The prescription of actions for personal injuries established by article 2262 of the Civil Code of Lower Canada is not waived by failure of the defendant to plead the limitation but the court must take judicial notice of such prescription as absolutely extinguishing the right of action.
The reservation of recourse for future damages in a judgment upon an action for tort is not an adjudication which can preserve the right of action beyond the time limited by the provisions of the Civil Code.
When in an action of thig nature there is but one cause of action damages must be assessed once for all.
And when damages have been once recovered, no new action can be maintained for sufferings afterwards endured from the unforeseen effects of the original injdry.
APPEAL from the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench, (appeal side), affirming the judgment of the Superior Court, District of Montreal, in favour of the plaintiff.
On 9th August, 1895, plaintiff sustained bodily injuries through an accident due to negligence on the part of the city and brought an action thereupon for the sum of $2,000 in which she recovered judgment on :-Sir Henry Strong C.J. and Tasebereau, Sedgewick, King and Girouard JJ.
the 12th June, 1896, for $1,000 damages, recourse being therein reserved for any further action she might have for future damages which might result from the same accident, not included in that first action. On 3rd December, 1897, she brought a second action for further damages said to have been ascertained since the institution of her first action and recovered $5,000 additional damages.
The appeal is from the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench at Montreal affirming this decision. The questions at issue on this appeal are stated in the judgments reported.
Atwater Q.C. and Ethier Q.C. for the appellant. This action is for bodily injuries, and was prescribed by the lapse of one year, Art. 2262 at the time of its institution, and falls within Art. 2267 C. The right of action is denied, and under Art. 2188 C. the court must of its own motion, supply the defence. Breakey. v. Carter (1) ; Dorion v. Crowley It becomes a question of costs if judgment turns upon this point.
Canadian Pacific Railway Co. v. Robinson
The first action did not interrupt prescription of the damages now claimed. There was no continuing cause of damage, although the effect of the accident might have been continuing.
St. Marie v. City of Montreal
For all over the $1,000 awarded by the first judgment the limitation has operated. Art. 2262 C. C. No complacent reserve by the court can prevent the defendant claiming prescription accorded by the law or extend the plaintiffs right of action; Art. 2247 N.; S. V. 77, 1, 147; Aubry & Rau (5 ed.), sec. 215; Janes v. Sun lutual Ins. Co. of York
Bisaillon Q.C. and Mignault Q.C. for the respondent. Arts. 2264 and 2265 C. C. must be read together, and the effect of the udgment in the first suit was to furnish a new title prescriptible by thirty years only. Art. 2265 C. C.; Pothier, Obl. No. 701; Beaudry- Lacantinerie and Tissier,
Prescription,
No. 552; Leroux de Br6tagne, Prescription, No. 507; Aubry & Rau ed.) pp. 528, 529 ; Lidge, Ist April, 1896, Pasicrisie, 1896 (Appel), 261, 262; Aliour v. Harris The first suit interrupted the prescription against the second.
See Baudry-Lacantinerie and Tissier, Prescription, Nos. 574 to 578 ; Leroux de Br6tagne, Prescription, No. 539 ; Laurent, Vol. 32, Nos. 89, 90, 139, 140, 141, 142, especially the case referred to at No. 90: Cass. 6th Dec. 1852.
Dal. '53, 1, 50; Rolland de Villargues, cited by Troplong, Prescription, (ed. Belge) ; (1) M. L. R. Q. 439. No. 561 2o, Note 5. The second suit is distinctly contained in the first, and does not constitute une demande dislincte or une demande nouvelle. Cour d'App. Brussels, 23 juil 1885, Pasicrisie 1886 (Appel) p. 90.
The appellant acquiesced in the reserve in the judgment by pleading to the second suit exactly in the terms of the reserve, and a judicial contract intervened which was subject to the thirty years prescription, same as a judgment; Merlin, R6p. Vo. Contrat judiciaire; Pand. Fr. Vo. Contrat judiciaire, Nos. 1, 6, 12, 17; Fuzier Herman, Rep. Vo. Contrat judiciaire, Nos. 1, 7, 14; and Vo. Jugement et Arrt No. 2944. Prescription does not run again for the same period where there is novation; Art. 2264 C. Appellants have renounced the prescription set up by as stated by art. 2185 C. C. by silence in the first court. In this case prescription was suspended.
Art. 2232 C. C. is an absolute rule as to its first paragraph. The medical evidence shows that it was impossible to act sooner.
