P.
*Nov. 16.
AND
LOUIS ADOLPHE ROBITAILLE
RESPONDENT. (PLAINTIFF).........
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH, APPEAL SIDE, PROVINCE OF QUEBEC.
During the term of a license to cut timber on ungranted lands of the Province of Quebec, the local Crown Lands Agent made a sale of a part of the lands covered by the license and issued location tickets or licenses of occupation therefor under the provisions of Arts. 1269 et seq. of the Revised Statutes of Quebec, respecting the sale of Crown Lands.
Subsequently the timber license was renewed, but, at the time the renewal license was issued, there had not been any express approval by the Commissioner of Crown Lands of the sales so made by the local agent as provided by Art. 1269 R. S. Q.
Held, affirming the judgment appealed from, Taschereau and Davies JJ. dissenting, that the approval required by Art. 1269 R. S. Q. was not a suspensive condition the fulfilment of which would have retroactive effect from the date when the sales by the local agent were made, and that, at the time of the issue of the renewal license, the lands in question were still ungranted lands of the Crown for which the timber license had been validly issued. APPEAL from the judgment of the Court of King's Bench (appeal side), reversing the judgment of the Superior Court, District of Gasp6, and maintaining the plaintiff's action with costs.
The plaintiff claimed to be proprietor in possession for several years previous to the trespass charged against :-Sir Henry Strong C.J. and Taschereau, Gwynne, Girouard and Davies JJ.
the defendant, under a renewal of his license from the Department of Crown Lands of the Province of Quebec, dated 3rd May, 1899, covering the year then following, of the right to cut timber on certain timber berths or limits known as "Limits A and B " on the Bonaventure River, in the county of Bonaventure, Province of Quebec. By the action, which was commenced by saisierevendication, the plaintiff claimed a quantity of logs alleged to have been unlawfully cut by the defendant, during the autumn and winter of 1899-1900, upon lots covered by the license, and a further sum for damages suffered through the defendant's trespass.
The defendant denied the trespass and alleged that the logs in question had been cut by him, upon lots nos. 23 and 24 of the Township of Hamilton, with the permission of the owners, Bourque and Arbour, who held these lots under location tickets issued to them on the 18th and 22nd of December, 1898, respectively, by the local agent of the Department of Crown Lands, prior to the renewal of the plaintiffs license, and which were, in consequence, withdrawn and excepted from the lands covered by the license under which the plaintiff claimed the right to the timber. The defendant contended that, as Bourque and Arbour were settlers upon the lots which they so held, in good faith, they had the right to assign their rights to the timber thereon and that the lots had been inadvertantly and by error included in the renewal of the plaintiffs license of the 3rd of May, 1890, and that the license, in so far as it assumed to affect the lots in question, was, under the statute then in force, null and without effect.
By his answer, the plaintiff contended, among other things, that the location tickets conferred no rights upon the holders, Bourque and Arbour, because they had been issued by the local agent subject to the approval of the Commissioner of Crown Lands, which approval had never been formally given, but had been RoI'* withdrawn and impliedly refused when the lots wdre included in the renewal of his timber license on the 3rd of May, 1899
The plaintiff's license contained clauses providing that the licensee had the right to cut timber on the lands therein mentioned during the term of the renewal, but that-" tous les lots vendus ou mis sous la location par 1'autorit6 du Commissaire des Terres de la Couronne, avant la date de la pr6sente, sont retires de cette licence, et aussi les lots ainsi vendus ou mis sous location, subs6quemment A 1'6mission de telle licence, cesseront d'y tre sujets apris le 30 avril suivant, et dans chaque cas la vente on la location d'aucun des dits lots sera annulee, ces lots seront ins&rs de nouveau dans cette licence."
During the hearing the defendant admitted having cut 722 logs on the plaintiff's timber berth beyond the limits of the lots held under the location tickets, and the trial judge, DeBilly J., maintained the attachment for this quantity of timber only, dismissing the action as to the rest of the plaintiff's demande and releasing the remainder of the logs from seizure.
