Renaud v. Lamothe

In the Province of Quebec the English law rules on the subject of testamentary dispositions, and, therefore, in that province, a testator may validly impose as a condition of a legacy to his children and grandchildren, that marriages of the children should be celebrated according to the rights of any church recognised by the laws of the province, and that the grandchildren should be educated according to the teachings of such church and may also exclude from benefit under his will any of his children marrying contrary to its provisions and grandchildren born of the forbidden marriages or who may not have been educated as directed. APPEAL from the judgment of the Court of King's Bench, appeal side, reversing the judgment of the Superior Court, District of Montreal, and dismissing the plaintiffs action with costs.

The action was taken by one of the grandchildren of the late Honourable Louis Renaud, deceased, against his testamentary executors for an account to the plaintiff as one of the residuary legatees of the deceased testator.

By the will in question the testator left all his property to his widow in usufruct during her life, then to his children, as institutes under the substitution created by the will, and afterwards to his grandchildren as universal legatees.

The plaintiff is a son :-Sir Henry Strong C.J. and Sedgewick, Girouard, Davies and Mills JJ.

of one of the children of the testator whose marriage, subsequent to the execution of the will, had not been celebrated according to the rights and usages of the Roman Catholic Church. The plaintiff was not baptised according to the rights of the Roman Catholic Church, nor brought up in that religion, and does not profess it.

A clause of a codicil to the will is as follows :-" Je veux et ordonne que tous les enfants n6s ou A naltre de tous mariages que pourraient avoir contract~s on pourrout contracter par la suite mes dits fils Louis, Zbphirin et Alfred Renaud contre ma volont6 expresse ou qui n'auraient pas 6t6 contract6s conform6ment aux lois et aux rites de la sainte-eglise catholique, apostolique et romaine, on qui n'auraient pas t6 61v6s et instruits dans cette religion, soient totalement exclus de ma succession et ne regoivent aucune part dans le partage de mes biens, la substituton cr66e par mon dit testament ne devant pas s'appliquer i eux. J'exclus 6galement de ma succession et du b6n6fice de la substitution faite en faveur de mes petis-enfants, tous enfants qui pourraient naltre de tous mariages que pourraient contracter quelques-uns de mes autres enfants d'une manire clandestine et contrairement aux lois et rites de la sainte religion catholique, apostolique et romaine, ou qui ne seraientpas 6lev~s dans cette bonne religion." In the Superior Court, Mr. Justice H. T. Taschereau maintained the plaintiff's action and ordered the executors to account but this judgment was reversed by the Court of King's Bench by the judgment from which the present appeal is asserted.

An impossible condition, or one contrary to good morals, to law or to public order, in a will, is considered as not written.

See Kimpton v. Canadian Pacific Railway Co.

The condition under discussion is, in a two-fold sense, illegal and contrary to public order, for not only is it in restraint of marriage but it is in restraint of religious liberty and, to give effect to such a clause, would be a violation of the public policy of this country which allows the free exercise of choice in the matters of marriage and religion. By-.the Consolidated Statutes of Canada, chap. 74, sec. 1, the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference is, by the constitution and laws of the Province of Quebec, allowed to all Her Majesty's subjects therein.

We refer to Saintespes-Lescot, des Donations entre Vifs, p. 212, nos. 137, 138; Coin-Delisle, Art. 900; 7 Aubry &Rau, no. 692; Meyer v. Pfister Colmar, Mars, 1827. The statute 41 Geo. III., Chap. 4 (1801), subsequently reproduced in the Consolidated Statutes of Lower Canada, Chap. 34, sec. and later embodied in art. 831, of the Civil Code, introduced free disposal of property. Under the old law the testator could only bequeath a certain portion of his property; a husband could receive nothing by will from his wife, and vice versa. All these restrictions have been swept away, and art. 831 of the Civil Code is the result. See also 5 Touillier, no. 264.