Contra non valentem agere nul/a currit prescriptio. The words " in fact " of our article are important; Kerr v. Atlantic & North-West Railway qualified the rule by adding "when the damage results exclusively from that act, and could have been foreseen and claimed for at the time."
case in point is cited by Muteau, Responsabilit6 Civile, p. 478, note, and, in our courts, we have a similar case in Barette v. Les Commissaires d'Ecoles de St. ien
J.-J'abonde dans le sens de Monsieur le Juge Girouard qui a bien voulu me communiquer ses notes.
L'action de l'intimbe est prescrite. La r~serve que fait en sa faveur le jugement sur la premiere action n'a pu lui conf~rer un droit que la loi lui refuse.
Janes v. The Sun Mutual Insurance Company of New York
Si cette nouvelle action lui comp6tait, elle y aurait droit ind6pendamment de ce premier jugement. Elle ne peut 6tayer sa cause sur cette r6serve, que d'ailleurs le savant juge n'a faite que conditionellement.
C'est comme si le juge avait dit - La prescription aniale contre l'intim6e a commenc6 A courir, ipso jure, concurremment avec la cause de son action.
Or la cause de son action, c'est la faute de 1'appelante, la cause des souffrances et des blessures dont elle r6clame compensation.
C'est cette faute qui, sous Particle 1053 du Code, lui a donn6 son droit A une r4paration le lendemain mime de l'accident. L'intim6e voudrait ne faire courir la prescription que de la date of' elle a 6prouv6 ses dommages. Mais c'est vouloir changer le Code on plut6t 1'abroger, et en radier la prescription annale de l'action en dommages.
La loi d6crete, pour un motif d'ordre public, que depuis 'an expir6, elle est pr6sum6e avoir 6t0 payee pour tons les dommages qu'elle a pu subir par suite de cet accident, et c'est IA une prisomption juris et de jure, contre laquelle nulle preuve ne peut pr&valoir.
Elle est d6chue de tout droit d'action ult6rieur.
Sa cr6ance est absolument 6teinte, (art. 2267, C. et 1'auteur de l'accident a droit de se consid6rer d6sormais A l'abri de toutes rclamations autres que celles produites.
Tous les dommages recouvrables lui out 6t6 accord6s par le premier jugement. Les autres, s'il y en a, ne sont pas recouvrables. L'intim6e invoque en vain l'article 2232 du Code et la maxime contra non valentem agere non currit prescriptio. Elle est cens~e avoir demand6 par sa premidre action tons les dommages que l'appelante lui a caus6s, actuels et futurs.
Si ses pr6tentions 6taient fond6es, celui qui, par exemple, est oblig6 de se faire amputer le bras six mois apres un accident imputable A la n6gligence d'un autre pourrait en tout temps avant le laps de dix-huit mois apr~s 1'accident instituer son action.
Ou, si 1'amputation n'a d6clarde n6cessaire qu'apris 1'ann6e expirbe, il pourrait poursuivre pendant l'annie subs6quente quoiqu'il n'eut fait aucune r6clamation durant l'ann6e qui a suivi l'accident.
Mais telle n'est pas la loi.
" Their Lordships" dit Lord Watson, en d6livrant le jugement du Conseil Priv6, dans la cause de Canadian Pacific Railway Company v. Robinson (1),
O'est sur ce principe, qui domine le sujet dans le droit frangais comme dans le droit anglais, qu' Holroyd ' J. disait dans Howell v. Young
Mais, nous a dit I'intime, ma seconde action peut 4tre consid~r6e comme une continuation de la premibre. Je n'ai pu saisir sur quoi elle a tent6 d'appuver cette pr6tention.
La premibre 6tait bien et dxment terminde A, toutes fins que de droit quand cette seconde a t prise. Le jugement et le paiement par I'appelante du montant de ]a condamnation contre elle avait mis fin complte au litige.
Si la premidre eut t porte devant la Cour de Circuit et la seconde devant la Cour Sup6rieure, I'intimbe ne pr6tendrait pas que "a dernibre est la continuation de la premibre. II doit en 6tre ainsi quoique les deux aient 6t port6es devant la mime cour.
La dernibre est une demande nouvelle et entibrement distincte de la premiere.
Et la premibre n'a interrompu civilement la prescription que pour les mille piastres que le jugement lui a accordees.
II ne peut pas 6tre question d'interruption de prescription de ce qui ne forme pas partie de Pacte interruptit.
