Chicoutimi Pulp Co. v. Price

An appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court, rendered on the trial a cause, will lie to the Court of King's Bench, appeal side, if taken within the time limited article of the Code of Civil Procedure of Quebec, notwithstanding that, in the meantime, on an appeal the opposite party, the Court of Review may have rendered a judgment affirming the judgment appealed from.

Although the granting of an order for injunction, under article of the of Civil Procedure of Quebec. is an act dependent the exercise judicial discretion, the Supreme Court of Canada, on an appeal, reversed the order on the ground that it had been improperly made upon evidence which shewed that the plaintiff could, otherwise, have obtained such full and complete remedy as he was entitled to under the circumstances of the case. Davies and Idington JJ. dissenting, were opinion that the order had been properly granted.

possessory action will not lie in case where the trouble de possession did not occur in consequence of the exercise of an adverse claim of right or title to the lands in question, and is not of a permanent or recurrent nature. Davies and Idington JJ. dis- *PRESENT:-Fitzpatrick C.J. and Girouard, Davies, Idington, Maclennan and Duff JJ.

senting, were of opinion that, under the circumstances of the case, a possessory action would lie.

P. brought an action a possessoire against the company for interference with his rights in a stream, for damages and for an injunction against the commission or continuance of the acts plained of.

service of process, the company ceased these acts, admitted the rights and title P., alleged that they had acted in the belief that a verbal agreement made with P. some years previously gave them permission to do so, that this license had never been cancelled but was renewed from year to year and that, although the privilege had not exercised them during the two years immediately preceding the alleged trespass 1904, it was then still subsisting and in force, and tendered in compensation for any damage caused their interference with P.'s rights.

Held, reversing the judgment appealed from, Davies and Idington JJ. dissenting, that, as there had been no formal cancellation of the verbal agreement or withdrawal the license thereby given, had to be regarded, notwithstanding non user, as having been tacitly renewed, that it was still in force in at the time the acts complained and that P. could not recover in the action as instituted.

The Chief Justice, on his view of the evidence, dissented from the opinion that the agreement had tacitly renewed for the year 1904.

.

As the appeal involved merely a question as to costs, it should not entertained. APPEAL from the judgment of the Court of King's Bench, appeal side, affirming the judgment of His Lordship Mr. Justice Gagn, in the Superior Court, District of Chicoutimi, whereby the plaintiff's right to recover damages was reserved and an injunction made absolute in his favour with costs.

The circumstances of the case and questions at issue on the appeal sufficiently appear in the headnote and statements in the judgments now reported. The dispositions of the formal judgments in the courts below, which are specially referred to are as follows:

GAGNt J. (8 mars, 1906).-"Consid6rant, etc., etc. "Maintient l'action en partie, rejette les dites offres, ordonne la d~fenderesse de cesser de troubler le demandeur dans la jouissance de son pouvoir d'eaucmncouim et de son moulin ci-dessus mentionn6s, et lui ordonne de cesser d'envoyer et de laisser tomber dans la dite rivibre Chicoutimi des 6corces, sciures de bois et autres ddchets, et d'obstruer par les dites 6corces et autres d~chets, le pouvoir d'eau, le canal et le moulin du demandeur, le tout avec d6pens, r~servant au deinandeur son recours pour tons dommages qu'il peut avoir soufferts, hL raison des faits dont il se plaint; et adjugeant sur la requ~te pour injonction, maintient la dite requfte, d~clare F'injonction 6man&e en cette cause perpftuelle et finale, et ordonne h la d6fenderesse, a ses officiers, reprdsentants et employds de cesser d'enyoyer et laisser tomber dans la rivibre Chicoutimi des 6corces, sciures de bois et autres d~chets, et d'obstruer par les dits d~chets le pouvoir d'eau, la chauss6e, le canal et le moulin du dit demandeur, avec d~pens," etc.

