Dominion Fire Co. v. Nakata

Per Davies J.-In the circumstances of the case the broker through whom the plaintiff effected the insurance became her agent all purposes in connection therewith and was also constituted the agent of the company for the purpose of giving notice of the cancellation of the policy.

.-The mere description the promises insured as a bawdy house is not sufficient evidence *RRESENT:-Sir Charles Fitzpatrick C.J. and Davies, Idington, Duff and Brodeur JJ.

justify promoting illegal or immoral purposes. Clark v. Hagar Can. S.C.R. 510)'; Lloyd Johnston (1

& P. 340); Bowry v. IIN Bennett (1 Camp. ; Hamilton Grainger II. & 40), and Pearce v. Brooks (L.R. 1 Ex. 213), referred to. Bruneau Lalibert6

425). discussed.

Per Idington and Dulf J.J.-The broker, who was handed the policy delivery to insured and collection the premium, became the agent of the company for those purposes.

He, however, had no authority from the insured to receive notice of cancellation the policy on her behalf nor waive the requirements of statutory condition of the "Northwest Territories Ordinance," (1st sess.). as to notice of cancellation of policies insurance return of premiums paid.

APPEAL from the judgneit of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Alberta (1), affirming the judgient of Beck J., at the trial, maintaining the plaintitT's action with costs.

The circumstances of the case are stated in the head-note.

THIE CHIEF JUSTCE.-[ have conie to the conclusion, with some hesitation, that this appeal must be allowed.

This is certainly not from any desire to assist the appellants, for I think, as Lord Mansfield says in Holman v. Johlnson(2).

the objection that contract is innoral and illegal as between plaintiff and defendant sounds at all times very ill in the mouth the defendant.

The objection is allowed on principles of public policy which the defendant has the advantage of con- (1) Alta. L.R.

Cowp.

trary to the real justice as between him and the plaintiff.

In the appellants' factum it is said:- It must clearly borne in mind in dealing with this appeal that this is not one those too frequently occurring cases of an attempt The Chief an insurance company to escape means some technicality a Justice.

liability deliberately assumed it and for the assumption which it has received its stipulated recompense.

These are brave words, but unfortunately are not borne out by the facts. The factum proceeds:- The plaintiff is a foreigner of bad character.

The law, I think, is stated in Phillips on Insurance, (5 ed.), in chapter III., section 2, on the legality of the insurable interest. We read sub-section 210:- Insurance upon a subject is void if the interest insured is illegal or if the contract contemplates an unlawful use it;

and this is carried further in -sub-section 211, though there is no express prohibition respect to subject. still if insurance upon it is contrary to the spirit and general principles, or what is called "the policy" of the law, the owner cannot make a valid insurance upon it.

Again, sub-section 231, after referring to cases partly lgal and partly illegal where a valid insurance may be made for the legal part, continues:- In the preceding cases no illegality appeared on the face the contract of insurance.

Where such does appear, the whole contract void, as in the case of an agreement to employ a ship in an illegal trade.

In Pearce v. Brooks (1), at page 218, Chief Baron Pollock said:- No distinction can made between an illegal and an immoral purpose; the rule which is applicable to the matter is, ex turpi causd oritur actio, in which the plaintiff has participated it comes equally within the The Chief terms of that maxim and the effect is the same; no cause of action Justice. can arise out of either the one or the other.

Many cases are cited in support of this latter proposition.

By section 228 of the Criminal Code the keeping of a disorderly house is an indictable offence and the purpose for which this house is used, being expressly stated in the policy, there can be no doubt of the illegality of the purpose for which it was used. In Scott v. Brown(3), at page 728, Lindley L.J. said:- Ex urpi causa non oritur actio. This old and well known legal maxim founded in good sense and expresses a clear and wellrecognized legal principle which is not confined to indictable offences. No court ought to enforce an illegal contract or allow itself to be made the instrument of enforcing obligations alleged to arise out contract or transaction which is illegal.

*

* If the evidence adduced the plaintiff proves the illegality the court ought not to assist him.

In his judgment in the case inl this court of Clark v. Ha gar(4), Mr. Justice Gwynne refers to a number of cases as establishing that the true test whether a demand connected with an illegal transaction is capable of being enforced at law, is whether the plaintiff requires any aid from the illegal transaction to estab- (1) L.R. 1 Ex.

1 Sm. 412.

Can. S.C.R. 510. lish his case. In the present action the plaintiff, now resondent, could not, without ing the policy bearing on its face evidence of ille- NA,TA.

g ty. Such proof is offe11Sive to the court and cannot be received.

That we find in the English reports no case exactly in point is not, I think, a matter of surprise. English insurance companies, it is well known, rarely dispute their liabilities, never except in gross cases. Further, I should think it probable that respectable companies would be unwilling to state in their policies an immoral purpose.

Few people, one may suppose, are willing to advertise their own turpitude innecessarily. There is a case in the Circuit Court of Quebec of Bruneau v. Lalibertc(1), in which Mr. Justice Andrews held that

I do iot think it is necessary for ue to dissent fronm anything said in the judgment above referred to of Clark v. Hagar(2).

