Lamoureux v. Craig

person propounding will, in the preparation of which was instrumental and which is sole beneficiary, is obliged to support it evidence sufficient not only to shew that the will was duly executed, but also to justify the righteousness of the transaction and to establish that it truly expresses the last testamentary wishes of the testator and that the testator knew and appreciated the effect of its dispositions and approved them.

Two days before her death the testatrix, to whom morphine was being administered to alleviate pain, executed two wills in the English form.

She requested her husband to have will prepared and, on his instructions, his brother, an advocate, drafted a will whereby the husband was made sole beneficiary. Upon this will being read over to her, in the forenoon, the testatrix took exception to it because it ignored promise, made to her father, that certain property she had received from him should ultimately revert to members of her own family; and she did not then execute it.

Another will was drafted the husband's brother to meet her wishes, but, either on account of her drowsiness or because of the presence in her bedroom of friends, including her sister, the plaintiff, the second will, though ready at noon, was not presented to the testatrix for signature until late in the afternoon, when she attempted to sign it, but the brother declared it worthless owing to the illegibility of the signature. being told of this opinion, the will read to her in the morning, or one similar in its contents, was presented to her *PRESET:-Sir Charles Fitzpatrick C.J. and Idington, Duff, Anglin and Brodeur JJ.

signature and her husband offered to read it to her, but she I---' clined to have this done, saying that she had already heard read and knew its contents; she then signed it with her mark presence of witnesses.

In an action to set aside the last will, the evidence failed to establish that the testatrix understood its contents and the difference between its provisions and those of the will which she had attempted to sign, nor did it remove suspicion arising from the fact that the impeached will had been prepared under the instructions of the sole beneficiary, and other peculiar circumstances attending its execution.

Held, reversing the judgment appealed from (Q.R. K.B. 252), the Chief Justice dissenting, that the evidence failed to establish that the will in question expressed the true last testamentary wishes of the testatrix and, consequently, that it should aside.

Barry v. Butlin P.C. ; Fulton Andrews (L.R. H.L. 448); Tyrrell v. Painton ((1894), P. 151); McLaughlin v. Mc- Lennan (26 Can. 646); Brown Fisher L.T. St. George's Society of Montreal Nicholls (Q.R. 273) Harwood v Baker P.C. 282) ; Tribe Tribe Jur. 793); Mignault Halo Jur. 288), and Mayrand Dussault Can. S.C.R. 460), referred to.

APPEAL from the judgment of the Court of King's Bench, appeal side(1), reversing the judgment in the Superior Court, District of Montreal(2), and dismissing the plaintiff's action with costs.

The circumstances in which it was sought to set aside the will in question are stated shortly in the head-note and are fully set out in the judgments now reported.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE (dissenting).-The will in this case is attacked on several grounds. I quote from the plaintiff's declaration:- (1) Q.R. K.B.

Q.R. stat A That the will was duly executed was found by both courts below. The trial judge found against the will on the.ground that the husband of the deceased induced her to sign it on the false representation that the previous will was invalid because the signature was illegible. Whether it was or not, I submit respectfully, is not in issue here, but that the husband was so informed by his brother, a professional man. cannot be doubted. I understand that the majority here is of opinion that the will in question was properly executed and that the testatrix was of sound and disposing mind, but that it does not truly express her last intentions and that she was in error as to its provisions when she signed it.

What are the facts ? The parties married in Quebec, under what is known there as a "r6gime de s~paration de biens."

The husband, therefore, would not, in case of intestacy, inherit anything from his wife. They apparently lived together for twenty-seven years. During all that time the wife was under the impression that the last survivor would inherit everything. When the attention of her husband was drawn to the true situation, his observation was "in my wife's present condition, I am not to trouble her about such things." This is not evidence of rapacity on his part. The respondent's father saw the priest who was about to attend on the deceased and he was asked to speak to her about her temporal affairs, and it.was only as a result of that interview that the husband came to interfere in the matter at all. For what occurred when the wife gave her instructions to draw the will we must rely entirely upon his evidence. He says that her suggestion was that he should have the property, but that, when he came finally to dispose of it, he should bear in mind her promise to her father to give what she had received back to her family. I read the husband's evidence to mean that the deceased was prepared to execute the will leaving everything to him on his personal undertaking to comply with her request. He thought, however, that it would be more satisfactory to have the wife's wish expressed in the will itself. Hence the change.

If anything is clear in this unfortunate controversy, it is that the wife's wish was to give her husband her estate, relying upon him to carry out her verbal request with respect to her family, and the effect of this judgment is to defeat that intention. For that reason I think the appeal should be dismissed. As the evidence was carefully and ably analyzed by the Chief Justice of the Court of King's Bench, I do not think it necessary to do more than to say that I adopt his conclusions as well as his reasons. J.-The respondent's late wife, whose health had not been very satisfactory for some time, fell rather suddenly very ill.

She was nervous and suffered such pain that her physician, in order to alleviate her sufferings, administered morphine. He intimated to her husband that her condition was such that her spiritual adviser should be called in, and the reverend Father Charbonneau was accordingly sent for. On his reaching the house, he was interviewed by Idi-,u the father of the respondent, domiciled with him, and asked to bring under the notice of the sick woman the fact that her worldly affairs were not settled and to advise her to consider same.

Something is sought to be made of the different versions given on the trial hereof, by respondent's father and the priest, both as to what transpired at this interview and what the priest reported to him after leaving the sick-room of the dying woman.

I attach little importance to any such discrepancy, though accepting the priest's version of what was said.

The eagerness of respondent's father is, of course, the subject of fair criticism. But the important thing to be observed is that it was not until after the priest had discharged his duties as required, by administering the last rites of the church to the sick woman, that the subject of making a will had ever been considered by her.

Immediately after the departure of the priest, respondent tells that he was called into her room and, when the nurse had retired and no one else present, he was spoken to by her on the subject of her worldly affairs which, up to then, she had seemed to think settled.

The result of what seems to have been a very brief interview was that the brother of the respondent, also living in the same house and an advocate by profession, was asked to draw a last will and testament for his wife according to instructions given by him.

The brother, accordingly, without any interview with her, drew up the following very short will:- Par mesure prudence, et sans me croire nullement dangereusement malade, je prends, A tout inv6nement, les prdsentes dispositions: Idington J. Je donne et lgue, sans restriction, A mon 6poux, Isale Craig, tous mes biens, tant immeubles que meubles, sauf les cadeaux qu'il jugera A propos de faire I mes proches comme souvenirs.

Et je d6clare pouvoir signer.

When this was read to her by respondent, she, as he testifies, said:- Si tu pouvais faire quelque chose pour ma famille; mon pere m'a toujours demand4 de penser eux autres autant que la chose serait mon gorit, j'aimerais que tu ferais la mme chose si tu peux. He says that, thereupon, he withdrew and instructed his brother accordingly.