By the judgment now appealed from, the Court of King's Bench modified and reformed the trial court judgment and maintained the action in revendication of all the timber seized, with costs against the defendant.
Pelletier K.C. for the appellant.
The appellant's auteurs hold the lands by titles prior to the plaintiff's license which have the effect of withdrawing them, by the mere operation of the statute, from the license to cut timber which can only apply to ungranted lands belonging exclusively to the Crown at the date of the license. Arts. 1269, 1270, 1273, 1309 R. S. Q. The Commissioner of Crown Lands must be assumed to have approved of the sales of lots 23 and 24 to Bourque and Arbour at the time the local agent's report of the sales reached the department in January, 1899, and, although the local agent received such notification only upon the 22nd of May, 1899, the approval related back to the dates when the sales were made in December, 1898, and validated them from those dates.
Art. 1085 C. C. The plaintiff's license is, therefore, subject to the exception made by the statute and by its own express terms.
Arts. 1244 1310, 1343, R. S. Q.
The sales were complete when and as made by the local agent, subject only to the condition that the Commissioner of Crown Lands might have disallowed them for some special reason, and this was never done. See 63 Vict. ch. 14 (Que.)
We rely also upon the following authorities, viz. 1 Proudhon, Trait6 du Domaine, nos. 96, 97, 182; 1 Gandry, Trait6 du Domaine, nos. 53, 54, 58; Gaudry, Trait6 du Domaine, no. 323; Rocheleau v. Lacharitd at page 538 per Boss6 J.
Chase- Casgrain K.C. for the respondent. The mere act of the book-keeper claimed to have been an approval of the sales is not a compliance with the statute. The approval contemplated is a judicial act which can only be effectual when performed by the Commissioner of Crown Lands in person. The effect of the stalute is delectus persons and the commissioner cannot delegate the powers conferred upon him as such. Arts. 1269, 1288 R. S. Q.
The effect of Art. 1273 R. S. Q. is merely to validate sales made by a local agent after this formal approval has been duly given. The Act 63 Vict. ch. 14, amending Art. 1269 R. S. Q., can only affect this case as showing that our contention is based upon the correct construction of that article as it stood at the time of our license.
The statute is in restraint of alienations of the public domain and must be strictly construed as against delegation of powers or tacit approval.
We refer to Rocheleau v. Lacharild Lanigan v. Gareau
THE CHIEF JUSTICE.-I am of opinion that this appeal ought to be dismissed.
When the license of the 3rd of May, 1899, was granted to the respondent, the sales to Bourque and Arbour had not been approved by the commissioner. Prima facie therefore the licenses were valid.
I cannot agree that article 1085 C. C. (similar to article 1179 Code Napoleon) applies. We cannot, I think, treat the inchoate sales made by the agent Maguire as sales made under a suspensive condition, namely, the condition that the commissioner should approve of the sales, and that consequently when at some date between the 3rd of May, 1899, the date of the license, and the 22nd of the same month, the date at which the approval of the commissioner was communicated to Maguire, there was, by reason of the commissioner's act approving the sales, a retroactive effect to be attributed to the approval destroying the condition and making the sales, by relation, absolute from the dates of the respective location tickets issued by Maguire.
Whatever may be the operation of the article referred to n the. case of ordinary contracts I cannot regard the statutes as meaning anything other than this: that if there should be no absolute and completed sale at the date of the issue of the license to cut timber, the license should in law be unconditionally good and effectual. The statutes therefore, I think, exclude the operation of the provision of the code. This alone would be sufficient to dispose of the case.
Even if the article 1085 C. C. ought to be held to apply, I could not come to the conclusion that it annulled the license. According to the Roman law and to English law also, retroactive operation is regarded as a fiction which is held not to take effect to the prejudice of the rights of third persons acquired intermediately. This, however, I must admit is, in the opinion of some of the commentators on the Code Napoleon, especially Laurent and Hue, not the effect of the article 1085 C. C. They hold that the condition being put an end to in the case of a sale all intermediate dispositions the property fall with the condition and that the sale is by relation good ab initio. Older and other commentators are of a different opinion
But treating the first mentioned view of the law as sound even those who insist upon it admit a distinction in favour of acts of administration which, though subsequent to a sale subject to a suspensive condition afterwards ratified by the performance of the condition, are conserved. Even Laurent is of this opinion.
