Prévost v. Lamarche

A

(PLAINTIFFS)....................

*Nov. CHARLES

ARTHUR

PREVOST

OTHERS(DEFENDANTS)

.........

AND

VALMORE LAMARCHE

'S

(MIS

EN

CAUSE)....................R

P

E ON APPEAL

FROM THE SUPERIOR

SITTING IN REVIEW, AT MONTREAL.

Construction of will - Usufruct - Substitution - Partition between The effect of the statute, Vict. (Que.), respecting the will of the late Amable Provost, read in conjunction with the provisions of the will and codicils therein referred to, is to declare the deed of partition between the beneficiaries thereunder final *PRESENT:-Fitzpatrick C.J. and Girouard, Davies, Idington, Maclennan and Duff JJ.

and definitive and not merely provisional; the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench, on the appeal side taken under that PRtvosT statute, has no other effect. Neither the statute nor the judgment referred to sanctions the view that the said will and codi- R pils constitute more than one substitution; there was but one substitution created thereunder in favour of all the joint legatees and consequently accretion takes place among them within the meaning of article of the Civil Code, in the event of any legacy lapsing, under the terms of the will, upon the death an institute without issue prior to the opening of the substitution. In such case, the share of the institute dying without issue devolves to the other joint legatees, as well in usufruct as absolute ownership, and, consequently, none of the institutes substitutes have the right of disposing of any portion of the testator's estate, by will or otherwise, prior to the date of the opening the substitution.

Judgment appealed from (Q.R. 257) reversed. DeHertel v. Goddard L.J.P.C. distinguished.

APPEAL from the judgment of the Superior Court, sitting in review at Montreal (1), Loranger J. dissenting, whereby the judgment of the.Superior Court, District of Montreal (Fortin J.), dismissing the plaintiffs' action with costs was affirmed.

The action was brought by the appellants, Armand Prdvost and Adele Pr&vost (wife of Azarie Brodeur) as co-heirs and beneficiaries under the will of the late Amable Pr6vost, deceased, against all other co-heirs, under the said will, and the respondent, Lamarche, in his capacity of testamentary executor of the last will of Louis Rom6o Pr&vost (one of the co-heirs) deceased, for the partition of the share of the estate of the said Louis Romeo Provost under the last will of the said late Amable Prdvost. The defendants, other than the present respondent, did not contest the action, and the judgment appealed from was rendered upon the issues joined by the executor, under the circumstances following.

(1) Q.R. 257.

The late Amable Pr6vost, who died in 1872 leaving seven sons and daughters, made his last will on 26th December, 1844, and subsequently made codicils thereto, the material parts of which are as follows:- By his last will he gave and bequeathed to the child born and to the children to be born of his marriage with his wife (yet living) the enjoyment and usufruct during their lives of all the property, movable and immovable, of which he should die possessed, his said child and children to be born to enjoy said property in usufruct during their lives, subject to all the charges ordinarily imposed upon usufructuaries, the full ownership of his said property to belong, after the death of his said children or any of them to the children to be born of their respective marriages, and his grandchildren who were thereby substituted to his said children, as regards his said property, to enjoy, use, deal with, and dispose of the same as they may think fit, appointing them for that purpose his universal legatees.

It further provided that the revenues of said property should be received by the testator's children for their support and that of their children, and should, therefore, be neither transferable nor subject to seizure by creditors; that the property itself should pass: to the grandchildren, and should not be sold even for their greater advantage; and that none of the grandchildren should alienate, incumber, or hypothecate their parts or rights or his or her part and rights in. his said property before the extinction of the usufruct in such property bequeathed to his said children, or of the share thereof belonging to the father or to the. mother of said grandchildren respectively.

One of the codicils contained the following provisions: "It is my will that if the child born or the ehildren to be born of my marriage with my wife, all die before her without leaving children or legitimate descendants, * my said wife shall have, during widowhood, the enjoyment and usufruct of all the property movable and immovable * * * except the land with buildings and dependencies which I -have at Terrebonne, which I leave, in such case, to Louis Joseph Pr~vost, my brother, in full ownership, and as to my other property movable and immovable after the extinction of the usufruct thereof, which I have bequeathed to my said wife during widowhood, they shall return and belong to the said Louis Joseph Pr& vost and to Dame Edwidge Pr~vost, wife of Mr. Saraphin Bouc and Miss Anathelie Pr~vost, my sisters, if they are living, if not to their children," etc.

