In re White

re WHITE,

APPLICATION to Sedgewick J., in chambers, for a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of commitment of the petitioner on a conviction by the Stipendiary Magistrate of the City of Halifax, N.S. The circumstances under which the application was made are stated in the judgment reported.

Haydon for the application.

Newcombe K.C. contra.

After hearing the parties the following judgment was pronounced by:

J.-The applicant is confined in a Nova Scotia gaol by virtue of a conviction of the Stipendiary Magistrate of the City of Halifax for stealing certain goods "in or from" a warehouse belonging to the Intercolonial Railway.

le first applied to the Chief Justice of his province for a writ of habeas corpus which was refused.

Then he applied to Graham J. who referred the matter to the Supreme Court. After argument and due consideration his application was again refused, two judges dissenting.

No appeal was :-His taken from such judgment and he now renews his application to me, a judge of the Supreme Court Canada, under section 32 of the Supreme and Exchequer SedgewickJ. Courts Act.

That section may give me all the power which the common and statute law gives to judges of superior courts in matters of habeas corpus, but it does not constitute me a court of appeal with jurisdiction to void or reverse judgments of the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia. If I have in the premises equal and co-ordinate power with a judge of that court, my power most certainly does not extend further. The suggestion is almost impertinent, but were either of the two judges of the provincial court who until now have had no part in the matter, to grant the writ and, in spite of the judgment of the Supreme Court, and in vindication and assertion as well of his autonomy as of his possibly superior and conceivably 'infallible knowledge of law, to release the prisoner, his action, violating elementary principles as to legal authority and precedent, would be open to not undeserved censure. In the case supposed he would unhesitatingly and without question accept as law the judgment of his court. And what he should and would do, I must also do.

Even if I thought the imprisonment illegal, (which I do not), I would not, and under the circumstances above stated, I cannot interfere.

The application is refused.

Application refused. ....

JOSEPH HARGROVE MOTION for special leave to appeal from a judgment of the Court of Appeal for Ontario (1) affirming the judgment of the Divisional Court in favour of the plaintiff.

The plaintiff was a member of the Order of Royal Templars of Temperance and held a benefit certificate which entitled him on becoming seventy years old, or being totally disabled, to receive a sum based on the membership of the Order provided he had fulfilled the conditions of his membership.

In an action to recover the amounts due under this certificate the defence was that plaintiff had incorrectly stated his age in applying for admission to the order, and that he had not observed certain conditions which, however, were not set out nor referred to in the certificate. The plaintiff succeeded in all the courts below and the amount recovered being less than $1,000 defendant applied to the Supreme Court for special leave to appeal from the final judgment.

Hogg K.C. for the motion.

or

Sinclair contra.

(Oral).-We must refuse this application.

The case cannot be distinguished from Fisher v. Fisher (1) which we must follow. Even if we were not bound by that decision the appeal should still be refused.

It raises no question of public importance and the judgment appealed from appears to be sound, two principles always considered by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as grounds for refusing an application for leave to appeal.

Motion refused with costs.