Canadian Northern Quebec Railway Co. v. Gignac

action to restrain the flooding of the plaintiff's land from the defendants' railway . ditch, was maintained the Superior Court and an order made directing the railway company to construct the necessary works to cause the trouble to cease within a time mentioned, failing which the plaintiff authorised to the works at the company's expense. an appeal from this judgment, the Court of Review, of its motion, added more specific directions as to the works to done and, instead authorizing the plaintiff to construct the works, in case default, reserved his recourse for future damages and dismissed the appeal.

that the judgment the Court of Review had confirmed that of the court of first instance and, therefore, an appeal there- Court visions section 40 of the "Supreme Court Act," R.S.C. Hull Electric Co. Clement Can. followed.

MOTIONS to set aside the judgment of the registrar, acting as a judge in chambers, affirming the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Canada to entertain an appeal from the Superior Court, sitting in review, at Quebec, and also to quash the appeal for waint of jurisdiction.

*PRESENT:-Davies, Idington. Duff, Anglin and Brodeur JJ. The respondent moved to set aside the judgment of the registrar and also to quash the appeal for want of jurisdiction on the grounds that, as the judgment of the Court of Review had modified the judgment of the Superior Court, an appeal lay to the Court of King's Bench, appeal side, and, consequently, that an appeal would not lie from that judgment to the Sipreme Court of Canada.

The circumstances of the case are stated in the judgment of the registrar, follows:- THE REGISTRAR:-This is motioi to affirm jurisdiction of the court.

Can non K.C. for motion.

Belleau K.C. contra.

It would appear from the pleadings that the lands of the plaintiff, having been by the works of the defendants compelled to receive imore water than they were by nature called upon -to carry, the plaintiff brought an action in 1911 for redress.

The parties came to an agreement on October 28th, 1911, set out in the statement of claim, which provided for the construction by the defendants of certain drainage works which would relieve the plaintiff from the injuries complained of and the action was thereupon dropped, the defendants paying the costs and damages.

Subsequently the defendants altered the drainage system with the result that the plaintiff's land was again subjected to an overflow of water and the present action was taken in which the plaintiff by the 10th paragraph of his pleadings, declared himself to be the proprietor of the lands in question and, by the 11th, declared that he was not subjected to any servitude with respect to the water now being brought upon his property by the defendants.

He also asked that it be declared that the defendants should make the works necessary to relieve him from the injuries coinplained of and in default of so doing that he, the plaintiff, be authorized to make these works at the cost ana charges of the defendants and that the defendants be ordered to pay damages to the amount of $250. The defendants denied generally the allegations of the plaintiff and also alleged that the works subsequently made by them and which the plaintiff now complains of were so made at his express request and that the result of the works was to carry the water in its natural channel as it existed before the construction of the railway.

The case was tried before the Hon. Mr. Justice Letellier, who gave judgment as follows:- The defendants thereupon inscribed in review where the judgment was confirmed in the following language:- Confirme le dit jugement avec d~pens, sujet a la modification suivante du dispositif qui se lira comme suit:- Nous maintenons l'action et ddclarons que la d6fenderesse n'a iucun droit d'exercer sur la proprite du demandeur la servitude d'4coulement des eaux, lequel resulte des travaux construction du chemin de fer:-Nous ordonnons plus A la d6fenderesse de discontinuer 1'exercice telle servitude et cesser de faire diverser dans foss6 de ligne et les dceharges du demandeur eaux qui s'y 6coulent par suite du talus et du fosse du chemin de fer; et nous ordonnons a la d4fenderesse faire les travaux n~cessaires pour mettre au dit trouble conform6ment a transaction intervenue entre les parties le vingt-huit octobre et a d~faut par elle faire d'hui au premier mai prochain, la Cour reserve au demandeur tout recours pour dommages ultirieurs, et nous condamnons plus la defenderesse A payer au demandeur la somme de deux cent cinquante piastres dommages avec int~rt et les depens l'action.

