Turgeon v. The King

By a regulation the Intercolonial Railway, no person is allowed to get aboard cars while trains are in motion. Without ascertaining that all his train-crew were aboard, the conductor signalled the engineman to start his train from a station where it had stopped to discharge freight.

One of the crew, who bad been assisting in unloading, then attempted to board the moving train and, in doing he was injured.

Held, that the injury sustained the employee was the direct and immediate consequence of his infraction of the regulation which he was, by law, obliged to obey and not the result of the fault of the conductor; that disobedience to the regulation, the employee had voluntarily exposed himself to danger from the moving train; that the negligence of the conductor in giving the signal to start the train was not an act for which the Government of Canada could be held responsible and that its relation to the accident was too remote to regarded as the cause the injury.

Judgment appealed from Ex. C.R.), affirmed.

APPEAL from the judgment of the Exchequer Court of Canada(1), dismissing the petition of right of the suppliant with costs.

*PRESENT:-Sir Charles Fitzpatrick C.J. and Idington, Duff, Anglin and Brodeur JJ.

The circumstances of the case are stated in the head-note and the issues raised on the appeal are discussed on the judgments now reported.

THE agreed in the judgment dismissing the appeal with costs.

J.-I think this appeal must -be dismissed with costs.

J.-Rule No. 48 enacts (inter alia)

To this extent at all events the rule is within the rulemaking authority conferred, by the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1906, ch. 36, sec. 49, upon the Governor-in- Council; and it must be given effect to as a legislative enactment as well as one of the rules of the appellant's employment.

The injury suffered by the appellant was the direct and immediate consequence of a violation of this rule; but he alleges that the act done in violation of it was done at the invitation of the conductor and upon that allegation he bases his contention which is the ground of his appeal that this is a case of faute commune.

There are three answers to that. 1. If what the conductor did was an invitation to commit a breach of this rule, it was, in so far, an act for which the Government is not responsible. 2. The forbidden act was the act of the appellant; and it could only be in very special circumstances, if ever, that conduct such as that of the conductor which is relied upon as constituting the fault upon which the claim is based could be so DJ connected with -the forbidden act as to bring it within the category of fault dans locum injuriw. In this case it is clear that the fault relied upon is in its relation to the injury too remote to be regarded as in the legal sense one of the causes of it. 3. The rule is plainly .

framed with the object of avoiding just such accidents as that which happened. The observance of it is one of the duties which the law imposes upon the employee for that purpose. The violation of it cannot give him a right of action merely because other fellow servants equally bound to observe it concurred with him in that violation.

The appeal should be dismissed with costs. J.-There can be no doubt that the direct and immediate cause of the injuries sustained by the appellant was his violation of Rule No. 48, which enacts that- This was a rule and was intended for the safety of persons in the position of the appellant. While the conductor was, no doubt, most blameworthy for having signalled the train to start when he knew, or should have known, that if the appellant was to board it he must do so while it was in motion, that does not excuse the plaintiff's breach of the explicit prohibition of Rule 48. I agree with the learned trial judge that on this account alone this petition of right must fail.

J.-II s'agit d'un accident de chemin de fer arriv6 sur "PI'ntercolonial."

L'appelant 6tait employ6 comme serrefrein sur un convoi de marchandises. Ce convoi 6tait en gare et 1appelant en 6tait descendu pour aider h charger et dbcharger des marchandises. Aprs avoir fini son ouvrage, il se disposait h rejoindre le char ofi les employs se tiennent pendant le trajet d'une gare &L P'autre et qui se trouvait h

1arribre du convoi.

Le conducteur du train donna ordre de partir; et, pendant que le convoi 4tait en mouvement, 1'appelant a essay6 de monter dans son char. Malheureusement il glissa et se fit 6craser la jambe gauche et reput d'autres contusions moins graves.

Le gouvernement plaide que F'accident est dft entibrement h la faute de 1appelant parce qu'il aurait mont6 sur le train lorsque ce dernier 6tait en mouvement.

Par la section 49 de Facte des chemins de fer du gouvernement, le gouverneur en conseil est autoris6 de faire des riglements pour la conduite des employs du chemin.

Parmi ces r~glements se trouve celui portant le No. 48 qui dit:- Par la section 54 du m6me acte il est dit que ces r~glements seront consid6rds comme ayant force de loi.

Bien loin d'tre tenu de monter sur le convoi lorsqu'il

6tait en mouvement, cela lui 6tait formellement d6fendu par les riglements qui lui 6taient donnds comme r~gle de conduite.

Laurent, vol. 20, p. 521, dit

II pourrait peut-6tre se pr6senter dans cette cause la question de savoir s'il y a eu "faute commune" de la partie 16s~e et de la partie d6fenderesse.

Les faits cependant sembleraient d6montrer que 1'accident est entibrement a la faute de la victime. La cour d'appel de Qu6bec, appel~e h appr6cier un accident a peu pris semblable, dans une cause de Central Vermont Railroad Co. v. Lareau (1), en 1886, a d6cid6 que ce n'6tait pas un cas de faute commune mais que la personne 16sbe en 6tait seule responsable. C'est d'ailleurs, je crois, la conclusion h laquelle en est venu lui-m~me P'honorable juge de la cour infbrieure, que 'accident est entibrement h la faute de la victime. Cependant je ne pourrais pas acquiescer h la proposition que je rel~ve h la fin de son jugement et qui est dans les termes suivants:- Il ne faut pas oublier que les principes de la "contributory negligence" du droit anglais ne s'appliquent pas dans la province de Qu6bec (Juge Dorion dans Dearoches v. Gauthier(2)), et cet accident ayant en lieu dans cette province doit 6tre jug6 suivant les lois de cette province.

La faute de la victime n'est pas toujours un obstacle h sa demande en dommages-int6rts. Si son imu9 prudence ou sa faute est la seule cause du dommage,

6videmment elle ne peut rechercher personne en justice pour 1'indemniser de ce dommage. Mais si une autre personne a contribu6 aussi h produire le fait pr~judiciable, si les deux parties sont en faute, alors nous sommes en pr6sence d'une faute commune. Et l'imprudence commise par la partie 16s6e ne saurait affranchir de toute responsabilit6 celui dont la faute a contribu6 h determiner 1'accident.

Cette imprudence de la victime du dommage a seulement pour effet d'en entrainer la reduction du chiffre. Sourdat, Responsabilit6, No. 108, dit:- Tout en confirmant le jugement de la Cour d'Echiquier dans la pr6sente cause, je ne saurais accepter le principe que faute

C'est, au contraire, dans ces cas-lk que la faute commune existe et qu'il y a lieu d'appliquer les principes. Aubry & Rau, vol. 4, p. 755; Hue, vol. 8, No.

434; Laurent, vol. 20, No. 491; Baudry-Lacantinerie,

"Obligations," No. 2881; Dalloz, 1880-1-16; Dalloz,

1896-1-81, avec note de Planiol.

L'appel doit 6tre renvoy6 avec d6pens.

Appeal dismissed with costs.