Laramée v. Ferron

The existence of circumstances which might raise suspicion that the execution a will was procured captation, improper suggestions or undue influence on the part of those promoting it is not a sufficient ground to justify an appellate court in interfering with the concurrent findings of the courts below as to the validity of the will.

Judgment appealed from (Q.R. K.B. affirmed, Girouard and Maclennan JJ. dissenting.

APPEAL from the judgment of the Court of King's Bench, appeal side(1), affirming the judgment of the Superior Court, District of Richelieu (Charbonneau J.), dismissing, with costs, the appellants' contestation of the petition of the respondent for leave to take up the instance (requtite en reprise d'instance), in a suit pending, in the Superior Court, District of Richelieu.

The petition was an incident in an action taken by the late Aur6lie Quintin, dite Dubois, assisted by her judicial adviser, against the appellants, to set aside a *PRESENT:-Sir Charles Fitzpatrick C.J. and Girouard, Davies, Idington, Maclennan and Duff JJ.

(1) K.B.

deed of sale as being a donation in contemplation of death. While the suit was pending, the plaintiff died and the respondent, as chef de communautd, petitioned to be allowed to take up the suit in lieu of the deceased plaintiff, his wife being plaintiff's universal legatee under a notarial will made on the 21st day of June, The appellant contested the petition, alleging that the will in question was invalid, having been made by the testatrix when she was not in possession of her mental faculties, and inspired by suggestion and undue influence on the part of the respondent and his wife.

The contestation was dismissed with costs by the Superior Court and that decision was affirmed by the judgment now appealed from.

The circumstances in relation to the issues on the appeal are stated in the judgments now reported.

Their opinions are to be found in the report of the case in the court below(1).

The testatrix was interdicted on the ground of insanity at the request of the appellant, on the 19th of February, 1905, but, apparently, against the opinion of the relatives summoned to form part of the fdmily council. She was relieved of this interdiction on the 29th of May following, and, on revision, this last judgment was confirmed on the 15th of June, and the will impugned in these proceedings was made on the 21st of the same month. The question is: Was the testatrix of sound and disposing mind on that date?

The interdiction was removed on the advice of a family council composed of eleven of the nearest relatives of the testatrix, the majority of whom formed part of the first family council; and their finding that the testatrix was then of sound and disposing mind may be said to be equivalent to the verdict of a jury. On an application to review their finding it was confirmed by the judge.

No change is proved to have taken place in the mental condition of the deceased between the 15th and the 21st of June. Subsequently, the same issue was tried in these proceedings by the judge who removed the interdiction and he again found in favour of the sanity of the testatrix and his judgment was confirmed in appeal.

Under these circumstances we are asked to reverse. This is, in my opinion, one of the cases in which we should apply the rule that has been laid down on more than one occasion in this court, that we should not reverse the concurrent findings of two courtir on questions of fact unless clearly erroneous.

An interesting question was raised in the Court of appeal below and at the argument here as to whether or not the judgment relieving, on the advice of the family council, the testatrix of the interdiction was res judicata as between the parties in this case. It is not necessary to decide that question now, but I would refer to Lacoste, "Chose Jug6e" (2 ed.), page 8, n. The appeal is dismissed with costs.

(diff rant).-J'hsiterais h renverser le jugement rendu dans cette cause par deux cours sur une question de fait, si dans 1'apprciation de la preuve elles avaient tenu compte d'un principe qui, dans une cause comme celle-ci, a toujours servi de guide aux tribunaux; savoir qu'un 1gataire qui a fait faire un testament en sa faveur an prejudice des h6ritiers, soit en loi on en vertu d'un testament antirieur, doit prouver que tout a 6t6 fait 16galement par un testateur comp6tent et agissant librement.

II s'agit d'une demande en nullit6 d'un deuxibme testament pour cause de d6mence, suggestion et captation ou influence indue. Comme tonjours, la preuve est contradictoire et c'est surtout dans ces circonstances que 1'application du principe ne doit pas 6tre perdue de vue.

