-Nov.
.
DORCHESTER (DEFENDANTS) .
AND
*Feb.
HESIODE ROY (PLAINTIFF) .........
.RESPONDENT. APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH, APPEAL SIDE, PROVINCE OF QUEBEC.
Per Idington and Anglin. JJ.-As it was apparent that the defendants could operate their works in such a manner as to avoid, diminish, the inconveniences occasioned thereby, it would not proper, in such an action, to include possible future losses in assessing the damages to given as compensation for the injuries complained of. Montreal Street Railway Co. Boudreau Can. S.C.R. 329);
Chanbly Manufacturing Co. Willett (34 Can. S.C.R. 502); and Backhouse v. Bonomi I.L. Cas. 503), referred to.
Davies, Idington, Duff, Anglin and Brodeur JJ. Bench, appeal side(1), which varied the judgment of McCorkill J., in the Superior Court for the District of Quebec (2), by increasing the damages awarded to the plaintiff.
The plaintiff was the owner of a mill driven by water-power, on the River Etchemin, near the site of which the company, defendants, erected a dam in connection with a power-house which they were constructing on the same stream a short distance below the plaintiff's mill.
The dam, was of a permanent character and had the effect of penning back the water, raising its level and flooding the tail-race of plaintiff's mill to such an extent that his mill-wheels were drowned. Another effect of the dam was to make still water where previously there had been a rapid, that ice formed in the pond so created and, when it came out in freshets, the ice carried away the plaintiff's mill. For all these injuries the plaintiff sued to recover $6,000 damages and, at the trial, McCorkill J. assessed the damages at $1,070, being for the actual losses incurred up to the time of action, less $110 for some of the machinery which had been saved, and recourse was reserved to the plaintiff to bring further actions for any damages happening subsequently. Both parties appealed and, by the judgment now appealed from, the Court of King's Bench dismissed the appeal taken by the company and allowed that of the plaintiff by increasing his damages to $3,685 in consideration of the diminished value of the plaintiff's water-power and adjoining property.
The questions in issue on the present appeal are stated in the judgments now reported.
1. A. Cannon K.C. for the appellants.
Eusibe Belleau K.O. for the respondent.
J.-The trial judge did not grant damages once for all 'because he felt himself concluded from doing so by the decision of this court in Gale v. Bureau(1). I do not think, however, that that case decided that point absolutely.
There are obviously many cases in which future damages may or may not arise and which may or may not be foreseen or capable of being estimated at the time action is brought or proceedings begun under the statute to fix them. In all such cases recourse may be reserved for future damages. But with respect to damages which have been incurred and which are capable of being estimated when action is brought or proceedings taken under the statute to estimate them I see no reason whatever why they should not be estimated and determined. With respect to the value of the water-power of the plaintiff which the trial judge did not include in his judgment, because he thought it was a subject-matter for future damages which the authorities prohibited him from considering, I cannot see why such value may not now be estimated as well as later.
It is found as a fact by both courts that the plaintiff's mill has been destroyed and his water-power had ceased to be a water-power as such it has been destroyed. The defendant does not plead that the dam erected by him which caused this destruction was a temporary construction or other than a permanency. In the absence of any such plea we must hold it to be intended as a permanent work. If the plaintiff is not now entitled to be compensated for the loss of this water-power, when will his future right to such compensation arise ?
A reservation of future rights in such a case would be an illusory one. He has, in my opinion, under the circumstances a right to damages as well for the destruction of his water-power as for the destruction of his mill. The assessment of damages made by the court of appeal, on the basis of the plaintiff being entitled to such damages once for all, I see no reason to quarrel with.
On the other question as to the right of the plaintiff to take proceedings for the recovery of the damages in the courts, without resorting to the method prescribed by the statute, I am of opinion that we are bound by the authorities to hold that the statute does not take away the common law right of the party damnified to sue unless at any rate proceedings had been properly commenced and prosecuted under the statute for the assessment of the damages.