The brother drew then a will which reads as follows:- Outremont, Montrial, Juillet, Par mesure prudence et sans me croire dangereusement malade, prends tout 6v6nement prdsentes dispositions: Je donne et a mon 6poux, Isate Craig, tous mes biens tant immeubles que meubles, sauf les cadeaux qu'il jugera a propos faire a proches, souvenirs.

Suivant les recommendations ddfunt pare, je lui recommande de mnme ne donner ou leguer dits biens A nuls autres qu'aux membres ma famille, et je signe. I omit in each case the attesting clause signed by the witnesses.

I desire only to present the actual operative form of each of these wills. All this took place about half-past ten or eleven o'clock in the morning of the 5th of December.

Why she was not asked to sign this latter will till five o'clock in the afternoon is not, to my mind, at all clearly established beyond suspicion.

It is said, by and on behalf of the respondent, that she slept and only awoke about five o'clock.

It appears, however, that her sister, the appellant, had called about eleven o'clock in the forenoon and stayed until five p.m. Nothing was said to her of these wills or of the purpose that existed relative thereto.

It may be but a coincidence that she slept whilst the sister remained, but I cannot rid my mind of the suspicion that her sister's presence was equally a barrier in the way.

However that may be, the sands of life were meantime ebbing fast, for in forty hours she was dead. The stock of vitality which was able in the morning to discuss the difference between the will first read to her and what it omitted and she would have preferred to have it provide for, had become so low at five o'clock that she could not write her name so as to be legible when she attempted to subscribe the second will and, obviously, could not see the material difference between them, and treated the one as the equivalent the other.

We are asked to believe as conclusive of her capacity to understand that she asked if this one to which she set her mark was the same as read in the morning, and to have her spectacles handed to her.

There is a marked difference between these two wills. And the fact that she did not observe it seems conclusive that she did not apprehend clearly what she was doing or saying.

I am not concerned with any difference in their legal effect. I cannot assume that she was possessed of that legal knowledge and acumen that would have enabled her to decide that they were (if they were)

in law the same.

To the ordinary mind they were as widely different as can be on the point she had called attention to in the morning and requested consideration of. She had forgotten. She had been drugged. She, when aroused from the slumber that induced, clearly had not that grasp of thought to enable her to discover this vast difference in language. That difference ought, but for the condition of mind thus induced, to at least have revived her memory relative to what she had requested. Nay, more, her request, veiled in the language of affection and politeness as quoted above, ought, to my mind, to have been treated by her husband as that of a command, or have, at least, driven him to the straight course of bringing to his wife the adequate assistance in the way of the independent skill of some one to whom she might have given instructions freed from the embarrassment of his presence.

The dying are entitled to such consideration at the hands of those they have loved and cared for. Or if he had even taken the appellant into his confidence and left the sisters to settle the matter and the dying woman had then, as the result of such consideration, persisted in leaving it entirely in his discretion whether she should leave him absolute owner or not, he would have possibly been relieved from the suspicion he must now forever rest under.

He has not removed it so as to comply with the law as laid down in the leading cases of Barry Butlin (1), and Fulton v. Andreto(2).

In the latter case, at foot of page 471 and top page 472, Lord Hatherly uses language to be borne in mind in such cases as this. It is as follows:- "Now," again adopting the language of Lord Hatherly, "how did the respondent discharge this onus in the present case"?

What I have related and suggested answer that he failed.

But, when we find that she left no children, that her property came from her father, that her sister had children surviving, that her father had extracted from her a solemn promise that the property should return ultimately to his family, the hopes and wishes she had expressed to her husband, so illuminated by such facts and read in light of the law applicable to one directing all and so directing it as to make the result enure entirely to his benefit, seem to have been so disregarded that this instrument cannot be called her will.

I think we must that he undoubtedly failed to discharge the onus resting upon him.

There is much that might be said relative to the details of the execution and attestation of this pretended will but, in view of the answer which these broad features of the case present, it seems needless to dwell on such details.

The appeal should be allowed with costs throughout and the judgment of the learned trial judge be restored.

J. concurred with Brodeur J.

J.-This case has given me not a little J trouble and anxiety.

Three questions arise: First: Had the testatrix mental capacity? Second: Was the will propounded by the defendant duly executed ? Third: Does the evidence sufficiently remove the suspicion created by the facts that the instrument in question was prepared under the instructions of the husband of the testatrix, the defendant, who is the sole beneficiary, and its execution was procured by him a suspicion which is augmented by the peculiar circumstances of this case and establish that it expresses the true last will of the testatrix and that she knew and approved of its contents ? Tyrell v. The evidence has satisfied me that the testatrix had testamentary capacity at certain times on the day in question.

McLaughlin. v. Ml.cLellan(2); Martin v. Martin (3) ; Kaulbach v. Archbold (4).

From about noon until after four o'clock she slept most of the * time under the effect of a dose of a quarter of a grain of morphine administered about eleven o'clock. She appears to have been awake and fully conscious from about half-past four until after five o'clock, when the nurse gave her another dose of one-eighth grain morphine to allay her pain. Whether the effect of this latter dose had not so much benumbed her faculties by six o'clock, or shortly after, when the will now propounded was executed, that she was unable to fully appreciate the differences between it and the paper she had lattempted to sign a short time before, is, I think, extremely doubtful. Yet it is essential to the validity of the will propounded by the defendant that he should establish that, at this time, the testatrix was capable J. of thus discriminating between the two wills and of understanding and approving the contents and effect of that to which she finally put her mark.

It is not satisfactorily proven that the formalities prescribed for the execution of a will in the English form were observed. The evidence of nurse Laporte, although in some parts uncertain, in the end seems clear enough that the three witnesses signed this will in the room of the testatrix and in her presence and that it was another will, to which .the testatrix had previously put an illegible signature, which, although then believed to be of no value, was subsequently signed by the same witnesses in another room a peculiar circumstance, if it be the fact, of which there is no real explanation in the evidence.

The witness, Marie-Louise Craig, is most unsatisfactory; and the evidence of the third witness, Dorila Amyot Lessard, while by no means clear, rather goes to shew that it was the signatures to the document now propounded which were affixed by the witnesses in another room and out of the presence of the testatrix. On the whole evidence, perhaps the balance of probability is in favour of the due execution of the will propounded. But it is not satisfactorily proven.

It is upon the third question, however, that the chief difficulty arises.