(31 mai, 1906).-"La cour, aprbs avoir entendu les parties par leurs avocats sur le m6rite en cette cause en cons6quence de F'inscription en revision faite de la part du demandeur, examin6 le dossier de la proc6dure et sur le tout mftrement ddlib~r6:

"Confirme le jugement rendu par la cour sup6rieure sikgeant en la ville de Chicoutimi, pour le district de Chicoutimi, le huitibme jour de mars mil neuf cent six, en ce qui concerne le recours en dommages r6serv6 au demandeur, avec d6pens de la revision contre le demandeur en faveur de la d6fenderesse; et la cour donne acte h la d~fenderesse de sa declaration qu'elle n'acquiesce pas au jugement relativement h l'action possessoire et h Plinjonction."

CouR Roi (6 dec., 1906).- "Consid6rant que la demande en injonction du demandeur intim6 est bien. fond6e, et qu'il n'y a pas erreur dans le jugement de la cour de premibre instance qui l'a maintenue;

"Consid6rant que le demandeur, intim6, ayant inscrit en revision afin d'obtenir une adjudication sur sa demande en dommages qui avait t r6serv6e lappelante (intimbe en revision) s'est oppos6e h la modification du jugement;

"Consid6rant que la cour of revision si6geant A Qu6bec a, le 31 mai dernier, (1906), confirm6 le jugeinent de la cour sup6rieure en ce qui concerne le recours en dommages r~serv6 au demandeur et a simplement donn6 acte A l'appelante de sa d6claration qu'elle n'acquiesgait pas A ce jugement quant h la demande an possessoire et il F'injonction;

"Consid6rant qu'aux termes de larticle 1203 C.P.C. ce jugement de la cour de revision est devenu celui de la cour sup6rieure, qu'il remplace absolument, et que F'inscription en appel ne fait aucune mention de ce dernier;

"Cette cour rejette 1appel avec d~pens contre Pappelante, savoir l'appel du jugement final rendu par la cour sup6rieure h Chicoutimi le 8 mars dernier. (1906)."

THE CHIEF JUSTICE.-The respondent, plaintiff in the court below, brought an action in the Superior Court at Chicoutimi against the appellants, in respect of interferences with his rights, alleging that he and his predecessors had been for a great number of years in possession as proprietors of a water-power on the Chicoutimi River; that the defendants, now appellants, owned and operated a large pulp-mill situated a short distance above on the same river in connection with which they used several machines known as barking mills; that the refuse from these machines, consisting of bark, sawdust, etc., was dumped into the river and thence carried by the current into the flume and cistern of his mill thereby injuring the power, mill, and machinery, and generally causing the plaintiff damages for which he claims in compensation

$2,000.

To this action the defendants filed a plea admitting the plaintiffs' title to the water-power alleged to have been interfered with and denying that they ever at any time claimed any right or title to the use or possession of any portion of it; and they alleged affirmatively that such refuse as did get into the river was put there as the result of a misunderstanding;

that during previous years an agreement existed under which the bark and sawdust were thrown into the river and that portion that reached the plaintiff's premises was under agreement removed by the latter at the defendants' cost, and they undertook to prevent in future a recurrence of the trespass complained of.

An interlocutory injunction was applied for and granted when the action was first launched.

As I read the pleadings and evidence the plaintiffs' title was not in dispute. The trespass complained is proved as is also the agreement alleged by the defendants to have existed during previous years. I do not find evidence to support the allegation that this agreement was renewed for 1904, and the evidence. that defendants continued to dump their refuse into the river after being notified that the agreement was at an end in my opinion is far from conclusive

A preliminary question of procedure raised for the first time by the judges in the court of appeal, though not argued there as stated by the appellants in their factum, is pressed on us here. I give the facts as they appear by the record.

In the Superior Court the plaintiff's pretensions were maintained except as to his claim for damages for which his recourse was reserved. The interlocutory injunction was declared permanent and the possessory conclusions of his declaration maintained. Both parties deeming themselves aggrieved by the judgment appealed, the respondent to the Court of Review and the appellants to the Court of King's Bench, as each had under the Quebec Code of Procedure the right to do. The case came on for hearing in review first and then the defendants made this formal declaration:

Stre The Court of Review held unanimously that as to the damages, which was the only point submitted, the judgment of the Superior Court was right. Then the appellants here, who had succeeded in review, being within the delay prosecuted their appeal to the Court of King's Bench and the majority of that court held that the injunction had been properly granted, but they said that the appellants should have appealed from the judgment of the Court of Review which had become, under article 1203 of the Code of Procedure,

P . the judgment of the Superior Court. As I understand the considdrants of their Lordships' judgment they contend that the judgment from which the appeal should have been taken was the judgment of the Superior Court sitting in review and not the judgment of the Superior Court sitting as the court of first instance, although both are absolutely the same in so far as the

"dispositifs" go.