It was contended by the appellants that the said will and codicil should properly be interpreted as imposing on each of the testator's children an express substitution in favour of their children if any, and, in case of death without issue, an implied substitution in favour of the institute's surviving brothers and sisters or their children.

The interpretation contended for by the respondent was that the will created as many substitutions as there were children of the testator; that each substitution was in favour of the children of the institute if any, and, failing children, in favour of the brother and sisters of the testator in the event of all the testator's children dying without issue before their mother; that upon the death of Louis Romeo Pr~vost (who died without issue, in the State of California, on the 19th of October, 1902), his share was subject only to the contingent substitution in favour of his uncle and aunts and in the meantime remained in his estate.

After having held possession of the estate of the late Amable Pr~vost, as usufructuaries in common, for about seven years after his death, the beneficiaries executed a deed of partition thereof among themselves by which the said estate was divided into seven separate shares and, since then, the said shares have been separately held and enjoyed by the respective beneficiaries to whom they were so allotted. Doubts having arisen as to the validity of the partition, upon petition of all the beneficiaries having interests on the 9th of January, 1897, a special statute was enacted, as follows, by the Legislature of the Province of Quebec: "An Act to declare the Partition of the Property of the Estate of the late Amable Pr~vost final and definite."

"Whereas by his testament, dated the twenty-fourth of December, one thousand eight hundred and fortyfour, and by codicils, respectively dated the twentysixth day of December, one thousand eight hundred and forty-four, and the twenty-second day of January, one thousand eight hundred and sixty, received at Montreal before J. Belle and his colleague, notaries, the late Amable Pr~vost, in his lifetime of the same place, merchant, bequeathed to the children born and to be born of his marriage with Dame Rosalie Victoire Bernard, his wife, the usufruct and enjoyment, during their lifetime, of all his movable and immovable property, the full ownership of the said property to belong, after the death of the said children or of any of them, to the children to be born of their respective marriages;

"Whereas the said will and codicils constitute a substitution in which the children of the said late Amable Pr6vost are the institutes and his grandchildren are the substitutes; and whereas it is especially Ordered by the said will and codicils that the real estate or immovables of the testator should pass in kind into the hands of the said grand-children without the children of the testator or even the grandchildren, so long as the usufruct bequeathed to the children should exist, being able to alienate, sell, pledge or hypothecate the same for any cause whatsoever;

"Whereas the said late Amable Prevost died at Montreal on the ninth of February, one thousand eight hundred and seventy-two, without having revoked his said will and codicils, leaving as his survivors his wife, the said Dame Rosalie Victoire Bernard, and seven children;

"Whereas the said late Amable Pr6vost was common as to property with his said wife, Dame Rosalie Victoire Bernard, so'that the said will affected only the share of the said late Amable Pr6vost in the said community and the property personally belonging to him;

"Whereas, after inventory was made of the property that was left by the said late Amable Prdvost, his said children and their mother, the said Dame Rosalie Victoire Bernard, proceeded on the twentyseventh of April, one thousand eight hundred and eighty-three, by deed passed before G. M. Pr6vost, notary, to the partition and liquidation of the said community of property and of the estate of the said late Amable Pr~vost; and, by the said partition, all the movable and immovable properties coming to them from their father were divided amongst the seven children of the said late Amable Pr~vost, his only heirs and legal representatives;

"Whereas the agreements and stipulations of the said partition have been carried out on both sides, and since the said day, the twenty-seventh of April, one thousand eight hundred and eighty-three, the heirs Provost have separately enjoyed the property of the said estate according to the partition then made amongst them;

"Whereas, since the said partition, doubts have .arisen as to the question whether the said partition was a provisional one, like that between institutes, under the provisions of article 948 of the Civil Code, or whether, on the contrary, it is final, in consequence of the special provisions contained in the will of the -said late Amable Pr~vost;