The suspicion created by the facts that the defendant is the sole and absolute beneficiary under this will, that it was he who gave the instructions for its preparation to his brother, Fernand Craig, who is a lawyer, and that he was present at and procured its execution is greatly increased by the following circumstances, deposed to by himself. testatrix, when the defendant read this instrument to J. her on the morning of the 5th of July (possibly in the presence of nurse Laporte, as was found by the trial judge upon evidence which is very slender, to say the least), expressed a desire that he should do something for her family in conformity with a wish of, if not in fulfilment of a promise made by her to, her father from whom she had received her property. The trial judge finds that she then refused to sign the will as drawn.

As pointed out by the learned Chief Justice of the Court of King's Bench, there is no direct proof of such a refusal.

The evidence, however, warrants the inference that the testatrix took exception to the will in the form in which it was read to her. In order to comply with the wish thus expressed by his wife, the defendant had his brother draft another will in which, after bequeathing her property to her husband, she recommends him not to give or bequeath it to any persons other than members of her family. This will was drawn about noon, but was not presented to the testatrix until after five o'clock in the afternoon, either because she was drowsy from the effect of the dose of morphine given to her about eleven o'clock, because of the presence of visitors in her room, including her sister, the plaintiff, who remained from about eleven o'clock to five o'clock. The testatrix signed this Will, apparently with much difficulty, and at the cost of considerable effort. It was subsequently attested, but, probably, not in her presence. This opinion is expressed by Archambeault C.J. in rendering the judgment of the Court of King's Bench. The signature of the testatrix is said to have been illegible. The brother of the defendant, who had drawn the wills, was not present at the execution of either and was not called as a witness in this case. On seeing the defective sigc 'G. nature, he expressed the opinion that it was worthless and that the will which bore it was invalid. The good faith of this professional opinion may be open to serious doubt.

But I proceed on the assumption that fraud was not intended.

On being told that her signature was insufficient, the testatrix, according to the testimony of the defendant, asked that the first writing of the morning should be brought to her. The defendant and the three witnesses say that he offered to read to her the document which he brought, but that she said it was unnecessary, that he had read it to her and that she knew its contents. She asked for a pen and her spectacles and signed it by making a cross. The witnesses then signed, probably in the room of the testatrix and in her presence. This took place about or shortly after six o'clock in the evening. The testatrix died on the morning of the 7th of July. The will now in question was admitted to probate in common form on the 3rd of August.

In his preliminary examination, although asked generally to tell the circumstances surrounding the preparation and execution of this will, which he propounds, the defendant made no allusion to the preparation or attempted execution of the other will. At the trial, during the early part of his evidence, occupying fourteen pages of the appeal case, he entirely suppressed the fact that another will had been drawn. He gives a manifestly false explanation of the delay in the execution of the will now propounded, which was read to the testatrix in the morning but not signed until the evening.

It is only when pointedly asked whether there were two wills made that, after first pretending to be surprised and not to understand the question, ("je saisis pas la chose,") when pressed he discloses the circumstances which led to the preparation of the second instrument and the facts concerning it.

He was undoubtedly trying to conceal those facts. In a number of particulars some important, some not his evidence at the trial differs from the testimony which he gave on preliminary examination. He is not a frank or candid witness and his conduct in the litigation adds to the very grave suspicion which already surrounded this case.

The will to which the testatrix attempted -to place her signature undoubtedly expressed with approximate accuracy her real testamentary wishes.

It was only because she was told that the illegibility of her signature to that document rendered it worthless that she assented to signing another.

The defendant sought to make it appear that it was the testatrix herself who asked that the document first prepared should be brought to her for signature. The other witnesses, Laporte, Marie-Louise Craig and Lessard, do not corroborate him on this point. His father, speaking of the time when the testatrix had endeavoured to sign the second instrument, says:- Moreover, although the witnesses agree that, when the defendant 'brought in the will now in question, he offered to read it to his wife and she declined to hear it read upon being told that it was the will which had been read to her in the morning, in the evidence of nurse Laporte we find this passage:- There is, no doubt, evidence from which an inference might be drawn that the testatrix knew that she was signing the document which had been read to her in the morning; but it is far from being absolutely clear that she was not confused or that she fully appreciated that it was not to a copy of the second will, which had been read to her shortly before and which she had attempted to sign, that she was asked to make her mark.

The execution of this instrument took place about or shortly after six o'clock nurse Laporte says about twenty minutes - Dorila Amyot Lessard, some few minutes after she had endeavoured to sign the other document.

She had an injection of one-eighth grain of morphine about five o'clock. Did she appreciate the difference between the two instruments when asked to make her mark to that now propounded because her attempted signature to the other was illegible ?

Did she, consciously and fully realizing what she was doing, abandon the wish she had expressed in the morning and the will giving effect to that wish, with which she had announced her satisfaction when it had been read to her some fifteen or twenty minutes before ? Whether benumbed faculties afford the true explanation of her signing at six o'clock a will to which she had taken exception at noon, or whether she accepted the document presented to her because she was fatigued and tired of the whole affair and anxious to be done with as her repeated expression "d6pchez vous" would indicate, or, perhaps, feared that she might not con- J tinue in a fit state to make a will long enough to have another prepared more exactly in accord with her wishes, is by no means clear. Whatever the explanation, she put her mark to an instrument which did not fully express her wishes not of her own initiative, but upon this document being presented to her for signature by her husband at the suggestion of his brother, Fernand Craig, who undoubtedly could have given evidence that would be very valuable upon material points in this case. He was not called. defendant, on whom lay the burden of proof, must bear the consequences of failure to call him.

Whatever the true facts may be, no adequate reason is given for the testatrix relinquishing her desire to have her father's wish carried out and the evidence is by no means convincing that she did consciously and deliberately abandon her intention to give effect to that wish and decide of her own volition to make the will in which it is ignored.

The learned trial judge found against the will propounded on the ground that its execution was invalid because procured by a mistaken representation of law, viz., that the imperfection of the signature to the.other will rendered it valueless. The court of appeal held that this mistake did not avoid the later will. Apparently proceeding on the footing that the burden proof was on the plaintiff and that she had failed to prove the allegations of her declaration, the appellate court held that the will attacked contained the last wishes of the testatrix; that she was of sound mind at the time of its execution; and that this will was made in conformity with the formalities prescribed by law. The judgment of the Superior Court was reversed and the action dismissed. With great respect I think there was error in charging the plaintiff with the burden of proving that the formalities of execution were not observed and, more especially, that the will propounded by the defendant did not really express the last wishes of the testatrix. Probate in common form of this will having been granted, the plaintiff was, no doubt, obliged to begin. But, so soon as it appeared that the will had been procured by the defendant who was the sole beneficiary, the burden of proof shifted. Tyrell v. Painton ; Brown v. Fisher(2) ; Fulton v. Andreu (3) ; St. George's Society of Montreal v. Nichols(4) art. 858 C.C.