In review the judgment of the Superior Court is confirmed purely and simply, and the technical point raised in appeal was merely as to the date of the judgment from which the appeal was taken. When, as I said before, the judgment was rendered in the Superior Court both parties had the right to appeal instanter from that judgment either to the

Court of Review or the Court of King's Bench. One appeal must be taken within eight days and the other can be taken at any time within six months, but if at once after judgment rendered both parties appealed as they subsequently did, one to the Court of Review and the other to the Court of King's Bench, the judgment appealed from would necessarily have been the judgment of the Superior Court of date 8th March,

1906, and because by the judgment of the Court of Review that judgment must thereafter bear a different date, though it remained the same in substance and form, the appeal, in the opinion of their Lordships, must be refused. In this highly technical view I cannot concur.

It would be interesting to know what the position would be if in this case the judgment of the

Court of Review had not been rendered until after the expiration of the six months within which the defendants were obliged to take their appeal.

Which CrlcounmI would then be the judgment appealed from, or when would the delay of six months expire?

Now, as to the merits.

The Chief

Justice.

By the judgment below the injunction was main- tained, the conclusions of the possessory action were granted and the recourse of the respondent for the damages he alleges to have suffered is reserved to him. I am of opinion that the injunction should not have been granted and that the possessory conclusions of the action should have been dismissed; and I would reform the judgment below to that extent and reserve the right of the respondent to claim such damages as lie may have suffered, the two courts below having concurred in the opinion that on the pleadings and evidence it is impossible to determine the quantum of damages.

Article 957 Code of Procedure:

Any judge of the Superior Court may grant an interlocutory order injunction in any of the following eases:

Whenever it appears the petition that the plaintiff entitled to the relief demanded, and that such relief consists, in whole or in part, in restraining the commission or continuance any act or operation, either for a limited period or perpetually:

During the pendency of a suit:

By the plea to the action aiid the answer to the petition for an injunction defendants admit plaintiff's right to the water-power and deny that they ever had any intention to interfere with it. They further declare that the improper use which they admittedly made of the river had been so made under the belief that an agreement admitted to have previously existed between them and the plaintiffs was still in force and under which a mode of settling the damages complained of had been fixed.

It has been suggested that there is a difference between the case of the appellants as stated in their pleadings and as made by the evidence, and that in fact the trespass was continued after the suit was brought.

The only evidence to support the statement that the appellants continued to throw their refuse into the river after the injunction is to be found on page

36, lines 20 et seq.

Dubuc, at page 86, line 10, says that he forbade his employees to do this. On pages 87 and 88 Dubuc explains what occurred. Dubuc at page 90 denies having allowed any of the refuse to get into the river from the time the injunction was actually served, and no attempt is made to cross-examine him on that point.

To justify interfering by interlocutory injunction the court must be of opinion that there is a substantial question to be tried and some legal right as to property to be protected during the litigation. The granting of an injunction is, it is true, an act dependent on the discretion of the court, but in exercising this discretion the court must consider whether the act complained of will produce injury to the applicant or whether the injury can be condoned for by damages.

The only question here was whether the bark or refuse had been thrown into the river by the permission of the plaintiffs' employees.

There was no attempt made to put in issue the legal right of the plaintiff to prevent the defendants from doing what ief was complained of.

(See evidence by Racey, at page 38 of the case on appeal, lines 20 et seq.) If done without the permission of plaintiff's employees the defendants had incurred a liability for which there was a remedy full and complete by an action of damages. The plaintiffs had for a couple of years acquiesced in what defendants were doing.and had accepted compensation from them, thus shewing that it was not impossible to fix compensation for future injury. Omerod v. Todmorden Mill Co. (1).

