Pilon v. Brunet

On the 17th February, 1841, 0. and wife acknowledged by the deed that they were indebted to one S. ., widow of one P., in a sum of $140, due to her late husband. On the same day, 0. and wife, the son-in-law and daughter of S. X and P., also acknowledged to be indebted to S. N. in an annual life-rent, in Present,-Ritchie, C. J., and Fournier, Henry, Taschereau and Gwynne, J. J.

consideration of certain real estate given. to them previously by the late P. and S. N., by deed of gift, 16th February, 1830. On 19th February, 1841, the widow, S. N., married one . B. L. On . the 21st January, 1870, J. B. L. and his wife, S. N., transferred to P. L., the grandson of J. B. L., all the arrears of life-rent due them by . and his wife as well as the sum of $140, being the amount of the obligation.

On an action brought by P. L. against C. and wife, to recover £1,325, for 26 years of said life-r6nt, and £35 for the amount of the obligation of the 17th February, 1841

Held,-1. Affirming the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench for Lower Canada (Appeal side), that the arrears of the life-rent which accrued during the second marriage of S.N belonged to the community which existed between her and her second husband, J. B. L., and that the husband as head of the community could legally dispose of his share in the community, viz: one-half of said arrears, in favor of his grandson P. L., but the transfer as to the other half belonging to his wife, S. N, was null, as by law S. N. could not transfer to any of her husband's descendants, who, in such a case are, by law, considered as persons interposed 'to secure directly to the husband a benefit which cannot be conferred to him directly- Art. 774 C. C. (P. Q.)

Reversing the. judgment of the Court a quo, that although the sum of $140 formed part of the movables belonging to the first community, yet the half of said sum belonging to S. IV. at the time of her second marriage formed part of the second community, and her husband, J. B. L., could legally dispose of his share in said sum, viz.: $35 in favor of his grandson, the transfer of the balance, viz., being null and void.

In this case both parties appealed to the Supreme Court, the iespondent, A.

. et ax. having succeeded in getting the judgzuent of the Court a quo reversed on the second point and con. firmed on the first point, were allowed costs of a cross appeal. In plaintiffs declaration it was alleged that the arrears of rent trans"erred to him and which he claimed from defendants were due in virtue of a life-rent constituted by a deed of cession, dated 16th February, 1828, and in the Superior Court, after argument, a motion was made by plaintiff to discharge the delibdrd inasmuch as it was discovered at the argument that a clerical error of a serious nature to the interests of the present plaintiff had inadvertently crept into one of the authentic documents invoked by the -plaintiff in support of his action, such error being as to the date of a certain donation upon which the action is mainly based; and inasmuch as such clerical error can most easily be remedied by referring to the minute of the notary who passed the deed or otherwise, this motion was granted, and a second motion was made by the plaintiff en reprise d'instance, praying to be allowed to amend the declaration by adding under count No. 10 in the declaration the following, to wit: "That the date of the constitution of the rent above mentioned was erroneously mentioned in the deed of transfer above related as being made by and in virtue of the contract of marriage of the said A. date I the 7th February, " That the said constituted rent is made by a deed of the 16th February, 1830, as it appears from an authentic copy of said deed forming part of exhibit number one of the plaintiff in this cause, and that the intention of the parties to the said deed of transfer at the time of the execution thereof was to transfer the arrears of rent constituted by the said defendant on the 16th February, 1830. The said rent being the only one due by the said A. C. to the said S. N."

Held (affirming the judgment of the courts below), that the error in the transfer, as to the date of the deed under which the rent was due, was a mere clerical error. There was no other liferent to which the transfer could apply but the one in question. The claim was sufficiently identified by the description of the deeds and the date of their registration, under the special allegations of the plaintiff and the evidence which he has adduced. APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of Queen's Aench for Lower Canada (Appeal side), reversing a judgment of the Superior Court for Lower Canada, by which the plaintiff, Pierre Lalonde, then represented by his widow Dame Albina Mallette, as tutrix to his two minor children, had been condemned to pay to the respondent es-qtalit6, the sum of $5,143.00 with interest and costs, the Court of Queen's Bench reducing the condemnation to $2,101.77 with costs of appeal against the respondent es-q'ualit6.

The judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench, (Appeal side) was appealed from to the Supreme Court by the present appellants on the ground that the condemnation was yet excessive.

At the same time the respondent appealed also from the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench (Appeal side), on the ground that the Pwx judgment of the Superior Court ought to have been . affirmed.

This second appeal was treated by the Court as a cross-appeal under the Supreme Court rules. The facts of the case as stated by Sir A. A. Dorion, C. J. of the Court below, are as follows :- On the 7th of February, 1828, Addlaide Pilon, then a minor issue of the marriage of Joseph Pilon and Scholastique Neveu, married one An!oine Ciarlebois. Joseph Pilon was a party to the contract of marriage and gave to the future consorts certain real estate, of which he reserved for himself as well as for his wife, the enjoyment (l'usufruit) as long as they lived.

On the 16th February, 1830, Pilon and his wife made a transaction with Charlebois and his wife, by which in consideration of an annual life-rent (rente viagere) payable in kind, they released the enjoyment (l'usufruit) which they had reserved by the first deed. Pilon died in 1889 and his wife survived him. On the 17th of February, 1841, his widow, Scholastique Neves gave to Charlebois and his wife, a discharge, in full, for all the arrears of this life-rent which were due to her up to the 17th of February, 1811.

The arrears have also been paid since for the year 1842, 1843 and 1844, as admitted in the plaintiff's declaration.

On the same day, 17th February, 1841, Charlebois and wife acknowledged by a notarial obligation that they were indebted to Scholastique Neves, widow Pilon, in a sum of 840 francs ancient qurrency, equal to $140, due for the amount of an obligation of the 18th of September, 1830, by Charlebois to the late Joseph Piton.

Having thus settled her affairs with her daughter and her son-in-law, Scholastique Neves married one Jean Baptiste Lacombe, on the 19th day of February following (1841).

Lacombe was a widower and had a daughter by his Puos first marriage. Her name was Marie Virginie Lacombe. She married Pierre Mose Lalonde, and had by this marriage a son whose name was Pierre Lalonde.

On the 21st of January, 1870, Lacombe and his wife Scholastique Neveu, the mother of the appellant, transferred to this Pierre Lalonde, the grandson of Lacombe, all the arrears of life-rent which were due by Charlebois and his wife to Scholastique Neveu, from December, 1844, to December, 1869.

In the deed of transfer it is erroneously stated that the arrears of life-rent so transferred are due by virtue of the contract of marriage of Charlebois and his wife ol the 7th February, 1828, and also by virtue of deed of transfer of the 16th February, 1828, written at the foot of the said contract of marriage, while this life-rent was created by an act of the 16th of February, 1830, already mentioned, which act is however written at the foot of the original contract of marriage of the 7th of February, 1828.

Lacombe and wife also transferred by the same deed to Lalonde the 840 francs or $140 due by Charlebois and his wife by their obligation of the 17th of February, On the 27th of March following (1870), a little over two months after the date of this transfer, Scholastique Neveu died.

Shortly after her death, Piele Lalonde brought the present action against Charlebois by which he has claimed:- 1st. For 26 years of life-rent transferred to him by Scholastique Neveu under the above transfer............£1,325 5 10 2nd. The amount of the obligation of the

17th of February, 1841, 840 francs equal to..............

.........

85 0 0 3rd. For the funeral expenses and expenses of the last sickness of Scholastique

P x Neveu paid for by the defendant

Charlebois and his wife............

35 11 Making a total of.................£1,894 0 - 4 Equal to $5,576.06 with interest from the 28th of April, 1871, and costs.