The defendants now desire to appeal from the judgment of the Court of Review, claiming that no appeal lies to the Court of King's Bench and that an appeal lies to the Supreme Court of Canada under section 40 of the "Supreme Court Act," which reads as follows:- In the Province of Quebec an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment of the Superior Court in Review where that court confirms the judgment of first instance, and its judgment is not appealable to the Court of King's Bench, but is appealable to His Majesty in Council.

It will be perceived that, substantially, the only modifications made by the Court of Review of the judgment of the Superior Court are two:- 1. That while the earlier judgment simply orders that the necessary works be done to put an end to the cause of complaint, the subsequent judgment provides that the manner of doing these works shall be that provided for in the agreement between the parties above referred to and,- 2. That in case of default instead of authorizing the plaintiff to make the works himself, it reserves to him the right of further recourse by action in the event of future damages.

The question between the parties the present motion, therefore, resolves itself shortly into this: Has the judgment in the Court confirmed, although modifying, the judgment below, or has it rectified an error in that judgment ? It is to be noted that the Court of Review expressly uses the words "confirme le dit jugement" and that the modification in question which the plaintiff now claims to be so material to his interests, was not asked for by him by way of a cross-appeal, but was its own motion granted to him by the court as result of the defendants' appeal.

Two cases are cited by the defendants in favour their motion.

The first is Beauchdne v. Labaie(1), a decision of the Court of Queen's Bench of Quebec, which is very much in point.

The judgment turned upon the interpretation which should be placed upon what now appears as article 43(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure of Quebec, which provides that an appeal shall lie to the Court of King's Bench sitting in appeal, except:- In that case upon an appeal -by the defendant from a judgment of the Superior Court the Court of Review said:- Notwithstanding this modification of the judgment of the Superior Court, it was held by the Court of Queen's Bench that the judgment of the court below was confirmed by the judgment of the Court of Review and that no further appeal lay.

The judgment of the Court of King's Bench was affirmed by the Supreme Court, this court holding that the defendant, when dissatisfied with the judgment of the Court Review, should have appealed directly to the Supreme Court, it being a case in which no appeal lay to the Court of King's Bench because the Court of Review had confirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. The plaintiff relies on the case of Fraser v. Barnette (2), but in that case the Court of Review expressly and in terms reversed the judgment of the Superior Court. He also relies upon Simpson v. Palliser(3), but in that case also the Court of Review in terms declared that there was error in the judgment of the Superior Court, and this is the ground upon which the Supreme Court said that no appeal lay from the judgment of the Court of Review to this court, but only to the Court of King's Bench.

appears to me that a review of these decisions Itapa a justifies it being held that where the judgment in review confirms the judgment below in favour of the plaintiff, although some additional or other relief is also given to the plaintiff, not as a result of a crossappeal by him, but by the court of its own motion for the purpose of more effectively carrying out the judgment of the trial judge, no appeal lies to the Court King's Bench by the defendant, and, therefore, an appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court of Canada, if the judgment would have -been the subject of a further appeal to the Privy Council, had the case been a proper subject for an appeal to the Court of King's Bench. In the present case it is admitted that had the judgment in review simply confirmed the judgment below, the case would have been appealable to the King in His Privy Council. This is an action v6gatoire raising an issue with regard to a servitude which under' the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court is a matter concerning "titles to land" and is, therefore, appealable to the Privy Council under article 68, sub-section 2, of the Code of Civil Procedure, and is also appealable to the Supreme Court, where substantially the same language is used in section 46, sub-section (b), of the "Supreme Court Act."

I am, therefore, of the opinion that the jurisdiction of the court should be affirmed.