"Whereas, the said institutes have consulted eminent legal authorities, but their opinions are divided on this point and even, in a non-litigious proceeding, to wit: an application made by Dame Marie Elizabeth Adb1e Provost, wife of Azaire Brodeur, Esquire, physician, of the City of Montreal, for the purpose of being authorized to expend a sum of money for the improvement of a property which devolved to her by the said partition, the Honourable Mr. Justice Jett6, by an order in chambers, dated the twenty- -seventh of March, one thousand eight hundred and ninety-six, ordering the convening of a family council, declared that the said partition was not provisional, but final, that the said legatees, the institutes, were authorized to make it so by the very terms of the said will and codicils, and, consequently, that each institute definitely owned the share of the property bequeathed to him, on the sole condition of delivering it -to his children, and that the other institutes have no interest in the property so allotted to one of them; "Whereas the said order, although it cannot constitute res judicata, causes serious doubts as to the nature, whether provisional or final, of the said partition; whereas such doubts cannot be solved except by a suit at law between the said heirs Prdvost, which cannot but be very long and costly, and which would have the effect of dissipating the property of the said succession; whereas the legatees, the institutes, have divided the property of the said estate amongst themselves in a fair and equitable manner; whereas one of them, to wit: Amable Oscar Alexandre Prdvost, in his lifetime of the City of Quebec, superintendent of the Government Cartridge Factory at Quebec, died on the sixteenth of September, one thousand eight hundred and ninety-five, leaving minor children, now represented by their mother, Dame Marie Louise Duchesnay, their tutrix, duly appointed in law, in favour of whom the said substitution is now opened, as regards their father's share, so that it is necessary to determine, without delay, the true character of the partition made on the twenty-seventh of April, one thousand eight hundred and eighty-three, of the property left by the said late Amable Provost;

"Whereas all the testamentary executors appointed by the said late Amable Provost are now deceased, and the interested parties have applied to the courts to have them replaced, but the Honourable Mr. Justice Taschereau, by an order, dated fifteenth of November, one thousand eight hundred and ninety-six, declared that the execution of the said will and codicil were completed, and that there was no occasion to replace the said testamentary executors;

"Whereas, Edouard Henri Armand Pr6vost, burgess, both in his quality of legatee and institute, and as curator duly appointed in law to the said substitution, Louis Romeo Pr&vost, accountant, Toussaint Prdvost, Benjamin Hector Provost, broker, and Dame Marie Rh6a Berthe Pr~vost, widow of the late Joseph Elz6ar Berthelot, all of the City of Montreal, being the majority of the legatees and institutes in the substitution established by the said late Amable Provost, have, after alleging the facts above mentioned, represented, by their petition, that they are prepared to accept the principle laid down in the order of Mr. Justice Jett6, as aforesaid, and to acknowledge the partition of the property of the estate of the said late Amable Pr~vost, as having been final and definite; and whereas it is very important, in order to remove all doubts and avoid ruinous law suits for the heirs, that the said partition of the twenty-seventh of April, one thousand eight hundred and eighty-three, of the property of the estate of the said late Amable Prdvost, be declared final and definite to all intents and purposes whatsoever; and whereas it is expedient to grant the prayer of the petitioners;

"Therefore, Her Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Legislature of Quebec, enacts as follows:

"The partition of the property of the estate of the late Amable Pr~vost, in his lifetime merchant, of the City of Montreal, made by and between the legatees who are institutes in the substitution under the will and codicils of the latter, dated respectively the twenty-fourth and twenty-sixth of December, one thousand eight hundred and forty-four, and the twenty-second of January, one thousand eight hundred and sixty, before J. Belle and his colleague, notaries, by a deed of partition and liquidation before G. M. Provost, notary, on the twenty-seventh of -April, one thousand eight hundred and eighty-three, is declared to be and always to have been final and definitive; and, accordingly, the legatees who are institutes in the substitution established by the said late Amable Pr~vost are declared to be and always to have been the sole proprietors of the share of the said property which has respectively devolved to them, under the terms of the said deed of partition and liquidation, subject to the condition of handing over such share to their children at their death, as set forth in the said will and codicils; and the children, issue of the marriage of the said late Amable Oscar Alexandre Pi6vost with the said Dame Marie Louise Duchesnay, are declared to be and always to have been, since the death of their father, the sole owners of the property which devolved to the said late Amable Oscar Alexandre Pr&vost, in virtue of the said partition.

"Nevertheless any of the parties interested may, within two months following the passing of this Act, submit to the Court of Queen's Bench, sitting in appeal, the other heirs being duly notified, the question whether the said partition of the 27th April, 1883, made before Provost, notary, is final and definitive, which may be done by taking an appeal to the said court by inscription in the ordinary way from the judgment rendered in chambers by the Honourable Mr. Justice Jett6, in March, 1896, and in such case the parties shall proceed as in a case in which the said partition shall have been declared definitive.

"If, by the judgment of the said court, the said partition is declared definitive, the said judgment shall be declared final and without appeal. If the contrary, the said parties shall immediately proceed to a new partition and liquidation according to the ordin- :ary rules of voluntary partitions, each interested party returning to the mass, according to law, all that he shall have received under the said partition of the -27th April, 1883. The partition thus made after the returns shall be final and definitive for all purposes, -subject to the substitution enacted by the will of the late Amable Prdvost."