To this demand the defendant Charlebois pleaded the facts already stated, and further, that the life-rent transferred by Scholastique Neven to Lalonde represented to the extent of one-fifth the individual estate (lespropres) of the said Scholastique Neven and for four-fifths the properties acquired during the first community; that no part of the four-fifths of his life-rent, which represented the properties acquired during the first community, could form part of the second community; that Scholastique Nevezn had no right during her marriage to give any of her property to her husband Lacombe, nor to his grandson Lalonde; that the sum of 840 francs ancient currency was also a conquet of the first community and that the transfer made to Lalonde was only valid as to one-tenth of the arrears of life-rent, which was the share of Lacombe in one-fifth of such arrears which had fallen into - the second community, and Charlebois offered to confess judgment for $312 as the value of the share of arrears of said life-rent which Lacombe was entitled to transfer.

To this plea the plaintiff answered generally; also that Sclolastique Neven had made a will by which she had disposed of all her properties in favor of her husband Lacombe, and that the defendant had therefore no interest in asking that the transfer of the 21st of February, 1870, be annulled.

On this contestation, the Superior Court holding that the transfer was not affected by the Edit des secondes noces and that Scholastique Neves had the right to transfer her claims to Lalonde, as she had done, condemned the defendant Charlebois to pay to the plaintiff a sum of $5,143.21 with interest from the 29th of April, 1871, and costs.

There was no dispute about this last claim of $142.90 which was admitted by the appellants.

The only other facts requiring to be noticed with reference to this appeal are, that Pierre Lalonde, the original plaintiff, died before judgment was rendered in the court below and that Antoine Charlebois, the original defendant, died since the judgment. They are now respectively represented in the cause, Charlebois by the appellants and Lalonde by the respondent.

As the pretended will of Scholastique Neven invoked by the plaintiff in his answers to the defendant's plea the date of which is not even indicated, was never fyled, it was found unnecessary to examine whether or not it would have been a good answer to the defendant's pretensions had it been produced.

The first question that naturally comes up under the plea of general denial is whether the plaintiff as assignee under the deed of the 21st January, 1870, can claim any of the arrears of pension due by the defendant to Scholastique Neves.

The deed under which the pension was constituted was passed on the 16th Feb., 1830; this is the only deed under which a pension may be claimed from the defendant; but by the transfer of the 21st January, 1870, Scholastique Neven and . B. Lacombe assigned over to the plaintiff the arrears of a pension which might be due to S. Neveu in virtue of the contract of marriage of the 7th February, 1828, between the defendant and A. Pilon, and under a deed of cession bearing date the 16th February, 1828, written at the end of the said contract of marriage.

No such pension exists, and plaintiff has failed to prove any title to the pension which he claims in this cause. The plaintiff felt it so much that after the case had been argued and taken en " d6libr6," he moved that the "d6lib6r6"

be discharged in order that he might be allowed to amend his declaration. This motion was granted and the amendment allowed, but illegally, as the defendant submits: 1st. The motion was not stamped and this is fatal

2nd. The amendment was allowed on payment of $60 costs, which have not been paid. 3rd. No verbal evidence of the transferer's intentions could be adduced.

The evidence of the notary, who is about the only witness brought up, and who throws the blame of what he calls an error on his clerk to whom be dictated the deed, is illegal as tending to prove against a written document and to contradict it.

Besides, no proof of the intent of the late donor, but suppositions only could be made, which are destroyed by the following circumstances: (a) The old lady never intended to claim this life-rent, which she had not claimed for 25 years; (b) it was only on her death bed, aged years, that she was beset by her husband's family to make her husband's grandson this transfer, which meant the total ruin of her only child. This error might have been a very clever mode of evading the obsessions she was beset with, without ruining her child. Suppositions will not be strained to help committing an injustice.

The following are in point to prove that the absence of date or a false date given in the enregistration of deeds is fatal, and carries with it the complete nullity of the enregistration:

Cass. (Ehrard) S.

Cass. .(Lahaye) S. V. 7, 1, 284, 22 avril 1807 ; C. N. 2, 1, 1376 ; Cass. 19 juin 1888 (Barsalon) S.

Dalloz, P. 83, 1; Cass. 1 Mai 1860 (Rocher) S. V. 61, 1, 267.; Merlin, R6p. Insc. s. 5, No. 18, et vo. Hypothdque, sect. 2, a. 2, Art. 10; Grenier, t. 1, No. 97; Persil, R6g. hyp. Art. 2148, s. 3, Nos. 1 et 2 ; Zacharie, t. 2, s. 276, No. 7, t. 3, sur No. 276, p. 344 and foll ; Solon, Des nullites, t. 1, No. 362 : " The false enunciation of the date of the instrument creating the debt is sufficient to make the inscription null;" Cass. Septembre 1807 (Lefdvre) S. V. 92; Rouen, 8 f6vrier 1806 (Langlois) S. V. Coll. N. 2, 2, 113, and others.

According to all these decisions and authorities the enregistration of the preseat transfer would be a complete nullity because the date of the deed creating the hypothee, to-wit, the deed constituting the pension of date 16th February, 1830, is not given in the transfer and would not appear in the registrar's books. If the date were in the transfer but not in the inscription, the inscription would be null. For the same reason the error being in the transfer itself, such transfer is null and void; no debt is transferred, because the one which is mentioned does not exist, and the one which exists is not mentioned.

How can a debt be sold which is not described? Art. 1576, C. says: "The seller of a debt or other right is bound by law to the warranty that the debt exists and is due to him."

*

*

* How could such a warranty exist when no debt is mentioned ? But here the debt mentioned does not exist, and whether so declared on purpose or not matters not.

The plaintiff shows no title to claim from defendant the pension due in virtue of the deed of 16th February, 1830, and if he has any recourse against J.

A second preliminary point was invoked by the appellant, under the plea of general denial, viz. : that there is no proof that the transfer in favor of plaintiff has ever been enregistered; no certificate of enregistration has been fyled ; a certificate of service of the transfer only has being fyled.

On the merits of the case we submit, first, that the transfer of the wife's share in the arrears of the life rent was void, as made by a wife to her husband through an interposed person, being a benefit between husband and'wife conferred during marriage by act inter vivos. Marriage covenants, wheLher determined by the parties or settled by law, are irrevocable (1).

It is a public law; the nullity is absolute Therefore a wife cannot give any of her own property to her husband, either directly or indirectly, nor relinquish any of her rights in the community property. According to the old custom of Paris, man and wife could not benefit each other during marriage either by donation or will

A provincial statute passed in 1801 has taken away the prohibition of conferring benefits by will, as it gives full power to bequeath all or any property in favor of any person whatsoever. The Civil Code of Quebec maintains the prohibition as to Acts inter vivos only, but the plaintiff wants to have it said that the liberty of conferring benefits by last will implies the liberty of conferring benefits inter vivos, and even has abolished all restrictions to marriage covenants, made, of course, before marriage, by persons marrying a second time and having children from a first marriage. But such a pretension is clearly untenable.

Art. 774, C. defines who are interposed persons; it is the ascendants, the descendants, the presumptive heir at the time of the gift, and the consort of the person incapable, unless the presumption established by law be rebutted by services rendered, or relations of kindred.

There is no such pretension here, and the charge imposed is quite foreign to the wife, and only the discharge of. a duty devolving upon the husband, J. B. Lacombe, and the donee.

It is objected that the arrears of the pension fell into the community of property existing between J. B. Lacombe and Scholastique Neves that J. B. Lacombe, as head and master of the community, could dispose of the same absolutely, even in fraud of his wife's interest in them, saving the wife's recourse for indemnity upon the husband's property after the dissolution of the community; that there was no fraud against the wife, as she was a party to the deed of transfer; and finally, that the defendant cannot oppose fraud as he is not heir to Scholastique Neveu.