A motion is now pending returnable on the 1st day of the February session to quash this appeal for want of jurisdiction. I would have refused to entertain the present motion until the court had dealt with the motion to quash were it not that both parties were desirous of having the present motion disposed of because, if I were against the jurisdiction of the court, by the Code of Civil Procedure for launching an appeal from the judgment of the Court of Review to the Court of King's Bench, but the time for taking such proceedings will expire before the 2nd of February. My order as to costs, therefore, will be that the costs of this motion be costs to the defendant in any event of the cause unless the motion to quash is granted, in which event my order affirming jurisdiction will, course, fall.

L. A. Cannon K.C. for the appellants. contra. J.-I concurred with the judgment of this court in the case of Hull Electric Co. v. Oldment(1) only because, as I stated, the settled jurisprudence of the Province of Quebec upon the meaning of sub-section 4 of article 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure Quebec was that a judgment of the Court of Review confirming one of the Superior Court and affirming the right of the plaintiff to recover in the action, but reducing the amount of damages awarded to plaintiff was a confirmation of the judgment of the Court of Review within the meaning of the article of the Code referred to and was not appealable to the Court of King's Bench.

I think the registrar was right in affirming our jurisdiction to hear this appeal direct from the judgment of the Court of Review which confirmed, but modified, that of the Superior Court; and that the appeal from his judgment should be dismissed with costs and the motion to quash the appeal should be refused with costs.

-No absolute rule can, in my opinion, be laid down. The question in each case must be not simply whether there was a formal confirmation of the Superior Court, but whether the modification was a substantial modification of the judgment of the lower court. Here the substantial question in controversy was decided by both courts in respondent's favour; the modification related merely to the manner in -which effect should be given to that judgment.

I think, therefore, that no appeal would, under the jurisprudence of that court, lie to the Court of King's Bench; but, as it is conceded one would lie to the Privy Council, the appeal will lie here.

J.-This appeal seems to me within the principle affirmed by the judgment of this court in Hull Electric Co. v. Cldment (1), and, hence, the motion to quash must be refused and the counter motion of appellant against the ruling of the registrar dismissed, each with costs of motion.

J.-I concur in the result.

J.-In my opinion the jurisdiction of this court to entertain this appeal is settled by Hull Electric Co. Cl6ment(1).

The Court of Review pro tanto affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court against the defendant, and from the judgment so affirmed it has a right of appeal to this court. Unless the plaintiff should launch and maintain a crossappeal the variation of the judgment made by the Court of Review will not be a subject for consideration in this court.

The appellant is entitled to the costs of the motions before us to quash and by way of appeal from the order of the registrar affirming jurisdiction. J.-II s'agit de savoir si nous avons jundiction pour entendre cette cause.

Le demandeur intim6, Gignac, avait, en 1911, institu6 une action n4gatoire contre 1'appelante en alhguant que cette dernibre laissait 6couler sur son terrain des eaux qu'il n'6tait pas tenu de recevoir. Une transaction 6tait intervenue le 28 octobre, 1911, et la compagnie appelante avait reconnu comme bien fond&es les plaintes du demandeur, Gignac, et s'6tait engag6e de faire certains travaux.

Les travaux convenus auraient 6t6 ex6cut6s mais ils furent subs6quemment d6molis par la compagnie alors la prdsente action n6gatoire a 6t6 institue. Cette action a 6t6 maintenue par la Cour Sup6rieure dans les termes suivants:- A a payer au demandeur la $250. dommages avec init&rt CANAIAN et depens de Faction.

NosmnK

La d6fenderesse a port& la cause devant la Cour de Revision, oif le jugement fut confirmn- dans les termes suivants