On the 23rd of December, 1897, the Court of King's Bench, upon an appeal taken under said Act and to which Louis Romeo Pr6vost and the present parties, were parties, affirmed the judgment of Mr. Justice Jett6 in the Superior Court and held that the testator had "bequeathed to each of his children an equal share of his property, and substituted to each of his children the children of the latter, to receive the share of the property which their father or mother would have received by means of the legacy to the latter; that the share of the property accruing to each of his said children had been fixed at the time of the testator's death and defined by the said partition for each of the children, within the language and according to the intention of said will'; and declared the partition final.

On the 19th of October, 1902, Louis Romeo Pr6vost made his last will in authentic form, thereby bequeathing to Marie Louise Bouthillier, during her natural life should she remain unmarried, an annuity of $1,200 per annum, to be paid out of his estate, consisting principally of the share he inherited under his father's will, and the residue to his brothers, Oscar Provost, Arthur Provost, Armand Provost and Elector Prbvost, and his sister, Mrs. Berthelot, or the survivors or survivor of them and to the lawful issue of any of them who might pre-decease him, in equal shares, constituting them his universal residuary legatees in absolute ownership. In his said will he also appointed the respondent his sole executor, extending his powers beyond the time limited by law and authorizing him to sell or dispose of all or any part of his said estate with the powers necessary to carry out, that provision.

In the Superior Court, the appellants' action was dismissed with costs by Mr. Justice Fortin, who held that the effect of the will, codicils and the statute, read together, was the constitution of as many separate and distinct substitutions as there were children of the testator, and his judgment was affirmed by the judgment of the Court of Review (1), now appealed from.

The main questions upon -the present appeal are as to the correct interpretation of the will of the late Amable Prbvost and codicils thereto read in connection with the statute, 60 Vict. ch. 95 (Que.) ; the effect of the partition, and the right of thelate Louis Rom6o Pr~vost, dying without issue, to dispose of his. share in the estate of the said late Amable Prbvost as. he did by his will.

The usufruct is declared inalienable and unitseizable and the will expressly forbids alienation of the property until the end of the usufruct. The property must be delivered to the grandchildren en natureas at the time of the testator's death.

The grandchildren are the real legatees of the estate according strosS to the testator's will. Romdo Pr6vost could not make a will and dispose of part of the estate which was given in express terms in usufruct to the children, without assigning any share, and in property to the grand-children of the testator. The testator's intention to preserve the whole estate for the grand-children is moreover expressly manifested in the codicil where it is provided that if all the children die without issue, the estate shall revert in usufruct to the widow and in property to the brother and sisters. Here again it is quite clear that the testator wished the estate to remain in the family, and that, in the case of only one grand-child surviving he should get the whole. According to respondent's contentions, if of the seven children only one had married and had issue, that issue would have received only one-seventh of the estate; and six-sevenths would go to strangers, if the children chi>se to make wills to that effect. Such cannot be the proper interpretation of the will of the late Amable Provost.

The statute had not the effect of changing the will as to the transmission of the estate. The only matter that it settles is the partition of the property and not the transmission, which will follow according to the will.

The words of the first paragraph are: "And, accordingly, the legatees who are institutes in the substitution established by the said late Amable Pr6vost are declared to be and always to have been the sole proprietors of the share of the said property which has respectively devolved to them, under the terms of the said deed of partition and liquidation, subject to the condition of handing over such share to their children at their death, as set forth in the said will and codicils." The will provides that the property in the estate shall belong to his grand-children without assigning any particular share to any one of them. This general disposition of the estate makes it clear that the intention was that it should contain the clause of accretion. Romeo Pr~vost having died without issue, his shares accrued to his co-usufructuaries. and to the grand-children.

The judgment of the Superior Court is based on the case of DeHertel v. Goddard (1), which was rendered by Loranger J., who states, in the present case, that there is no analogy between the two cases. In the case of Addle Pr6vost v. Berthe Privost (2), on a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that Addle Provost, one of the appellants in this case, had no interest in her co-heir's share, because the partition had been declared final and definitive, the Court of King's Bench dismissed the motion and maintained the contentions of appellants herein on that point. We also refer to 7 Aubry & Rau, nn. 714, 726 and 22 Demolonibe, p. 349, no. 394.