We answer by saying, first, that the husband, as head of the community, may dispose of its property absolutely, provided it be, 1st, in favor of persons capable of receiving; 2nd, without fraud That supposing the arrear did fall in the community of J. B. Lacombe and Scholastique Neves, which we do not admit, the dona. tion, by the husband, of his wife's share to one of his. descendants is a complete and absolute nullity; is ull a and void, as contrary to a public law; the donation by the wife, or her joining her husband in the donation to the husband's grand-child, is also void, as an indirect advantage to the husband. She might, after the dissolution of the community, claim indemnity on her husband's property if she chose, but she is at liberty, specially if the husband has divested himself of all his estate, to claim the things given, whether movable or immovable, from whomsoever is in possession of them, and the reimbursement of the sums of money so given and paid (1).

Addlaide Pilon was the only child and natural heir to her mother Scholastique Neves, and was seized of all her mother's rights and estate by law, without any act of apprehension; it is sufficient if she does not renounce.the succession, C.

It was, therefore, sufficient to mention. that Addlarde Pilon was the daughter of Scholastique Neveu, in order to establish that she was seized of the property, rights, and actions of Scholastique Neven against the plaintiff. As she was in community of property with the original defendant, Antoine Charlebois, the latter, as head of the community, was also seized by her decease of said rights of Scholastique Nevea. Besides, it is not necessary -that the child should be heir to his mother, as he takes as child and not as heir the property acquired. by his mother during-her first community. Pothier, Contrat de manage, No. 645.

A fourth question is : What portion of the life-rent fell into the community? We say only one-fifth. The pension represented for four-fifths thejoint acquets of the first community of property which had existed between Joseph Po!on and Dame S. Neveu, and S. Neves could not dispose of any portion of the said first community's property in favor of he second husband, neither directly nor indirectly, under Art. 279 of the Oustom of Paris. Any property coming to her through her first community was substituted to her children, issue of the first and second marriage, by the event of her second marriage.

She could not dispose of it in favor of any one else. Pothier, Contrat de mariage, Nos. 630, Such property did not fall into her second community, id. No. 643.

It is objected that arrears of a life-rent are not a capital sum, but the fruits and revenues of a capital sum, and as such fall into the second community.

They may fall into a first community, but all movables which fall into an ordinary community do not fall into a second community, they do not when they have been acquired during the first community, art. 279 of the Coutume de Paris, including movables as well as immovables, in the property of the first community substituted in favor of the children, in the event of their mother marrying again.

Troplong, contrat de mariage, t. 1, No. 68, 441; Pothier, communaud, No. 102; id contrat mariage, 0.0. 1272, 382; Guyot, Rep. v. Noces, p. 164, 2nd col. in fine; Pothier, contrat de mariage, Nos. 631, 632, 643; Ferridre, Coutume de Paris, t. on art. 279, gloss Nos. 31 and Then there are three sorts of life-rent; some are given or bequeathed as aliments; some are bought for a capital sum paid-up cash, and some are constituted as the price of sale of movable or immovable property.

The life. rent in question here belongs to the last category. rLo. When the life-rent is bequeathed as aliment or bought VBRET. for a sum of money, the rent is the capital or thing given or bought; the sum of money paid is the price of it. When it is constituted for the price of an immovable, then the immovable is the thing sold and the life-rent is the price. The arrears of the life-rent are not considered in such a case as fruits or interest, but as a capital sum.

Troplong, contrats alev., Nos. 216, 217, 218 ; Dalloz Cass. 36, 409; Pothier, rente, Nos. 614, 615.

Four-fifths of the pension represented immovables belonging to the first community of property of Scholastique Neveu, and, as such, did not fall into the second community with I. B. Lacombe (1).

A fifth question regards the transfer of 840 francs ($140) by J. B. Lacombe and S. Neveu to the original plaintiff. We submit that the unanimous arrdt of our Court of Queen's Bench which held such transfer void is correct, under the second head of the Edict of Francois II. on second nuptials (made in 1560) (2). The first head enacts that a widow marrying again cannot settle on her second husband a greater portion of her own property than on her child least taking; the second head forbids her settling on her second husband, or disposing in favor of any other party but the children of her first marriage, any property coming to her from the liberality of her first husband. Then comes art. 279 of the Custom of Paris, already cited, substituting in favor of the wife's children any property acquired during the first community as community property (3).

That debt of 840 francs was due under an obligation passed in 1841 a few days before the second marriage, hox but was a debt due to the first community, being only a renewal of a former obligation passed in 1830, during the first marriage.

By law, Adelaide Pilon was owner of one-half of it as heir to her father, Joseph Pilon, and therefore it was not due to her mother. If the latter did acquire it from her late husband, say under his will (nothing shows how she did, and the obligation of 840 francs seems to have renewed for the whole under a misapprehension,) then it was a liberality of her first husband, and, as such, became her child's property from the moment of her second marriage, under the second head of the Edict. As to the other half belonging to S. Neveu, for her share in the community, it was a sum of money acquired during her first community, and also substituted to Adelaide Pilon, her only child, under art. 279 of the Custom of .Paris.

It is objected that all the restrictions imposed by the Edict and art. 279 of the Customi were abolished, first, by the statute of 1801, granting freedom of making wills; and, in the second place, by art. 764 C. C. To say that the withdrawal of one prohibition implies the withdrawal of all other restrictions is going too far. Formerly a testator could make no dispositions in favor of his wife, and many other persons who were incapable of receiving under a will, nor under a donation inter vivos; power was given by the statute of 1801 to every person to receive under a will, but the prohibitions as for donations inter vivos were not altered (1).

As for art. 764, C. it revoked all restrictions imposed on widows contracting marriages, but it stipulated only for future marriages. This is formally mentioned in s. 128, 29 Vic., c. 41 (1865), adopting the draft of the code.

ho, No other interpretation can be given without giving the code a retroactive effect and destroying acquired rights. The only question raised by commentators has been whether we must consider the first or second marriage, and most of them hold for the time of the first marriage, because the law did then settle the rights of the children.

But here, both the first and second marriage took place long before the code was enacted. The codifiers gave as the law in force in 1866 the dispositions of the edict on second nuptials and art. 279 of the custom, which they proposed to abrogate for the future, and for future marriages; this suggestion was adopted by the legislature, aad is now art. 764 of our Civil Code.

It is unnecessary to dwell at any length on the preliminary points which were urged in the courts below by the defendants, and which have been over-ruled by both Courts. It is sufficient to mention them with a few observations:

The party took advantage in the first court of clerical error which had occurred in the description of the deed constituting the life-rent, which had been mentioned as being due by virtue of the contract of marriage of the 7th February, 1828, instead of the do. nation of the 16th of February, 1880. This error was rectified by an amendment, of which the defendants acknowledged having received due notice, and conclusive evidence was adduced by the admission of defendant himself, that the transfer was made of the life-rent in question, and both Courts unanimously held that it was a clerical error which could in no manner affect the plaintiff's title.

Another objection was also raised, arising from the absence of registration of the transfer. This was not set up in the plea, but set forth only at the argument in appeal. The defendants invoked art. 1570 of the Code, in support of his pretension.

This article says that " the buyer of a right of action has no possession available against third parties, until signification of the act of sale, and a copy delivered to the debtor."

But the Art. 2127 establishes the penalty in consequence of such omission, in these words: " If these formalities be not observed, the conveyance or transfer is without effect against subsequent transferees who have conformed to the above requirements."

This provision of Art. 1570 has consequently no effect, except when there is a subsequent transfer made of the same claim, but cannot be of any avail to the debtor when called upon to pay the amount transferred after due notification of the same, as was made in this cause. As these points have been formerly adjudicated upon by both Courts against the defendant, and are matters of form, this Court would not for that reason alone reverse the judgment of the lower courts.