Confirme dit jugement avec ddpens, sujot A la modification suivante du dispositif qui lira comme suit:- Nous maintenons l'action et ddclarons que la d6fenderesse n'a aucun droit d'exercer sur la proprite du demandeur la servitude d'4coulenent des eaux, loquel r6sulte des travaux de construction chemin de fer: Nous ordonnons plus A la d6fenderesse de discontinuer I'exercice telle servitude et cesser de faire ddverser dans le foss6 de ligne et les ddcharges du demandeur les eaux qui s'y Ccoulent par suite du talus et du foss6 du chemin fer; nous ordonnons a Ia d6fenderesse faire les travaux n6cessaires pour mettre fin dit trouble conform6ment A la transaction intervenue entre les parties vingt-huit octobre, et a dcfaut par elle faire d'hui au premier mal prochain, la Cour rdserve an demandeur tout recours pour dommages ult6rieurs, et nous condamnons de plus la d~fenderesse A payer an demandeur la somme deux cent cinquante piastres dommages avec intdrat et ddpens Faction.

L'appelante appelle h cette cour du jugement de Ia Cour de Revision.

En vertu de la section 40 de Pacte de la Cour Suprine, il y a appel devant cette cour de tout jugement de la Cour de Revision confirmant celui de la Cour suprieure.

Je dois dire qlue par contre, en vertu de 'article 43 du Code de Proc&dure Civile, les jugements de la Cour Sup6rieure confirmds par la Cour de Revision ne sont pas susceptibles d'appels a la Cour du Bane du Roi. Nous avons done a d6cider si dans la pr6sente cause le jugement a quo a confirm6 celui de la Cour Sup6rieure.

Comme on le voit, 1'action ndgatoire a 6t0 maintenue en (our Sup rieure et en Cour de Revision. Suivant la demande qui en avait kt faite par d6fenderesse fut condamnde, outre, faire tains travaux.

En Cour Sup~rieure on avait ordonn6 de faire les trauri ndcessaires.

En Cour de Revision on a spcifi6 que les travaux decraient faits suivont la convention des parties. Alais dans son principe le jugeinent de la Cour Sup6rieure est le mnme; on a simplement spcifi6 plus claireinent la nature des travaux i faire.

Il n'y a pas de doute que la partie du jugement qui maintenait l'action ndgatoire puisse 6tre port6e devant cette cour. En effet, la Cour de Revision sur ce point a confirm6 simplement le jugement de la Conr Sup~rieure et la compagnie appelante n'aurait pas le droit d'aller devant la Cour du Banc du Roi pour faire renverser cette partie du jugement.

C'est du moins la pratique suivie par la Cour du Banc du Roi depuis la decision rendue en 1876 dans la cause de Heauch6ne v. LaBaie(1). Et la Cour Supr~me a dcid6 dans le mime sens dans la cause de Hull Electric Co. v. Climent(2).

L'autre partie du jugement qui d6termine comment les travaux devront Atre ex~cuths n'est que la cons(quence de Faction n~gatoire elle-mine. Elle ne toiiche pas a la snbstance du litige, mais elle rend pins explicite Pordonnanoce de la Cour Supdrieure.

Elle enlive. il est vrai, an demandeur la facult6 d'ex6cuter lui-m~me les travaux. Mais il ne se plaint pas de cela.

Le jugenent a quo d'ailleurs declare formellement que l'on confirme celui de la Cour Sup6rieure.

Dans le cas un jugement de la Cour Sup6rieure est partiellernent confirm on infirm6 par la Cour de Revision, la Cour Supr~me devra exercer sa discr6tion pour d6cider si lappel doit tre port6 directement devant elle, on bien s'il doit au pr6alable tre sonmis A la Cour de Banc du Roi.

Garsonnet, Proc6dure Civile, vol. 5, p. 328.

Le 16gislateur a voulu 6videmment 6viter les appels trop nombreux et alors il a d6cr6t6 que les jugements confirm~s par la Cour de Revision seraient imm6diatement port6s an Conseil Priv6 on h la Cour Supreme. Dans les jugements partiellement confirmis, la Cour Supreme rencontrera certainement mieux les vues du 16gislateur en permettant de suite 'appel qu'en ordonnant aux parties de passer par la Cour de Bane du RoL.

Les motions doivent 6tre renvoybes avec d~pens. Motions refused with costs.