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Champion v. World Building Co.

(1914) 50 SCR 382 Court SCC Decision date 1914-11-30 English

Decision Majority · DUv J. (dissenting)

Contents

Majority

A
1-- 1APPELLANTS; *Oct.
ANOTHER
(PLAINTIFFS) .............
*Nov.
AND
THE WORLD BUILDING COM- PANY AND OTHERS (DEFENDANTS).
RESPONDENTS. APPEAL FROM THE OF APPEAL FOR BRITISH DAVIEs J.-A motion to quash this appeal was and argued before us by Mr. Robinson on the . ground that this action was one originating in the County Court of British Columbia under the "Mechanics' Lien Act," and that in such actions the jurisdiction of the County Court was exclusive and not concurrent with the Supreme Court of that province. Our jurisdiction to hear appeals not originating in a Superior Court is defined in section 37 of the "Suprene Court Act" and an appellant must, of course, bring himself within that section in order to justify his appeal.
The two conditions necessary to give us jurisdiction are first that "the sum or value of the matter in dispute" should amount to $250 or upwards; and, secondly, that the court of first instance, in the present case the County Court, should possess concurrent jurisdiction with a Supreme Court.
The amount in dispute is large, several thousands of dollars, and it is contended that so far as defendants' personal liability is concerned there is concurrent jurisdiction in both courts.
In one sense that may be true, because as an inci- (lent -to successfully maintaining his action for a lien the County Court must adjudge the amount for which the lien shall be declared to exist or apply and the Supreme Court of the province had, apart from the lien, undoubted jurisdiction in a personal action for any amount.
But it seems to me that the true construction section 37 of the Act establishing this court is that the "concurrent jurisdiction" there spoken of as essential to our entertaining an appeal is one in all the essentials of the action.
J.
Now this action is one for a lien for whatever amount might be found due the plaintiff. The County Court possessed exclusive jurisdiction under the "Mechanics' Lien Act" to entertain such an action. The determination of the amount for which the lien was to stand was no doubt a most important incident in the action and by section 35 of that Act an appeal was given from the County Court judge where the judgment exceeded $250, as in ordinary cases to the appeal court of the province.
By virtue of this appeal the Court of Appeal has jurisdiction over the whole case and may deliver the judgment which the County Court judge should have given.
But such an appellate jurisdiction does not interfere in any way with the exclusive jurisdiction of the County Court over the lieil action up to the time of the appeal.
The essential ingredient therefore necessary to give an appeal to this court is wanting, namely, the possession by a superior court of jurisdiction concurrent with the County Court in suits to give effect to mechanics' liens.
I think the motion to quash should be granted with costs.
J.-These suits were instituted under the "Mechanics' Lien Act" in a County Court in British Columbia to enforce an alleged mechanic's lien nuder the said Act.
The 34th section of that Act is as follows:- Upon the hearing of any claim for a lien, the court or judge may, far as the parties before him, or any of them, are debtor WL and creditor, give judgment against the former in favour of the latter for any indebtedness or liability arising out of the claim, in the same manner as if such indebtedness or liability had been sued upon in the County Court in the ordinary way, without reference to Idington J. this Act.
And judgment may given for the sum actually due, notwithstanding such sum may exceed the ordinary jurisdiction the County Court.
The County Court gave judgment for the sum of $6,000 against the respondent and also declared the plaintiffs entitled to a mechanic's lien to secure said sum and costs in one of the actions now before us but dismissed the other action and a cross action. Thereupon appellants appealed to the Court of Appeal, which dismissed the appeal with costs. The appellants appeal from that judgment to this court and respondents move to quash the appeal on the ground that the appeal cannot fall within section 37, sub-sec. (b) of the "Supreme Court Act" which is as follows:- (b) In the Provinces of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, British Columbia and Prince Edward Island, if the sum or value of the matter in dispute amounts to two hundred and fifty dollars or upwards, and in which the court first instance possesses concurrent jurisdiction with a superior court.
The question thus raised turns upon the meaning of the phrase:- In which the court of first instance possesses concurrent jurisdiction with superior court.
It occurs to me that in every case one can think of the superior court would have jurisdiction to hear and try the causes within the general jurisdiction of the County Court and thus in a sense they have con- * current jurisdiction in all cases falling within the general jurisdiction of the County Court.
happens that when a suitor goes into the superjor court with a claim suable in a County Court he is Jin some cases punished by deprivation of costs for so doing, but that does not deprive the superior court of jurisdiction even if the County Court has jurisdiction. It would seem that this sort of concurrent jurisdiction limited to claims over $250 was what was primii facie aimed at in the 37th section of the "Supreme Court Act."
Then we find two special subjects in probate and equitable jurisdiction assigned to the County Courts, but in the delimitation of the nature of the actions these courts may so entertain they are specially declared to have as to such actions concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court of the province.
When we turn to the "County Courts Act" we find in the 40th section thereof the following:- This is followed by twelve sub-sections defining a great many classes of matters and suits in respect thereof to be dealt with thereunder.
A mechanies' lieu is not one of these. There is in sub-section (3) the following:- The words "or lien" so used d"i not imply a mechanics' lien I imagine. And if they (lid it would only be one up to $2,50(, which would not help in this case to give jurisdiction here.
Then we have section 34 of the "Mechanics' Lien Act," which is quoted above and shews clearly a special jurisdiction not falling within the general jurisdiction of the County Court or within this sub-seetion or related thereto in any way.
I think we must conclude that this special jurisdiction not expressly designated as are others "concurrent" was not intended to be a concurrent jurisdiction or what was aimed at in section 37, sub-sec. (b) of the "Supreme Court Act" as being an exercise of a concurrent jurisdiction.
The power to award a judgment for the debt forms a mere incident to the creation of a special jurisdiction or mode of procedure to be followed out thereunder and not otherwise, but confined within the provision of the Act giving same.
Only such appeals as the special jurisdiction and remedy given permit can be availed of by those resorting thereto for the benefits to be got by invoking same. I think the point well taken and that the motion ought to prevail with costs.