Le jugement sur la premibre poursuite n'a pu produire novation, comme l'intimbe 1'a soutenu & l'audience, pour ce qui n'en formait pas partie. La novation suppose une dette pr6-existante, une prescription commence6e qui recommence A courir.
Or, si sa cr6ance 6tait pr6-existante, elle 6tait incluse dans la premibre action, et dans ce cas, cadit questio; I'intimbe est hors de cour, et par la loi, et par les termes m~mes de la reserve que fait le premier jugement qui est express6ment limitbe aux dommages non compris dans la premire action.
Et si sa cr6ance n'6tait pas incluse dans la premibre action, alors elle a 6 annihil6e par le laps d'une ann6e apr~s 1'accident.
D'ailleurs, y eut-il interruption mais pas de novation, la prescription aurait recommenc6 & courir par le mime temps qu'auparavant, (art. 2264. C.) et 1'action de 'intim6e n'en serait pas moins prescrite car elle a 6ts institude plus d'un an aprbs ce jugement. Tant qu' la partie de la premi6re action dont l'intim6e a t6 d6bontee, il n'y a pas en en loi d'interruption civile. Et il n'6tait pas au pouvoir du juge de d6cr6ter qu'il en serait autrement.
L'effet du renvoi d'une action est que la prescription a continu6 6 conrir comme s'il n'y avait pas eu d'interruption.
Puis 1'article 2265 C. cit6 par 1'intim6e, qui d~crete qu'une poursuite forme un titre qui ne se prescrit que par trente ans, ne peut venir A son aide. n'a d'application, dans 1'espice, qu'& ce qui a l'objet du jugement, aux mille piastres que ce jugement lui a alloubes.
L'intimse a avanc6 la proposition que 1'appelante 6tait li6e par la r6serve faite dans le jugement sur la premibre poursuite, parcequ'elle n'en avait pas appel6. Mais je ne vois rien qui justifie ses conclusions. D'abord, comment un d6fendeur pourrait-il appeler d'une telle T6serve, lorsqu'il se soumet au jugement et en paie le montant ?
Puis, pourquoi en appeler?
Elle est inefficace et impuissante A faire revivre un droit d'action que la loi d~clare absolument p~rim6, et une cleance presum6e juris et jure avoir t compltement payee, mdme A 1'encontre des mineurs et autres incapables loi contre qui, par exception, currit prescriptio d'une telle action, quoique von valentem agere.
Pour ces raisons, j'opine avec Monsieur le Juge 0ironard que 1'action de l'intim6e doit 6tre d6boute. Mais j'irais sloin. Je ne crois pas qu'ele eut OF Masjiasplus psq'leetAONTREAL droit A une seconde action, quand bien mime elle n'aurait pas t6 prescrite, et c'est peut-6tre sur ce motif que devraient 6tre bas6es nos conclusions. Elle TaschereauJ. a exerc6 la seule reclamation qu'elle exit en loi contre 1'appelante.
Sa pr6sente action, bas6e comme elle 1'est sur la premibre, aurait di 6tre renvoy~e sur une d6fense en droit. Elle est cens6e avoir d6ji demand6 et avoir obtenu tous les dommages auxquels cet accident lui a donn6 droit.
Dans une cause de Fetter v. Beal (1) le demandeur all6guait que sur une action prkcidente il avait recouvr6 certains dommages pour un assaut commis sur sa personne par le d6fendeur, mais que depuis, une fracture du crAne des suites de cet accident s'tant d6clare, il r6clamait les dommages additionels qu'il ignorait lors de sa premibre demande.
Mais ut d6bout6 de sa demande,
Cette decision date de loin, mais elle fait encore autorit6 dans la jurisprudence anglaise.
Dans une cause de Hodsoll v. Stallebrass (2); Littledale J., dit ;
Dans Serrao v. Noel (3); Bowen L. J., dit;
Et dans une cause comparativement r6cente The Darley Main Colliery Company- v. Mitchell (4). Lord Halsbury disait dans la Chambre des Lords;
Q.
No one will think of disputing the proposition that for one cause of action you must recover all damages incident to it by law once and forever.
Lord Bramwell ajoutait
MCGEs.
It is a rule that when a thing directly wrongful in itself is done to TaschereauJ. a man, in itself a cause of action, he must if he sues in respect of it do so once and for all.
As, if he is bitten or wounded, if he sues, he must sue for all his damage, past, present and future, certain and contingent.
He cannot maintain an action for a broken arm and subsequently for a broken rib, though he did not know of it when he commenced his first action.
