Judgment of the Court
JUSTICE.-We are all agreed that this appeal must be quashed.
As the case comes before us, there is nothing in it but a controversy as to a pecuniary amount of less than $1,000, and therefore not sufficient to give us jurisdiction.
The contention that the case might be appealable under subsection (a) of the Act 60 & 61 Vict. c. 34, cannot prevail.
There is no title to real estate or any interest therein in question, controverted or in controversy, upon this appeal. Compare Tintsman v. National Bank (5); Stillwell B. & S. V. Co. v. Williamston Oil 4 F. Co. ; Carne v. Russ ; Farmers Bank Alexandria v. Hooff (8); Nicholls v. Voorhis Scully v. Sanders (10).
The effect or consequences of a judgment are not a test of our jurisdiction. Wineberg v. Hampson (1); The Emerald Phosphate Co. v. The Anglo-Continental Guano Works (2); Jermyn v. &
Tew (3); Frechette v. Simmonneau ; Toussignant v. County of Nicolet
Neither can the right of appeal be supported upon sec. subsec. (d) of the Act.
There is in the case no matter in question relating to the taking of an annual or other rent, customary or other duty or fee, or a like demand of a general or public nature affecting future rights. These last words are] governed by the preceding ones. A demand must be of a general and public nature besides affecting future rights.
In re arois (6); Gilbert v. Gilman ; Wineberg v. Hampson (1) ; Raphael v. MacLaren
The appellant now asks that, failing his maintaining his appeal as of right, we should grant him special leave under subsec.
But ithat application is too late, assuming that it could be heard without notice to the respondent.
More than sixty days have elapsed since the judgment he would now appeal from; sec. 40 Supreme Court Act; and under a constant jurisprudence, our power to grant special leave is gone, and the time cannot be extended for such a purpose either under sec. 42 which applies exclusively to appeals as of right, or under rule 70 which has always been construed as not applying to delays fixed by statute. Our jurisprudence on the subject under this Ontario Act is the same that we have followed as to leave to appeal per saltum under section 26, subsec.
Barrett v. Syndicat Lyonnais du Klondyke and cases therein cited, to which may be added In re Smart (2); and Stewart v. Skulthorpe, referred to in the second edition of Cassels's Supreme Court Practice, at page 37. See Credit Company v. Arkansas Central Railway Co. (3) CESTMENT Brooks v. Norris
Appeal quashed with costs.