Something 'has been said of alleged intrinsic evidence afforded by the documents themselves that the will to which the testatrix finally affixed her mark was not the document read to her in the morning. But, as this aspect of the case does not appear to have been gone into at the trial, I pass no opinion and rest nothing upon it.

J.

The appeal should be allowed with costs in this court and in the court of appeal, and the judgment of the Superior Court should be restored.

J.-II s'agit du testament de Madame Isaie Craig, n6e Flore Lamoureux, dont on conteste la validith.

Ce testament qui a 6t fait suivant la forme driv6e de la loi d'Angleterre, est dat6 a Montr6al le 5 jaillet, 1911. Il est sign4 d'une croix et porte l'attestation de trois personnes du sexe f~minin, savoir, Madamie Dorilla Amiot Lessard, une amie de la testatrice, Mlle. Marie-Louise Craig, une cousine du l6gataire universel, et Mlle. Anna-Maria Laporte, la gardemalade de la testatrice.

Par ce testament, elle 14gue tous ses biens a son mari dans les termes suivants:- A L'attestation des t6moins se lit comme suit:- A Comme il a kt produit dans la cause, an cours du prochs, un autre testament dont j'aurai h parler plus loin, je d6signerai celui dont je viens de donner le texte comme "le testament sous croix" ou le testament P.

La testatrice est d~c~d~e le surlendemain, le 7 juillet, 1911.

Le 16gataire, qui est le d~fendeur et intim6 en la pr6sente cause, a, le 2 aofit, 1911, pr6sent an protonotaire une requ~te pour v6rification de ce testament sous croix; et a produit an soutien de sa requ~te davit du t6moin, Mle. Marie-Louise Craig, sa cousine, qui a d6clar6 que:- Les h6ritiers de la difunte n'avaient pas 6t6 appel6s A cette v6rification qui s'est faite ex parte et le protonotaire a alors d~clar6 le testament dftment prouve.

Le 21 aofit, 1911, la prbsente action a t institude par la swur de la testatrice, 1'une de ses h6riti'res, pour faire annuler ce testament en allguant en substance que ce testament 4tait le fruit de 1'erreur et du dol, qu'il y avait eu suggestion et captation, qu'il ne repr6sentait pas la volont6 de la testatrice et que les formalitbs essentielles n'avaient pas td remplies.

J

Le d~fendeur a comparu par le ministre de Favocat Craig, son frare, celui-l m~me qui avait r6dig6 les deux ou trois projets de testament en question h cette date du 5 juillet, 1911. Il y a eu cependant substitution de procureur et M. Pavocat Craig a cessa d'occuper comme avocat du d~fendeur.

La cour sup6rieure, pr~sid~e par 1'honorable juge Bruneau, a annul6 le testament P. en disant qu'il avait 6t6 sign6 par erreur.

La cour d'appel a renvers6 le jugement de la cour sup6rieure et a maintenu le testament.

La demanderesse, par le present appel, nous demande de consid6rer la validit6 du testament et de Pannuler.

Il s'agit surtout d'apprcier la preuve qui a 6t6 faite; car la diff6rence d'opinion entre les deux cours inf6rieures r6sulte de leur interpr6tation des faits. Il y a cependant la question de 'onus probandi qui se prbsente aussi.

Le demandeur a examin6 les trois t6moins du testament et le d6fendeur. Je suis d'opinion que la preuve qu'il a faite est suffisante pour faire mettre de ct6 le testament.

A tout 6v6nement, cette preuve 6tait suffisante pour faire disparaitre la prbsomption qui r~sultait de la v6rification en faveur du testament.

L'onus probandi retombait sur le d6fendeur.

Ce dernier aurait d-i alors faire entendre son frbre, Pavocat qui a ridig6 ce testament et qui aurait pu 6clairer la justice sur les incidents de cette journ6 du juillet, 1911. Avant de diss~quer cette preuve, il convient que je rappelle bri~vement des faits qui me paraissent admis par les deux parties et au sujet desquels la preuve offre une certitude assez parfaite.

et Mde. Craig, le 16gataire et la testatrice, M'

4taient inariks depuis plusieurs anues et n'avaient pas d'enfants. Us 6taient s6pards de biens.

Le 5 dicembre, 1904, le phre de Madame Craig, Olivier Lamoureux, lui aurait fait donation d'une somme de $7,000.

lui aurait fait promettre plus tard, et mime jurer sur les 6vangiles, de donner le capital de ses biens aux membres de sa famille. Madame Craig tait d'une saut6 delicate, souffrant de gastrite depuis plusieurs anndes. Le 3 juillet, 1911, elle a 6t6 oblig6e de prendre le lit. Les m~decins out 6t6 et son eas paraissant d(sespr6, une gardemalade fut appelke a son chevft.

Elle demeurait depuis longtemps chez son beau-pbre avec son mari et les deux frbres de ce dernier.

Parmi ces frbres se trouvait I'avocat Fernand Craig.

Le juillet au matin, on d6cida de faire venir le pr~tre pour lui administrer les sacrements. Et alors le phre Craig a demand6 A son fils, le mari de la malade, si elle avait fait un testament. Sur rbponse negative et sur le refus du mari d'aborder ee sujet avec sa femme, le phre a attendu larriv6e du pritre; et, avant que ce dernier entrat dans la maison, il lui a dit de sugg6rer a la malade de faire un testament. Le cur6 s'est charg6 du message; et aprbs son depart la mourante aurait demand6 h la garde-malade de faire venir son mari h qui elle aurait exprim le d&sir de faire son testament.

Nous n'avons quant A ses instructions que le t6moignage du mari, le 16gataire, car la garde-malade n'6tait pas rest6e dans la chambre.

Au lieu de faire venir un notaire, il crut qu'il 6tait pr~f6rable de faire r6diger le testament par Favocat Fernand Craig, son frbre, qui 6tait alors dans la maison.

Ce dernier aurait 6videmment prdpar6 un testament par lequel le mari 6tait institu6 l6gataire universel en jouissance et en proprit.

Ce projet de testament ainsi r6dig6 aurait communiqu6 par le mari a sa femme. Nous ne savons ce qui s'est alors pass6 que par le t6moignage du mari. Il est sur ce point aussi bien que sur 'bien d'autres, si pen satisfaisant, et mime si contradictoire, que je ne puis pas Faccepter sans corroboration.