I do not think the letter written to the plaintiff in this case before suit began constituted such a valid commencement of proceedings under the statute. It was, no doubt, an invitation to the plaintiff to name an arbitrator under the statute, but that was all and such a mere invitation without the naming of an arbitrator by the party himself making it cannot be held to constitute a valid commencement of proceedings. I would dismiss the appeal.
(dissenting).-It seems to me that to allow damages based on the supposition that the respondent's water-power has been permanently taken away, is contrary to the law as laid down in the judgment of this court in the case of Montreal Street Railway Co. v. Boudreau(1), which I think should be followed.
It was and is quite competent for the appellant to so lower its dam as to avert future damages. Of course, if the appellant chose to avail himself of the statutory provisions for assessing damages what is allowed here might well be proper measure such.
But in an action even where the right to assess damages is provided by arbitration under a statute that does not -necessarily determine same measure of damages in each case.
The appellant being liable for actions from day to day we ought not in this case to depart from the law so laid down and add to the confusion that prevailed b)efore that case.
The appeal should be allowed with costs.
J.-The respondent was the proprietor of a mill situate on the River Etchemin worked by the direct application of water-power derived from the river.
The appellant company, at a place below the respondent's mill, erected a dam, for the purpose also of obtaining water-power for working its plant. The respondent's mill was carried away by a freshet in
April, 1911, and it was charged by the respondent and
J. has been held by the courts below that this was due to the presence of the appellant's dam.
It has also been found as a fact that the effect of erecting the dam was to raise the level of the river to such an extent as to submerge the respondent's turbines and permanently to diminish the head of water available for the working of his mill. The learned trial judge held that the plaintiff was entitled to compensation in respect of the injury proved to have been suffered by him down to the time of the commencement of the action -- such damages comprising the value of the mill swept away and loss of profits arising, first from the diminished efficiency, and afterwards from the destruction of the mill. The court of appeal held that the plaintiff was entitled to reparation not only in respect to the damages mentioned, but also for loss in respect of the diminution in the value of respondent's land by reason of interference with his water-power.
Two questions arise: First: Can compensation for such loss be awarded ? and, Secondly: Whether, by reason of certain proposals made by the appellant's solicitors,.
prior to the commencement of the action, the action ought to be entirely dismissed ?
The appellant's dam was erected and worked under the authority of article 7295 of the Revised Statutes of Quebec of 1909.
That article and the succeeding article 7296 are as follows:- . Every proprietor of land may improve any water-course I-bordering upon, running along or passing across his property, and LA may turn the same to account the construction of mills, manufactories, works and machinery of all kinds, and for this purpose may erect and construct in and about such water-course, all the works necessary for its efficient working, such as flood-gates, flumes, em- Roy.
bankments, dams, dykes and the like.
Duff J.
(1) The proprietors or lessees of any such works are liable for all damages resulting therefrom to any person, whether excessive elevation of the flood-gates or otherwise.
Such damages shall be ascertained experts to appointed the parties interested in the ordinary manner.
In default either of the said parties appointing an expert, experts selected by the warden of the county shall act; and, in case of difference of opinion, the two experts appointed shall choose a third.
The experts shall be sworn before a justice of the peace faithfully to perform their duty as such.
In assessing the damages and fixing the compensation to paid, the experts may, whenever proper, set against the whole any part of such damages, any increased value which the property the claimant has acquired reason of the erection of such works, mills, manufactories or machinery.
In default of payment of the damages and indemnity awarded, within six months from the date of the report of the experts, together with legal interest to be computed from the said date, the party whom the payment is due, shall demolish the works which he shall have erected, or they shall so demolished at his expense, upon judgment to that effect rendered, the whole without prejudice to the damages already incurred.
It was held by this court in Breakey v. Garter (1), (I am quoting for convenience from my own judgment in Gale v. Bureau (2))
That the right given article in so far as it justified the penning back the waters of a stream upon the upper riparian proprietors, is to regarded as a right of servitude to which is attached an obligation to indemnify the proprietor who is prejudiced the exercise of it.