The respondent in this case, complaining that the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench was erroneous, and contending that the judgment of the Superior Court ought to have been confirmed in every particular, also appealed from the judgment now on appeal before this Court, and, as the appeal taken by the respondents is to be treated by the Court as a cross appeal, I will first urge the reasons why I believe the judgment of the Superior Court ought to have been maintained. To maintain the correctness of the judgment of the Superior Court, and establish the error of the alterations made thereto by the judgment of the Court of Appeals, the plaintiff asserts as undoubted legal propositions: 1st. That the annual profits of a life-rent, created during a previous marriage, but accruing during the second, and a claim for a sum of money which originated daring the first, but remained unpaid during the second marriage, appertains to the second community

Under Art. 1272 of our Code there can be no question that the obligation for 840 livres and the rent reserved to the donors Joseph Pilon and his wife, Scholastique Nevey, became assets of the community, this article stating that all movable property, and rents, revenues, interest and arrears of whatsoever nature they may be, belong to the community.

This article is not new law, but the re-enactment of Art. 220 of Couturme de Paris, from which it is derived. See Pothier, Traild de la Communauld (1) ; Denizart, Communautd (2).

These authorities above quoted enunciate the unquestionable principles of our law respecting the property which falls into the community, and over which'the husband has an absolute and unlimited control; the arrears of rent accrued during the community, either that existing under the first marriage of Scholastique Neveu and Joseph Pilon, or under the second community of the said Scholastique Neveu, with her second husband, Jean Baptiste Lacombe, were chattels belonging, by law, to the community.

The same rules apply to the obligation of the 17th of February, 1841, for 840 livres which was transferred to Pierre Lalonde, on the 21st of January, 1870. This obligation was granted by the debtor to the widow after the dissolution of the first community. Whether the cause was a claim of this community or not makes no difference, as Pothier says: We consider only the thing due without any regard to its origin or to the cause from which it is derived. It is impossible to (1) Pp. and seq.

conceive under what rule of law the defendants, in the Court below, could assert the proposition that the life s V. rent represented the immovable property which was granted to Adilaide Pilon by the deed of donation. This alienation was unquestionably the free act of the father and mother in favor of their common child. The usufruct, which was first reserved, may be considered as a joint acquest, immovable or real estate, and, admitting even that it represents in any proportion the value of the property given, the fruits or revenues derived from such usufruct undoubtedly accrued to the community as they became due.

The second conversion took place by the abandonment of the usufruct, on the part of the father and mother to their child, in consideration of which the liferent was constituted by the donees in favor of the donors; and it cannot be pretended for a momeit, that the arrears of the life-rent do not fall into the community.

The defendants alleged that two of the immovables, so given were propres (i. the separate and absolute property) of the wife, and the other two, joint acquests -What belonged to her absolutely, she had power to dispose of as she thought fit; what belonged to the community the husband had absolute authority to convey.

It matters not whether they were propres or conquels, or what proportion of value any of these properties bore respectively, we have to deal only with chattels, which are part of the community; which, as such, were under the control, and at the disposal of the husband, and which he validly assigned, with the consent and concurrence of his wife.

The next proposition is that the husband had power to disposeof such property absolutely, and the conveyance of it, made by the husband jointly with his wife, to his grandson, is not made in fraud to a person interposed, but, if done to the prejudice of the wife, it gives rise only to a claim by her or her heirs for compensa- . tion. See Art. 1292 C. C. (P. Q.) ; Arts. 233 Coutume de Paris (Duplessis), 375 ; Pothier, Traite de la Communautd, 708, 720.

These authorities leave no room for doubt as to the absolute right of the husband to execute a valid conveyance of any chattel, even to his presumptive heir, issue of a previous marriage. Whether it be acquired during the community or previous, it equally appertains to the community and, as such is at the absolute disposal of the husband, leaving the wife after the dissolution of the comninnity, or her heirs to urge any objection as to the disposal by him made of any effects of the community, and to claim compensation therefor. My third proposition is: There is no restriction or exception to the right of the community over movable property, or to the authority and control of -the husband over it, by reason of the previous marriage of the wife.

There existed under our old laws several prohibitions and restrictions on the property possessed by a widow or widower who contracted a second marriage when there existed any children, issue of the first marriage. The most important of these prohibitions is contained in the edict of Francis II., 1560.

But all these prohibitions have been abrogated by the statute of 1801, which gave unlimited power to parties to dispose of their property in favor of whomsoever they please, without any restriction or limitation (1). Then we have our own article of the Code 764, C. C., L. C.

Now, admitting for a moment that the prohibitions (1) III., 4th; existing under the edict of Francis II, and the article r.o

879 of the Coutume de Paris, were still in force, the edict could not be held to apply to the transfer of the 21st of January, 1870.

The prohibitions of the edict affect only what the consorts hold by a donation or liberality of their deceased husband or wife.

This cannot be said to comprehend the property which was acquired during the community as his or her share, this not being given by the husband or wife, but acquired by law in virtue of marriage, and the prohibition applies only to direct gifts of property obtained from the liberality of a previous consort made to a consort in second marriage. The only grounds, therefore, which the defendants could urge to impugn the transfer would be the Art. 279 of the Coutume de Paris (if it were still subsisting), which precludes the wife from giving any portion of the joint acquest of her first community to the prejudice of the children issue of the first marriage, and this article would apply solely to the transfer of the 840 livres.

This is no more the law of the Province of Quebec, and was not in existence at the date of the transfer in question, and cannot, therefore, be invoked by the defendants as applicable.

The Code was published and came in force on the 1st of August, 1866, and the transfer in question was made on the 21st of January, 1870.

Even under the old law and the prohibition of Art. 279 of the Coutume de Paris, it never was pretended that the issues and profits, or the annual income of property of any of the consorts, were subject to the restrictions of the edict or of the Coutume.

See Bourjon Droit Commun (1); Lauridre, Coutume de Paris (2) ; Merlin, Rdpertoire

But there is another ground upon which the respond ents must succeed in getting the judgment of the PLo Superior Court in their favor affirmed, viz:- The debtor or the party who consented to the obligation transferred is not 'competent to raise the question of the validity of the transfer,-such right is exclusively reserved to the wife and to her heirs. According to the law of the Province of Quebec, all rights, obligations, debts and claims, personal and real, special or otherwise, devolve to the heir the nearest of kin in case of intestacy, or to the universal legatee in case of a devise by will. After the death of the defendant and original debtor, Antoine Charlebois, pending the suit, his wife continued the proceedings as his representative, but not as heir or representative of her mother, and she, no more than her husband, could urge .these grounds, which were reserved to the heirs in such capacity.

It is a violation of- an elementary principle of our law which precludes anyone from setting up the rights of third parties to avoid their liabilities. Defendant had no title, interest, or capacity to urge. Merlin, Rep.(1). Unless she assumed the quality of heir of her mother, which would make her irrevocably liable for all obligations and debts of the estate, she could not claim any right to the property trahsferred by her mother, or question the title. If she had assumed her heirship, the plaintiff was entitled to contest it or to show that there existed a will which disposed of this claim. The principle that such claims arising from transfers of movable property, by parties who contracted second marriages, could be made only on assuming the title of heir, and, as such, was so universally acknowledged in France, before the cession of Canada, that Bourjon in his work (2) says: The Courts universally held that it (1) & 7.

was only a reservation made by law in favor of the heir, pu o, and which he could not urge if he renounced the estate.

This rule should have its application in Canada with greater force after the statute of 1801, which removed all restrictions and limitations as to the disposal of property, even between husband and wife, whether propres, acquets or conquets. It cannot be doubted that Addlatde Pilon, the mother, could have disposed by of all her share of the first community in favor of her second husband. If the defendant had claimed as heir of her mother, the plaintiff would have been entitled to set up the will and deny her quality; not doing so, the defendant had no ground to repel the action of the plaintiff.