This law is. reproduced, word for word, in art. 3439 R.S.Q., under Title XIX, intituled " Religious Matters." The question decided by the arret of Gellin v. Candy is quite different from that of Meyer v. Pfister and from the present case.

This case was decided two years before Meyer v. Pfister, and the contrary was decided by the same Court by arrit of 11th Aug. 1847.

See Troplong, Trait6 des Donations, p. In addition to these arrtis, the Cour Royale de Corse, by an arret on 2nd June, 1828, in Rouaserra v. *

Rouaserra held that the condition imposed in a will upon the legatee to marry a designated individual, must be considered not written, as contrary to the liberty of choice.

The English law has little or no bearing on this case but, on reference to 2 Jarman on Wills, sec. 44, it will be seen that there is a distinction between devises of real estate and personal legacies, and that, as regards the latter, conditions in restraint of marriage are void, and that the rules of the civil law were in part adopted. In Jones v. Jones it was stated by Blackburn, J., that there was a strong authority that, where the object of the will was to restrain marriage and to promote celibacy, the Court would hold such a condition to be contrary to public order and void.

The appellant submits that the clause in question should be read as a whole and one condition, and that the condition therein contained should be declared illegal and contrary to public order and as not written. Belcourt, K.C., and Lanothe, K.C., the respondents.

As the appellant was born before the death the testator he was personally excluded by the will. Troplong, 1 Trait6 des Donations nn. 190, 202. 208; 8 Duranton, n. ; Booth v. Meyer ; Re, Brown's Settlement The validity of such a clause is admitted in the matter of an obligation, it should be equally admitted in the case of a will.

All creeds are now on the same footing. They are equally free; and stipulations in regard to them have become free and legal. In abolishing a state religion and in granting liberty of conscience, public authority has placed the matter in that category of things concerning which stipulation is permissible.

All preferences have vanished; the State, as a State, is disinterested, and the citizen enjoys, in this connection, the same liberties and privileges that he possesses in all matters, against which there exists no prohibitive law.

The French authorities have no application, and are misleading. The absolute freedom of disposing by will does not exist in France as it does in Canada. Nor does the decree of the Court of Colmar represent the unanimous opinion of the French courts. On 22nd Dec. 1825, the Royal Court of Grenoble gave a decision in an opposite sense in Gellin v. Candy (1). We also refer to Pandectes Frangaises, vo. " Donations et Testaments," nos. 391 et seq.; 3 Mass6 et Verger, sur Zacharite, p. 177, § 464; Troplong. Donations entre Vifs, p. 274, No. 255 ; 18 Demolombe. No. 261; Ricard, Dispositions Conditionnelles, t, p. 147, No. 155. As the laws of the French Revolution of 1791 should not and cannot have any effect in Quebec, it is necessary and proper to disregard the authorities that still admit expressly, or even by implication, the force of those laws.

The English Courts, have not adopted the rule the civil law, but have subjected it to various modifications. Hodgson v. Halford (2); Re Knox (3); Wainwright v. Miller (4).

The authorities distinguish between conditions that prevent a marriage, in an absolute manner, and conditions which merely tend to direct the course of the marriage.

The first named conditions are contrary to public order; the others are not, since they do not prevent the marriage. This decision has since been followed, see Theobald on Wills, p. 453 ;

Evans v. Rosser (5); Newton v. Marsden (1); Allen v Jackson (2) ; Sutton v. .Tewks (3); Stackpole v. Beaumont (4).

Conditions against marriae with a Scotchman, or in a manner not in accordance with the rules of the Quakers, or with a person of a particular religion, or a domestic servant, are valid. Perrin v. Lyon (5); Haughton v. Haughton (6); Duggan v. Kelly (7) ; Jenner v. Turner (8). We rely aho on Hamilton v. Plenderleatlh (9); Abbott v. Fraser (10); 25 Demolombo, No. 294; 4 Aubry & Rau, 302; 17 Laurnt n. 32.