It is quite clear that the legislature intended to set at rest every question- upon which judge Jett6 had expressed an opinion. The summary of his opinion is given in the preamble;-the necessity of removing doubts and preventing litigation, the declaration, in the petition, that the petitioners were willing to accept judge Jett4's opinion, the granting of the petition; and the safeguarding of the rights of the other heirs by means of an appeal from judge Jett6's order, put this beyond doubt. One of the questions . upon which judge Jett6 expressed an opinion, was the one in controversy here, viz., Whether or not any substitute had, after the partition, any interest in the property assigned by the partition to the other institutes. This question was answered in the negative, and the Court of King's Bench agreed with him. There is, therefore, res judicata on the point. The statute declares the partition to be and always to have been final and definitive; and accordingly the institutes to be and to always have been the sole proprietors of the property, respectively devolving to them under the deed of partition, subject to the condition of handing over such share to their children, etc. Here, as in the judgment of Mr. Justice Jett6, is found not merely a holding that the partition is final, but a declaration as to the consequences of such finality, that each of the institutes is and always has been proprietor but that his ownership was subject to the condition of handing over, etc. It is evident, both grammatically, and from the intention evinced by the recitals in the preamble that "the conditions" mean "the sole condition."

The mere use of the definite article in connection with the word "condition" excludes the idea that there any other condition was contemplated. The intention of the Act was that, as between the institutes, there should be but one final and definitive partition; either the one already affected, or the new one ordered by the Act in the event of the Court of Queen's Bench declaring it to have been provisional. The partition having been declared final, each co-petitioner must be "deemed to have inherited alone and directly all the things comprised in his share and to have never had the ownership of the other property of the succession."

Art. 746 C.C. Everything, therefore, is in the same position as if the will had specifically bequeathed to Romeo Provost the property which actually fell to him under the partition, with a substitution in favour of his children.

Consider the position of the children of the deceased institute, Amable Oscar Alexandre Pr6vost. The partition having been final, they must be "deemed to have never had the ownership of the other property of the succession"; they must be deemed to have been excluded from the ownership of the other property of the succession. Yet if appellants' contention be well founded, they are entitled to a part of this other property, and perhaps ultimately to the whole of it.

The case is concluded by the judgment of the Privy Council in De Hertel v. Goddard (1). Reference is also made to Dumont v. Dumont (2) ; Joseph v. Castonguay(3); Thevenot-Dessaules

(ed. Mathieu) nos. 1003, 1004, 1005, 1006; 4 Mignault, Code Civil, 332. J.-Je partage entidrement le sentiment de Mr. le juge Loranger, qui a diffr6 de la majorit6 de la cour de revision.

Les motifs qu'il apporte a 1'appui de son dissentiment me semblent si p6remptoires que je serais dispos6 h les adopter purement et simplement.

Mais comme la cause est importante, nous croyons devoir r~sumer les raisons qui nous ont engag6s h& arriver h cette conclusion, sans cependant r6capituler tous les faits de la cause.

En cour sup6rieure, Mr. le juge Fortin admet que iAnCs. le testateur, Amable Pr6vost, a fait deux substitutions distinctes, 1'une en faveur de ses enfans comm6 grev6s, et de ses petits enfants comme appel6s, et 1'autre subsidiaire, si tous ses enfants d6chdent sans post6rit6, en faveur de sa femme comme grev6e et de certains collat6raux comme appel6s. Mais, ajoute le savant juge, ceci a t change en 1897 par un acte de la 16gislature de Qu6bec, 60 Vict. ch. 95, intitul6

La 16gislature de Qubbec a si souvent modifI6 les testaments de ses habitants, que depuis longtemps on tient pour constant qu'il n'y a pas de testament qui soit a l'abri de ses coups. A cette m~me session de 1897, pas moins de huit testaments out 6t6 revus, corrig&s et surtout consid6rablement alt~rbs. Si les substitutions sont pr6judiciables aux familles et A la socitd, il vaut mieux les abolir, comme on a fait en certains pays, plut6t que de les laisser A la merci de la 16gislature h la requite de certains usufruitiers qui trouvent toujours leurs revenus insuffisants pour supporter le fardeau de la vie moderne.

Mr. le juge Fortin et la majorit6 des juges en r6vision, sont d'avis que 1'effect de la loi Pr~vost a 6t de cr6er autant de substitutions que le testateur a laiss6 d'enfants, chaque part formant une substitution distincte.

Mr. le juge Pagnuelo est d'avis que la porte du jugement de Mr. le juge Jett6, qui fait P'objet de la loi Pr6vost, est que

J.