A tout 6v~nement, ce testament n'a pas 6t6 agr& able A la femme et elle a dfi alors lui rappeler la promesse on le serment qu'elle avait fait h son phre et elle a dfi sugg6rer de faire un autre testament par lequel elle 1guerait ses biens en jouissance a son mari et en nue propri6t6 aux membres de sa famille, puisque Pavocat Fernand s'est mis h PoEuvre pour ridiger un nouveau testament par lequel, aprs .avoir 16gu6 ses biens a son mari, elle ajoutait:- A On ne sait pas pourquoi ce testament ne fut pas alors sign6 de suite. Sur ce point il y a deux versions 6galement probables. La premibre, c'est que la malade s'est endormie on qu'elle 6tait trop faible et qu'on n'a pas voulu la d~ranger. La seconde, c'est que Farriv6e de la demanderesse, vers cette heure-1A, a gAnd le d6fendeur, qui n'a pas voulu qu'il ffit question du testament en pr6sence de la sceur de la testatrice. Je dois dire ici que depuis une couple de jours on faisait prendre h la malade de la morphine pour apaiser ses douleurs qui, au t~moignage de tout le monde, 6taient des plus atroces. Les mbdecins experts qui out & examines sont d'opinion que ce traitement -_ avait pour effet d'amoindrir ses faculths intellectuelles, que son cerveau ne pouvait pas 6tre aussi clair et aussi lucide et que la morphine diminuait la force de sa volont6.

Dans le cours de 1'aprbs-midi, apris le d6part de la stur, le d6fendeur s'est mis en frais de faire signer ce second testament. Il 1'aurait In en presence des trois t6moins, Madame Lessard, Mle. Craig et Mle. Laporte.

La testatrice aurait alors demand6 ses lunettes et aurait griffond6 sa signature.

Le juge instructeur d~clare que les t6moins auraient de suite, en sa presence, sign6 iattestation. A Parrive la maison de Pavocat Fernand Craig, il prit connaissance de la signature de MIde. Craig et, ayant trouv6 qu'elle 6tait illisible, i1 aurait alors dit en pr~sence de son pere qui nous le rapporte:- Et alors le mari serait revenu dans la chambre avec un autre projet de testament. On ne le lui aurait pas lu. Elle aurait fait sa marque d'une croix. Ce testament est celui qui est en litige et qui, comme je Fai dit plus haut, a t0 annuld par la cour sup6rieure, mais maintenu par la cour d'appel.

Comme le testament portant la signature plus ou moins lisible de la testatrice devra tre mentionn6 assez souvent au cours de ce jugement, je vais le designer comme le testament de jouissance, on le testament P. 2.

Nous sommes en presence de deux testaments bien diff0rents.

Dans Fun elle donne tous ses biens a son sans restriction. Dans Pautre, elle lui recom- J. mande de ne 1guer ou donner ces biens qu'aux membres de sa famille. Sons d6cider de la port6e exacte de ces deux testaments, mais pour simplifier les faits en litige, je dirai que dans le premier elle institue son mari 16gataire en jouissance et en propri6t6 tandis que dans le second il n'est que le 14gaitaire en usufruit, la famille de la testatrice devant avoir la. nue proprit6.

Quelles 6taient les intentions de la testatrice avant de tester ?

Nous avons la promesse formelle qu'elle a faite A son pore de ne pas laisser sortir les biens de sa famille. Ce serment qu'elle avait donn6, elle s'en est 6videmment rappel6, puisqu'elle a sugg6r6 qu'on en fasse mention dans le testament P. 2. Elle avait d'ailleurs d6clar6 h ses samurs, avec que elle 6tait dans les relations les plus intimes, que son mari aurait la jouissance et que ses neveux auraient la nue propridt6 de ses biens.

Nous avons bien, d'un autre ct6, la declaration du pire Craig qu'elle lui aurait dit h plusieurs reprises que tout ce qu'elle avait, retournerait h son mari. Mais la cour sup~rieure, en presence de ces t6moignages contradictoires a accept6 la version des premiers t6moins en disant: "qu'il est certain d'apr&s la preuve que le testament exhibit P. 2 celui consid&6 comme portant une signature illisible, contient et exprime exactement la volont6 et Fintention de P'6pouse du d&fendeur dans la disposition de ses biens."

Et la cour d'appel ne parait pas attacher au t6moignage du pbre Craig plus d'importance que la cour sup6rieure.

Doiic nous pouvons dire que 1'intention de la testatrice 6tait de disposer de ses biens de manibre ) ce qu'ils ne sortent pas en d6finitive de sa famille. Ce sentiment est d'ailleurs conforme a ce qui se fait d'ordinaire dans les familles canadiennes-frangaises.

On y est toujours soucleux de conserver les biens dans une famille.

Nous en avons d'ailleurs la preuve 6vidente dans le principe des substitutions qui, quoique aboli en France, a Ct6 conserv6 cependant dans la province de Quebec.

Cette intention de la testatrice de laisser ses biens a sa famille, non seulement elle I'avait manifest6e avant de tomber dangereusement malade, mais elle la 6videmment d6clar6 a son mari quand il est venu lui lire le premier projet de testament.

Ce projet, suivant la version du mari, et i est le seul pour nous dire ce qu'il s'est pass6, ne donnait rien a sa famille. Ele lui a rappel6 les recommandations de son phre, et c'est alors que le frbre du mari,

'avocat Craig, a pr6par6 un nouveau testament, Flexhibit P. 2, qui contenait le legs de nue propri6t6 en faveur de la famille de la testatrice.

Ce testament aurait 6t6 lu en presence des t6moins. La testatrice aurait paru Pavoir bien compris et elle y aurait appos6 sa signature avec beaucoup de difficult6, c'est vrai, ce qui montre son grand 6tat de faiblesse. Mais quand on montre cette signature h lavocat A son retour, il dit:- Le mari informe sa femme qu'il faut recommencer parce que la signature n'est pas correcte; et alors on substitue au testament P. 2, c'est h dire an testament le mari n'6tait 16gataire qu'en usufruit, un autre testament, l'exhibit P. 1, oif il est 16gataire en usufruit et propri6t6.

Comment cela s'est-il fait ? Comme c'est le fait le plus important dans la cause, il est bien important de diss6quer soigneusement la preuve sur ce point. C'est ce que je vais faire.

II faut d'abord dire que les trois femmes qui out attest6 ce testament, ont, en g6n6ral, donn6 leur t~moignage avec pen de clart6. Elles paraissent bien de bonne foi, surtout Madame Lessard et Mle. Laporte, la garde-malade.

Quant h l'autre, Ml1e. M.-L. Craig, elle 6tait tellement 6nerv~e qu'on a 6t6 oblig6 de suspendre son t6moignage et de remettre la cause h une date ult6rieure.

Elle parait bien dispos6e faveur du d6fendeur.

On lui a demand6 si elle 6tait en amour avec lui et la question n'a pas t permise. Mais il est 6tabli que le ddfendeur allait la voir tons les jours, c'6tait sa cousine, c'est vrai. Et devant cette cour il a 6t6 affirm6 et non contredit de 1autre c~th, qu'elle 6tait maintenant maride an ddfendeur.