When we come to consider the reasons given by the Court for the reduction of one-half on the claim, arising from the assignment of the arrears of rent accrued from the 21st January, 1844, it is impossible to escape the conclusion that it is the result of an oversight, on the part of the learned judges, of the true principles which regulate such matters, and to which their attention was not called.

The judgment admits that the arrears of rent are the property of the second community, and are not subject to the reservations and restrictions contained in the Edict, or in the Art. 279 of the Coutume. Under these circumstances, it is clear the respondents must succeed on their cross appeal, and the appellants' appeal be dismissed.

FOURNIER, J.:

L'action en cette cause a 6t6 intent6e par Pierre Lalonde contre Antoine Charlebois. Les demandeurs et d6fendeurs, d6c6d6s tous deux pendant l'instance, pont maintenant repr6sent6s, le demandeur Lalonde, par son 6pouse Albina Malette en qualit6 de tutrice des enfants issus de leur mariage, assist6e d'Emery Brunet P1s son second mari, en qualit6 de tuteur conjoint aux enfants du premier mariage de la dite- Albina Malette. Le d6fendeur Charlebois est repr6sent6 par Adelaide Fournier, J. Pilon, son 6pouse et les enfants issus de leur mariage, reprenant l'instance.

Par son action, le demandeur originaire Lalonde r6clamait du d6fendeur Charlebois la somme de $5,576. Le jugement de la Cour Sup6rieure, A Montrdal, en date du 9 novembre 1877, lui accorde celle de $5,143 20. Appel du jugement ayant 6t0 interjet6 par le d6fendeur Charlebois, la Cour du Banc de la Reine r~duisit cette condamnation do plus de moiti6, savoir, A la somme de $2,101.77.

Trouvant cette condamnation encore trop 6lev6e, les reprbsentants de Charlebois, dame Adelaide Pilon et at, ont interjet6 appel A cette Cour. De leur o6t6 les repr6sentants de Pierre Lalonde, se croyant 16s6s par la r6duction que la Cour du Banc de la Reine a faite de la somme qui leur avait 6t

4djug6e en premier lieu, se sont aussi port6s appelants.

Ainsi, nous avons en cette cause deux appels du m~me jugement, mais en r6alit6 ils n'en forment qu'un seul pour les questions ; d6cider, car les moyens invoqu6s par 1'une des parties au soutien de son appel, sont les mimes que ceux qu'elle oppose A l'appel de son adversaire, et vice versd

Les faits qui ont donn6 lieu au present litige sont en r6sum6, comme suit:

[The learned judge then stated the facts of the case ] En appel les principales questions d6cid6es par le jugement de la Cour du Banc de la Reine sont:

lo. Si 1'erreur commise dans le transport du 21 novembre 1870, en indiquant le 7 novembre 1828, comme 6tant la date de l'acte cr6ant la rente viag~re transport6e au lieu de celle du 16 novembre 1830 qui eat la v6ritable date, pent Atre fatale A cette partie de ,

1'action rclamant lea arr6rages de cette rente.

t

2o. Si l'obligation du 17 mars 1811 pour 840 frs., on aucune partie de la rente viagbre transport6e A Lalonde, Fournier, J representait des biens acquis pendant la premibre communaut6, et si dans ce cas Scholastique Neveu pouvaient transporter ces cr6ances & Lalonde au pr6judice de son enfant.

Si dans le cas oi la dite obligation et lea arr6rages de rente ne repr6sentaient pas des biens acquis pendant la premi6re communaut6, ils ont pu former partie de la seconde, et a'ils pouvaient comme biens de cette derniAre communaut6 Atre transport6s aux enfants et petitsenfants de Lacombe par l'acte du 21 janvier 1870. Quant A la premibre de ces questions, la rente dont il s'agit 6tant la seule due par Charlebois, elle trouve par le transport et par la preuve suffisamment d6asign6e et identifi6e pour qu'il ne puisse y avoir aucune m6prise a cet 6gard. L'indication d'une date erronAe n'ayant dans le cas actuel caus6 aucun prjudice a 1'intim6, elle ne saurait 6tre admise comme un moyen de faire rejeter cette partie de la demande qui repose sur le transport. Dans tons lea cas, c'eat une de ces erreurs clricales auxquelles lea cours n'attachent aucune importance lorsqu'elles n'affectent pad la position des parties. Cette Cour 6tant sur ce point du mAme avis que la Cour du Banc de la Reine comme 1'a 6t0 cette dernibre, unanime A d6clarer cette objection non fond6e. Les deux autres questions ont 6t0 consid6r6es par la Cour du Bane de la Reine comme si intimement hi6es qu'elle ne lea a pas s~par~es dans l'examen qu'elle en a fait.

Le jugement a d6clar6 que le transport des arr6rages de la rente viagAre en date du 21 juin 1870, 6tait nul pour moiti6, et a rbduit d'autant cette partie de la r6clanation des appelants

II a aussi d6clar6 nul le transport de la somme de 840 frs., 6gale a $140, montant de l'obligation de 1841.

P w Les appelants pr6tendent qu'ayant r~ussi quant a cette obligation, sur le principe qu'elle n'avait pu faire partie de la seconde communaut6, la Cour aurait dA Ritchiec. pour la m~me raison les renvoyer non seulement d'une partie, mais de la totalit6 de la demande.

Leurs pr6tentions peuvent se r6sumer comme suit: 1. Que par suite des prohibitions de 1'6dit des secondes noces et de 'article 279 Coutume de Paris, les biensmeubles qui tombent dans une communaut6 ordinaire, ne peuvent pas entrer dans une seconde, lorsqu'il y a des enfants vivants d'un premier maiiage,-et ils en concluent quel'obligation de $140 n'est pas comprise dans la communaut6 entre J. B. Lacombe et Scholastique Neveu.

De leur c60, les intim6s Brunet .et al, pr6tendent au contraire.

J

Ne diff6rant d'opinion d'avec la Cour du Banc de la Reine que sur un seul point, cette Cour ne croit pas devoir entrer dans la consideration d6taill6e de toutes les questions que pr6sente cette cause. Ele se bornera en cons6quence A exprimer son concoura dans ceux des motifs du jugement qu'elle approuve, en limitant ses observations A la seule question sur laquelle il y a divergence d'opinion.

En donnant gain de cause aux appelants, Pilon el al, quant A la totalit6 de l'obligation de 840 frs., dont moiti6 appartenait & Scholastique Neveu, comme sa part dans cette somme qui-6tait un conquet de sa 16re communaut6, la Cour du Banc de la Reine donne par la, sans restriction, son approbation A la premibre proposition des appelants, savoir, qu'aucune partie des biens-meubles provenant d'une premibre communaut6 ne peut tomber dans une seconde.

Cette Cour ne saurait admettre cette proposition g6n6rale, qui, si elle 6tait fond6e, comporterait une prohibition absolue A la femme et au mari qui passent A de secondes noces de faire entrer en communaut6 aucune partie quelconque des biens de leur premidre communaut6.

II est indubitable que 1'6dit des secondes noces et l'article 279 Coutume de Paris ont apport6 des restrictions importantes aux donations et avantages que peut faire A son conjoint la personne qui passe A de secondes noces.

Ces prohibitions sont : lo. Qu'une veuve ayant enfants d'un premier on autres subs6quents mariages ne peut, en se remariant donner A son mari, directement on indirectement par personnes interpos6es, plus que la part de 1'un de ses enfants le moins prenant,-2o. Ni donner sucune partie des biens qui lai proviennent des lib6ra- 1its de ses pr~c6dents maris avec lesquels elle a en des enfants auxquels elle est tenue de r6server ces biens, -3o. Ni aucunement disposer des conquets faits aves 'BRET. ses pr6c6dents maris au pr6judice des portions dont les . enfalits des dits pr6c6dents mariages pouvaient h6riter de leur mare.