II n'est aucunement question de changer de religion; le fils on le petit-fils peut le faire sans forfaire au legs; seulement le pare prend des mesures de precaution pour conserver sa foi chez ses descendants.

Voici, d'ailleurs, la clause du testament en toutes lettres :

Troisibmement.-Je veux et ordonne que tous les enfants nds ou 4 naitre de tous mariages que pourraient avoir contractis ou pourront contracter par la suite mes dits fils Louis, Z6phirin et Alfred Renaud contre ma volont6 expresse on qui n'auraient pas t contractis conform6ment aux lois et aux rites de la sainte 4glise catholique, apostolique et romaine, on qui n'auraient pas 6t0 blevds et instruits dans cette religion, soient totalement exclus de ma succession et ne regoivent aucune part dans le partage de mes biens, la substitution cr6e par mon dit- testament ne devant pas s'appliquer & eux. J'exclus dgalement de ma succession et du b6ndfice de la substitution faite en (1) 2 John. & H., 356.

(10) L. R. 6 P. 0. 96.

Le premier point que nous avons A examiner est la position de 1'6glise catholique romaine dans la province de Qubec.

A l'6poque de la cession de la colonie A la Grande- Bretagne, un pareil legs aurait t6 parfaitement valide, l'6glise cat holique 6tant la seule religion reconnue au pays. Les capitulations de Qu6bec et Montr6al et le trait6 de cession n'ont pas, il est vrai, reconnu 1'6glise catholique comme 6glise de l'6tat, mais le libre exercice de cette 6glise fut garanti, sans aucune restriction. Ces stipulations ont autant d'autorit6 que les statuts de l'empire et il n'est jamais venu A la pens6e des l6gistes de les m6connaitre.

Bien au contraire, par l'acte de Quebec, le droit i la dime, qui avait 6t6 r6serv6 par la capitulation de Montr6al, fut consacr6; et, par des lois subs6quentes pass6es par la l6gislature coloniale, bien avant la conf6d6ration, la construction des 6glises catholiques fut encourag6e par la cr6ation d'un privilbge comportant hypothbque sur les propri6t6s immobilibres de ses membres.

Ce droit n'a pas 6t6 accord6 aux autres eglises, pas mime

A 1'6glise d'Angleterre, qui n'a pas non plus le privilge de pr6lever la dime, privil~ge qu'elle rclama an d6but, mais qui lui fut refus6 par les autorit6s anglaises.

On pent affirmer que si 1'6glise catholique n'est pas la religion nationale de la grande majorit6 des habitants de la province de Qubbec, elle y est cependant 6tablie par exception, ot par les trait6s internationaux et par les lois de 'Empire Britannique (art. 4 du Trait6 de Paris, 1763; ss. 5 et de 1'acte de Qu6bec 1774; sect. 35 de 'acte constitutionnel de 1791, et sect. 42 de l'acte d'union de 1840).

Les statuts refondus du Canada, 1859, ch. 25 et 74 -qui avaient surtout en vue les 6glises protestantes et 16glise catholique du Haut- Canada,-n'ont rien d'incompatible avec cette position particulibre de l'6glise catholique dn Bas-Canada. Girouard J Voir Brown v. Les Cure et Marguillers de Notre Dame de Montrial (1) et les documents sur les reserves du clerg6 publi6s par le bureau des Archives du Canada, 1899, pp. A 41.

L'Appelant soutient qu'un legs, comme celui fait aux fils Renand, favorisant indirectement 1'6glise catholique romaine on aucune autre religion, est nul, comme 6tant contraire A l'ordre public, c'est-h.dire, i la libert6 de conscience, et il cite Particle 831 du Code Civil et le chap. 74 des statuts refondus du Canada, L'ordre public on social-'int6rAt g6n6ral-public policy-Voili de grands mots, assez vagues, qui en droit doivent avoir cependant une signification d6finie.