As to the possessory conclusions, which were maintained by the judgment of the Superior Court, the defendants admit plaintiffs' title as alleged-affirm they have no right or title to the use or possession of the water-power and say that what was done was under the erroneous impression that the previous existing agreement was renewed, and that the trespass complained of ceased when the action was brought, and for such damage as was caused they offer in compensation the sum of forty dollars. On these facts would a possessory action lie? Leconte, No. 93, first paragraph:

doit r~puter trouble de possession, dit cet auteur, tout acte emportant prftention A la proprit un droit servitude. Mais puisque le meme acte pent, suivant l'intention de celui qui le commet, passer pour un trouble possession ou pour un pur fait nuisible, comment le demandeur fera-t-il pour qualifier sa The Chief demande?

Ne faut-il pas admettre que l'action possessoire sera Justice. r6guliftrement formfe, toutes les fois qu'il sera possible d'interpr6ter le fait denonc6 la justice comme un acte possession? Sans doute, j'admets que dans cas la demande sera bien dirigde, sens qu'aucune faute n'tant A impliquer au plaignant, les frais de citation devront Ctre mis a la charge du d6fendeur.

Mais je n'oserais pas dire que I'action sera toujours possessoire; je crois au contraire que cela dependra de la rdponse que fera le d6fendeur. S'il ddclare qu'il

'agissait pas jure domini, qu'il n'a aucune pr6tention A. r6p6ter des actes semblables il me r6pugne voir une action possessoire 1M ol il n'y nul d6bat sur la possession. The same doctrine will be found in Dalloz, Repertoire de Jurisprudence, No. 53, ro. "Action po.ssessoire." See also, Bioche "Actions possessoires" page 11, para. 32; Pothier, "Possession" No. 39; Boitard, "Procedure" page 425; Price v. Girard (Chronique Judiciaire de Beaubien) ; Bcrtrand v. Levesquc(1). Both these cases were decided in review by a very strong bench.

The nature of the act complained of here was in itself sufficient to shew that the possessory action should not have been brought because evidently there was no intention manifested by the appellants to exercise any claim of right. Dalloz again, loc. cit. para. 59. And by their plea the defendants made it abundantly clear that they did not pretend to do the acts complained of jure domini.

I wish to repeat that I am clearly of opinion that under the Quebec Code the disturbance must be one of a permanent or recurrent nature; isolated acts of (1) Q.R. 28 460.

interference give rise to an action for damages but do not constitute a ground of action to justify the plain- Puue tiff in having recourse to the action nigatoire which corresponds to the Roman actio negatoria. The Roman actio negatoria applied principally in cases in which the defendant claimed to be entitled to do the act complained of by virtue of a servitude affecting the owner's land.

I would allow the appeal.

The action of the respondent is dismissed and the injunction dissolved, with costs in all the courts sauf recours as to the damages suffered. I would add that this conclusion has been reached after much hesitation because I am obliged to differ from the trial judge, for whose great learning and impartiality I have always entertained the highest respect, if I may with proper deference be permitted to say this much.

GIRoUARD J.-Il s'agit ici d'une action possessoire intent6e le 30 mai, 1904, par le propri6taire inf6rieur d'un moulin h scie, situ6 sur la rivibre Chicoutimi, contre le propriftaire sup~rieur d'un moulin a pulpe, qui, depuis le mois d'avril pr6c6dent, jetait h la rivibre quantitis d'corces, de ripes, sciures de bois et d'autres d6chets du mime genre. Il all~gue que ces matibres, emporties par le courant, finissent par obstruer le canal et le pouvoir d'eau de son moulin et en arriter la marche.

Il conclut aussi It $2,000 de dommages-int6r~ts.

Cette action fut prc6de d'un prott notari6 qui fut signifi6 A 1'appelante le 4 mai, 1904, et fut suivie d'une injonction provisoirement accord~e le 4 juin. Dans tous ces documents, il n'est fait aucune allusion h l'arrangement qui jusqu'alors avait regl6 les relations de ces deux industriels, appuybes apparemment sur des motifs de bon voisinage.