Nous sommes en pr6sence de deux testaments: 1'un inattaquable, v6ritable arrangement de famille fait par les parents, de 1'assentiment de leurs enfants, qui sont les parties dans cette cause, oi il faut supposer que les droits de part et d'autre furent loyalement examines et justement trait~s; l'autre fait a une 6poque oii la testatrice-son mari 6tait mort dans 1intervalle-qui avait toujours 6t6 compltement 6trangore aux affaires, 6tait en outre malade, paralytique, souffrante et faible d'esprit et pouvait facilement subit 1'influence, surtout de ses proches les plus chers, par lequel testament elle prive presqu'entidrement 1'une des branches de sa famille, les Laram6e, des avantages du premier testament pour les faire passer a P'autre, les Ferron.. Sans entrer dans tons les incidents et les details nombreux et assez compliquds qui forment le J. dossier (qui couvre trois cents pages imprim6es), il est cependant n6cessaire de s'arrter sur quelques faits saillants.

Les parents ici, monsieur et madame Bonin, n~e Aurdlie Quintin dit Dubois, cultivateurs de St. Marcel, comt6 de Richelieu, n'6taient pas les phre et mere mais les parents adoptifs de deux jeunes filles scours et ni~ces de madame Bonin, dont l'une avait 6pous6 Thdodule Larambe, lappelant, et l'autre Joseph Ferron, 'intim6. Apres leur mariage, madame Larame et son mari rest~rent avec les parents adoptifs environ un an, puis allrent aux Etats-Unis d'o, apris un s6jour de huit ans, ils retournorent h St. Marcel vers 1901; et finalement en 1904, ils allrent de nouveau habiter avec les vieux parents 1h la suite des arrangements de famille que voici: Le 10 fivrier 1904, par un acte entre vifs, qu'ils qualifient "vente et donation," pass6 devant Cardin, jeune, N.P. de Massueville, ils pass~rent a Laram~e la terre paternelle, of ils vivaient, avec tout ce qui en d~pendait, moyennant certaines charges et une rente viagbre.

Le meme jour, par un autre acte entre vifs intituld aussi "vente et donation," ils pass~rent a Ferron une autre terre de moindre valeur, il est vrai, mais c'tait, parait-il, ce qui avait t6 convenu entre eux aprbs mfires d6lib6rations, comme cela se pratique invariablement dans nos campagnes, et il est remarquable que pas un seul t6moin n'a 6t6 produit qui alt mis en doute 1'6quit6 de ces arrangements. Pour donner plus de force h ces dispositions entre vifs, deux testaments furent faits devant le m~me notaire et deux t6moins du voisinage: 1'un, celni de M. Bonin, le 11 f6vrier 1904, et 'autre, celui de Mme. Bonin, le 11 mars suivant,

Ces deux testaments confirment en tous points les dites ventes et donations.

Quelques jours aprbs, savoir le 28 mars 1904, M. Bonin s'est suicid6 pour des raisons qui n'apparaissent pas et qui sont d'ailleurs 6trang6res au litige. Naturellement, cette mort 6trange a dfi 6tre un grand choc pour sa veuve et il n'est pas surprenant d'apprendre que le 15 mai suivant elle 6tait frapp6e d'une forte attaque de paralysie.

Elle reput les soins du m~decin de 1'endroit, le docteur Gendron, et pen de temps aprbs elle 6tait convalescente et comme d'ordinaire dans les cas de cette nature sans 6tre gu6rie. Il est rare en effet qu'une personne ag6e d'environ soixante-dix ans, frapp6e de paralysie comme elle le fut, en revienne compl~tement. Le docteur Gendron, qui revit la pauvre vieille chez les Ferron oii elle 6tait en promenade h I'automne de la m~me annie, 1904, en compagnie du notaire Cardin, certifie qu'elle 6tait alors "d6mente, un cerveau ruin6."

A trois reprises diff6rentes durant cet automne de 1904, en septembre et en d6cembre, Ferron, durant la visite de madame Bonin, fit venir le notaire Cardin dans le but de lui faire faire un deuxibme testament. Le notaire s'est rendu A 1appel chaque fois mais sans r6sultat, vu que d'apr~s lui elle n'6tait capable de tester; la dernidre fois, cependant, afin d'en finir avec ces courses, il demanda an docteur Gendron de 'accompagner, ce qui fut fait. Le notaire ajoute que le docteur Gendron, apr~s examen, lui a d6fendu de regevoir le testament et que s'il le faisait, il t6moignerait contre lui. Le t6moignage du docteur Gendron confirme celui du notaire A cet 6gard. C'est alors que M. Cardin a abandonn lidke de regevoir un deuxi~me testament.