It i's relied on in the decision of Morin The A nglo-Canadian Fire Jtsurance Co. (3), in the court of appeal for the Province of Alberta, which the decision now under appeal professes to follow, and also in the later case of Trites Wood Co. v. The Weste)ji Assitraiice Co. (4), in the Court of Appeal for British Columbia.

It is, however, unneces- 'sary to examine this judgmoent particularly, as I am unable to find in it anything to support the decisions in these .cases in which, as in the present case, the illegality appears upon the face of the contract sued upon.

For the Frenich law the see Planio1 ed.), vol. para. 1009 et .seq., and cases there cited. The modern tendenc of the Cour de ( Cassation woild appear to be, however, to maintain the validity of contracts such as the one here in question on the ground that the reciprocal obligations which the parties assume relate exclusively to the payment b the insured of the agreed premium and to the payment by the company of the stipulated indemnity in the event of the destruction of the thin- insured.

Vide Sireyv, 1904, page 509; but see S.Y. 1896, 289; Appert's note; S.

There is no provision the Code Penal whih corresponds with section 228 of the Canadian Criminal Code.

DAvnEs J.-I think this appeal should be allowed upon the grounds submitted by Alr. Cassels.

In the first place, I think Carr was the agent Yaka ta for the purpose of procuring the policy of insurance in question.

The husband of the plaintiff applied to Carr, an insurance broker, to obtain the insurance and was told by him that he could not take it in the insurance company for which he was agent, but would apply to other companies and was instructed to do so. He applied to the general agent in the province of the appellant company, who agreed to take it. The appli- J cant paid to Carr -a part of the insurance premium and shortly afterwards returned to Carr to obtain the policy when he was told it was subject to cancellation at any time. He then paid Carr the 'balance of the premium and Carr handed over to him the policy. Carr says that at that time he asked them whether in case of cancellation he would return the money put the insurance in some other company-and he was told to put it in some other company.

The same afternoon Oarr received notice that the head-office had cancelled the policy, whereupon he wrote and sent by registered post a letter to the plaintiff telling her the policy was cancelled.

Carr had received the premium from the applicant, and on receiving notice of the cancellation of the policy made, as instructed, efforts to obtain insurance elsewhere, but was unsuccessful and the premium remained in his hands.

The trial judge was of the opinion that

The learned judge was not satisfied that Carr was an agent to receive notice of cancellation and this view prevailed in the court of appeal.

I am of opinion, however, that Carr was such an agent and that the premium having been left with him in case of cancellation to obtain insurance in some other company, that he was the agent of the in- ,sured for receiving notice of such cancellation. On the other ground also, that the contract was one for facilitating the carrying on of an illegal and immoral object, I think the appeal should be allowed. The trial judge and the court of appeal felt themselves concluded by the case of Mllorin v. Anglo-American DaviJ. Fire Insurance Co. (1).

I am not able to accept that authority or the reasoning upon which it was founded. I think the principle upon which the case of Pearce v. Brooks(2) was decided the proper one to apply in this case.

That principle is that one who makes a contract for sale or hire with the knowledge that the other party intended to apply the subject-matter of the contract to an immoral purpose cannot recover on the contract.

As Pollock C.B. said in that case if an article was required and furnished "to facilitate the carrying on of the immoral purpose" that is sufficient. The courts would not lend their aid to carry it out. It seems to be that the facts of the case now before us are stronger against the enforcement of the contract than those in the case of Pearce v. Brooks(2), which the Exchequer Court refused their aid to enforce. In that case, the plaintiffs sued for the hire of a brougham by a woman known by them to 'be a prostitute and who used the 'brougham to their knowledge for the purpose of making a display favourable to her immoral purposes. .

In the case of Johnson v. Union Marine and Fire Insu)raice Co. (3), the court followed a previous decision of their own in Kelly v. Home Insurance Co.(4), and held that if a person engaged in the unlawful business of selling intoxicating liquors without a licence at the time of the making and acceptance of a policy of insurance on his stock iii trade and a month afterwards, V' the policy does not attach, although lie made application for a licence iinnediately after lie began such business.

The grounds on which the decision was placed in Kelly v. Home )Isirance Co.(1) above referred to were that the object of the assured in obtaining the policy was to make their illegal business safe and profitable and that the direct and immediate purpose of the contract -of insuraince being to protect an(l encourage an unlawful traffic the contract was illegal and never attached.

The same principle was held by Andrews J. to govern in the case of Bruiewi v. (aliberid(2). I think this principle should apply to this case, the contractual obliga tion of the company being in case of loss either to pay the same up to the amount insured or to "rephice the property danaged or lost." Could it he fairly argued that the replacement of the property not be an aiding or facilitating of the immoral purpose for the carrying on of which the, house and furniture were used?

I think the courts of this land should not lend their aid to enforce contracts made to facilitate the keeping of houses of illfame, wh ich, in my judgment, this insurance policy was calculated to do.