Par sa defense produite le 9 juin, 'appelante nie d'abord qu'elle ait jamais voulu troubler Fintim6 dans la libre jouissance de son pouvoir d'ean, puis elle all~gue:

A Puis elle offre $40.00 et les frais d'une action de cette classe en tout $49.75, pour payer les frais d'en- 16vement des 6corces pour le printemps de 1904, sauf A parfaire.

L'arrangement est prouv6 hors de tout doute, tant par lagent de l'intim6, Blair, que par celui de 1appelante, Dubuc.

Le juge de premihre instance (Gagn6 J.) est d'opinion qu'il n'6tait que pour lann6e il fut fait et qu'il ne s'applique pas h lavenir. II est admis que si c'est le vrai sens de lentente, 1action doit 6tre maintenue; si, au contraire, elle liait les parties taut qu'elle n'6tait pas r6voque-point que le savant juge n'examine pas-elle doit 6tre renvoye. La preuve 6tablit que cet arrangement fut suivi et ex~cut6 par les deux parties jusqu'au temps du protit du 4 mai, F'intim6 remettant ses comptes de charges qui furent invariablement payds par Pappelante. Etait-il encore en force le printemps de 1904 et de fait toute la saison de cette ann6e lh? Voici la nature de Farrangement tel que d6fini par Blair, Pagent de Pu co.

Fintim6 avec qui il fut fait:

PRICE.

Au commencement,

(sans donnee de date pr6cise)

je me suis Girouard J. a qu'il (l'agent de l'appelante Dubuc), envoie des ripes dans la rivibre, par rapport que cela nous faisait un grand dommage ensuite nous sommes venus a une entente, que mettrait. * * * Je leur ai demand6 premierement de mettre un homme on deux hommes pour tenir les ratelliers du moulin scie clairs et monsieur Dubuc n'a pas voulu.

m'ont demand6 de mettre des hommes moimome et qu'ils paieraient le coat du nettoyage.

C'est qui a t fait monsieur Blair?

R. Oui, c'est qui a 6t fait.

Vous avez mis des hommes pour nettoyer les reteliers et la pulpe les payait?

R. Oui.

En transquestion, Blair ajoute:

Q. Les arrangements dont vous avez parl6, monsieur Blair. c'etait pour chaque arnne, n'est-ce pas?

R. Oui, chaque annbe.

Q. Vous n'avez jamais fait d'arrangements pour donner le droit A la compagnie pulpe d'envoyer ses 6corces dans 1'avenir, ind4finiment, n'est-ce pas?

R. Non, jamais.

L'appelante pr6tend non pas que larrangenent obligeait les parties pour toujours, mais qu'il les liait tant qu'il n'4tait pas rdvoqu6, et qu'il ne pouvait l'tre que pour les ann6es futures et non pour celle qui 6tait commenc6e.

Et d'abord, que comportait cet arrangement, sinon un louage d'ouvrage susceptible de la tacite reconduction aux termes de l'article 1667 du code civil, different h cet 4gard de Particle 1780 du code Napolon? Mais il y a plus.

Comme je lis Farrangement, il fut stipul6 qu'il durerait tant que l'une des parties n'y mettrait pas fin. C'est en effet de cette manibre que les deux parties F'out interpret6 par leur conduite. ne parait pas qu'il ait jamais td expressement renouv&16 apr~s avoir kt fait.

Il fut agr66 avant on vers la saison de

1900, et les regus des frais d'enlivement des dWchets par Fintin6 6stablissent qu'il fut suiri et excut4 a la lettre en 1900 et 1901, sans renouvellement pour cette dernibre annbe.

En 1902 et 1903, les 6corces et d~chets farent brfids au brfileur que 1'appelante venait de faire construire pour se conformer h la loi, cons~quemment Fintim6 n'eut pas de comptes a envoyer pour ces deux anu6es.

En 1904, le brileur se brisa et ce fut pendant que Pappelante r~parait qu'une petite partie des kcores et dichets dont se plaint l'inti m &-un sixi me de toute 1usine-furent jetis Peau.