FERRON. Le 4 f6vrier suivant (1905), madame Bonin 6tait Girouard J. interdite a Sorel pour cause de d6mence h la requite de Larame, mais, en v6rit6, ainsi que Laram6e et le notaire instrumentant, Cardin, Pavouent, h Finstigation sp6ciale de Ferron.

M1. Cardin ajoute dans son t6moignage:

Monsieur Ferron a r6pondu: "Puisqu'on ne pent pas faire un testament et puisqu'elle est folle, on va toujours lui nommer un curateur, quelque chose, pour la reprbsenter," et il m'a demand6 proceder a I'interdiction, 1-dessus j'ai dit: "Est-ce que M. Laram6e serait consentant?"

II dit: "Voyez-le done."

J'ai vu M. Larambe on a proced6 Finterdiction a l'unanimit6 du conseil famille. Q.-C'est monsieur Laram~e qui a proc6d6?

R.-Oui. Il m'a demand6 d'aller voir M. Laramie pour voir s'il serait consentant; j'au vu les deux parties, nous avons proc6d6 A la demande monsieur LaramCe, mais c'est A la demande M. Ferron que l'interdiction cu lieu.

La cons6quence de cette interdiction a 6t de faire naitre dans le coeur de madame Bonin de la haine pour Laram6e.

Une de ses r~ponses aux interrogatoires pour son interdiction d6nore Fesprit qui l'animait:

Q.-Qui n'stait pas raisonnable?

R.-Monsieur Laram~e. II faut voir qu'il est. II est ambitieux. est-ce qu'on trouverait le magot.

passerait le magot. passerait dans le champ et on ne le trouverait pas. II a t6 courir A Sorel.

Il est grand.

II a t6 A Sorel pour dire que j'6tais folle. Pourquoi cela? c'btait pour avoir magot mais magot lui 6chappera bien.

Linsucc~s de Ferron avec A1. Cardin lui inspira Fide d'aller frapper it la porte d'un autre notaire, plus complaisant, savoir Joseph G6ddon Larivibre, exergant h St. Aim&.

Nous avons le t6moignage de ce dernier et malgrb les imperfections, r6ticences et hesitations, il en rdsulte qu'il d6clare h Ferron que si Flinterdiction 6tait levee et que madame Bonin fut pourvue simplement d'un con- J. sell judiciaire, elle pourrait faire un testament. De suite Larivibre, a la demande de Ferron, prend les procedures n~cessaires pour obtenir le relev6 de 1'interdiction. II s'arme d'abord de lI'affidavit du m~decin de Ferron, le docteur Pepin, asserment6 devant lui le 12 mai, oil ce dernier jure que Mme. Bonin "a toujours joui de toutes ses facult~s -mentales" "qu'elle est capable d'administrer ses biens et affaires" bien que plus tard, lorsqu'il fut appel6 comme t6moin, il avoue qu'il n'a jamais tenu de conversations avec elle et n'a fait aucun examen de son 6tat mental. Puis, le 23 mai, Larivibre donne h Larame avis d'une assemble de parents chez Ferron, a Massueville. Enfin le 26, au lieu et a I'heure indiqu~s, I'avis du conseil de famille 6tait pris devant lui a la requite de Bonin, d~clarant qu'elle jouissait de toutes ses facultis mentales et qu'elle 6tait capable de regevoir sa rente annuelle de $207.50 et d'administrer ses affaires. Ferron a pris par r cette d6lib6ration, mais non Laram6e qui est sorti de 'assemblie en disant qu'il reviendrait avec son aviseur 16gal; mais on n'a pas attendu son retour et alors Laramde s'est pourvu par appel devant la cour a Sorel. Le 15 juin, 1905, apr~s un nouvel interrogatoire de Mine. Bonin et un nouvel avis du conseil de famille, 1honorable juge Charbonneau rendit un jugement nommant un conseil judiciaire a Mine. Bonin pour les raisons suivantes:

Larame a pris part i cette d61ib6ration, 6tant d'avis qu'un conseil judiciaire 6tait indispensable. Il ne s'inquita gubre de la possibilit d'un deuxieme testament, parce qu'il consid~rait sa pauvre tante comme 6tant absolument d~mente. Mais il comptait sans Mtre. Larivibre.

Pendant que toutes ces procedures se d~veloppaient devant le notaire Larivibre et devant la cour h Sorel, Mme. Bonin babitait d~finitiveinent le domicile des Ferron oi elle tait gard6 vue et ofi le docteur Gagu6, le on vers le ( juin

1905, quoique envoye expr~s par le juge pour faire l'exanien de madame Bonin sur son 6tat mental, fut obligh de revenir sans la voir.

