p. 559, and recent decisions under art. 1442 N. in the Cour d'Appel in France; V. '94, 2, J99; V. '95, 2, 30; Patrix v. Quesnel, Jour. de P. '95, 230. Compare also exceptions in cases of minors, (art. 311 C. C. and art. 472 C. N.) Dalloz, Rep. vo. " Minorit6," no. 649; " Cessante ratione, leges, cessat ipsa lex." The continuation should have been demanded from the survivor and it is too late now, after her death, to make that demand upon her heirs. Continuation does not exist de plein droit, the demand to the survivor essential consequently, during her life time. Arts. 240, 291 C. de P.; art. 1323 C. C. (old text); Pothier, Com. no. 800; Merlin, Rep. vo. "Con.

Lamoignon, Arrites, lit, 33, art. 2; 2 Provost de la Jannis, no. 374. To prevent the continuation of con munity, the survivor must make a formal inventory.

Argon Int. Liv. 3, chap. 5, pages 46, 47; Lebrun, Comm. Lib. 3, chap. 3, s. 1, n. par. 1; tothier, Comm. nn. 772, 876: art. 241 C. de P.; arts. 1323-1325 C.

The law presumes the existence of common property in cases of community Q.

Q. and it is consequently unnecessary to make proof its existence, quantity or value. The omission to * make the inventory leaves the survivor in reputed usurpation of the presumed property of the first community, small though it may be. She prevented dissolution taking effect, and voluntarily and deliberately submitted herself to the obligation as well as to the penalty of continuation of community.

This presumption can be destroyed only by authentic proof in writing. Apart from that, property existed in a sufficiently appreciable proportion to give rise to the continuation.

There was at the time of the marriage, a bed, bedding and some other small effects. The second husband admits having continued the business of the first husband, and no doubt made use of the instruments and tools of the first husband in his occupation as a gardener and dealer in garden produce. See Pothier, "Comm." nn. 565, 771, 772, 784, 785, 800, 803, 876; Armour v Ramsay

The defence does not deny the existence of common property and the law can now only regard the confusion resulting from the omission of the inventory and apply the provisions of the Code.

The cases cited by the appellants all involve special circumstanc< s which distinguish them completely from the condition of facts in this action. See also Renusson, " Communaut6," 3rd part., ch. 2, no. 42.

The law regards the inventory as a quasijudicial proceeding of the greatest importance and it cannot be omitted without incurring the penalty. Art. 1323 et seq. C. C. (old text); arts. 1387 et seq. C. P. Q. The deceased consort and the defendant were defaulters and can claim no equitable rights in face of their disregard of the law.

This court should not disturb the findings of the courts below as to the fact of the existence of common property.

There has not been any decision in the Province of Quebec that a demand was necessary during the lifetime of the survivor; the remarks of Sir L. N. Cassault in Bourassa v. Lacerte are merely obiter dicta. A valid demand can be made upon the survivor's representatives.

JUSTICE.-I entirely agree with Mr. Justice Girouard in the ground on which he places his judgment for the allowance of this appeal, namely, that it sufficiently appears that there was nothing to include in an inventory and, such being the case, the omission to make an inventory is not to be followed by the penal consequences imposed by the Code, viz., a continuation of community, but I think it right to say that I also agree with the reasons given by the majority of the Court of Review for their judgment. Those learned judges following the jurisprudence and especially the decision of Chief Justice Casault and the late Chief Justice Meredith in Bourassa v. Lacerte held that the continuation of community must be demanded in the lifetime of the surviving spouse, and that a demand of the heirs after the death of that survivor and at a time when a continued community would by the express provision of. article 1335 C., if one had existed, have been dissolved, is too late. The appeal must be allowed with costs and the action dismissed with costs to the appellant in all the courts below.

and JJ. concurred in thejudgment allowing the appeal and dismissing the faut done qu'il ait des biens communs et c'est aux parties qui invoquent la continuation de communaut6 , all1guer et prouver ce fait. C'est ce que les intim~s n'ont pas fait.