Mais h cette 6poque, 1ancien arrangement tait en force:

Le prott du 4 mai, 1904, pent bien Atre considr6 coinme un acte de r~vocation, mais il ne pent avoir d'effet quant au pass6 ui neue pour Fanuee courante.

L'action est done mal fond~e.

L'iutim6 aurait dii faire enlever les dichets par ses hommes et envoyer son compte a Pappelante.

Ainsi que je Pentends, c'tait encore la loi des parties le printemps de 1904, an dire mime de Pagent de Fintimb.

Voici ce que Dubuc repr~senta a l'agent nouveau de Fintimb, Racey:

prt

Ce fut aussi de cette fagon que Racey comprit la situation aprbs s'tre renseign:

De linstitution de Faction possessoire et la demande d'une injonction.

Comment Racey a-t-il pu conclure que Dubuc ne pas payer? C'est ce que je ne puis congevoir. Dubuc n'a jamais d6clar6 qu'il ne paierait pas. C'est tout le contraire qui apparait.

Il envoya un de ses employds, Morrier, deniers en mains, lui offrir $40 pour les frais d'enl~vement et les d6pens d'une action de cette classe que Racey ne voulut pas m~me prendre en consid6ration.

II voulait 6videmment avoir recours au possessoire, lorsque sa possession 6tait m~me reconnue par Dubuc.

II ne r6plique pas que le montant u'est pas suffisant.

ne lui envoie pas de compte.

II est sous l'impression, sans raison, que Dubuc n'tait pas s~rieux et qu'il lamusait. Au lieu de recourir an possessoire, iH aurait dft faire enlever les dkchets, lui envoyer un compte du coftt de cet ouvrage et poursuivre en reconvrement, s'il n'6tait pas pay6. Je considbre que dans les circonstances, le recours au possessoire est un abus, la possession n'tant pas nie, mais mime admise.

La cour de premi6re instance et la cour d'appel ont d~cid6 que 1'arrangement n'6tait que pour une ann6e; les savants juges ne le disent pas en toutes lettres, mais le r~sultat d~montre que c'6tait li leur opinion, puisqu'ils maintiennent laction possessoire et 'injonction. La cour de revision n'en dit rien, pour la raison toute simple que 1'intim6 avait inscrit seulement sur la demande des dommages qui fut rejet6e par les deux cours quant h present.

Je suis d'avis que le premier arrangement 6tait encore en force en 1904 et qu'il fut m~me formellement renouvel6 cette annie li, bien que ce renouvellement n'6tait pas n~cessaire.

Quant & l'objection technique, que lappelante n'a pas appel6 du jugement de la cour sup6rieure si6geant en revision, je crois qu'elle est mal fond6e. C'4tait son droit d'appeler comme elle le fit. L'intim6 ne souffre rien de ce que son inscription fut du jugement du juge

Gagnd, puis qu'il fut confirm6 purement et simplement. Je la considdre done r~gulibre.

Pour ces raisons, je suis d'opinion d'accorder lappel et de renvoyer laction et l'injonction de l'intim6 avec ddpens devant toutes les cours, sauf recours pour les frais d'enl~vement des 6corces et ddchets.

(dissenting) concurred in the opinion of

Mr. Justice Idington.

(dissenting).-There is really nothing but costs involved in this appeal and for that if no other reason we should refuse to interfere.

The appellants owned a pulp mill about a mile higher up the same stream as that on which the respondent owned and ran a planing mill.

In 1897, being forbidden by law from throwing into the stream the refuse of such mills, the appellant's manager says it was agreed that until his company got a burner erected to burn the refuse, his company agreed to make their peace with the respondents .

by paying for the expenses of the removal of so much of the refuse as should lodge about and be detrimental to the respondent's mill and there were several payments made for that sort of service.