Ferron remarqua qu'il ne voulait rien faire sans consulter le notaire Larivi re qu'il envoya chercher et qui arriva "et encore," ajoute le docteur dans son timoignage, "on im'a refus me la laisser voir. On m'a dit qu'il y en avait assez qui 1'avait vue." En sus les Ferron et leur notaire lui adress rent des injures.

Dans son jugement qui dans des termes g~nraux, contrairement i larticle 541 du code de procedure, le savant juge ne fktit aucune allusion i cet incident qui, suivant noi, peint la situation. Inutile d'ajouter que Laranie qui a tent de voir sa tante vers melme Apoque, n'a pas eu plus de succ~s, Enfin le temps presse; il fant arriver an dbnouement.

notaire Lariviere se prdpare it mettre i execution lavis qu'il a donn6 i Ferron; celii de faire un deuxi ne testament.

Le juge-en-chef Taschereau est d'avis que "c'est la testatrice elle-nenie qui envoie qubrir le notaire Lariviere."

Le notaire dit cependant:

A l'entendre, on dirait que c'est la premiere fois qu'il en est question et cependant depuis plusieurs mois lui et Ferron ne cessaient de faire pas et d6marches pour J arriver a ce r~sultat.

Larivibre raconte qu'il s'est rendu chez Ferron oii il a regu les instructions de Mime. Bonin en pr6sence seulement de Ferron et de sa femme. Les Ferron, dit-il, n'ont pas donu6 les termes du testament, mais "des explications."

Le conseil judiciaire n'a pas kt invit6 h 6tre present. Larivibre n'a pas regu le testament ce jour-la, n'ayant pas de second notaire et ne voulant pas prendre des timoins sur les lieux dans la crainte d'6bruiter le testament. 11 dit a Ferron qu'il fera venir le notaire Rivet d'Yamaska, situ6 h quelques lieues, et de cette fagon tout restera dans le plus profond secret. C'est en effet ce qui eut lien quelques jours .apris, durant la veill~e du 21 juin, Larivire et Rivet regoivent le testament de Mme. Bonin, Ferron et sa femme 6tant pr&sents. Les notaires testifient qu'elle savait ce qu'elle faisait; quant h Ferron il est impossible de savoir ce qu'il en pensait, car il n'a pas off ert son t6moignage. L'ex~cution du testament prit peu de temps; il 6tait court; tout 6tait donna a la femme de Ferron. Personne ne sut rien de ce qui s'tait pass6 jusqu' apris le d~cis de la testatrice qui cut lieu le 15 mai 1906.

Cependant, en juillet, 1905, le notaire Larivibre, Ferron et le conseil judiciaire Lemieux vont demander certains effets chez Laram6e. Ce dernier refusa invoquant le premier testament.

La-dessus, Larivibre lui dit: "Monsieur Larame, tout est a vous par ce testament, si c'est le dernier."

ne lui a jamais dit qu'elle venait de faire un deuxibme testament; son serment d'office s'y opposait, dit-il. Cependant il avait admis les Ferron a son excution.

Il me semble que tous ces faits d~montrent nonseulement que ce sont les inannuvres de Ferron qui out amend I'excution du deuxibme testament a son avantage, mais tablissent de fortes prbsomptions de captation et suggestion on influence indue, pratiquees en fraude des droits des Larambe, pr6somptions que Ferron devait repousser par une preuve compl~te. C'est ce qu'il n'a pas fait; c'est nme le contraire qui apparait.

La cour sup6rieure, Charbonneau J. et la cour d'appel, Blanchet et Lavergue JJ., diff6rants, out maintenu le dernier testament, all~guant que les Larame n'avaient pas prouv6 leurs avanc~s. Mais dans les circonstances sur qui retombait la tAche de faire la preuve?

Les appelants n'ont-ils pas assez prouve pour ]a rejeter sur le b~ndficiaire? Si nous appliquons les principes que nous avous d6fnis dans la cause de Mayrand v. Dussa.ult(1), il ne peut y avoir de doute selon moi que le dernier testament doit tre rejet6, taut d'aprbs le droit frangais que d'apris le droit anglais.

Nous retrouvons en effet daus la pr6sente. espce tons les 616ments de la suggestion ou de la captation poses par les auteurs, en particulier par Baudry-Lacantinerie, Pricis, tome 2, no. 774; Laurent, vol. II., nos. 132, 134, 135; et Marcad6, tome 3, art. 901, page 407.