La demanderesse appelante pretend que la testatrice, en signant de sa croix 1'exhibit P. croyait signer un testament semblable h celui qu'elle avait essay6 de signer quelques minutes avant.

Le d6fendeur intim6, an contraire, pr6tend que la testatrice a demand6 de changer ses dernibres volont6s et qu'elle ne voulait pas donner ses biens en propri6t6 h sa famille.

Pour arriver h r~ussir, la d6fendeur doit d&montrer formellement qu'il y a eu un changement d'opinion chez la testatrice. Autrement il devra succomber dans ses pr6tentions. Yoyons la preuve. D'abord, prenons Mle. Laporte, la garde-malade.

Il y a dans son t6moignage beaucoup de confusion et d'incertitude. Elle est de la meilleure foi du monde, j'en suis convaincu; mais elle n'est pas bris~e aux affaires, elle a, comme les autres thnoins du testament, kt laiss~e dans l'ignorance de ce qui s'6tait pass6 le matin entre le mari et la femme lorsque celleci a demand6 de faire un testament et a manifest6 ses intentions.

Ce qui a donn6 lieu aussi &L beaucoup de confusion,

('est que pour les avocats le premier testament, c'est celui qui avait kt pr6pard le matin, c'est A dire le testament donnant tout sans restriction; tandis que pour les t6moins, le premier testament est celui qu'elles ont sign6 le premier, &est A dire 1'exhibit

P. 2, on le testament avec signature illisible.

Voici ce que dit Ml1e. Laporte. On lui demande:

Par ltre.

Par Mtre. J. A. Hurteau:- Elle a la bien identifi6 les testaments.

On interroge plus loin, pour savoir si le testament d6pos6 devant la cour, c'est A dire le testament vbrifi6, a 6t6 In. Voici le texte de sa deposition A ce sujet:- Le testament qui est devant la cour, vous dites qu'il a 6t6 I par qui ?

R. Par monsieur Isaie Craig.

Brodeur J.

Q. En prdsence des trois t6moins ?

monsieur.

Par Mtre. J.

R. Ils sont tous retirds pour aller souper; moi, je suis rest~e seule avec elle dans la chambre.

Cette d6claration est absolument inexacte. Ce testament d6pos6 devant la cour n'a pas t lu. La testatrice a declar6 que ce n'6tait pas n6cessaire. n'y a eu qu'un testament de In; c'est 1'exhibit P. 2, mais non pas le testament v6rifi6, on celui devant la cour.

On l'interroge encore sur cette lecture et elle n'est pas aussi positive. Voici d'ailleurs cette partie de son t6moignage:- Q. Savez-vous qu'est-ce que Monsieur Craig a lu ?

R. Il a lu un papier dapres lequel son 4pouse lui donnait tout qu'elle poss6dait.

Savez-vous quel papier ? Est-ce celui-la ? Etes-vous capable jurer que c'est celui-la ou le second testament ?

R. Je crois que c'est celui-ci, celui qui est ddpos6.

Vous le croyez ?

R. Qui, monsieur.

Etes-vous capable de le jurer ?

R. Je ne me rappelle pas assez, mais je crois que c'est celui-ci. On lui fait dire la diff6rence qu'il y avait entre les deux testaments et, en parlant du testament par lequel la testatrice d6sirait que ses biens iraient a sa famille, on lui demande:testament a

In A la malade ?

Comme on le voit, elle s'est contradite; mais elle 6tait de bonne foi; c'est 6vident.

L'honorable juge-en-chef de la cour d'appel dclare que la testatrice, apris avoir sign6 le testament P. 2 et aprs avoir 6t inform6 qu'il 6tait nul, demanda d'apporter le premier projet testament, celui qui avait Brodeur J. t pr6pare dans 1'avant-midi.

Et il se base sur le timoignage de 111le. Laporte et de Mile. Craig.

Aille. Laporte est loin d'Ctre positive. Voici d'ailleurs ce qu'elle dit, quand on lui en parle pour la premidre fois, apr~s qu'on lui efit fait rapporter ce qui s'6tait pass6 au sujet du testament P. 2.

Qu'est-ce qui s'est passe, qu'est-ce qui s'est

R. a rapport6 papier vingt minutes, une demi-heure apres, peut-tre pas tout fait autant, on est arriv6 avec et elle a demandg si c'dtait bien le m~me, on lui a dit: "Oui, je te l'ai lu"

elle a mis sa croix.

Par ltre. Cinq-Mars:- Q. Vous avez dit tout l'heure, si j'ai bien compris, que Madame

Craig avait demand6 son mari si c'6tait le mome testament qu'elle avait sign6 dans l'apras-midi qu'on voulait lui faire marquer de croix ?

R. Non, si c'Atait bien qu'on lui avait lu.

Q. Si c'6tait qu'on lui avait

Voulez-vous dire qu'en parlant cela, madame Craig voulait mentionner le testament qu'elle avait sign6 d'une maniare illisible

Ou du testament qui est produit en cette cause ?

R. Moi, je veux parler celui-ci, celui qui est produit en cour.

Est-ce que dans le temps le testament qui est devant vous, lui avait 4t4 In ?

Par ltre. J.

Q. Avez-vous vu Pautre document on testament sur lequel vous avez dit que la testatrice avait mis une signature illisible ?

Q. L'avez-vous In ?

disait testament ?

R. Exactement la mame chose, except6 qu'il avait un d6sir d'exprim6.

Quel d6sir ?

Brodeur J.

ses biens iraient 11 sa famille.

Que ses biens iraient sa famille ?

R. Oui, un ddsir.

qu'on voudrait savoir de vous, mademoiselle Laporte, quand on est venu avec vous avec le testament qu'elle a sign6 croix, et qu'elle a demand6 si s'6tait le testament qu'on lui avait lu, est-ce testament qui est produit maintenant devant la cour dont parlait la malade ?

R. Celui qui est avee la croix.

Celui qui est maintenant devant la cour ?

Par Mtre. J. A. Desearries, C.R., conseil de la Q. Voulez-vons dire qu'd moment-IA on pr4sentait A la malade testament qui est maintenant devant la cour et la malade demand4: "Est-ce le testament qu'on m'a lu

Quand elle disait cela, voulait-elle parler du testament qui maintenant devant la cour ? de 1'autre testament dont vous avez parl6 vous-meme ? Quand elle a dit "est-ce le testament qu'on m'a lu" voulait-elle parler, quand elle disait cela, voulait-elle mentionner L'autre testament bien celui-ci ?