Vide Pollock on Torts, (5 ed.) 184; Ilayne on Damages, (5 ed.) 102; Sutherland on Damages, vol. 1, par. 106; vol. 3, par. 1251; Clegg v. Dearden (1). Aux Etats Unis lajurisprudence est unanime dans le m~me sens.
In actions for injury to the person
*
*
* by accident on a highway or railroad,-dit Metcalf J., dans Warner v. Bacon (2)-; it is settled law that * * * when damages have been once recovered, no new action can be maintained for sufferings afterwards endured from the unforeseen effect of the original injury.
Vide Curtiss v. Rochester & Syracuse R. R. Co. (1); Filer v. New York Central Railroad Company (2); City of North Vernon v. Voegler (3).
Fresh damages merely will not give a fresh action and a judgment in a suit founded on a single act of tort will be a conclusive bar to a second suit for the same injury, although harmful consequences may have made themselves apparent subsequent to the first suit ; as it will be held that in the first verdict the plaintiff recovered all that he was entitled to claim.
Hence the statute of limitations runs from the time of the breach.
Sedgwick on Damages, vol. 1, par. 84.
A la Louisiane, sous un Code calqu6 sur le droit frangais, on ne peut trouver un seul cas parmi le grand nombre de causes identiques que les rapports judi. ciaires contiennent, on un meme accident ait donn6 lieu & deux on plusieurs actions successives par la m~me personne.
Comp. Barksdull v. The New Orleans (1) Q.
(3).20 Barb. 282.
Gray (Mass.) 397.
(4) 49 N. Y.
(5) 103 Ind. 314.
and Carrollton Railroad Company (1) ; Wardle v. The New Orleans City Railroad Company (2).
Et je puis THE en dire autant de la Province de Qu6bec, si j'en juge par le factum de l'intim6e.
En Ecosse, o-k le droit romain guide directement la ' jurisprudence, il est aussi de r6gle qu'une seule action, TaschereauJ. sous ces circonstances, peut 6tre port6e.
" I am of opinion," dit le Lord President Inglis, sur un appel dans la cause de Stevenson v. Pontifex 4- Wood (3), that a single act *
*
* * cannot be made the ground of two more actions for the purpose of recovering damages arising within different periods but caused the same act.
Et Lord Adam ajoutait;
There was only one wrongful act on the part of the defenders, and, in my opinion, as soon as the act was committed, the right of action to recover all damages arising from it arose.
*
*
*
* It always impossible to ascertain accurately what sum of damage will cover the injury, but although the amount of damages awarded may be to some extent speculative, yet the evil thus resulting is far less than would be the evil of allowing successive actions of damages from time to time arising from the same originating cause.
Et le jugement de la cour inf&rieure par lequel les dfendeurs avaient 6t6 " assoilzied from the action," fut confirm6 A l'unanimit6.
Cette jurisprudence est bas~e sur la maxime " Nemo bis vexdri dMbet pro eddem causd," Wood v. Gray Sons (4), qui pr6vaut dans le droit frangais comme dans le droit anglais, et n'est d'ailleurs que la cons~quence logique de 1'extension lib~rale adopt6e par nos tribunaux, A 1'instar de ceux d'Angleterre et des Etats Unis, des r~gles dominantes sur I'apprdciation et la mesure des dommages r6sultants d'injures corporelles.
L'on rencontre en France des d6cisions dans le sens (1) 23 La. Ann. 180.
(3) 15 Sc. Sess. Cas. (4 ser.) 125. 35 La. Ann. 232.
[1892]
contraire, Dal. 62, 1, 123; Dal. 71, 2, 241; (voir Laurent 527 et Fuzier-Hermann, Rep. vo. "Chose jugie nos. 439 et seq.) mais h mon avis, elles s'6cartent des vrais principes. Un dommage seul ne peut tre la base d'une action.
I faut une faute, sans cela J. pas -d'action possible; or, si cette faute a d6ja t la base 16gale, la cause juridique d'une action en r6paration, elle ne peut Atre la base, ]a cause d'un nombre illimit6 d'actions du m~me genre contre le mime d6fendeur.