DUv J. (dissenting)

.- Section 34 of the "Mechanics' Lien Act" (R.S.B.C., ch. 154), is as follows:- The effect of this section is that a plaintiff suing to enforce mechanics' lien may at the same time, and under the same summons, proceed with his action to enforce the pecuniary obligations in person am arising W, out of the contract express or implied upon which his claim to a mechanics' lien is based. It is a condition of the jurisdiction of the County Court that the "indebtedness or liability" thus sought to be enforced should arise "out of the claim" which is alleged to be the foundation of the mechanics' lien; but, the conditions being satisfied, the jurisdiction, having once arisen, is a jurisdiction concurrent with that of the Supreme Court in respect of the like action.
Here we seem clearly enough to have a case in which the "court of first instance possesses concurrent jurisdiction with a superior court" within the meaning of section 37 of the "Supreme Court Act." J..-The plaintiffs sued in the County Court of Vancouver to recover the sum of $9,930 and for the establishment and enforcement of mechanics' lien in respect thereof. Jurisdiction to entertain such an action is conferred on the County Courts of British Columbia by the R.S.B.C. (1911), chapter 154. Judgment was awarded the plaintiffs for $6,000, for which they were declared pntitled to a lien. An appeal by the plaintiffs to the Court of Appeal to have the amount of the judgment increased and a cross-appeal by the defendants to have the action dismissed were both unsuccessful.
The plaintiffs have taken a further similar appeal to this court, and the defendants a like cross-appeal.
The defendants now move to quash the plaintiffs' appeal'for want of jurisdiction. The plaintiffs assert that they have a right of appeal under section 37 (b) of the "Supreme Court Act," which is as follows:- Notwithstanding the awkward grammatical construction of clause (b), I think it reasonably clear that the antecedent of the relative pronoun "which" in its concluding member is "the action, suit, cause, matter or other judicial proceeding" mentioned in the earlier part of the section.
That this is the correct construction of the clause is made certain by comparison with the French version, in which the concluding member reads
In order that there should be jurisdiction in this court under section 37(b) "the action, suit, cause, matter or other judicial proceeding" instituted in the inferior court must also be within the jurisdiction of a superior court in the province. It does not suffice that in respect to some part of an action, some claim made in it, or some relief which may be accorded there is concurrent jurisdiction in both the superior and inferior courts.
The jurisdiction must be concurrent over the action as a whole.
In the present instance the jurisdiction of the inferior court is exclusive as to the claim of mechanics' lien.
It is the existence of this claim which is the foundation of the County Court jurisdiction. It is only as incidental to an action in which such a claim asserted that the County Court is given an extended personal jurisdiction.
I am convinced that in a mechanics' lien action, which the superior court could not entertain, the County Court cannot be said to possess concurrent jurisdiction with the superior court merely because in such an action the former court may give a personal judgment for debt could have been, and must have been, sought in the superior court, if sued for alone.
I am, therefore, of the opinion that the motion to quash should be granted with costs.
I find nothing, however, to warrant the view suggested that jurisdiction under section 37(b) is confined to cases in which the jurisdiction of the inferior court is explicitly declared, either by the statute conferring it or by some other statutory provision, to be concurrent with that of a superior court. Clause (b) applies to four. provinces.
The introduction into it of such a limitation would probably preclude an appeal in many cases in which it was intended that the right should exist.
Appeal quashed with costs.

Statutes and regulations cited