It was also held in that case(1), and the decision on that point was followed in Gale v. Bureau(2), that this statutory right to reparation was one in respect 44 Can. S.C.R. at 312. (1) Cass. Dig.
of which the person damnified has recourse to the courts as damage from time to time accrues notwithstanding the provisions of article 7296. I think, moreover, that there is no satisfactory ground for holding that (assuming an action to lie in the circumstances)
the plaintiff cannot recover in the action reparation once for all to the full extent to which experts proceeding under the Act would be entitled to award him compensation.
I may add that I regard this action as a proceeding to recover compensation under this statute; I decide nothing as to the rules of law by which, apart from the statute, the measure of damages would be determined.
As to the second ground of appeal, I think that, in the circumstances, the appellants were, at least, bound to shew that they were in point of fact ready and willing to proceed under article 7296 and, having regard to the delay that had already taken place, I agree with Mr. Justice Cross that they have failed to do so.
(dissenting).-Two questions arise on this appeal the first, whether the plaintiff's right of recourse to the courts is taken away by article 7296,
R.S.Q. 1909; the other, whether the plaintiff's recovery should be once for all, in respect of damages future as well as past, or should be confined to damages already sustained.
No case was made for a review of the finding that the appellants' dam caused the injuries complained of.
The quantum of the damages awarded in the Superior
Court, if they should be confined to injuries already sustained, or of those awarded by the court of appeal, if they should be now allowed once for all, has not been seriously attacked.
If the first of the two substantial questions presented for determination, were res integra, I should incline to the view that the appellant's contention upon is well founded. By article 7295 certain works are authorized; by article 7296 the proprietor or lessee of such works is required to pay "all damages resulting therefrom," and it is provided that "such damages shall be ascertained by experts, etc." the lia-bility thus created would seem to be only for damages so ascertained.
But it has been held in a series cases in the Province of Quebec (see Gale v. Bureau (1), at page 308), and by this court in Breakey v. Oarter(2), followed in Gale v. Bureau(1), that the jurisdiction of the courts is not ousted by these statutory provisions. If, as Mr. Justice Cross appears to think, effective steps to commence proceedings under article 7296, taken before action has been brought in the courts, would oust the jurisdiction of the latter, I agree in his view that it has not been established in the present case that such steps were so taken. The appeal on this branch fails.
The second question presents a little more difficulty. The decision of this court in Gale v. Bureau(1) does not appear to be decisive upon it.
There is no suggestion made that the structure of the defendants is not meant to be permanent or that the invasion the plaintiff's rights was unintentional. In Gale v. Bureau(1) the defendant appears to have done what was complained of inadvertently (p. 311) and it was not his avowed intention to maintain the dam in such a way as to continue the flooding complained of (p.
In the present case the appellants may so manage the gates of their dam in future years that the' water privileges of the respondents will not be affected at all, or at least, not to the same extent as during the period complained of.
I incline to think that the plaintiff did not in his declaration claim to recover for permanent loss of his water-power.
The judgment awarding damages for that loss seems, therefore, to be ultra petita, and, as such, in contravention of article 113, C.P.Q.
The case is not one of trespass. The appellants were not wrong-doers in constructing the dam. They had statutory authority to do so, subject to the condition that they should pay "all damages resulting therefrom."
It is the resulting damages which constitute the cause of action and they are recoverable when and as they occur. Chambly Affg. Co. v. TWillet(1);
Montreal Street Railway Company v. Boudreau (2).
The well-known principle of the decision in Backhouse v. Bonomi(3) seems to be applicable. Although the appellants have not exercised a right of expropriation, yet it would appear to be within the purview of article
7296 that damages once for all may be awarded in the expertise for which it provides.
But I do not think that future damages are recoverable in an action such as that now before us.
I would for these reasons allow this appeal to the extent of restoring the judgment of the learned trial judge.
J.-Le demandcur intim6 avait un moulin sur la rivibre Etchenin dans le comt6 de Dorchester. Ce moulin 6tait mft par un pouvoir d'eau et existait depuis un grand nombre d'annies. La compagnie appelante, en vertu de Particle 7295 des Statutes Revises de Qubbec, 6rigea dans 1'automne de 1910 une digue a quelqnes arpents plus 'bas de l'endroit 6tait le moulin en question.