Qae faut-il donc entendre par ces mots en matieres civiles ? Le Code ne le dit pas. Ne faut-il pas comprendre qne pour qu'un acte soit contraire A l'ordre public, qui est l'expression consacr~e par le Code, il faut qu'il y ait au moins violation d'une loi d'int6rat public ? Or, il n'y a aucun texte de loi qui d6fende de semblables legs. Reste A examiner 1'interpr~tation donnde par la jurisprudence.

Sera-ce tonjours la jurisprudence frangaise qui devra d~terminer notre ligne de conduite, mime lorsque nous avons adopt6 le droit anglais sur un sujet particulier ? Nous avons d6cid6 r6cemment dans une cause de Glengoil Steamship Co. v. Pilkington, (2) que l'ordre public, en matieres civiles, n'est pas toujours tel que compris en France, ancienne on nouvelle.

Allons-nous decider que la capacit6 de donner et recevoir par testament, qui incontestablement est d'ordre public et nous vient du droit anglais, doit Atre interpr~the par la jurisprudence frangaise ? Non, je ne puis accepter cette proposition, d'autant plus qu'il est de l'int&rt de la province de Qubbec et de -ouad toute la Puissance, que, sur un sujet comme celui que nous consid6rons, il y ait uniformit6 de jurisprudence.

Singulier spectacle que serait celui oi un legs, comme celui fait aux h6ritiers Renaud, serait valide dans toutes les provinces, A 1'exception de Qubbec et ce pour raison d'ordre ou d'intbrat public. C'est ce que nous verrions cependant si le testateur efit laiss6 des immeubles situ6s dans Ontario, par exemple.

Il ne peut en Atre ainsi & moins que la loi ne le dise clairement.

On oppose lajurisprudence frangaise.

En effet, les commentateurs et les tribunaux de la France moderne sont divis6s sur la question que nous avons A decider. Je doute que l'on ne puisse accumuler autant d'autorit6s dans un sens comme dans 1'autre.

Supposons mime qu'elles soient unanimes'; pour quelle raison devrions-nous les suivre dans 1'esp~ce ? Il ne suffit pas qu'elles soient frangaises, pour les recommander A notre jugement.

Il faut voir d'abord si les lois, promulgu6es dans les deux pays sur la matibre, sont A peu pris identiques.

N'oublions pas que la r6volution frangaise changea bien des principes, particulibrement en ce qui concerne l'ordre public.

Des principes nouveaux, que l'on est convenu d'appeler

" les grands principes proclam6s en 1789,"

sont venus changer l'ordre public, celai qui fat l'Ame de notre jurisprudence. Une nouvelle liberts individuelle succ6da A l'ancienne; et pour n'en citer qu'un exemple qui nous int6resse le plus, la facult6 m~me de tester disparut. est -vrai que ces principes furent plus tard en partie abandonnis ou consid6rablement modifi6s.

On ne peut nier cependant qu'ils out laiss6 une profonde impression sur le peuple frangais, sur ses 16gislateurs et ses jurisconsultes.

plus de soixante ans de disrtance, Particle ler de la constitution de 1'Empire de Giro-ard J. 1851 proclamait de nouveau les principes de 1789. Plac6s dans cette position de confusion et d'incertitude, quel est notre devoir sur une question d'ordre public?

Lorsque le Code de la province de Quebec est semblable an Code frangais, je comprends que la jurisprudence frangaise doit 6tre notre guide, an moins une haute autorit6, qui a rarement t6 ignor~e par cette cour, si jamais elle le feit, quelque diff6rente qu'elle soit du droit anglais.

(Voir Consumers Cordage V. Connolly

Mais si notre Code est diff6rent, s'il d6crite un principe du droit anglais, n'est-il pas raisonnable de recourir A la jurisprudence anglaise pour l'interprter ? Or,-et ceci n'est pas contest6,-la libert6 pleine et entibre de tester nous vient de 1'Angleterre. La France ne l'a jamais connue.