Then the timber license in question was not a sale of the land but a mere act of administration and, as such, a disposition which ought to be upheld.
I cannot concur in upholding the objection that the commissioner's personal approval was essential. The approval of sales made by a local agent is a ministerial not a judicial duty imposed on the commissioner the performance of which may be delegated.
The appeal must be dismissed with costs.
J. (diff&rant).-Cet appel devrait, A mon avis, 6tre allou6. Comme le jugement de la cour doit 6tre en sens contraire, il me suffira de dire en peu de mots les motifs sur lesquels je me fonde pour en diff6rer.
La cause a perdu de son importance pour le public et 1'administration des terres de la Couronne par le fait que les dispositions statutaires qui out donn6 lieu au conflit entre les parties out depuis t6 amen- Le demandeur, intim6, invoque comme son titre & la propri~t6 du bois en question, une licence on permis de coupe de bois sur les lots en litige en date du 3 mai, 1899. Ce permis lui a t oetroy6 par I'agent des Terres de la Couronne A New-Carlisle, sous l'autorit6 de la section 1309 des Statuts Refondus de Qu6bec, qui donne le droit au Commissaire d'6mettre un tel permis, mais exclusivement sur les terres publiques non conciddes. Et le permis de 1'intim6 comporte d'ailleurs la stipulation expresse
Les lots en question avaient-ils &6, avant le 3 mai 1899, conc6d6s ou vendus on mis sous location par 1'autorit6 du Commissaire des Terres ? C'est dans 1'esphce, toute la question.
Le jugement d quo d6cide que non, et que cons6quemment la licence de l'intim6 lui a 6t6 16galement octroy~e.
Avec d6f6rence, je crois que ce jugement est erron6.
II appert, et il est d'ailleurs admis, qu'en d6cembre, 1898, plusieurs mois avant 1'octroi A 1'intim6 de sa licence de coupe de bois, 1'appelant (par ses auteurs) avait achet6 les lots en question de 1'agent des Terres de la Couronne, qui lui avait accord6, non pas un billet de location sous la section 1269 des Statuts Refondus, mais ce que je consid6rerai en premier lieu comme un permis d'occupation comportant vente sous la section Or cette section 1270 d6crte express6ment que le porteur d'un tel permis, acheteur de la terre y d6crite, peut en prendre possession et l'occuper. Le permis de l'appelant sur ce terrain, il est vrai, r6.
serve au Commissaire le pouvoir d'en rbvoquer la vente.
Mais il n'est question dans la cause d'aucune telle r&vocation; il n'est pas pr~tendu qu'il y en ait jamais eu. Et ce permis n'6tait pas sujet A 1'approbation du
Commissaire, comme le pr6tend 1'intim6. Ce n'est que
1'octroi fait sous la section 1269 qui soit sujet A cette approbation.
La section 1270 paraltrait & elle seule, n'accorder le droit d'octroyer un tel permis qu'au
Commissaire lui-mime.
Mais la section 1273 d6crte express6ment que le permis 6mis par 1'agent des Terres de la Couronne conf~re les m~mes droits que s'il avait t 6mis par le Commissaire lui-m~me.
J'en conclus que tant aux termes du statut qu'd ceux de la licence elle-mime de 1'intim6, les lots en question n'ont pu 6tre inclus dans la dite licence parce qu'ils avaient 6t6 vendus a l'appelant plusieurs mois avant son 6mission.
Maintenant, en supposant que le titre, dat6 en d6cembre 18U8, de 1'appelant soit un billet de location sous la section 1269, je ne puis admettre avec l'intim6 que la Couronne ait pu 16galement, cinq mois plus tard, pendant que ce billet de location 6tait en vigueur, lui donner une licence de coupe de bois sur un terrain qui
6tait sorti de son domaine, et dont l'appelant 6tait en possession A titre de propri~taire.