Qui a vers6 le poison de la haine dans le cwur de madame Bonin contre Laram&e, ainsi qu'elle 1'a manifest6 dans sa r6ponse h l'interrogatoire cit6e plus haut? Peut-on raisonnablement supposer que ce soit autre que les Ferron? 3fme si le doute 6tait permis it cet 6gard, Ferron a-t-il repouss6 la pr~somption du droit anglais que celui qui fait faire un testament en sa faveur au pr6judice des h6ritiers l6gitimes, qu'ils le soient par la loi on en vertu d'un testament, doit J. prouver hors de tout doute que le testament a t6 fait par une personne capable de tester, librement et mime hountement?

Nous avons d6clar6 dans la cause de Mayrand v. Dussault(1), que cette r~gle devait tre suivie ici comme faisant essentiellement partie de la libert6 de tester qui nous vient du droit anglais; et je dois ajouter que le Conseil Priv6 a refus6 de reviser notre d6cision.

Je conclus en citant lautorit6 du "House of Lords" dans Fulton Andrew(2), comme 6tant la plus haute autorit6 sur la imatibre. Lord Hatherley disait:

Pour ces raisons, j'accorderais l'appel, maintiendrais la contestation des appelants, rejeterais la requate de l'intimk pour reprise d'instance et d6clarerais le dernier testament nul et de nul effet, avec ddpens devant toutes les cours.

J.-In the case of Ren aud v. Lamnothe(3) this court decided that, in the Province of Quebec, the English law governs the subject of testamentary dispositions.

Under that law it has been determined by the Court of Appeal in England, in Tyrrell v. Painton et al. (1), and it is now accepted as the true rule to be deduced from Barry v. Butlin(2) ; Fulton v. Andrcw J. (3) ; and Brown v. Fishcr(4);

In the present case two wills had been executed, the first one under circumstances which admitted of no suspicion attaching to it, and the last one, which was attacked on the grounds that it was made and executed

At the close of the argument I entertained some doubt upon the question. Since then I have carefully considered the respective contentions in the light of the conflicting evidence, expert and otherwise, and the several judgments of the courts below, and, while my doubts have not been entirely removed, I have not been able to reach such a clear conclusion that the judgment of the majority of the Court of King's Bench is wrong as would warrant me in reversing that judgment.

The fact that neither the respondent nor his wife were called to give evidence was calculated to intensify suspicion.

They were the parties in whose favour J. the will was made, who were seeking to maintain it, and with whom the testatrix resided for some months before her death and at the time the will was made. They were both present in the house at the time of its execution, and Mrs. Ferron was, as I gather from the evidence, in the room when the testatrix gave her instructions to the notary for the will and when she afterwards executed the will. Mr. Casgrain, I think, very properly, under the circumstances, accepted the onus of supporting this will, and the sole question is: Has he discharged that onus?

Both courts below,.the trial judge and the Court of Appeal, found that he had, and, while the fact of the evidence of Ferron and his wife having been withheld had added to the doubts which the circumstances of the case created, it has not carried me any further and to doubt merely, in such a case as this, is to confirm. The experts called with respect to the soundness of mind of the testatrix differed in their opinions. I attach great importance to the evidence of the two notaries, one of whom took the instructions and prepared the will, and the other of whom accompanied him when it was executed. Both these notaries knew of the previous interdiction by the court of the testatrix for insanity. They also knew of her subsequent release from that interdiction, but accompanied with the appointment of a judicial adviser, and of a host of other circumstances calling for special precautions on their part, alike as to her capacity to make a will and as to her knowledge and approval of its contents. The notary who drew the will swears that he prepared a will upon notes taken at the dictation of the testatrix, that he re-drafted and re-arranged these notes at his home, and that three days afterwards he returned to the testatrix, accompanied by the notary Rivet, and that she then repeated, without suggestion or aid, what she had told him in regard to her last wishes; that the will was then read to her and that she approved of it is as being what she wished and what she had dictated, and they both state that they were fully alive to the necessity, under the peculiar facts, of taking every precaution so as to satisfy themselves with regard to her mental condition and her wishes with respect to the disposition of her property. The learned judge who heard the case and knew all the parties and their circumstances and relations to each other and to the testatrix, and who was the judge who had removed the interdiction, found for the will, accepting the testimony of these notaries and the other witnesses who testified to the testatrix's sanity. A majority of the Court of King's Bench confirmed that judgment and, notwithstanding the many suspicious circumstances which surround the case, I am unable to reach such a clear conviction of the error of these judgments as would justify me in reversing them. J.-I think this appeal should be dismissed with costs. A careful perusal of the evidence leads me to infer that the only impairment of the mind of the testatrix was the result of a paralytic stroke that rendered her incapable for a time of making a will; that she thereafter grew better and so continued to improve until she became and was at the time of making the will in question possessed of the necessary testamentary capacity therefor.