In 1904, respondent desired to start up his mill and found not only a large quantity of old refuse from appellant's mill accumulated and needing removal, but .also found further that appellants had renewed, in April of 1904, without asking permission their former practice of throwing refuse into the stream. The manager of appellants did not when remonstrated with, stop this being done. After some time the respondent's manager caused a formal protest against this utterly unjustifiable conduct to be served on the other manager on the 4th of May, 1904. It continued, however, from time to time and on the 2nd June, 1904, the respondent took steps to get, and on the 4th of June, 1904, got an injunction and sued for its continuation and also to recover damages. At the trial the injunction was continued, but the right to recover damages in this action was refused and reserved to the respondent to be recovered by such means as the respondent found open to him.

The appellants' manager had after action tendered, he says, forty dollars to cover these damages. One is at a loss to know how, if honestly desirous of having damages assessed at the trial, the appellants could not bring it about when the respondent was pressing for

The respondent appealed unsuccessfully to have this done. The Court of Review dismissed this appeal, and a nice question of practice arises here, which I will not dwell upon, though, if the respondent's contention is right as to the effect of article 1203 of the

Code of Procedure and the other things he urges, appellants ought not to have been heard here. I pass that and many other things that are or have been in the case to say that the court of appeal did not accept the contention of the respondent in this regard, but dismissed the appeal which the present appellants had carried there and upheld the judgment of the learned trial judge.

The appellants by way of appeal therefrom, come here asserting that they had never denied and do not now deny the rights of the respondent to enjoy his property, and use it free from such disturbances as the respondent complains of.

They in this case suffer nothing, by the judgment and injunction standing, but the costs they have been ordered to pay.

They have escaped paying damages they certainly ought to have paid and, as I understood counsel to state without contradiction, nothing further had been done and the respondent's right to damages had been thus prescribed. If the material damages really were as the court seems to think after action, though I might have thought otherwise, the appellants practically escape.

is said, however, this action is wrong in form by claiming an injunction that is not maintainable. Even in this I do not agree. It is in the last analysis a question of fact whether it be so or not. It has J. been passed upon and upheld by two courts at least in the Province of Quebec, and according to one contention, by three, and yet respondent is not satisfied. I do not think it is open to any one, in Quebec or elsewhere, by a continuous and persistent system of disturbing others in the enjoyment of their property, such as appellants were here guilty of, to say that because they do not do it in assertion of a right and in denial of the wronged party's title, the jurisdiction to enjoin cannot be exercised. It was continued even a day or two after the injunction.

So persistent was appellants' manager.

In Martineau & Delfausse, annotated edition of the Code of Procedure (1), there is collected under section 1064 of the same, such a review of the authorities as leads me to come to the conclusion that this action was on the evidence here rightly brought and has been properly maintained.

It is said, however, there was an agreement between the parties regulating this practice, but the only one proven is the one that I have shewn ended in 1902, and it never was revived.

There is a loose sort of conversation given as taking place between the managers, but exactly when or how or where is not clear.

At best it seems to have taken place after at least a good deal of what is complained of was done. The evidence is very unsatisfactory unless we accept entirely, and discard all else, a sentence or two of the appellants' manager which I am not disposed to do. I would infer, if anything in the way of assenting to it was done by the respondent, it was conditional upon settling for the past and ceasing to disturb, and

. that no such spirit of settling was ever shewn by appellants' manager, but rather a contemptuous treatment of the other manager, and a continuation of the disturbances which rendered an injunction necessary.

It rests on the evidence of appellants' manager and he swears that the protest and the suit for injunction were on one and the same day.

If that is a fair specimen of the reliability of his evidence when we know from the record these two

,,vents were nearly a month apart, I want evidence of some one more credible to go upon than one so reckless, before I reverse the courts below.

Moreover, the story is not that which is pleaded.

The pleading alleges only one bargain. The evidence of this man shews two.

It is only the last that is applicable if at all to this case.

If it had in fact transpired as he puts it with nothing done after it, we would likely have seen it so pleaded.

The other manager's story clearly shews when read as a whole that so much of this story as he assents to was conditional upon getting together and settling as

I have already said.

The only right bound or affected by the judgment below being one of costs, the cases of Moir v. The Village of Huntingdon (1), and Schlomann v. Dowker (2), ought, I submit, to be followed, and the appeal be dismissed with costs.

and JJ.

Justice Girouard.

Belleau, Belleau & Belleau. Pentland, Stuart & Brodie.