Morgan v. Avenue Realty Co.

JAMES MORGAN AND OTHERS (PLAIN-j

APPELLANTS; -May TIFFS) ....

.......................

June 14. THE AVENUE REALTY COMPANY

(DEFENDANTS) ....................

. IESPONDENTS. APPEAL FROM THE OF KING'S BENCH, APPEAL SIDE, PROVINCE OF QUEBEC.

The defendants erected their building against the plaintiffs' wall that it served them in the way exterior protection for the side of the new building; they connected the metal roof-flashing with the wall nails, etc., but constructed the new works such a manner as to avoid depending upon the plaintiffs' wall for support and without piercing recesses in it to receive joists, etc.

Held, reversing the judgment appealed from (Q.R. K.B. 524), Fitzpatrick C.J. dissenting, that the defendants had exercised party-rights in the plaintiffs' wall and utilized it as an external wall for their building, and that they were, consequently, obliged to treat it as a common wall and to pay half the value of the portion thereof so utilized by them.

APPEAL from the judgment of the Court of King's Bench, appeal side(1), reversing the judgment, at the trial, in the Superior Court, District of Montreal, and dismissing the plaintiffs' action with costs.

The material circumstances are stated in the judgments now reported.

*PRESENT:-Sir Charles Fitzpatrick C.J. and Idington, Anglin and Brodeur JJ.

(1) Q.R. K.B.

v7.

(dissenting).-I agree entirely with the judgment of the court of appeal.

J.-The question raised here is whether or not the respondents have so used the wall erected by appellants as entitles the latter to call upon them for payment of half the costs of construction.

The line between these adjacent properties has never been finally determined and seems so doubtful that their respective surveyors employed to try and determine it, found the appellants' wall in part might be upon the ground of the respondents and recommended making a party-wall of it.

But the respondents instead of agreeing to that conceived the idea that they might so construct their building as to avoid perceptibly pressing upon or enjoying support from this wall yet enjoy every other benefit that an external or end wall could give it and be free from being called on to contribute to the cost of its erection.

Respondents' architect ingeniously contrived, by means of an iron structure rested on the front and rear walls or foundations and on pillars in the basement at a distance of a few feet from the wall in question, to avoid putting any beams into the wall as in old days was the common method of support to carry the upper part of a building.

The iron beams reached up to the edge of the wall in question and, so as to enable respondents to say it did not touch the wall, a sheet of paper was put between the end of each of these beams and the wall. It was thought this was not enough, buit a pretence of an end wall was made by building one of eight inches consisting of terra-cotta brick which, I suppose, could be a furring to receive the plastering on the inside.

Covered over the roof by usual material the job looked well done and all the protection of any partywall was got without the expense of paying for half of it.

There were weak spots in the scheme.

In the cellar the wall in question was white-washed by respondents, no doubt for purposes of light and cleanliness.

The terra-cotta brick only began with the ground floor and was carried on the iron frame structure I have referred to. And when it became necessary to make the roof complete the respondents used metal flashing, which they found necessary to tie to the appellants' wall by nails driven into that.

The respondents, therefore, had all the benefits (save the usual extent of support) a party-wall ever gives by sheltering the occupants of its building from the inclemencies of the weather.

The terra-cotta unless covered by metal or cement was worthless as an external wall.

This was not so covered.

The question is raised whether or not this use of a party-wall is a usage of it that entitles the appellants to compensation.

It is said that so long as the party-wall is not used for support of the building put up against it the appellants have no right to complain.

It is by no means clear that the respondents' structure does not derive very substantial support from the stone wall in question. If the foundations of respondents are, as few are, absolutely solid, and can never settle and their structure has been built absolutely plumb, the structure undoubtedly can never rest for support on the party-wall. But if, as shewn, it rests on a blue clay, liable to give way and produce a settlement, then assuredly the party-wall of stone may become not only a great support and stay, but also a perpetual safe-guard that the settlement will, on that side, be kept nearly plumb.' I hardly think the sheet of paper, now most likely ground to powder by the pressure, will help much.

It seems asking rather too much, indeed, to require a good deal of assurance, to obtain such an assurance against the possibilities of the consequences of such settling tendencies and yet to say that this party-wall is of no use to respondents and hence that it does not use it.