R. Je crois que c'est celui-ci ?

Vous croyez que c'est celui-ci ?

Quand elle parlait la sorte, voulait-elle parler du testament dans lequel un d4sir 6tait exprim6 que ses biens iraient A sa famille 7 R. Non, monsieur.

Ele ne voulait pas parler ?

R. Non, monsieur.

Pourquoi dites-vous cela ?

R. Parce qu'on nous a li la premiere partie du testament qui 4tait, si je me rappelle bien, la mdme chose que celui-ci et le dtsir a rapporld.

Sur le testament ?

R. Oui, sur celui qui avait une signature illisible.

Par 31tre. J.

Trouve-t-on dans cette deposition i'intention formelle de la testatrice de changer son testament ? Non. Suivant Mle. Laporte, elle aurait demand6: "Est-ce le testament qu'on m'a lu ? " Le mari a rpondu: "Oui, je te l'ai In."

La testatrice devait supposer que c'6tait celui qu'on venait de lui lire, c'est & dire, 1'exhibit P. 2, celni elle faisait certains legs A sa famille.

Maintenant Mle. Laporte suppose cependant qu'il peut s'agir du testament pr~par6 le premier, le matin. Ce n'est qu'une supposition de sa part; mais nullement bas6e sur les propres termes de la testatrice. Et quand on la presse h ce sujet, elle finit par cette phrase incomprehensible:- Je suis incapable, avec une preuve comme celle-1, de dire avec la cour d'appel que cette testatrice a chang6 d'id6e et que le testament sous croix repr6sente sa volont6. D'ailleurs, on demande A Mile. Laporte:- Cette r6ponse catbgorique, suivant moi, r~gle le point.

Mile. Craig, la cousine du d6fendeur, est 1'autre Brodeur J t6moin sur lequel la cour d'appel se base pour d~clarer qu'il y a changement d'id6e chez la testatrice. Son t6moignage cependant u'est pas beaucoup plus clair que celui de Mle, Laporte.

Elle 6tait tellement 6nerv6e qu'on a 6t0 oblig6 de suspendre les proc6dures et d'ajourner la cause pour lui donner l'avantage de se remettre.

Que dit-elle ?

Elle commence sa d6position par ces d6clarationsci qui ne sont gubre compr~hensibles.

a-t-il eu seulement un testament ?

R. C'est A dire qu'il en a eu deux.

Q. Voulez-vous expliquer la chose ?

R. Il a eu un qu'elle a sign6, mais la signature 4tait illisible. Est-ce le premier qu'elle a sign6 ?

R. C'est le deuxiOme.

Celui dont la signature 6tait illisible, c'4tait deuxiome R. monsieur.

Q. Vous tes bien positive que c'est deuxiame ?

R. Autant que peux me rappeler, vous savez dans occasions- IA.

Expliquez il la cour s'est pass- afin que je sache par vous mome comment les choses sont pass6es ?

R. Quand je suis arrivde, monsieur Craig, quelques minutes apres, m'a demand6 de lire un papier que j'ai lu, il m'a demand6 si je voulais signer. Madame Craig ne pas sign6, elle fait sa croix sur testament, et c'est plus tard qu'on sigad, c'est-a-dire qu'on a sign4 apres elle, elle avait sign6 un testament dont la signature 6tait illisible.

Avant ou apres

R. autant que je peux me rappeler, il semble. Q. Pourquoi aurait-elle sign6 un second testament; pouvez-vous dire A la cour ?

R. Moi, je ne le puis pas,

Q. Dites que vous savez ?

R. La signature n'stait pas beaucoup comprdhensible.

Q. C'est pour cela quelle aurait sign6 un deuxiome testament, le premier n'6tait pas compr4hensible ?

R. Oui, d'apres

D'apres vous ?

R. monsieur.

Vous venez dire que le testament dont Ia signature n'4tait pas comprdhensible avait sign6 le deuxiame.

Vous venez dire cela ?

Brodeur R. Vous m'embrouillez tellement que ne puis me le rappeler. Comment est-ce que je vous embrouille

R. Je no puis pas vous r4pondre.

Q. Pers6vdrez-vous A dire que le testament sur lequel on dit que Ia testatrice a mis une signature illisible a fait le deuxiame R. Je ne puis pas le dire.

Pourquoi ?

R. Parce que suis malade.

La deposition du t6moin est ajourn~e h onze jours et MIlle. Craig, qui dans 1'intervalle avait eu les visites presq ue quotidiennes du ddfendeur, reapparut et, nous relevons ce qui suit:- Oui, comment il fait a chang6 testament ? R. Elle a signd un papier.

Q. Oi ?

R. Dans sa chambre, elle a signd un papier, Ia signature 4tait illisible; alors on a pens6 que n'6tait pas bon et on a rapports un autre que son mari lui a demand6 pour lui lire et elle a dit: "Si c'est celui ce matin, je n'ai pas besoin, je le sais," elle a sign6 d'une croix, et aprts l'avoir lu je signd.

Jurez-vous qu'elle a prononc6 mots-lA, "celui qui 04 lu matin"?

R. Oui, je jure.

Plus loin on lui demande:- Qu'est-ce qu'on a dit a madame Craig pour lui faire signer Pautre testament, vu qu'elle venait d'en signer un ?

R. lui a dit que Ia signature 4tait illisible je crois que c'est cela qu'on lui a dit; ne me le rappelle pas au juste, vous savez cette j'4tais si impressionde la voir malade que ne pouvais presque pas rester

Ofl est Ia preuve 1h que la testatrice ait chang6 d'id6e?

Serait-ce dans cette phrase:- Si c'est celui matin, n'ai pas besoin. sais ? Mais elle n'a jamais demand6 d'apporter celui du matin.

D'ailleurs ces mots "si c'est celui du matin," on ne les retrouve pas dans la bouche de Mile. Laporte et encore moins dans celle de Mde. Lessard.

D'ailleurs, Mile. Craig nous dit elle-m~me qu'elle n'a jamais entendu madame Craig dire cette journ~e i1 qu'elle voulait donner ses biens h son mari. Elle nous dit aussi, Mle. Craig, que la testatrice n'a pas voulu entendre la lecture du second testament parce que cela la fatiguait trop.

Madame Lessard nous dit bien franchement qu'elle a toujours cru que les deux testaments comportaient la mime chose, c'est a dire, jouissance au mari et propri6t6 h la famille de la testatrice.

Ce t6moin aussi se mile quant h P'ex~cution des testaments et elle nous dit tant6t que c'est le testament P. 1 qui a sign6 le premier et plus tard elle se reprend et dit que c'est celui P. 2.

Elle est certainement de bonne foi.