La premiare de ces prohibitions n'a aucune application A cette cause, car il n'a pas 6t6 fait donation de part d'enfant par Scholastique Neveu, A son second mari, J. Bte. Lacombe.

La 26me interdisant A la femme de ne rien donner de ce qui lui provient des lib6ralit6a de ses pr&6cdents maris et 1'obligeant A lea r6server pour ses enfants, s'applique A la moiti6 des 840 francs dont S. Neves eat devenue propribtaire par la lib6ralit6 de son premier mari. Le transport 6tant de la somme de 840 frs. doit en cons6quence Atre d6clar6 nul pour la moiti6, comme 6tant fait en contravention A cette prohibition. L'autre moiti6 lui appartenant par son droit de communaut6 pouyait, sous certaines restrictions expliqu6es ci-apris, tomber dans la seconde communaut6.

La 8me, qui est une extension de 1'6dit, d6fend & la femme de rien donner de sea conquets A ses seconds et autres subs6quents maris au pr6judice des enfants des pr6c6dents mariages. La jurisprudence, dit Pothier A ce sujet (No. 636, Mariage) est conforme A 1'esprit de 1'art. 279. Il faut cependant remarquer qu'il y a une diff6rence consid6rable entre cette dernibre prohibition et la seconde. Elle restreint, il eat vrai, la libert6 de la femme A disposer de ses conquets, mais elle ne constitue pas sur cette esp~ce do biens une substitution 16gale comme celle 6tablie par le second chef A '6gard des biens dont la feinme qui as remarie a t6 avantag6e par sea pr6c6dents maria. Maio cette d6fense de donner de sea conquets peut-elle. tre interpr6te comme interdisant A la femme le droit de faire entrer dans une seconde communaut6 aucune partie de ses biens-mobiliers provenant d'une premiere?

La Cour du Bano la Reine semble avoir admis l'affirmative; car en d6clarant que la moiti6 F ndes 840 frs. appartenant a S. Neveu pour sa part dans le conquet de la premibre communaut6, n'avait pu pour aucune partie 'quelconque 6tre valablement transport6e par Lacombe, c'6tait effectivement d6ecider qu'aucune partie de cette somme n'avait pu lui appartenir par son droit de communaut6.

O'est admettre la premibre proposition des appelants qu'aucuns biens d'une premikre communaut6 ne peuvent tomber dans une seconde. O'est sur ce point seulement que part la divergence d'opinion entre cette cour et celle du Banc de la Reine. Au soutien de cette partie du jugement lea appelants citent un arr~t du 4 mars 1691, rendu sur lea conclusions du chancelier Daguesseau qui 1'aurait ainsi dcid6. Est-ce bien la question qui a 6t6 jug6e ? La lectire de cet fait voir que les appelants lui out donn6 une plus grande port6e que celle qu'il doit avoir. Cet arrt a jug6 que le terme " conquet," dans la dernibre partie de l'art. 279, comprend le mobilier comme l'immobilier acquis pendant la dur6e d'une communaut6,lors qu'il s'agit de 1'ex6cution de 1'6dit des secondes noces, et de l'art. 279 de la Coutume de Paris concernant les donations et avantages prohib6s.

Cette doctrine est sans doute correcte; mais elle n'a pas l'effet de prohiber la communaut6 l6gale dans le cas de secondes noces. ni par cons6quent d'emp~cher que des biens-meubles provenant d'une premibre communaut6 ne puissent entrer dans une seconde. ne faut pas non plus perdre de vue que dans le cas de cet arret, comme dans lea autres que l'on trouve sur le sujet, il s'agissait toujours de donations et de lib~ralit6s faites contrairement A l'6dit et A 1'art.- 279 et dont la r6duction 6tait demand6e.

AMerlin au mot Noces, secondes, le dit positivement: L'interdiction ne s'applique qu'aux actes de donation pure.

Dans le cas actuel les appelants ne demandent pas la reduction d'une lib6ralit6 qui leur a caus6 du pr6judice; Pu.ov ce qu'ils demandent c'est la nallit6 absolue du transport Ban Ey. des arr6rages de rente et de la somme de 840 frs. sur le principe qu'aucuns biens-mobiliers d'ane premibre com- Fournier, J. munaut6 ne peuvent, sans violation de l'art. 279, entrer dans une seconde.

Mais cet article, en d6fendant A la femme de disposer de ses conquets au pr6judice de ses enfants, la prive-t-elle du droit de contracter une communaut6 l6gale et la facult6 d'y faire entrer une partie quelconque de ses biens-mobiliers lui est-elle aussi interdite? Certainement non.

Les autorit6s suivantes le prouvent en mme temps qu'elles 6tablissent que la seule restriction A cette communaut6 est que la femme n'y peut pas apporter plus que son mari, sans faire A celui-ci un avantage que la loi ne frappe pas de nullit6 absolue, mais qu'elle d6clare seulement sujet A reduction, s'il en r6sulte un pr6judice pour les enfants.

Pothier-Mariage, No 550:

La communaut6 de biens qui est 6tablie entre une veuve et son second mari, est une esp~ce de contrat de soci6t6, qui ne renferme aucun avantage au profit du second mari, loraqu'it a apport6 autant que sa femme; mais loraque Papport est in4gal et que la veuve a apport6 plus que n'a apport6 le second mari; ainsi, si la femme a apport6 4,000 en communaut6, et que le second mari n'en ait apport6 que 1,000 ; cette in6galit6 forme au profit du second mari un avantage sujet & la r6duction de 16dit. Cet avantage est de la moiti6 de ce que Ia femme a apport6 de plus que lui.

Pothier-Contrat de mariage, No 551 :

Dans la communaut6 14gale, qui a lieu loreque les parties ne se sont pas expliqu6es sur la communaut6, ou lorequ'il n'y a pas du tout de contrat do mariage, si le mobilier de la femnme, qui est entr6 dans cette communaut6 16gale, 6tait beaucoup plus consid6rable que celui du second mari, cette in4galit6 serait-elle cens6e faire un avantage au profit du second mari, sujet & la r6duction de 'Edit, de meme que Fin6galith d'apport qui se trouve dans la communaut6 conventionnelle ?..................il est constant dans Pusage qu'il y est aujet, de meme que celui qui r6sulte de Fin6galit6 des apports dans le cas de la communaut6 conventionnelle.

Itp. Merlin-Vo. Noces (secondes) :

Bnu i.

XIV.-La stipulation de communaut6 de biens, lorsque lea ape.

ports sont 6gaux, n'est pas un avantage, elle en eat un lorsque les PLoI apports sont in4gaiix de Ia part du second mari on de Ia seconde Fournier, j. femme. L'avantage eat de la moiti6 de ce que l'autre 6poux a apport6 de plus. Ainsi, partage 6gal de la communaut6 ne peut se faire. qu'apras avoir d4falqu6 lea apports de part et d'autre.