But there is more than that; they made, as bound by law, an application to the civic authorities for a permit to build and, in that, represented their proposed building to be of four stories in height and the thickness of its external party-wall as follows:- Either it was intended to use this wall now in question or not.

Certainly if it was intended to use this appellants' wall as a shield against prosecution the respondents ought not to be heard to say they did not use it. And if it was not intended to use it, but to rely on the terra-cotta structure as an external wall, then that was something like fraud upon the authorities. I prefer believing respondents' application and intention were honest. Indeed, I hardly think they should be allowed to say otherwise.

The inspector says:- Oo. Q.-In other words, they used Morgan's wall as their outside wall, Idington J. is that the case ?

A.-Well, I do not know if I can answer that way. But what I know is that there was a wall there, and they came to to ask me if I would accept a terra-cotta wall hanging on steel joists and beams, I told them it was unnecessary as there was strong wall there. They said that they did not want to use this strong wall, but wanted a terra-cotta wall independent of Morgan's wall, I said Morgan's wall was not there you would have to build according to your application, because it would not answer the purpose the by-law.

Q.-You could not have terra-cotta wall without anything outside ?

A.-No, you cannot have an exterior wall built terra-cotta, only eight inches.

Q.-That would not have been wall ?

A.-No, not an external party-wall.

Q.-As a matter of fact there was no wall built them at all that would allowed as an exterior wall ?

A.-No, there was none.

Even without more than using the wall to nail the roof to and finish the protection against the weather which this wall in question gave respondents, I incline to think they made that use of the wall that requires they should pay for it.

The mere accidental shelter a wall gives, say to a tent, though beneficial as sheltering from the wind, can give no right of compensation.

But this design shews a great deal more. It is a use of a wall for all the purposes for which an external or party-wall is needed and the very effort put forth to avoid, by the design adopted, giving compensation, shews a desire to use the wall in the common acceptation of the term.

It is not the mere support involved and usually referred to that determines the limit of the law in this regard. The law gives the right to use such a wall and implies the corresponding obligation to pay for it. saves wasting money, and those thus saved (as the respondents were), must pay for the use they have made of the privileges the law gives.

Modern ingenuity and skill may enable a dispensation of the use of the old devices as to support, but does not avoid the application of the principle the law always carried in it and which, when applied here, seems to me to bind the respondents to pay for the benefits they enjoy thereunder.

Without this wall they would have had to build another, such as specified, by itself for external walls.

The appeal should be allowed with costs here and in the court of appeal, and the judgment of the learned trial judge should be restored.

Duer J.-The evidence is sufficient to establish the conclusion that the appellants' wall serves the purpose of an exterior wall in the protection of the respondents' building. The respondents' architect admits as much: and the municipal inspector makes it clear that it was because of the juxtaposition of the appellants' building that the respondents were allowed to proceed with the erection of their building without constructing an exterior wall on the south side. It is really not disputed that the respondents have intentionally and deliberately availed themselves of the appellants' wall for all the purposes of an exterior wall except support; and there can be little doubt that they constructed the building in the full expectation that, when it had settled into its permanent position, it should receive support also from the appellants' wall. The respondents have, no doubt, struggled hard to avoid the burden while enjoying the benefit but, I think, they have not succeeded.

I agree with reasons given by Mr. Justice Trenholme and by the trial judge.

J.-Although the evidence is probably insufficient to establish that it was the intention of the defendant company that their building should receive lateral support on its southern side from the north wall of the plaintiffs' building, or that it in fact receives such support, the use made by the defendants of the plaintiffs' wall, in my opinion, constituted it a party-wall.

By an ingenious method of construction the defendants have, perhaps sufficiently, provided for the support of the eight-inch terra-cotta structure, which they call the south wall of their building, without its receiving actual support from the plaintiffs' north wall. But the latter wall is none the less made use of by the defendants in many respects as an external wall of their building.