Pent-on alors mieux faire que de suivre les principes consacrbs par le Conseil Priv6 dans une cause analogue, celle de King v. Tunstall, d6cid6e en 1874, et rapport~e aux Law Reports. (2) Ici, il s'agissait non seulement d'un legs contre l'ordre public, mais contre les bonnes meeurs, telles que comprises dans le droit frangais, de riches seigneuries, d6passant en valeur la limite des aliments de 1'ancien droit, ayant 6t0 16gu6es a un enfant adult6rin.

Le jugement de la cour de premibre instance, rendu par un juge (Torrance J.) bien connu pour sa science en droit romain, se lit comme suit:

Parliament of Great Britain and Ireland, of the Act numbered chapter 83 of the Acts passed in the fourteenth year of the late reign of His late Majesty George III, capacity to dispose of his estate and property without reserve, restriction or limitation.

Considering that from and after the passing of the Act of the late Girouard J. Province of Lower Canada, numbered chapter IV of the Acts passed in the forty-first year of the reign of His said Majesty a testator had a right to bequeath in favour of any person or persons whatsoever all and every his or her lands, goods, or credits without reserve, restriction, or limitation.

L'opinion du juge Badgley, si~geant en appel dans la mAme cause est remarquable; elle est citae au long au rapport de la d&cision du Conseil Priv6 (1) : Reading the proviso as the substitute for the article, and considering its English origin, where entire freedom was observed in favour of devisees without distinction, the proviso could only have contemplated for this province the same enlarged power as was practised in England in such matters, and demonstrated the intent by omitting the qualifying words of the article as to the devisee, leaving the devisor free to give to whomsoever he might think proper to receive his liberality, and neces3arily giving to these capacity freely to receive without restraint. This proviso was the only change effected upon the old re-introduced law, and seemed to be intended to make testacy in Canada as extended and beneficial as in England.

It has been objected against the enlarging effect of the enactment to remove the previous incapacity of devisors to make such a bequest, that the previous law, the French law, was a law of public order and morality, and could not be set aside except by express terms, specifically innovating upon the terms of the old law.

It is sufficient to say that it was not a law so known, it was merely a French jurisprudence at any time, and, as shewn above, such bequests by parents were protected by the Parisian jurisprudence, up to and after April, 1663, when the law of the Custom was established here, at which time such bequest was not held to be against public order or morality as then known and practised in the Pr6v6t6 de Paris. It will likewise be borne in mind that the statutory provision originated in England, where such freedom of devise prevailed, and where neither law nor public order or morality incapacitated bastards, without distinction, from receiving bequests without restriction from their parents; and the same capacity exists in the common law in the United States; see Kent, Com. vol. ii, p. 209, et seq; Redfield on Wills, vol. i; and by (1) L. R. 6 P. C. at p. 60.

the decision of the Privy Council in Durocher's Case it was held that the alleged incapacity of testators was removed by the Act of 1774. E.

This Act was in force in the Province of Quebec in 1789, the date of the will and bequest in favour of the testator's natural son, William Girord J Plenderleath, and has not been repealed......

Both statutes being general in their terms for devisors and devisees, they can be controlled by no limitations or exceptions, unless specially declared......