Le pr6ambule de 1'acte fait en effet mention de jugement dans ces termes.

ajoute m~me que les grev6s

Mais quel est ce principe et ce jugement qui Ila consacr6?

Etait-ce le principe invoqu6 aujourd'hui par 1'intin6, qui n'6tait pas inme en jeu? On ne peut pas supposer que le jugement porte au dela de ce qui 6tait demand6, qu'il soit ultra petita. Que demandaient les grevs devant Mr. le juge Jett6 et la 16gislature? Simplement une d6elaration que le partage qui avait t fait 6tait non pas provisoire, inais d6finitif. Et c'est tout ce qui fut fait. Les parties comme le juge n'ont jamais voulu pourvoir a un cas qui n'existak pas, a 1'poque du partage, ni h celle du jugement on mime celle de lacte de la 16gislature, savoir, celui oti un ou plusieurs grev6s-ils 6taient an nombre de sept -dcderaient sans enfants. En exprimant son opinion sur l'effet du partage, Mr. le juge Jett6 n'a consid6r6 et ne pouvait consid6rer que les circonstances. qu'il avait devant lui, savoir, que tons les grev~s vivaient ou 6taient representds par leurs enfants. C'6tait imm~diat du partage que le savant juge avait en vue. Il eut t plus prudent de s'en tenir aux conclusions de la requite des grev6s et de d6clarer seulement que le partage 6tait d~finitif. Peut-on supposer un seul instant que les grevis auraient accept6 un effet de ce partage qui leur enlevait t eux et a leurs enfants, le droit d'accroissement, si 1'un d'eux d~c&dait sans enfants avant Iouverture de la substitution? Ils. ont accept6 le principe du jugement qui d6er6tait que la partage 6tait d6finitif et non provisoire, voili tout; rEt et c'est ce qu'ils s'enpressent de d6clarer de suite comne la phrase complte le d6montre, savoir:

Si le jugement de Mr. le juge Jett6 laisse quelque doute sur la port6e qu'il peut avoir sur le testament de Mr. Amable Privost, celui de la cour d'appeal n'en souffre aucun. Cette dernire cour 6tait autorise Ai l'examiner et mn~ne L le casser par le statut que nous venons d'indiquer, 60 Vict. ch.

Le grcv6 Roino Pr6vost 6tait lui-mme un des requibrants provoquant cette r6vision.

La cour d'appel a-t-elle sanctionn6 1'-opinion du juge Jett6 que les grev6s n'ont aucun int6rt dans les biens attribu6s

1'un d'eux par le partage? Non, elle a purement et simplement d6clar6 le partage final et dfinitif. Coune la teneur de cet arrt a jusqu'ici 6chapp6 i 1'attention des juges et des avocats, il West pas sans h propos d'en rappeler le texte:

A L'acte 60 Vict. ch. d6crte enfin que ce jugeient sera final et sans appel.

2 f/

1o06

11 faudrait un texte bien .clair pour accepter un changement aussi radical que celui suggr6 par l'intin1, et en cas de doute je le donnerai en faveur du testament. Le statut en question ne dit pas cela ni Girouard J. express6ment, ni implicitement.

Je suis heureux de le constater, la loi Prbvost respecte linvioliabilit6 des dernibres volont~s du phre de famille qui dispose de sa succession. Le 16gislateur le d6clare d'une fagon non 6quivoque et dans le pr6ambule et dans le texte du statut; il 16galise tout simplement un partage d6finitif, qui dans les circonstances 6tait un avantage pour tous les intdressds, sans changer les dispositions testamentaires ou pour tre plus pr6cis sans modifier l'ordre de transmission de la substitution qu'il avait cr46e.

L'acte 60 Vict. ch. 95 d6clare dans son pr&ambule que Mr. Provost n'a fait qu'une substitution en faveur de ses enfants et petits enfants (et non pas sept)

Attendu que les dits testament et codicilles comportent une substitution dont les enfants du dit feu Amable Provost sont les grev6s et ses petits-enfants les appel~s, et qu'il fut specialement ordonn6 par les dits testament et codicilles que les biens fonds ou immeubles du testateur passeraient en nature aux dits petits-enfants, sans que les enfants du testateur, ni meme les petits-enfants, tant que l'usufruit aux enfants ne serait pas 6teint, puissent les alifner, vendre, engager ou hypoth6qixer pour quelque cause que Puis dans le dispositif, section 16re, le statut d6crte que le partage des biens de la succession feu Amable Provost fait par et entre les 1gataires grev6s de substitution

*

* * declare etre et avoir toujours ete final et d~finitif, et en cons6quence les 14gataires grev6s de substitution du dit feu Amable Prevost sont declar6s Atre et avoir toujours 6t les seuls proprietaires la part des dits biens qui leur est respectivement 6chue aux termes du dit acte partage et liquidation, sous la charge rendre cette part A leurs enfants, A leur dfcas, tel que port6 aux dits testament codicilles.