But for its contiguity the by-laws of the City of Montreal, if enforced as we must assume they would have been, would have prevented the erection of the defendants' building having for its south wall merely an eight-inch terra-cotta structure. The evidence indicates that the civic authorities permitted the building to be constructed as it was solely because it was represented to them that the plaintiffs' north wall would be used as a party-wall. The defendants have in fact no other south wall of any kind in their basement. They have whitened the face of the plaintiffs' wall which serves as the south side of their cellar rooms. They have actually connected the top of their terra-cotta structure with the north wall of the plaintiffs' building by the use of metal flashing. Without the covering afforded by the plaintiffs' wall, the defendants' terra-cotta structure would not at all J. have answered the purpose of an external wall. It is in fact the plaintiffs' wall which, partially at least, serves that purpose. In these circumstances I am satisfied that the defendants have taken such possession and have made such use of the plaintiffs' wall that they should not be allowed to escape liability to pay one-half the cost of so much of it as they have thus taken advantage of.

In an attempt to evade this liability noteworthy for its cunning rather than for its honesty they have, no doubt, not made the full use of the plaintiffs' wall which they might have made of it as a party-wall. But they have made and are making a use of it which they cannot honestly enjoy without assuming the obligations incident to its existence as a party-wall. It is gratifying to me that the law, as I understand it, does not require us to reach a conclusion not consonant with common honesty, which would be the result of upholding the respondents' contention.

For these reasons and those stated in the opinions of the learned trial judge and of Mr. Justice Trenholme, who dissented in the Court of King's Bench, I would respectfully allow this appeal with costs in this court and in the Court of King's Bench and would restore the judgment of the trial judge.

J.-La question est de savoir si l'intim6e fait usage du mur 6rig6 par Pappelant dans la ligne de s6paration entre leurs propri6t6s, et si elle est tenue de lui en payer la moiti6 de la valeur.

II est bien 6vident que, d'aprbs les riglements municipaux, la bitisse de 1'intim6e serait ill~galement construite si elle n'utilisait pas le mur en question.

Les autorit~s municipales, quand elles ont accord6 le permis de batir, ont compris que ce mur serait utilis6 et l'intimbe s'est exempt6e par lh m~me d'en construire un tel que requis par les ordonnances de la Cit6 de Montreal.

Mais quand elle fut mise en deineure par Pappelant de payer la moiti6 de la valeur de ce mur, elle a r6pondu qu'elle n'en avait pas besoin.

Les ing6nieux proc~dds auxquels Fintimbe a en recours violent les principes 616mentaires de la justice et de l'6quit6 et il ne pent lui tre permis de s'enrichir ainsi aux ddpens d'autrui.

Elle a mis dans les tages sup6rieurs de sa bitisse un mur en brique poreuse (terra-cotta) qui, comme il est en preuve, ne pent servir que dans Fint~rieur et ne pourrait jamais 6tre utilis6 comme mur extbrieur h moins d'tre reconvert de metal on d'une coache de ciment.

Dans le soubassement elle n'a pas jug6 a propos de continuer son mur de brique poreuse et le mur du demandeur, appelant, fait la division des deux propri6tis.

L'intim6e avait laiss6 entre son mur de terra-cotta et le mur du demandeur un espace a peine suffisant pour y mettre une feuille de papier. Comme le terrain est peu solide h cet endroit il est arriv6 ce qui devait inevitablement se produire: les deux batisses se sont rejointes et elles se trouvent l'une sur Pautre.

L'intim&e, cependant, n'aurait pas pu se contenter d'en rester 1t car la pluie se serait in~vitablement introduite entre les deux murs et aurait desagr~g6 sa brique poreuse et rendu sa maison inhabitable. Alors elle a r6uni la partie sup6rieure de sa brique poreuse au mur du demandeur par une bande de m6tal qu'elle y a cIou&e solidement.

Elle a done fait acte de propri~taire sur ce mur en J. y introduisant ces clous et cette bande de m6tal. La loi declare que les murs sont prdsumbs mitoyens (art. 510 C.C.).

Il me parait bien evident que si, plus tard, les tribunaux avalent a se prononcer sur la nature du mur en question qu'ils le considbreraient comme mitoyen. L'usage que l'intime en fait dans le soubassement, la bande de m6tal qui y a introduite et cloude dans le haut feraient considerer le mur 6rig6 par le demandeur comme 6tant le mur mitoyen servant aux deux maisons, vu que le mur en brique poreuse qui s'y trouverait ne pourrait pas plus tre considr6 comme le mur extirieur de la maison de 1'intimbe que les enduits faits par le demandeur-appelant, de son c6t6.