It seems evident, therefore, that the alleged incapacity of William Plenderleath Christie, if it existed, had been removed by the effect of the general capacitating law existing in the province long anterior to 1835, the time of the opening of the substitution for his benefit, and enabled him to receive the bequest as any person whatsoever, and this is established by an undisturbed legislative and judicial concurrence, which may be resumed as follows :-First : Legislatively, by the statutory enactments of 1774 and 1801, condensed and combined in the 2nd section of chapter 34 of the Consolidated Statutes of Lower Canada of 1861, afterwards continued and adopted in ipsissimis verbis into the Civil Code, enacted and promulgated in 1866, and still in force, the whole without limitation or restriction upon the devisor to give or the devisee to receive. Secondly : Judicially, by the judgment of the Provincial Court of Appeal, in Durocher v. Beaubien in 1826, -composed of five judges, and confirmed by the judgment of the Privy -Council in 1828, which has not since been disturbed ; again, by the -judgment in Hamilton v. Christie in the King's Bench of 1839, composed of three judges and supported on the merits by the unanimous opinion of the Provincial Court of Appeal, in 1845, composed of four judges; then by the opinion of the three judicial codifiers, as expressed in their report upon wills in January 1864, referred to above ; then again in this cause, by the considered julgment of the court below, composed of one judge, from whose judgment this appeal to this court has been taken ; and, finally, by this court, composed of five judges, four of whom are in concurrence, and the fifth, Mr. Justice Monk, dissented mainly upon the non-retroactivity of the Act of 1801, which, he admitted, removed disqualifications in devisees from that time. It would be difficult to present a more uniform and consistent legislative and judicial concurrence of interpretation in favour of the pretensions of the devisee litigated in this cause, and of his capacity to receive the bequest in his favour when his receiving power became legally effective.

Lord Justice James, parlant au nom du tribunal, observe, p. 90 :

But beyond that, the law of England having from the earliest period, from the time when testamentary dispositions were introduced, given absolute power to a testator to deal as he liked with his property, wholly regardless of any-moral or natural claims upon him, the English Legislature introduced that law into Lower Canada. Gironard J. Puis, r~f6rant A [la loi canadienne de 1801, le tribunal ajoute:

In this state of things the Canadian Legislature, having before it the English law, passed an Act which professed to explain as well as to amend the English Act ; and it proceeds to recite that doubts and difficulties bad arisen with respect to the construction of the English Act.

These doubts and difficulties it was perfectly within the competency of the Canadian Legislature to deal with as they thought fit, being a mere matter of disposition of property in the colony, not affecting any imperial policy.

They recite the difficulties, and then they go on to declare and enact that it shall be lawful for a testator to give to any person or persons whomsoever, with the single exception of gifts in mortmain.

Indeed it was said that such a principle is not to be applied to this case ; that the attempt to make this gift is such a violation of law on the part of the testator that it is to be struck out just as if it were a gift pro turyi causd or contra mores.

Their Lordships are unable to take that view. Nobody surely can suppose that it is crime in a man to express by his will his wishes as to what should be the devolution of his property after his death, or that it should go in a particular direction,-even although that direction should be in favour of an adulterine bastard, leaving it open to the law to say whether the wish shall or shall not take effect.

There is nothing immoral, nothing wrong in the expression of such a wish, nothing to prevent the ordinary application of the ordinary principles of law to the case.

And, therefore, even if the old incapacity of adulterine bastardy had not been effectually removed by the English Act, it had, before the substitution opened, been removed by the intervening Canadian Legislation.

Voir aussi Abbott v. Fraser (1).

Ainsi sur une question m~me de bonnes mceurs en matibres civiles, telle que comprise dans l'ancien droit frangais et mime le nouveau, c'est le droit anglais qui doit nous r6gir. Il doit en 6tre de mAme (1) L. R. 6 P.

25% sur une question d'ordre public, qui est le seul motif que les avocats de l'appelant ont invoqu6.

A mon point de vue les statuts de et reproduits au Code Civil, art. 831, 839, 872 et 899, out Giroarl J. complitement rang6 la province de Qu6bec dans le domaine du droit anglais, au sujet de la libert6 de tester et de recevoir par testament.

La jurisprudence de l'Angleterre et des Etats-Unis, oi la libert6 de conscience est proclam6e aussi pleinement et lib6ralement qu'en France, au Canada on ailleurs, est unanime & reconnaltre la validit6 d'une condition comme celle qui est attach6e an legs fait aux h6ritiers Renaud.

Pour ces raisons, nous sommes d'avis de confirmer le jugement dont est appel, avec d~pens.

Appeal dismissed with costs.