Maintenant quant h la phrase qui aurait 6t6 dite par la malade quand on lui a apportk le testament P. voici ce qu'elle dit

Il n'est pas ia question. de testament du matin, comme le dit Mile. Craig.

Voila ce que nous disent les t~moins du testament. Je ne puis arriver a d'autres conclusions que la testatrice en signant de sa croix le testament attaqu6 a cru signer un document semblable a celui qu'elle avait sign6 quelques minutes auparavant. Ces d~positions ne sauraient justifier un tribunal de d6clarer qu'elle voulait donner ses biens A son mari seul.

Cette substitution s'est faite suivant le d6sir de I'avocat Fernand Craig qui d6clarait en pr4sence de son phre, apris avoir vu le testament P. 2 portant la signature illisible:- Et alors on a substitu6 un testament h Fautre.

Ces deux testaments 6taient bien diff rents et sans entrer dans les m6rites de la dissertation qui a 6t faite, je me contenterai de citer le jugement que nous avons rendu dans la cause de Shearer v. Hogg (1), pour d6montrer que la recommandation d'un testateur peut engendrer des obligations.

Je pourrals aussi sur ce point citer: Baudry Lacantinerie, vol. X., No. 1836; Coin Delisle, sur 1'art. 967,

No. 4; Laurent, vol. XIII., No. 480; Fuzier Herman,

Repertoire, vo. "Testaments," No. 68; Demolombe, vol.

XXI., No. 51; Zacharie, Aubry et Rau, vol. V., p. 492.

Je suis d'opinion qu'il n'est pas prouv6 si le testament attaqu6 a t sign6 par les temoins en presence de la testatrice.

La preuve sur ce point n'est pas non plus trbs satisfaisante. Les trois femmes ne sont gubre bien positives. II est un fait bien certain, c'est que Fun de ces testaments a t sign4 dans la chambre de la malade et I'autre a 6t6 sign6 dans la chambre de 1'avocat, hors de la pr6sence de la testatrice.

I aurait t6 int~ressant de connaitre h ce sujet la Brodeur J version de l'avocat. C'est bien malheureux qu'il n'ait pas 6t6 entendu comme tkmoin.

Nous devons au sujet de ce testament fait suivant la forme anglaise appliquer les rigles du droit anglais. C'est ce qui a t6 d6cid6 par le Conseil Priv4 dans la cause c616bre de Migneault v. Ml1alo (1).

The law which introduced into Canada the English law as to wills must be considered as having introduced it with all its incidents, and, therefore, with the admissibility of oral evidence. Dans un cas aussi pen clair que celui qui nous occupe, c'4tait le devoir du d6fendeur de prouver luimime que le testament 6tait valide. Cette r~gle par laquelle le fardeau de la preuve retombe dans des circonstances comme celle-ci sur le 16gataire, a 6t6 6nonc6e par Lord Hatherly dans la cause de Barry v. Butlin(2) :- There is one rule which has always been laid down the courts having to deal with wills and that is that a person who is instrumental in the framing of a will and who obtains a bounty that will, is placed in a different position from other ordinary legatees who are not called upon to substantiate the truth and honesty the transaction as regards their legacies.

It is enough in their case that the will was read over to the testator and that he was sound mind and memory and capable of comprehending it.

But there is a further onus upon those who take for their benefit after having been instrumental in preparing or obtaining a will.

They have thrown upon themselves the onus of shewing the righteousness of the transaction.

Et cette cour a 6nonc6 le mime principe dans la cause de Mayrand v. Dussault (3), en d6cidant:- L.C. Jur. 288.

Moo. P.C. 480.

Can. S.C.R. 460.

II s'agissait dans cette cause de Dussault d'un testament authentique fait dans la province de Qu6bec. Le juge Tait dans la cause de St. George's Society of Montreal v. Kichols(1), a aussi rejet6 le fardeau de la preuve sur le 16gataire qui avait pr~par6 le testament.

C'est une rigle juste et equitable que nous devons appliquer dans cette cause.

Il y avait un t~moin bien important qui aurait pu nous donner une foule de renseignements sur la confection de ces testaments.

C'est Pavocat qui les a r6digbs.

aurait pu nous dire pourquoi le testament P. 1 se termine par les mots: "Et je declare ne pouvoir signer" et pourquoi le testament qui aurait 6t6 &crit quelques minutes aprbs se termine par les mots: "Et je signe."

II aurait pu nous dire comment il se fait que certains mots au bas de Pattestation paraissent y avoir 6t6 ins~r~s aprs que les t6moins eussent sign& J'aurais voulu lui entendre r6pfter les instructions qu'il a reques de son frdre pour pr6parer deux on trois projets de testament et comment ii en est venu a faire signer Pun de ces projets dans sa chambre. 'Tons ces faits et bien d'autres, auraient clair6 la justice. Mais le d6fendeur n'a pas jug6 h propos de le faire entendre.

II aurait pu 6galement nous dire lequel des deux testaments a t sign6 par 1es t6moins dans - sa chambre, la preuve de ces pauvres femmes est si peu satisfaisante sous ce rapport.

L'ontus devait pour une autre raison retomber sur le d6fendeur.

Dans 1'affidavit qu'il a produit an soutien de sa requte pour v6rification, ii y est d6clar6 par Mle. Craig que

Quand elle est en presence du juge h P'enqute en cette cause, on lui demande:- Oi est la r~quisition de la testatrice ?

Les deux autres t6moins Laporte et Mde. Lessard, d~clarent 6galement que la demande de signer leur a 6tk faite par le mari. Le femme ne leur a jamais demand&.

En r~sum6, je trouve, comme la cour sup6rieure, que le testament attaqu6 ne repr6sente pas la volont6 de la testatrice. Elle voulait 6videmment conserver ses biens dans sa famille et cette disposition ne s'y trouve pas.

Je suis 6galement d'opinion avec P'honorable juge Bruneau que le testament P. 2 exprimait mieux les volont6s de la testatrice. Il est nul, dit la cour d'appel, parce qu'il n'a kt sign par les t6moins.

C'est possible.

Mais tant pis pour le d6fendeur. Pourquoi au lieu de se cacher comme il 'a fait, n'a-t-il pas fait ce testament au grand jour en presence d'un notaire qu'il lui aurait t6 si facile d'avoir dans une grande ville comme Montrial.

Je suis d'opinion que le d6fendeur n'a pas fait la preuve qu'il devait faire et que le testament n'ayant pas 6t6 fait suivant les exigences de Particle 851 du

Code Civil, il est aux terines de Particle 855 du mime code nul.

L'appel doit 6tre maintenu avec d6pens de cette cour et des cours inf~rieures et les conclusions du jugement de la cour sup6rieure d6clarant le testament P.

nul doivent 6tre confirm~es.

Appeal allowed with costs.