Cette digue a eu pour effet de faire refluer 1'eau et de rendre absolument sans valeur le pouvoir d'eau qui alimentait le moulin du demandeur.
De plus, la rivibre, cet endroit, ne gelait presque jamais; mais, a raison de la construction de cette digue, Peau est devenue plus limpide, la glace s'est forn6e et, au printemps de 1911, en se d6gageant, elle est venue frapper le moulin, l'a emport6 et a caus6 de tris grands dommages. Le demandeur, a raison de cela, r6clame une somme de $6,000 par son action institude le 28 avril, 1911.
Vers le mme temps oii cette action 6tait institu6e, mais avant qu'elle ffit signifie, la d~fenderesse appelante a, par lettres de ses avocats, du 2 mai, 1911, invit6 le d~fendeur a faire 6valuer ces dommages par arbitres, suivant les dispositions des articles 7295 and 7296 des Statuts Reviss de la province de Qubbec. Le demandeur n'en a pas moins persist6 dans son action et, aprs enqubte, la cour sup6rieure lui a accord6 une somme de $1,070 pour les dommages jusqu'alors encourus et lui a r6serv6 sa reclamation pour les dommages futurs.
La premire question qui se soulbve est de savoir si le demandeur pouvait proc~der par action directe sans avoir ces dommages d6termin6s par experts. Cette question a d6ja fait I'objet de nombreuses dtcisious devant les tribunaux et elle &est prbsentee devant cette cour dans une cause de Gale v. Bureau
LA II a alors 6t6 d&id6 que les dispositions de la loi statutaire n'empehiaient pas le recours par action ordinaire.
La jurisprudence a d'abord h6sit6; imais elle est maintenant bien 6tablie. Il ne peut y avoir de doute que les personnes qui souffrent a raison de P'rection de digues peuvent procder par vole d'action ordinaire.
(1869) Blais v. Blais(2) ; (1869) Nesbitt v.
Bolduc(3) ; Emnond v. Gauthier(4) ; (1879), Jean v.
Gauthier(5) ; (1878) Breakey v. Carter(6) ; (1881)
Proulx v. Tremblay(7) ; (1898) Cie. de pulpe de gantic v. Village d'Agnes(8) ; (1906) Leclerc v. Dufault (9).
Quant aux dommages, je dois dire que la cour d'appel a modifi6 le jugement de la cour sup6rieure et a condamn la compagnie d6fenderesse h payer une somme de $3,685.
L'appelante nous demande de r6tablir le jugeinent de la cour supdrieure et de renverser celui de la cour d'appel.
Dans son action, le demandeur disait que la construction de la digue avait eu pour effet de faire refluer 1'eau sur sa propridtd, d'inonder son moulin, de noyer ses turbines et d'empcher son exploitation.
II ajoutait aussi que la crue des eaux occasionn6e par la chauss~e et F'amas de glace qui en avait 4t6 la suite avaient d6truit compltement la batisse se trouvait son moulin et i1 r6clamait une somme de $6,000. La cour sup6rieure a 6valu6 les dommages, et a accord6 an demandeur la valeur du moulin dtruit plus la perte que le demandeur avait subie par le fait J. qu'il n'avait pas pu exploiter son moulin depuis 1'6rection de la chauss6e jusqu'au moment de Linstitution de Faction; mais elle ne lui a rien accord6 pour la destruction de son pouvoir d'eau et pour Fimpossibilit6 oii il va se trouver h lavenir de pouvoir continuer son exploitation.
La cour sup~rieure a r6serv6 ces dommages pour Favenir; et P'honorable juge dans ses notes nous dit qu'il n'a pas accord6 tons ces dommages, vu la dbcision de Gale v. Bureau (1).
En lisant, en effet, la note qui se trouve en tte de la d6cision on serait port6 A croire qu'il a 6t d6cid6 dans cette cause que les dommages qui seraient accord6s ne devaient pas 6tre des dommages globaux mais des dommages annuels.