Ils ont cependant examin6 1'appelant qui a r6pondu que lors de son marriage il n'avait rien,

Les intim6s savaient si bien que telle 6tait la situation de fait de la premiere communaut6 qu'ils n'ont pas mime tent6 de faire la preuve par commune renomm6e.

Bien peu de commentateurs out examin6 la question de savoir s'il fallait un prochs-verbal de carence, lorsque la communaut6 n'avait rien ou presque rien A inventorier.

LeBrun fut le premier A 1'exiger dans son Traite de la Communaut6, qui fut publi6 la premiere fois un an apr~s sa mort, en 1709.

La seconde edition parut en avec des additions, une, entr'autres, ofi est rapport un arrt du Parlement de Paris du septembre, qui, sur un appel du Chatelet de Paris, d6cida tout le contraire de la doctrine de LeBrun.

L'annotateur observe

J.-De droit commun, la continuation de communaut6 n'existe pas. Elle fut introduite en France en 1510 par l'article 118 de l'ancienne coutume de Paris et puis continu6e en 1580 par les articles 240 et 241 de la nouvelle coutume, qui devinrent le droit commun de la province de Qu6bec, reproduite an Code Civil, art. 1323 et 1324.

Il faut done l'entendre conform6ment aux termes de ces lois, sans en 6tendre les dispositions A ce qui n'a pas t6 pr6vu. Or le Code, comme la coutume, d6crite que, si le survivant des epoux

Renusson, un contemporain de LeBrun, adopte son sentiment dans son Trait6 do la Communaut6, se contentant d'observer que c'est l'opinion de LeBrun. Les dernibres 6ditions de ses ceuvres constatent cependant qu'elle fut rejet~e par le Parlement de Paris par 1'arrit de 1731, et que c'est le dernier mot de la jurisprudence. Egalement, Mesk, un autre autorit6 sur ]a matihre, rapporte cette d&cision avec approbation sur le fondement de la notori6t6 6vidente de la pauvrete de la communaut6

Mais, disent les intimbs, il r~sulte du t moignage memo de l'appelant qu'il y avait des biens communs, pen de choses, il est vrai, mais enfin quelque chose. Oui, quelques choses non appr6ciables h prix d'argent, un lit, des hardes de corps, et probablement quelques petits meubles de n~cessit6 premibre et exempts de saisie.

L'inventaire de tels biens 6chappe A l'attention de la loi.

De minimis non curat lex.

Aussi Denizart, vo. " Carence," d6finit-il le prochs-verbal de carence; Les intim6s out invoqu6 1'autorit6 de Pothier, "Communaut

" n. 565; mais cot 6minent jurisconsulte n'y entend pas parler de la continuation de communaut6, mais simplement de la renonciation A la commuanut6 de la part de lafemme qui n'a pas fait inventaire. Pothier ajoute qu'un acte de notori6t6 du f6vrier 1708, atteste que, dans ce cas, il ne suffit pas A la veuve, pour se dispenser de rapporter un inventaire, de dire que son mari n'a laiss6, A sa mort, aucuns effets, mais qu'elle doit le justifier par un procks-verbal de carence.

L'on trouve cet acte de notorit6 rap- G port6 an long par Denizart, " Actes de Notorit6 " p. 331 ; mais nulle part, Pothier enseigne que cette rigle doit 6galement tre suivie s'il s'agit de la continuation de communaut6.

A ce sujet, il garde le silence; il ne cite ni LeBrun, ni l'arrat en 1731. Pas un arr~tiste, pas un commentateur n'enseigne que cet arrft ne fit pas autorit6; bien au contraire, il est cit6 comme tant la dernibre expression de l'ancienne jurisprudence frangaise.

Enfin, la r~gle qi 'il consacre a 6t6 appliqu6e par les tribunaux et les jurisconsultes modernes dans des cas analogues

Elle parait solidement appuy~e sur le texte de la coutume de Paris et je ne crois pas que celui du Code Civil de Qu6bec puisse raisonnablement admettre une autre interpretation.

Pour cette raison, et sans examiner les autres points soulev6s par cet appel, nous sommes d'avis d'accorder 1'appel et de renvoyer l'action des intim6s avec d6pens. Appeal allowed with costs.