Car, il avait cette possession, A ce titre, tant en vertu du droit public de la province, d'aprbs lequel toute vente on cession d'un terrain par la Couronne en transmet ipso facto et instanti la possession, the seizin, que d'apris les articles
1025, 1472 et 1493 du Code Civil, et les termes m~mes de son billet de location en vertu duquel il s'est mis de suite en possession active de ce terrain.
La Couronne n'aurait pu de plein droit vendre ce terrain A un tiers; elle ne peut pas plus qu'aucun de ses sujets ceder des droits dont elle s'est dlpartie. L'agent qui a vendu ce terrain a dftment remis au d~partement, A Qu6bec, en janvier 1899, le montant du prix de vente reu de l'appelant, avec son rapport mensuel, exig6 par le d6partement, constatant qu'il avait vendu ces lots en d~cembre 1898.
Sur ce rapport, 1'entr~e a de suite 6t r6gulibrement faite de cette vente dans les r6gistres du d6partement comme ayant 6t6 dAment faite, ut ex tunc en dicembre 1898; et il est en preuve que telles ventes ainsi entr~es sont, et out toujours t, consid6r6es comme dis lors approuv~es par le Commissaire.
Le Commissaire lui-m~me a did, suivant la section 1240, certifier A la municipalit6 du comt6 de Bonaventure, qu'il avait vendu ces lots en d6cembre 1898, omnia presumuntur rite esse acta. Et ces lots, d'apres la m~me section, sont devenus sujets aux taxes municipales Acompter de d6cembre 1898. Et l'intim6 soutiendrait que I'appelant n'6tait pas propri6taire, quoiqu'il fit sujet aux taxes. S'il 61ait sujet aux taxes, c'est, il me semble, que la Couronne n'6tait plus propri6taire. Et si la Couronne n'6tait pas propri6taire apris d~cembre 1898, c'est 1'appelant qui l'tait. Et la Couronne n'avait aucun droit d'octroyer subs6quemment une licence pour coupe de bois sur ce terrain.
L- licence octroy6e A 1'intim6 est done nulle.
Mais, dit l'intim6, par la section 1269 du statut, Cette partie de l'argumentation de l'intim6 ne me parait reposer que sur un jeu de mots. Quand le billet de location de l'appelant dit " if sale not disallowed by the Commissioner", n'est-il pas conforme au statut qui d6cr~te que tel octroi est sujet . l'approbation du Commissaire? Les mots "if not disallowed by the Commissioner " veulent bien dire, il me semble, " sujet A la d6sapprobation du Commissaire." Or, quand le Commissaire ne d6sapprouve pas, n'est-ce pas parce qu'il approuve ? Et ces mots du statut " sujets , l'approbation du Commissaire ", n'ont pas suspendu la vente. Ils ne comportent qu'une condition protestative r6solutoire, le pouvoir de d6sapprouver et r~silier.
Et taut que le Commissaaire n'a pas risili6, la vente est parfaite; l'acheteur est propri6taire. Puis, comme le statut ne fixait aucun d6lai au Commissaire pour faire option, approuver on disapprouver, I'approbation pouvait 6tre donne en aucun temps comme elle 'a t le 23 mai 1899 ; art. 1082 0.C., ut ex tunc, avec effet r~troactif jusqu'd la date de la vente par l'agent, art. 1085 0.0. C'est il est en preuve et le billet de location donn6 A 1'appelant le constate, 1'interpr~tation que le d~partement a tonjours lui-mime donn6e au statut alors force et cette interpr6tation 6tait raisonable.
Le seul changement que le statut 63 V. c. 16 a apport6 Id-dessus, c'est de limiter A quatre mois le temps durant lequel le Commissaire a maintenant le pouvoir de d6sapprouver une vente faite par son agent.
