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Grand Trunk Pacific Ry. Co. v. Pickering

(1914) 50 SCR 393 Court SCC Decision date 1914-11-30 English

Contents
APPELLANTS; *Oct. 21.22. ANTS)..
.........................
*Nov. 30. ARTHJUR GODFREY PICKERING
R
(PLAINTIFF) .....................
APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR MANITOBA. IINGrox J.-The respondent was at work under his engine which, with a train of eighteen or more cars, was standing on a branch of the Canadian Northern Railway at a station in Manitoba when those in charge one of appellant's engines ran some three cars into said branch to connect them with said train. This was done without warning and with such violence that
It moved the whole train and injured the respondent who recovered a verdict and judgment against appellant therefor.
Appellant contends it cannot be held liable for the acts of the men occasioning such injury. It appealed to the Court of Appeal for Manitoba and the appeal was dismissed, Mr. Justice Richards dissenting. The appellant admits sending its men with the engine and a caboose and other cars to leave the latter in the yard of the Canadian Northern and to bring out a car which was loaded with freight to be taken over appellant's line. The car to be brought out was found attached to three other cars in a siding in said yard. Those had to be shunted about to accomplish this purpose.
-It seems to me clear that men on such an errand could not of their own volition have undertaken to shunt these cars about in any way seeming best to themselves without consulting those in charge in said yard.
Prima facie it would be the yardmaster who could and perhaps should direct what is to be done. It is said he requested the appellant's men to move the cars in question to a point on the main line and an engine would be along to pick up the three other cars, and they proceeded accordingly to get the car they were after by the several movements needed to accomplish it and had when done -these other remaining cars standing on the main line when some one suggested they connect them with the train I have referred to on the branch line and they did so accordingly without any notice to the men in charge thereof and thus injured respondent.
It is urged that in doing so they were acting beyond the scope of their duty and without authority and hence appellant is not liable for their negligence. It is quite clear that to have left the cars on the main line at the time when the express train was expected, and that other engine expected to take charge of them was not there to do so, would have been unjustifiable and possibly disastrous.
They did what seems to have been needed for the convenience of the Canadian Northern people and themselves in order that the business in hand should J. be most readily and rapidly discharged and they be enabled to get off with despatch out of the yard and end their errand.
I am not disposed to follow in all its mazes the other shunting it is suggested they might have done and the possibility of their running over some other man than the one they did, and still less the mass contradictions between the witnesses and variations of story on the part of some, for I am quite sure they acted in the course of their master's business and used the judgment which impliedly they had a right to use under the circumstances, but happened to be negligent therein for which the master must suffer.
No master ever gave his men authority to act negligently, and every man who does gets beyond the scope of his authority in a sense, but the unfortunate master has to bear that burden as far as others are concerned.
If the case called for it I think a good deal might be said in regard to what section 317 of the "Railway
Act" requires of each railway company and impliedly of those entrusted by any railway company with any part of the duty thereby imposed.
Again the several movements forward and backward would have had to be taken no matter into what siding they involved entering, and this evidence bearing upon the relation of sidings in question is of such conflicting character as to reduce the question to one for the jury, who may merely have found that appellant's men were reduced to exercising their judgment to extricate themselves from their difficulties and . properly chose this siding or branch as result, and acting thereon acted negligently.
In any way one can look at it and counsel, fertile in resources, has induced me to look at it in a good many ways it all comes back to the responsibility of the master for his servant in executing his master's business, and in that regard appellant must fail. The appeal should -be dismissed with costs. J.-I concur in dismissing this appeal. The only point requiring notice arises out of the contention of the appellant company that the acts of negligence charged are not acts for which they are legally responsible. The substance of the question is whether there was or was not evidence to support a finding by the jury that in fact those acts were done by the employee of the company in course of their employment as the servants of the company. It does not seem to me that there is much to be gained by discussing in detail the exact effect of the evidence.
After carefully considering it I have come to the conclusion that Mr. Coyne's contention must be rejected.
J.-The defendants appeal against the judgment of the Court of Appeal for Manitoba upholding the verdict of a jury finding them liable to 'the plaintiff for damages for personal injuries to the extent of $11,000.
Three main grounds of appeal were urged in this court: 1st, that the trial judge wrongfully refused to put questions to the jury; 2nd, that the evidence established contributory negligence the part of the plaintiff; and 3rd, that the act of the defendants' servants which caused the plaintiff's injuries was not within the scope of their employment. Having regard to the fact that counsel for the de- . fendants asked that certain questions should be put to the jury only after the learned judge had completed J. his charge, to the scope and character of the questions suggested, and to the presentation in the charge to the jury of the issues on which they had to pass, I think it was within the discretion of the learned trial judge to decline to put these questions. Moreover, I cannot see that any miscarriage of justice resulted from his failure to require the jury to answer specific questions.