L'intimbe pouvait bien acqurir la mitoyennet6 aprbs entente avec l'appelant. C'est une facult6 que la loi lui accorde (art. 518 C.C.).

Mais si, an lieu de proc6der de cette maniere, elle s'est servie du mur construit exclusivement par son voisin, il est clair qu'en pareil cas ce dernier pouvait la poursuivre en dommages-int6rits et pouvait demander la destruction mime de la besogne mal plantde, pour me servir de l'expression de Fuzier-Hermann, R6pertoire, vo. "Mitoyennet6," No. 222.

Mais ne pouvait-il pas 6galement, s'il le pr6f6rait, consid6rer 1'intim6e comme ayant tacitement manifest6 la volont6 d'acqubrir la mitoyennet6 et r~clamer d'elle le paiement de la moiti6 de la valeur de son mur? La jurisprudence et la doctrine n'ont pas craint d'aller jusque l.

(Fuzier-Herman, vo. "Mitoyennet6," No. 223.)

Le propri~taire voisin peut done devenir acqu6reur d'un mur mitoyen soit en donnant formellement son intention, soit en faisant des actes qui constituent de sa part la volont6 de se servir du mur.

Les auteurs appellent ce dernier cas "l'usurpation de la mitoyennet6:" et la personne qui y a recours engage aussi bien sa responsabilit6 que si elle avait formellement r6clam6 la cession forc6e du mur. La voie de fait est 6quivalente an contrat mifme de cession.

Dijon, 21 janv., 1880, Recueil, arrts de Dijon 1880, 151.

Quand y a-t-il usurpation d'un mur ? C'est une question de fait dont le tribunal de premidre instance devrait tre le juge souverain, surtout si, comme dans le cas actuel, la preuve est quelque peu contradictoire. Le savant juge qui a entendu la cause en cour sup6rieure a trouv6 que Fintime se servait du mur du demandeur, appelant.

Il n'est pas n6cessaire pour qu'un mur soit mitoyen qu'on y introduise des pontres: mais on peut en faire usage et, en consequence, engager sa responsabilit6 quand, en ayant recours a des moyens plus ing~nieux qu'honntes, le propri6taire d'un lot voisin d'un mur en retire tons les avantages qu'il pent procurer et qu'il se dispense, a raison de gela, d'en construire un lui-mime.

La jurisprudence Canadienne ne nous donne qu'une cause oft cette question se soit soulev~e: c'est celle de Boyer v. Marson (1), oii il a kt d6cid6 que le d~fendeur qui avait biti pr~s de la maison de la demanderesse sans faire de mur, mais qui avait rempli de mortier les interstices entre le toit et le mur voisin a kt oblig6 le payer la moiti6 du mur. Il y avait en plus le fait que les locataires du d~fendeur avalent pos6 de la tapisserie sur le mur. La situation 6tait passablement identique h cette cause-ci. En effet la partie sup6rieure avait t remplie de mortier, tandis que dans notre cas une bande de metal a t6 cloude dans le mur du demandeur.

Le mur avait t& tapiss6. Dans notre cas, la partie du mur dans le soubassement a kt blanchie A, la chaux.

L'intim6e a cite devant cette cour deux decisions qui ont t rendues devant les tribunaux frangais et qui sont rapporthes dans Dalloz 1859-1-277; Sirey, 1898-1-503.

La prenibre de ces decisions est a 1'effet que les constructions n'avaient t 4lev6es qu'a proximit6 du mur du voisin et qu'elles n'y pendtraient pas et we s'y appuyaient pas et qu'il n'y avait pas lieu de maintenir l'action possessoire qui avait t institude par voisin, vu que les constructions ne constituaient pas un trouble a sa possession.

La deuxibme de ces d6cisions a t rendue sous les dispositions de l'article 656 du Code Napoleon qui diff~re sensiblement de notre article correspondant (art. 513 C.C.).

Ce jugenent porte d'ailleurs non pas sur 1'obligation du propridtaire voisin de contribuer au muir dout il s'est servi par usurpation, mais sur le droit que le propriftaire posside de renoncer h la mitoyennet6 on de Fabandonner.