XV.-La communaut6 l6gale qui s'opAre en vertu de la Coutume et sans contrat de mariage, devient aussi un objet de reduction; si le mobilier de la veuve eat plus consid6rable que celui du second 6poux, lPin6galit6 fait au profit de celui-ci un avantage comme Fin&galit6 des apports dans la communaut6 atipul~e. Cet avantage eat 6galement sujet au retranchement, car quoique le second mari ne semble le tenir que de la loi qui a d6termin6 la communaut6 et lea biens qui la composent, cependant comme il d6pend des 6poux d'adopter ou non lea dispositions de Ia Coutume A cet 6gard, et qu'ils ne peuvent Padopter sans une convention tacite, c'est de cette convention, de ce consentement tacite de la femme et non de -Ia loi, que le second 6poux eat cens6 tenir imm6diatement ces avantages. La veuve en ne se r6servant pas sea propres, comme elle le pouvait, et en laissant tomber A dessein dans la communaut6 ce qu'elle avait de plus en mobilier que son second mari, eat cens6 lui avoir fait en cela le m~me avantage que celui qui eat fait dans le cas d'une communaut6 conventionnelle, lorsque la femme y apporte plus que lui; et il eat 6galement sujet A la rduction de l'6dit. C'est dans sens qu'il faut entendre Parr~t du 29 janvier 1658 qui a jug6, dit Denizart, " que la communaut6 6tablie par la Coutume entre conjoints par mariage, se trouvant excessive de la part de celui des deux conjoints qui s'est remari6, eat un avantage indirect au profit de 'autre, sujet A la r~duction en faveur des enfants du premier lit, et qui'apr4s Ia r6duction faite, le surplus de Ia communaut6 se doit partager entre ces enfants et le survivant des conjoints.

Merlin, p. 556, vol. 8:

XIV. La stipulation de Ia communaut6 de biens, loreque lea apports sont 6gaux n'est pas un avantage; elle en eat un lorsque lea apports sont in6gaux de lapart du second mari ou de la seconde femme. L'avantage eat de la moiti6 de ce que lautre 6poux a apport6 de plus.

XV. La communaut6 qui s'ophre en vertu de la Coutume et sans contrat de mariage devient aussi un sujet de r6duction; si le mobilinr de la veuve eat plus consid~rable que celui du second 4poux, Pin~galit6 fait au profit de celui-ci un avantage, comme lin6galit6 des apports dans la communaut6 stipul~e.

Cet avantage eat 6galement sqjet au retranchement.

Arr~ts de Brillon. V.*Avantage, p. 304 entre part D'aprbs lea autorit6s cit6es, il est 6vident qu'en 1'absence d'un contrat de mariage il y a eu communaut6 de biens suivant la loi entre T.

Quant A 1'obligation de 840 francs, il y a une distinction A faire.

S. Neves en 6tait propri6taire pour une moiti6 comme sa part dans cette cr6ance provenant de la premibre communaut6.

Cette moiti6 d'apris lea autorit6s cit6es est entr6e dans la seconde communaut6, mais sujette A la condition d'Atre r6duite au cas ou elle constituerait un avantage au profit de son second mari. Quant A l'autre moiti6, comme il faut conclure d'apr6s lea faits de la cause, que S. Neveu en 6tait devenue propri6taire A titre de lib6ralit6 de la part de son premier mari, elle eat rest6e en dehors de la communaut6.

Non-seulement la loi (le 2nd chef de 1'6dit,) lui faisait d6fense absolue d'en avantager son second mari, mais elle 6tablit sur lea biens qui lui proviennent de. cette manibre une substitution en faveur de sea enfants. Ainsi, il y a eu, dans ce cas, substitution en faveur d'Addlaide Pilon de cette moiti6 des 840 francs qui n'a pu entrer dans la communaut6.

A la mort de sa mbre, donnant ouverture A cette substitution, elle est devenue propri6taire de cette somme que, d'aprbs la loi, elle est cens6e tenir de son p6re et non de sa mbre.

L'autre moiti6 des 840 francs, c'est-A-dire 420 franca, 6tant entr6e dans la 2nde communaut6, J.-Bte. Lacombe on a acquis une moiti6 par son droit de communaut6, c'est-A-dire 210 francs, 6gal A $35.

Si 1'entr6e de cette rum;

somme dans la communaut6 exc6dait ce que Lacombe y aait apport6, Addlaide Pilon aurait pu en demander la r6duction. Mais pour cela il aurait fallu plaider et FournierJ~prouver quels avaient t6 les apports respectifs des con. joints et constater qu'il y avait eu de la part de S. Neveu un exc6dant sujet A reduction.

Rien de cela n'a 6t0 fait.

n'a 6t6 ni all6gu6 ni prouv6 que S. Nevew ait fait des apports plus consid6rables que son second mari.

D'aprbs la preuve tous ses biens n'auraient consist6 que dans les deux seuls articles en question en cette cause, Ia rente viagbre et 840 francs. Il n'a t6 fait aucune preuve des apports du mari, mais il est assez facile de constater par le transport meme dont la nullit6 est demand6e que ceux qu'il a faits devaient 6tre an moins 6gaux i ceux de sa femme. En effet, par cot acte il transporte d Lalonde en outre de 840 francs et des arr~rages do la rente de diverses autres sommes, savoir : 5,200 francs et tous les int6rAts 6chus; 300 francs de rente viagre A lui due personnel. lement en vertu d'un acte ant6rieur i son mariage avec S.Neveu, et tons les arrerages de cette rente. En l'absence d'une preuve positive constatant les apports, on ne peut pas pr6sumer qu'il y ait en in6galit6, seule condition qui aurait pu faire maintenir une demande pour cette moiti6 des 840 francs.

Comme propri6taire par droit de communaut6 d'un quart des 840 francs, J.-Ble. Lacombe pouvait en faire le transport & Lalonde sans tomber sons I'effet d'aucunes restrictions, pas plus sons celles de l'6dit que sous celles du code. Pour ces motifs le jugement de la cour du Banc de la Reine devrait 6tre reform6 et un quart des 840 frs. devrait 6tre ajout6 & la somme dont Lacombe pouvait disposer.

Quant aux arr6rages de la rente viagbre, cette cour est d'opinion pour lea raisons donn6es par Sir A. A. .Dorion, qu'ils sont entr6s dans la seconde communaut6. Les autorit6s sont d'accord Ai consid6rer que pendant le mariage tous les revenus, de quelques sources qu'ils proviennent, tombent dans la communaut6. Le second mari n'est pas consid6r4 avantag6 par le surplus de revenus que sa femme apporte & la communaut6. Fournier, J. Pothier, au No 552:

n'est n'est et oest et entreront tout Ricard decide qu'en ce cas, quoique le second mari profite des revenus de ]a femme, n~anmoins, cette communaut6 n'est point r6put6e un avantage qui puisse 6tre r~ductible suivant 1'6dit. Merlin, rep. vo., Secondes noces, dit pr6cis6ment la m~me chose. On trouve dans les arrts de Britton, vo. Avantage, p. 305, qu'il a t jug6, au sujet d'une rente viag~re remplagant un conqubt, que cette jouissance, 6tant un droit qui s'6teint par la mort du mari, ne pouvait former Pobjet d'une demande en indemnit6.

est clair d'aprbs les autorit6s que les prohibitions de 1'6dit des secondes noces et de l'art. 279 ne s'appliquent pas aux arr6rages de la rente en question.

Ainsi d'aprbs les autorit6s cit~es le transport est valable pour la part qui appartenait i Lacombe dans les cr6ances transport~es, savoir : moiti6 des arr6rages de la rente viagbre-et moitiA de 420 frs, partie de 1'obligation de 1811, tomb6e dans la communaut6.

II eat nul pour partie comme contraire an second chef de l'6dit des secondes noces, pour te moiti6 de 840 frs, qui 6tait une lib6ralit6 de son premier marn que S. Neveu 6tait tenue de r6server i son enfant. Mais ind6pendamment de 1'6dit, ce transport est encore nul pour toute la part de [VOL. v. S. Neves dans les cr6ances en question comme tant en contravention aux articles 1260 et 1265 Code Civil V* concernant 1'irr6vocabilit6 des conventions matrimoniales, et comme constituant un avantage indirect con- Fourne, J*f6r6 par la dite S. Neves. Sur ce point qui forme le sujet de la troisibme proposition des appelants, cette cour partageant l'opinion de Sir A A. Dorion, se borne A la citer comme une r6ponse compl6te aux arguments contraires de l'Intim6.