Dans cette action de Gale v. Bureau(1) le jugement avait accord6 une somme annuelle et on disait que c'6tait une ill6galitk.
Le juge-en-chef de cette cour, se basant sur Pautorit6 de Sourdat, d~cida que la cour avait parfaitement le droit d'accorder des annuit~s on une rente.
Il n'a jamais t6 d~cid6 dans cette cause que la cour ne pouvait pas accorder une soinme fixe une fois paye.
En effet, si nous consultons Sourdat, qui a t mentiohn6 dans le jugement de P'honorable juge-en-chef, vol. No. 132 bis, il dit ceci:- On a r6f6rb A la cause de Montreal Street Rwilway v. Boudreau(1), et on a dit que la d6cision dans cette cause ne justifie pas une indemnit6 d6finitive. Je crois que les deux cas ne sont pas analogues. Dans la cause de Boudreaii(1), le caractare permanent des dommages ne pouvait pas 6tre assum6 par la manibre dont les travaux avaient kt faits; an contraire, la cause de ces dommages pouvait tre facilement 6vit6e. Et, a raison de cela, i1 n'a pas kt jug6 A propos d'accorder des dommages globaux.
fait bon de mentionner le fait que la cour 6tait divis~e sur cette question et que le juge-en-chef, Sir E1z6ar Taschereau, et le Juge Girouard 6taient d'opinion qu'une indemnit6 definitive devait 6tre accord6e, suivant en cela la d6cision de cette cour dans une cause de Gareau v. Mlontreal Street Railway(2). Nous sommes dans la pr~sente cause en presence d'un statut qui invite h rigler d6finitivement cette question d'indemnit6, vu qu'il s'agit virtuellement de I'expropriation d'un droit dont jouissait le demandeur. Or, en vertu de 'article 407 du Code Civil, 1'expropri6 a droit a une indemnith juste et pr6alable. Cette indemnith doit couvrir tons les dommages.
La compagnie d6fenderesse ne sugg&re pas dans ses plaidoiries, on dans ses pr6tentions, que la digue qu'elle a 61ev6e n'est que temporaire.
Au contraire, cette digue a un caractare de permanence.
Le pouvoir d'eau dont le demandeur jouissait se trouve d~truit par le fait de cette digue. Le prejudice qu'il 6prouve a done un caract~re permanent et la suggestion que cet homme pourrait venir tous les ans devant les tribunaux pour r~clamer de la compagnie d6fenderesse le dommage resultant du fait qu'ill ne peut plus exploiter son moulin parait contraire h Fid6e que nous devous empicher autant que possible la multiplicit6 des procks.
Mais on dit: Vous accordez alors des dommages futurs.
Je ne crois pas que cela soit exact. Le dommage pent tre futur en ce sens qu'il se r~alisera dans l'avenir par suite du fait dommageable; mais A vrai dire le pr6judice est actuel et il continuera A se manifester.
(Laurent, vol. 20, p. 570.)
Fuzier-Herman dans son code annot6 sous Part. 1382 nous rapporte aux nos. 116 et 117 un jugement de la cour de.cassation au sujet d'une mine dont les travaux d'exploitation avaient alt6r6 les eaux d'une source il a t d6cid6
L'appelante pr6tend que la cour d'appel a ajugh au-delA des conclusions de Faction en indemnisant le demandeur intim6 pour la perte de son pouvoir d'eau. Je vois au contraire dans la d6claration que le demandeur alligue sp6cialement que la construction de la chauss6e a en pour effet d'inonder ses moulins, de noyer ses turbines et 'a empich6 de les exploiter; et apris avoir ensuite all~gu6 la crue des eaux et I'amas de glaces occasionn~s par la chauss&e, il demande une condamnation contre P'appelante de $6,000 de dommages.
Ces alligations 6taient certainement suffisantes pour justifier la cour d'appel de faire l'valuation de tous ces dommages et d'accorder $3,685.
Dans ces circonstances, je suis d'opinion que le jugenent de la cour d'appel est bien fond6 et que l'appel doit 4tre renvoy6 avec dbpens.
Appeal dismissed with costs.