Mais si Pun des grev6s meurt sans enfants, A qui ira sa part? Le statut n'en dit rien express~ment. Peut-il en disposer par testament ou autrement? L'in- V* tim6 pr6tend que ni le code, ni le testament, n'a pr6vu cette 6ventualit6, et qu'il n'y a pas lieu a l'accroissement. Le testateur ne parle pas d'accroissement en termes formels. Mais le testament de Mr. Pr6vost, en cr6ant une seule substitution en faveur de ses enfants et petits-enfants conjointement, qu'il institue ses 16gataires universels, ne dispose-t-il pas de cette part en faveur des col6gataires survivants? C'est ce que veulent dire les termes du testament, la loi des substitutions et le statut, 60 Vict. ch. 95, particulibrement ces expressions qui se trouvent dans ce dernier document que les grev6s de substitution seront tenus de rendre a leurs enfants, "tel que port6 aux dits testament et codicilles," ou encore celles qui forment les dernidres lignes du statut,

Assur~ment lorsqu'un chef de famille d6clare que l'usufruit de ses biens appartiendra a ses enfants et la propri6t6 h ses petits-enfants, il n'entend pas que ce legs change de destination chaque fois qu'un enfant ou petit-fils, repr6sentant une souche, d6c6dera sans post6rit6 avant 1'ouverture de la substitution. Le legs reste toujours le mime et de mime effet, c'est-adire, qu'il sera toujours en faveur des enfants et petitsenfants quelque soit leur nombre. Par la force mime du legs, il y a accroissement, mime si 1'article 868 du Code Civil n'existait pas. Cet article, a 'Mon avis, n'est venu que confirmer la position des 16gataires faite au testament. Il d6clare en effet:

On dit qu'ici le legs n'est pas caduc dans le sens de cet article. Pour quelle raison? C'est ce que je ne puis comprendre, h moins de d6cider que le testateur a fait autant de substitutions qu'il y a de grev~s, proposition que nous ne pouvons accepter. Il n'a cre6, selon nous, qu'une seule substitution en faveur de plusieurs conjointment, par une seule et mime disposition, comme d'ailleurs le d6clare la loi de 1897, et alors il y a accroissement.

Je ne puis concevoir qu'un legs fait aux enfants en -usufruit, et A leurs petits enfants en proprit6, ne devient pas caduc a 1'6gard du grev6, et de son appel6, et ce pour leur part, lorsqu'ils meurent sans enfants avant Fouverture de la substitution. Caduc, du latin eadere, vent dire que le legs, d'ailleurs valide, tombe et demeure sans effet par le d~chs du grev6 sans enfants avant l'ouverture de la substitution. Sa part accroit aux autres l6gataires conjoints, tant en usufruit qu'en propridt6.

C'est la volont6 expresse du testateur qui l'exige.

Personne autre n'est appel6. C'est la situation que 'art. 868 C.C. a en vue.

Enfin, lorsque l'on examine les diverses clauses du testament, Flon acquiert la ferme conviction que ce que le testateur voulait c'6tait avant tout de conserver dans sa famille, jusqu'd la deuxibme g6ndration apris lui, la fortune opulente pour 1'6poque qu'il avait amass6e. Les legs d'immeubles sont d~clar6s insaisissables et incessibles.

D6fense absolue de les ali6ner est faite aux 16gataires en usufruit. Les appel6s eux mimes, c'est-h-dire, les petits-enfants, ne peuvent pas -non plus disposer de leur part on de leurs droits durant la vie de leurs parents et des autres grev6s. Je (lit-il

Que signifie encore la deuxi~me substitution en faveur des collat~raux qu'il nomme, si ses enfants meurent tous sans enfants?

Aucune allusion n'est faite h cette substitution subsidiaire dans le statut de 1897. Il ne parait pas que les intdress~s h cette disposition aient t6 mis en cause on appel6s, probablement parce qu'en face du nombre des descendants de Mr. Prdvost, on la consid6rait comme non avenue. Ses enfants existaient tons on presque tous en 1860, quelques annies avant sa mort, lorsqu'il fit son dernier codicille et il n'a pas song- alors h rdvoquer cette seconde substitution, sans doute pour mieux manifester sa volout6 de conserver sa fortune dans sa famille.