There remains, however, the prohibitions of articles 282 and 283 of the Custom of Paris (articles 1260, 1266 and 774 of the Civil Code) that after marriage, the marriage covenants cannot be altered, nor can the consorts confer any benefits by acts inter vivo upon each other, except by means of life insurances. In the face of these prohibitions Scholastique Neveu could not transfer her share in the second community, nor in the life-rent or arrears thereof, which formed part of the second community, to her husband, for this would have been altering the conditions of their marriage, by conferring upon him a pecuniary advantage.

She was equally forbidden from transferring them to any of his descendants, who in that case are, by law, considered as persons interposed to secure indirectly to the husband a benefit which cannot be conferred to him directly. (Civil Coae 774).

It has been said that the above rules merely apply to gratuitous contracts and tiat the transfer to Lalonde was made for a valuable consideration, but the consideration mentioned in the deed, that Lalonde should take charge of his own father and mother, the latter being the daughter of Lacombe, is one which was altogether for the advantage of Lacombe and his family; and in which the wife Scholastique INeteu had no interest whatsoever, since she was not bound by law to contribute to the maintenance of the children of her husband by a first marriage.

(Civil Code, art. 1304).

Pour terminer il ne reste plus que quelques mots a dire sur les propositions des intim6s. La premibre, savoir qu'il n'y a aucune diff6rence entre une communaut6 ordinaire et une seconde, n'6tant que la contre-partie de celle des appelants, la r6ponse se trouve d6jA donn6e par les autorit6s ci-dessus cit6es 6tablissant quelles sont les restrictions apport6es par la loi a une seconde communaut6. 11 en est de m6me de leur pr6tention que l'autorit6 du mari est la meme sur les biens d'une seconde communaut6 que sur ceux d'une premibre. La r6ponse se trouve ' rx dans la citation de l'opinion de Sir Dorion, d6montrant clairement que les articles 1265 et 774, Code Civil, ne reconnaissent pas au mari une autorit6 aussi 6tendu'e sur lea biens de la communaut6 que les intimbs le pr6tendent.

La dernibre question d'aprbs 1'ordre ci-dessus indiqu6 et qui aurait di ^tre la premisre, si elle devait 6tre r6solue en faveur des Intim6s, est celle de l'abolition des prohibitions de 1'6dit des secondes noces et de Particle 279 de la Coutume de Paris. L'Intim6 pr6tend que ces restrictions ont ts abolies d'abord par le statut de 1801 qui a introduit la libert6 illimit6e de tester, puis ensuite par 1'acte 764 0.0., auquel il attribue un effet retroactif. Le statut de 1801 a sans doute proclam6 la libert6 ilimit6e de tester, et fait disparaitre toutes lea incapacitba de recueillir des legs i l'exception de celle concernant les mains-mortes. Mais cette r6gle n'est pas 6tendue ; la facult6 de donner entrevifa dans des cas oA elle 6tait interdite. La loi eat resthe ce qu'elle 6tait A cot 6gard. Aprbs la passation de ce statut, les biens d'une personne d6c6dant &b intestat 6taient encore sujets aux r6serves coutumibres et aux autres restrictions introduites par l'4dit et Particle 279. Pour exercer la facult6 introduite par le statut de 1801 et 6tre affranchi de toutes restrictions existantes auparavant il fallait disposer de ses biens par testament. C'est ce que la cour du Bano de la Reine a d6cid6 dans la cause de Quintin vs. Girard le premier mars 1858,

Ni ce pr6cdent ni le statut no peuvent avoir d'application an cas actuel, parce que la disposition dont il s'agit en cette cause a t6 faite par acte entrevifa, savoir par le transport du 21 fAvrier 1870.

Quant ' 1'art. 764, Code Civil, il eat bien vrai qu'il d6clare " que les prohibitions et restrictions des dona- "tions par un futur conjoint dans le cas de secondes "noces n'ont plus lieu,"-mais cette d6claration peut- F elle avoir un effet r6troactif et affecter des actes qui ont R6 accomplis avant sa promulgation ? Non, car Part. 2,618 d6clare que la loi en force avant le Cbde r6git les actes faits ant6rieurement

A sa promulgation. Et d'ailleurs, c'est un principe bien reconnu que les droits des 6poux sont irr6vocablement fix6s par le mariage; que c'est aux lois alors en force on aux conventions matrimoniales des parties qu'il faut recourir pour les d6terminer en ce qui concene les droits acquis Nul doute qu'a l'6poque de leur maiage, J.-Bte. Lacombe et S. Neveu 6taient soumis a toutes les prohibitions cidessus mentionn~es de l'6dit et de Part. 279. Les droits alors acquis entre eux doivent 6tre r6gis par ces lois. Mais en doit-il 6tre de m~me des r6serves faites on faveur des enfants; peut-on les considbrer comme des droits acquis avant le d6chs de leur m6re ? Les anteurs d~clarent qu'ils n'ont encore qu'une expectative qui ne peut se raliser que dans le cas o-i ils lui survivront (2). Lorsque la loi leur accordant conditionnellement ces r6serves est ensuite chang6e, comme elle l'a 6t6dans ce cas par Part. 764 0.0., le conjoint auquel ces restrictions 6taient -impos6es est-il par lk m6me rendu capable d'en disposer ?

est g6n6ralement admis que leg lois concernant la capacit6 des personnes prennent leur effet A dater de leun promulgation et n'ont point d'effet r6troactif (3). Mais ce principe ne saurait avoir d'application a cette cause.

Que S. Neveu ait 6t0 on non, lors du transport du 21 f6vrier 1870, rendue, par 1'art. 164, capable de disposer de ses biens par acte entrevifs sans 6gard aux (3) 1, restrictions de 1'6dit et de l'art. 279, c'est une question que les faits de cette cause ne permettent pas aux Intim6s de soulever ici. En serait-il autrement, s'il s'agissait d'une disposition que S.

Neveu aurait Four-ir, J. faite A d'autres qu'd son mari ? On pourrait probablement alors se demander si ce n'est pas la loi en force le 21 f6vrier 1870 qui devrait tre appliqu.e et non pas celle en force lors de leur mariage. Cette question est toute diff~rente de celle que soulve le transport dont il s agit en cette cause, et la cour pour cette raison s'abstient d'exprimer aucune opinion A cet 6gard. Quant L 1'effet du transport sur cette cause on pourrait m6me admettre ivec les Intim6s 1'abolition des restrictions de 1'6dit et de l'art. 279, sans quo le r6sultat leur fit plus favorable.

En effet, ces restrictions disparues, ne reste-t-il pas celles des art. 1200, 1265 et 774 auxquelles il est manifestement contraire'?

L'art. 764 permet bien aux conjoints dans le cas do secondes noces de s'avantager sans 6gards aux restrictions ci-devant existantes. Mais la facult6 qu'il leur donne ne pout Atre 4xerc6e qu'au moment o6 ils rbglent leurs conventions matrimoniales.

C'est aux futurs conjoints qu'elle est donn6e et non pas aux 6poux. Une fois le mariage conclu, les conjoints tombent sous 1'effet de l'art. 1265 qui leur d6fend de faire aucun changement aux conventions matrimoniales. Ainsi, le. transport doit, ind6pendamment de '6dit et de l'art 279, 6tre d6clar6 nul pour la part de Scholastique Neveu, comme 6tant fait en contravention A l'art. 1265.

Pour toutes ces raisons, cette cour est d'avis que 1'appel de Pilon et al, vs. Brunet -. et al, doit 6tre renvoy6 avec d6pens en. faveur des Intim6s. Et quant & I'appel de Brunet et al, vs. Pilon et at, cette cour 4tant d'opinion qu'une partie de la somme de 840 francs, savoir un quart, eat devenue la propri6t6 de J. Bte. Lacombe, par son droit de communaut6 avec Scholastique Neveu, le transport