D'ailleurs, ces decisions fussent-elles correctes en France, (elles n'y sont pas reques sans h6sitations, Dal. Rep. supp. vo. " Chose jug6e," n. 122), seraient inadmissibles ici, non seulement parce que la mesure des dommages en pareils cas est, dans 1'application, plus large ici qu'en France, mais encore parce que, en d6cr6tant la prescription absolue d'une seule annhe, et en autorisant les tribunaux la suppl6er d'office, notre Code s'est tellement 6cart6 de la loi frangaise sur la matibre que le but 6vident du 16gislateur a 6t de restreindre ici A des limites plus 6troites le recours aux tribunaux sur ce genre de
6clamations et de rendre dor6navant impossible la multiplicit6 d'actions successives bas6es sur une seule et mme faute, si toutefois elle a jamais 6t permise.
and KING J.J. concurred in the judgment allowing the appeal without costs, for the reasons stated by Taschereau and Gironard JJ.
J.-This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Appeal of the Province of Quebec, rendered on the 30th of September, 1899, which confirmed a judgment of the Superior Court rendered on the 23rd of December, 1898, and which condemned the present appellant to pay to the respondent the sum of $5,000 with interest and costs, as damages for bodily injuries sustained by her on the 9th of August, 1895, owing to the alleged bad con- CTYOF dition of a sidewalk in the City of Montreal.
On the 2nd of December, 1895, the respondent instituted a first action in damages against the appel- Girouard J. lant by which she demanded that the city be condemned to pay her the sum of $2,000 at which amount she assessed all her damages, past and future. She alleged in her declaration:
Que la d6manderesse, h raison des faits ci-dessus, 'a 6prouv6 et 6prouvera des dommages s'elvant h au moins deux mille piastres. On the 12th of June, 1896, the Superior Court having heard the parties and their witnesses, condemned the appellant to pay $1,000:
Consid6rant que, pour ces raisons, il nous parait qu'une somme de mille dullars est suffisante pour indemniser la dimanderesse des suites de cet accident qui est du & la ndgligence des employds de la d6fenderesse;
A maintenu et maintient 1'action de la demanderesse pour la dite somme de mille dollars, et condamne la d6fenderesse h payer h la demanderesse la dite some de mille dollars avec int6rit h compter du 4 dicembre dernier, date de la signification du bref et de la d~claration, et les d6pens distraits h Mm. Bisaillon, Brousseau et Lajoie, avocats de la demanderesse.
La demanderesse ayant demandg lui rdserver recourspyour dommages futurs qui peuvent lui resulter accident, la cour Ini rdcours, si toutefois demmages ne sont pas inclus dans sa prdsente demande, tribunal n'entend pasprduger.
On the 3rd of December, 1897, the respondent instituted a second ac ion against the city by which, after setting up her previous action and the judgment thereon, she states that she has ascertained since the said judgment that her injuries were far more serious than she then realised, and, in consequence of the same accident, she claims additional damages of $10,000. She alleges:
7. Qu'a la suite de cet accident, la maladie qui laccable et lea soins assidus que son 6tat exige de sa soeur, seule, 'acad4mie que toutes deux t enaient A Montrbal est d6sert6e, et la demanderesse est rdduite A la plus profonde misbre oF
8. Que le dit accident, les 16sions, les douleurs et 16tat delabr6 de MONTREAL sant6 qui s'en est suivi et se continue et a compromis les jours de la tC demanderesse sont dus exclusivement la ndgligence, l'incurie et la faute de la d6fenderesse et h ses employds, et ont caus6 des dommages Girouard J. irr6parables h la demanderesse, qu'elle riduit 4 la somme de $10,000. It does seem that, by this second action, the respondent demands damages accrued both after and before the rendering of the first judgment. It is not surprising therefore that the appellant met this second action by pleading that the damages claimed by the second suit were covered by the first judgment, and at all events that the $1,000, which the city was condemned to pay and did pay, was a sufficient compensation for any damages resulting from the same accident;
une compensation suffisante et une indemnit6 raisonnable pour tous les dommages que la demanderesse pretend avoir soufferts 4 raison du susdit accident, et qu'elle n'a pas droit h aucune autre somme de deniers, tel et suivant que reclam6 en son action.
A copy of the evidence adduced in the first case was filed by consent in support of the second demand, and some six or seven fresh witnesses were also heard, viva voce, before Mr. Justice Charland, who on the 23rd of December, 1898, condemned the appellant to pay to the respondent the further sum of $5,000 and costs of suit. In appeal this judgment was confirmed purely and simply with costs.
. The city appeals to this court and for the first time urges prescription of the second action under Arts. 2261, 2262, 2267, 2183, 2188 0. C
Art. 2261.
The following actions are prescribed by two years 2. For damages resulting from offenses or quasi-offenses, whenever other provisions do not apply;
Art. 2262.