Comment cette deuxibme substitution serait-elle r6alisable, si les biens 6taient passes 16galement h des mains 6trangbres?

Tous les grev6s auraient bien pu faire comme leur frbre Romo et alibner ainsi toute la succession.

Toutes ces dispositions d6montrent 1'absurdit6 des pritentions de l'intim6.

ne me reste plus qu'ajouter quelques mots A propos de 1'arrit du conseil priv6 dans la cause de De Hertel v. Goddard (1), 1896, qui semble avoir influenc6 quelques juges des tribunaux inf6rieurs. J'ai lu et relu cette d6cision et je dois avouer que la rapport qui en est fait est si raccourci-j'allais dire vague, il couvre deux pages-que je n'ai pu a sa lec- JT.

ture en saisir toute la port6e.

Comme dans cette cause, le conseil priv6 a confirm6 le jugement de la cour de r6vision et celui de la cour d'appel, je suis chercher des renseignements dans les rapports de ces cours.

Le jugement de la cour d'appel ne me parait pas avoir 6t rapport6, mais celui de la cour de r~vision l'est (1).

Il couvre treize pages et ga n'a pas 6t sans un certain travail que j'ai pu comparer les deux espces. Bribvement, voici ce dont il s'agissait dans la cause de De Hertel v. Goddard (2). William P. Christie 1gue la seigneurie de L6ry en usufruit h Catherine Robertson, et a son d6cs a ses deux filles, Mary et Amelia Robertson, et A sa nice, Elizabeth Tunstall, qu'il institue d'ailleurs ses l6gataires universelles en usufruit, pour en jouir par parts 6gales, aussi en usufruit leur vie durante et, apres leur d6cs, h leurs enfants en propri6t6; enfin, au cas du d6chs de deux d'entr'elles, sans enfants, la seigneurie descendait en propri6t6 aux enfants de la survivante. Cette dernidre 6ventualit6 arriva.

La nice mourut la dernidre laissant un fils. Le conseil priv6, la cour d'appel, et la cour de revision out jug6 que la propri6t6 6tait dbvolue a ce fils, a l'exclusion de la l6gataire universelle d'Amelia. Je ne puis congevoir comment cet arrt peut 6tre de quelque secours a l'intim4. Je crois qu'il aide plus les appelants, car il maintient le principe de l'accroissement entre les grev6s au deuxibme d6gr6; il ne pouvait en Atre question quant aux appel6s, puisqu'il n'y en avait qu'un seul.

Ce qui est certain, c'est que les deux espces sont bien diffrentes. D'abord la succession Christie a t ouverte et 1'une des grev4s est d6c6d6e avant le code civil. La succession de Mr. Pr6vost a 6t6 ouverte apris. C'est peut-6tre pour cette raison-il n'en donne pas-que le conseil priv6 tient que

C'est la r~gle toute contraire que larticle 868 du code consacre. Quoiqu'il en soit, les deux dispositions ne sont pas les mimes. Le fils d'Elizabeth Tunstall n'a pas recueilli les biens 1gu6s par une seule et mime disposition conjointe, tandis que les appel~s Provost doivent recueillir non seulement A ce titre, mais encore comme 16gataires universels.

On ne trouve pas dans le testament Christie les prohibitions d'ali~ner qui frappent dans le testament Provost, ni les mimes liens de parent6. Toutes ces circonstances tendent h faire connaitre la volont6 du testateur. Enfin, le testament Christie pr~sentait une difficult6 touchant la validit6 du legs h Pappel6, parce que, disait-on, il comprenait plus de d6gr6s que la loi ne le permettait, et cette difficult6 en a soulev6 une autre au sujet de F'in: terpr6tation de Particle 963 du code, qui ne se pr&sente pas dans le testament Pr6vost.

Sans entrer dans plus de d6tails, je conclus, avec Mr. le juge Loranger, qui a rendu la jugement de la cour de revision dans la cause de De Hertel v. Goddard(1), que les deux espces n'ont gubre d'analogie.

Pour ces raisons, nous sommes d'avis d'accorder l'appel et les conclusions de la demande des appelants, avec d6pens contre le mis-en-cause, contestant et intim6 devant teutes les cours, encourus depuis sa d6fense h Yaction.

J.

Appeal allowed with costs.