As much stress was laid by appellant's counsel on the evidence of want of capacity displayed in answer to the interrogatories she had to answer on three dif- J. ferent occasions I have paid particular regard to these answers.

The answers on the second occasion evince such a marked improvement over those given on the first occasion as to convince me she was, perhaps slowly, yet steadily, recovering her health and with her physical health her normal soundness of mind.

On the third occasion there appear some lapses memory and one or two of confusion, but the ordeal she was going through, which she quite well understood was to test the soundness of her mind, was quite enough, I think, to unnerve her at times. She had also on this occasion to undergo an examination of over an hour and, making due allowance for that and its incident fatigue as compared with the previous occasions, I think my theory of her continued improvement is correct notwithstanding the mistakes I have referred to.

Certainly the simple will she had decided to make was quite within the mental grasp she seems to have reached.

She certainly had conceived against appellant some sort of repugnance.

For that I think she left his house, and notwithstanding the cloud then hanging over her mind seems to have had intelligence enough to find her way to the place one would under such circumstances expect her to go to if her mind was clear but her body weak.

I I infer from what occurred that she desired when she reached there to be taken to the respondent's place and he was sent for and she was taken there accordingly.

If proof of anything it clearly is that she had mental capacity far beyond what some would have us believe.

It seems to me this clearly is not, whatever it may be, a case of senile dementia.

Then we have two professional gentlemen who give evidence as to the making of the will and unless we discard what they say as utterly unworthy of belief without any proper reasons for doing so I do not see how we can, especially in light of what had gone before, say that deceased was so deprived of mind, memory and understanding that she could not make a will.

They did not make it quite clear that she was, when giving instructions, taken aside beyond the hearing of the respondent and his wife.

That certainly would have been a proper course and I should have felt much more confidence in what was done if some such course had been pursued and the reasons asked of her, for her preferring one of two parties who appeared to have been equally probable subjects of her bounty.

However, I cannot lay down as a rule of law that such a course is absolutely necessary even where the man drawing the will has been procured to do so by the beneficiary.

The merely sending for or bringing some one to draw up a will is not alone enough to destroy a bequest to him or her who does so.

Each such case must be determined by its own surrounding circumstances when we are asked to attach weight to the mere fact of sending for, or engaging or even selecting, the notary to perform such a service. The only thing that has troubled me in the case since giving it all the reading of evidence and consideration thereof I possibly can, is that the condition of mind deceased then had, though of testamentary capacity, was what might be easily imposed upon. I see no evidence, however, on which I can rest any presumption in law or find as facts from which I can infer captation, suggestion, undue influence or any other form of fraudulent practice such as imputed to the respondent.

The learned trial judge saw the witnesses and had a better opportunity in many ways of forming a correct judgment than any one else, and he is satisfied and also the majority of the court of appeal, and it seems to me great weight must in such a case be attached to these circumstances.

The case of Mayrand v. Dussault(3), relied upon, had in it facts in abundance which we have not here of a nature to entitle us to draw the inferences that were drawn.

We must be careful not to substitute suspicion for proof. We must not by an extensive doing so render it impossible for old people to make wills of their little worldly goods.

The eye may grow dim, the ear may lose its acute sense, and even the tongue may falter at names and objects it attempts to describe, yet the testamentary capacity be ample.

To deprive lightly the aged thus afflicted of the right to make a will would often be to rob them of their last protection against cruelty or wrong on the part of those surrounding them and of their only means of attracting towards them such help, comforts and tenderness as old age needs.

It seems to me pertinent to speak thus for this very case, I rather think, furnishes an illustration of what people have to suffer at the hands of those that have not been as kindly treated as they had a right to expect.

(dissenting).-I agree with the opinion stated by my brother Girouard.

concurred in the dismissal of the appeal for the reasons stated in the opinion of Davies J. Appeal dismissed with costs.