In support of his contention that contributory negligence was established counsel for the defendants relied on the breach by the plaintiff of Rule 26 of the Canadian Northern Railway Company, in whose employment he was. That rule reads as follows:- Assuming that this rule imposed a duty on the plaintiff something which might very easily be more clearly expressed a perusal of the portion of the charge dealing with the issue of contributory negligence makes it clear that the jury was not asked to find the plaintiff negligent on the ground that he failed to observe Rule 26. No objection was taken to the charge on this ground, and the learned judge was not asked to direct the attention of the jury to the rule. Neither is there any reference to it in the judgments delivered in the Court of Appeal. Other grounds of contributory negligence dealt with in the trial judge's charge were not relied upon at bar in this J. court. I think the defendants are not entitled to have the judgment against them disturbed on this ground. Mr. Coyne's main contention was that in taking three Canadian Northern Railway fruit-cars to the Bird's Hill line the employees were either acting as servants of the Canadian Northern Railway Co. or as volunteers and not in the course of their employment by the defendants.
He also maintained that, if they had been acting within the scope of their duties as employees of the defendants in bringing the cars to the Bird's Hill line, they ceased to so act and were mere volunteers in proceeding to couple them to the Canadian Northern Railway train which was standing there. I think there was evidence to warrant the jury in concluding that, having regard to all the circumstances, the most practical, if not the only practical way of dealing with the three Canadian Northern cars, which was open to the Grand Trunk Pacific crew, in order to secure the Grand Trunk Pacific meat-car which they had been sent to get, was to take all four cars up to the Bird's Hill line as they did.
On Foster's evidence I think it was also open to the jury to find that the Grand Trunk Pacific crew had been requested by him to deliver the three Canadian Northern cars to Thompson for the Canadian Northern Railway Company; there was also evidence to support an inference that it would have been dangerous and improper to have left the three Canadian Northern cars standing the Bird's Hill line without placing them charge of (anadian Northern officials, and that the coupliing of these cars to the Canadian Northern train standing there was a reasonable, if indeed it was not the best, means available to the Grand Trunk Pacific crew to relieve themselves and their employers, the defendants, of all further responsibility in connection with those ears. The jury may well have found that
Thompson requested that the three fruit-cars should be coupled to the Canadian Northern train by the
Grand Trunk Pacific crew as the most convenient means of making delivery of the cars to him as Foster had
I think it was open to the jury to have drawn all these inferences and it must be assumed that they did in fact draw such of them as are necessary to sustain the general verdict which they rendered for the plaintiff. While the testimony on this branch of the case is certainly not as complete or as satisfactory as could be desired, on the whole L am of opinion that it cannot be held that there was no evidence on which a jury could find that what was done by the Grand Trunk Pacific crew was in the course of their employment.
No substantial attack was made by counsel for the appellants on the finding that in the coupling the three fruit-cars with the Canadian Northern train the defendants' servants acted negligently, and upon the evidence, at all events in so far as undue force in making the coupling was charged, such an attack could not very well have been made.
The appeal fails and should be dismissed with costs.
J.-This is the case of a railway accident. The plaintiff, respondent, who is a fireman in the employ of the Canadian Northern Railway Company, was doing some necessary work under his enwhen a Grand Trunk Pacific train came into gine we collision with it. The plaintiff got injured and he sues the Grand Trunk Pacific Railway Company.
A verdict of negligence was rendered by the jury and the judgment was confirmed by the Court of Appeal. We are asked to reverse that decision.
A meat-car had to be switched from a transferyard of the Canadian Northern Railway Company to the Grand Trunk Pacific line and a Grand Trunk Pacific engine went into that yard to get that car. But in order to reach that car the Grand Trunk Pacific people had to shunt some three cars that were in front of that meat-car.
They were asked by the superintendent of the yard to remove those three cars on a certain line. Those cars could just as well be switched in the yard proper or on that line. It was just as convenient for the Grand Trunk Pacific crew to make the shunting at either of those places. In bringing those three cars on the branch line they collided with the plaintiff's train. The impact was done carelessly.
The appellants seek to avoid the liability in stating that the Grand Trunk Pacific crew were not in their course of employment.
When they were in the yard of the Canadian Northern Railway Company the Grand Trunk Pacific crew had to follow the instructions, as to their movements, of the yardmaster. They could perhaps have refused to follow the instructions that were.given to them if they found them unreasonable; but, in this case, no suggestion is made that they were unreasonable.
It is even stated that the removal of those cars on l91 the branch line was a saving of time and work for the
Grand Trunk Pacific crew.
Then those servants were bound to act without w. negligence, and if by their negligent act they caused injury they render their master liable.
J. The verdict is a reasonable verdict in the circumstances and the judgment a quo should be confirmed with costs.
Appeal dismissed with costs.
Solicitor for the appellants: H. H. Hansard.
Solicitors for the respondent: Bonnar, Trueman &
Hollands.

Statutes and regulations cited

  • Unresolved citations
    • section 317