The following actions are prescribed by one year 2. For bodily injuries, saving the special provisions contained in article 1056 and cases regulated by special law;
Art. 2267.
In all cases mentioned in articles 2250, 2260, 2261 and 2262, the debt is absolutely extinguished and no action can be maintained after the delay, for prescription has expired.
Art. 2183.
Extinctive or negative prescription is a bar to and in some cases precludes any action.
MCVEE. Art. 2188.
The court cannot of its own motion supply the defence resulting from prescription, except in cases where the right of action TaschereauJ. is denied.
It is conceded that the exception contained in the last paragraph of Art. 2262 does not apply to the present case.
It is clear that the present action is one for bodily injuries and comes within the provisions of article 2262 This court has held on several occasions that short prescriptions can be applied even in appeal, although not pleaded and set up for the first time in the factum or at the hearing.
Breakey v. Carter (1);
Dorion v. Crowley (2).
In the case of The Canadian Pacific Railway Co. v. Robinson (3) the court added that by article 21. 8 the courts are bound, of their own motion, to dismiss any action brought after the expiration of one year, if limitation is not specially pleaded.
True, the decision of the Supreme Court was reversed by the Judiclal Committee of the Privy Council, (4) but upon another ground, and the above doctrine was not disturbed.
The respondent raised several objections to the contention that the second suit is prescribed.
In the first place, she contends that not being able to ascertain exactly the extent of her injuries, she could not proceed sooner, and claims the application of the maxim laid down in Art. 2232 C. C.
" Contra non valentem agere, nulla currit prescriptio." But can this excuse apply to the first action ? And, if no answer to that action, can it be to a second, third and possibly, I pre- (1) Cass. Dig. 2 ed. 463.
(3) Can. S. C. R. 292. (2) Cass. Dig. 2 ed. 709.
(4) [1892], A.
sume, to a fourth one ? Can the plaintiff say that, because she could not ascertain the extent of her injury within the year, she can take it after? Evi- .
dently.not.
But there is another answer to this contention.
What prevented her trom demanding by or J. in the first action a first condamnation par provision for the damages so far liquidated, and as many other interlocutory judgmefits in the same suit as circumstances would permit and a final condemnation when plaintiff would be satisfied that all the damages suffered have been ascertained, a course which seems to have been followed in the arr&' of the court Brussels of the 23rd July, 1885 referred to by the respondent ? Why did she not take her second action between the 12th of June, 1896, and the 9th of August, 1896, that is, within the year after the accident, and, if the full measure of damages could not then be ascertained, make a reservation of any further conclusions which might have been necessary, as above suggested?
In the second place the respondent submits that under Art. S264 C. C., the prescription invoked against her has been Interrupted.
Art. 2264 lays down the rule that after interruption, except as to prescription by ten years, prescription recommences to run for the same time as before, if there be no novation. Taking for granted that interruption would apply to a case like the present one-a point open to much doubt, as the first action was dismissed for everything exceeding the $1,000 (C. C. 2226),-it seems plain to us, that at least the second action was taken six months too late, that is nearly eighteen months after the rendering of the first judgment. In fact the Superior Court could not reserve an action which is absolutely denied by the legislature.
The -resLrvation evidently could not have any effect after the expiration of one year.
The respondent also contends that the appellant has tacitly renounced the benefit of prescription by not pleading the same, and she quotes Arts. 2184 and 2185 0. C. as supporting that contention.
But as the well settled jurisprudence of this court is to maintain short prescriptions when not pleaded, even of its own motion when not even suggested, no such tacit renunciation can be presumed from the mere silence of the defendant.
Finally the respondent lays down the proposition that under article 2265 C. C. the effect of the first judgment was to furnish her a new title, prescriptible by thirty years. Art. 2265 says that
As we read the first judgment, nothing was settled in her favour as to future damages; there is no "judicial condemnation " or adjudication of that matter within the meaning of Art. 2265; there was a mere reservation claimed by the plaintiff, but not adjudicated upon and forming no part of the condemnation.
The reservation means that if a second action be properly taken, the defendant cannot plead chose jugge, and that was all the effect of the reservation. The recourse for future damages is not recognised ; reservation is simply made of the plaintiff's declaration that she is entitled to such remedy, not purely and simply, but provided the future damages are not included in the first demand which the court did not intend to decide, n'entend pas pr6ijuger. For all these reasons we have come to the conclusion that the appeal must be allowed, and the action of the respondent dismissed without costs in all the courts,
Cases cited
- A.C. 481 A.C. 481