Il m'est impossible de donner au statut avec le jugement quo, une interpr&ation qui laisserait A la Couronne la proprit6 du terrain vendu par l'agent, tant que le Commissaire n'a pas en termes formels lui-m~me approuve la vente. Le billet de location en question, en termes non 6quivoques, considere la vente comme parfaite du jour qu'elle a t faite, car c'est dans six mois de sa date que l'acheteur est tenu de prendre possession.
De plus, il est statu6 par la section 1273 que toute personne A qui un billet de location a 6t0 octroy6 a les mimes droits que si elle avait obtenu du Commissaire lui-mame un permis d'occupation sous la section 1270. Or cette section 1270 donne & un acheteur A qui a t6 octroy6 un tel permis le droit de prendre possession d'occuper A titre de propri6taire, avec reserve de tout permis de coupe de bois pourvu qu'il soit ant6rieur A W.
sa date.
Et le permis de coupe de bois de l'intim6 est post~rieur A l'achit de 1'appelant. Le titre de l'appelant J doit done pr6valoir. La Couronne n'a pu transmettre A 1'intim6 en mai, 1899, des droits qu'elle n'avait pas. Je vois qu'il a th question en cour d'appel de la section 1343.
doit y avoir en un malentendu dont les parties sont probablement responsables. n'est pas fait mention au dossier d'une reserve de bois par la Couronne sur le terrain en litige telle qu'autoris6 par la section 1339. Et je ne puis y voir la preuve que 1'intim6 avait une licence de coupe de bois sur ce terrain avant le 3 mai 1899.
L'intim6, dans son factum, me semble exciper largement des droits de la Couronne et se constituer le protecteur du domaine public, qui, dit-il, ne peut Atre ali6n6 que suivant toutes les formalit~s requises par le statut. Et c'est sur ce point-lA exclusivement qu'il paralt avoir r~ussi devant la cour d'appel. Mais vraiment je ne puis voir comment dans 1'esp~ce la Conroune a pu souffrir, on m~me ait jamais 6t6 en danger de souffrir, des actes de son agent ou du d~partement.
La vente n'a t6 faite A l'appelant que sous la reserve expresse du pouvoir absolu du Commissaire de la r6silier , son gr6 et quand il le voudrait.
A mon point de vue, il n'y a qu'une question dans la cause. .La licence du 3 mai 1899 qu'invoque 1'intim6, lui a-t-elle 6t6 octroy~e sur un lot de la Couronne alors en vente, on bien sur un lot qu'elle avait ant6rieurement conc6d6 ? Il n'est gubre possible de dire que ce lot n'avait pas t conc6d6.
La licence de 1'intim6 est done nulle.
GWYNNE and JJ.-Concurred in the judgment dismissing the appeal with costs.
DAVIES, J. (dissenting.)-I concur generally in the reasons of Mr Justice Taschereau for allowing this appeal, but I desire to place my concurrence on the ground that the appellant's title was the location ticket -which he obtained from the Crown Lands Agent, under section 1259 R.S.Q.
This location ticket was, no doubt, subject to the approval of the Commissioner of Crown Lands. I agree with my brother Taschereau that such approval was given and that, when given, it confirmed the action of the agent and validated the location ticket from its date when the sale was made by the agent and the ticket issued.
Under section 1273 of the Revised Statutes of Quebec, location ticket holders have conferred upon them the same rights, powers and privileges, in respect of the lands for which such tickets have been issued by the Crown Lands Agent, and in my opinion, from the time when so issued, as are conferred upon persons obtaining licenses of occupation from the Commissioner under section 1270.
I cannot accede to the argument that these rights only attach after the apprwval of the Commissioner is formally given.
Appeal dismissed with costs. Sollicitors for the appellant: Drouin, Pelletier 4 Belanger.
Sollicitors for the respondent: Riopel - Lavery.
Statutes and regulations cited
-
Unresolved citations
- section 1309
- section 1269
- section 1270
- section 1273
- section 1240
- section 1343
- section 1339
- section 1259