Ce n'est done pas le cas tel que pos6 dans la cause actuelle que ces decisions des tribunaux frangais d6cident.

D'ailleurs les deux articles, ainsi qu'on le voit, ne sont pas du tout r~dig~s de la nine mani re. Voici, en effet, Particle 656 du ('ode Napolbon aisi que I'article 513 de notre code:

'es jugellients rectlilaisselit droit pro)ritaire diliiainolifP 1i

IorSlU ilur Ile salitic pa., H(t

I)htllS code, an coitraire, il est dit que la filcnt d'blmindonliler pent pas s'exerver si voisin i.uge

On ensigle 4pIlemllenit Fraice le propritaire responsibilit

;'il fait inur, lorsq' fiit servir Supporter bAtiments.

Fournel, "Traits

Voisinage," co. "llur," 316, et mot "Adosselient," Deioluhile, "Servitude," vol. 1, na. 421 ; Dilloz, 1870, 2, 217.

J'ni soulign les parties des deux articles qui diff*renlt.

Je reconnuis (ue la difttrence West pas tr s consillrable: ma'is elle dbut1oultre qule niotre loi eng-age plIIs faicililent la respo sabi lit4 tu1 co-1rn-opritaire que la loi frazlnluise.

Sous le ('ode Napolbon le droit d'ahandon ne pent s'exercer q ue dans le cas of le imur ne supporte pas la isse voisine: tandis (ue sois l'autori t de notre code la silmlple litii isation du inur empicle I exercice de (ette facult6.

Pour raisolis jen suis veill la concision que factioi (1d demandeur doit ctre minntenuc et qune la dfenderesse, iitnie, doit lid paver la inoit4 t mur en1 questioll.

L'appel doit 6tre maintenu avoc dlpens tant de cette cOur que de la cour d'appel et le jugernent h superieure clit confitine.

A'PEAL from the judgment of the Superior Court, sitting in review, at the City of Montreal, affirming in p;Irt the jud(nent of Mr. Justice Brunean in the Superior Court for the District of Richelieu.

The for breach of a contract for alterations and repairs to a ship, and the pleadings involved a counterchiim and an incidental demand.

At the close of the evidence the respondents (plaintiffs) made a motion for the appointment of experts to examine the ship in order to ascertain what works were necessary to put it in condition for navigation, and the cost of such works. The motion for the proposed crpertise was granted forthwith, notwithstanding objections raised on behalf of the appellants, and, without the consent of the parties as to the appointment and choice of an expert or experts, nor allowing an opportunity for recusation, the trial judge sua sponte, named one expert for the purpose of ascertaining the matters mentioned.

The appellants took exception to the judge's order. The single expert, named, made some investigations, but did not hear evidence of witnesses, and made a report recommending that certain alterations should be made to the ship at a cost of about $5,800.

The trial judge received this report, and, without any further proceedings, maintainied the respondents' action in respect of several items of ages by the principal denanl. and, addition, for the Sum. of $5,800 mntioned in the report of tile expert. Froln the total amouint, s0 fould, the trial judge deducted the amount claimed 'by the appellants' cross-demand, aind condentied. them to pay the remainder to Ihe respondents.

On an appeal to the Court of Review, this judgment was affirmed as to the principal demand and. the cross-demand, and, as to the incidental demand the Superior Court judgment was reversed and the said denuud was dismissed. The appellants, on their appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, contended that, on the evidence, the principal demand should have been dismissed and the cross-demand maintained, and complained that the appointinelt of tile expert had irregularly made, without compliallce with the requirenellts of articles 392 et seq. of the Code of Civil Procedure and, further, that the trial judge had no authority, oil the pleading-s, to submit the questions referred to a single expert and that the report should have been disregarded as tile expert had not based it upon evideice regularl adduced before him.

After hearing the arguments of counsel the court reserved judgment, and on a subsequent day the appeal was allowed with costs in the Supreme Court of Canada and in the Court of Review, costs in the Superior Court to abide the issue of a partial new trial; it was ordered that the cause should be remitted to the Superior Court to be re-inscribed for hearing on the roll at the stage it had reached when the motion for expertise was made; and it was declared that the appointment of the expert was irregularly made and the questions submitted to him by the trial judge were not relevant in the existing state of the pleadings.

Appeal allowed with costs.