(disSenting).-This is an action upon a policy of insurance against fire on a house in Calgary owned by respondent and used as a bawdy house, in modern slang phrase described, as it was in the said policy, as "sporting house," and on furniture therein.

The chief ground of defence set up was that, pursuant to a statutory condition indorsed thereon, the policy had been cancelled long before the fire. It is quite clearly established, indeed not seriously (lisputed, that the policy was duly issued by the general agents of the appellant an( the preniun therefor paid.

It was procured by a local broker from the said general agents.

A good deal of what was, I respectfully submit, needless discussion, has taken place as to the details of how this payment and its alleged return was dealt with.

I assume, upon the facts in evidence, that the general agents received the premium, but failed to return same in any way for more than six weeks after the date of the policy, although the alleged cancellation is claimed to have taken place within ten days after said date.

This alleged re-payment is only material in considering the contention set up by appellant that Ir. Carr, the broker, was the respondent's agent to receive the return of the money.

The power of cancellation relied upon is that contaied in the condition, No. 19, of the statutory conditions in force in Alberta.

I think it is necessarY for any company seeking to avail itself of the power therein contained to follow the very simple and clear terms of that condition. I cannot find in what was done anything even resenibling what the power requires.

Nor can I find that wh at the resnondent's husband said to Carr could entitle him, as her agent, to set aside or waive that condition and all implied therein.

The details of all that have been so fully dealt with by the learned judges in the courts below that I do J not think I can serve any good purpose by setting forth 'an additional elaboration thereof.

The -appellant stoutly maintains Carr was not its agent, though appearing on the policy as agent. accept its 'contention in that regard.

The doing so relieves me of the necessity for considering the possible effect of his sending her a notice. The 'only notice alleged to have been given the insured was one mailed to her by Carr, but never received by her, or heard of by any one acting for her as her agent for that purpose.

There never 'was, unless Carr was appellant's agent, anything done, I repeat, resembling what the statutory dondition imposes upon the insuring company to 'be done by it in such ca'ses, but not by some one else.

Again, it is contended that the policy was illegal upon the ground that the owner of a bawdy house cannot insure himself, or herself, against loss thereof by fire.

We have all heard of leases made of a house to be used for such like purposes being illegal, either because it obviously promotes the illegal purpose had in view, or because the consideration for such a lease may be tainted thereby and, hence, the contract is void. I am unable to understand how 'the policy of insurance can, as of course, in itself promote the carrying on of such a traffic, or in law be held to fall within the principles upon which I suggest 'a lease,. for example, may be illegal and be thereby void.

It is urged the house had become vacant and that change of condition so increased the risk as to violate the condition.

The learned trial judge upon the facts found against the appellant, and no appeal was made N . against that finding.

The appeal should be dismissed with costs. (dissenting).

The first question is whether the policy was in force at the time of the fire and that subdivides itself into: (a) Did the appellant company receive payment of the insurance premium ? and (b) Was the power of cancellation with which the insurers were invested by the-terms of the policy effectively put into operation ?

The answer to the former question must be in the affirmative or the negative according as the appellant company is held or not held to be precluded from disputing both that payment to Carr and that payment to Tavender & Co. would be payment to themselves. As to Carr-for some purposes he no doubt was the agent of the respondent, but it does not necessarily follow that he was not also the agent of the appellant company for the purpose of receiving payment of the premium. The policy was delivered by Carr to the respondent's husband and on the policy there was a-declaration to the effect that Tavender & Co. were the general agents of the company and there was also a stateieut that J

Carr was the company's agent.

In the appellant's factun it is said that the designation of Carr as agent was adopted as a matter of office procedure in recognition of Carr's right to a commission for the introduction.

For our present purpose we are not concerned "vith the appellant'-s office procedure." Carr held the policy for delivery to the respondent on payment of the premium and the designation of him as agent correctly describes the character in which he had possession of the policy which he unquestionalbly held for the company and delivered to the respondent on their behalf; the description of him as agent and his possession of the policy for the company together constituted a riepresentation upon which the respondent was entitled to act on paying the premium. Counsel for the respondent did not, of course, dispute, it would have been hopeless to do so, that if a loss 'had occurred immediately after the delivery of the policy and before the traumiission of the premium by Carr and before any steps had been taken looking to cancellation, that it would have been impossible to deny that the risk had attached.

As to Tavender & Co.-the premium was in fact paid by a set off of the accounts between Tavender & Co. and Carr-the repudiatioil Taveider & Co.'s action the company could have no effect upon the rights of the who, having no notice of any limitation of authority was entitled to assume that Tavender & Co. were acting within the scope of that conferred upon them.

As to cancellation.

It is not disputed that notice of cancellation was not received by the respondent. The appellant's contention rests upon the proposition that Carr had been constituted the respondeiit's agent for the receipt of such notice. The contention breaks down on the facts, there being no evidence to support a conclusion that the parties intended that the policy should be subject to cancellation without notice to the respondent personally.

The direction alleged to have been given to Carr to retain the premium in the event of cancellation cannot fairly be held to imply authority to receive notice of cancellation. The learned trial judge found against agency in fact and I entirely agree with his view on this point. We now come to the difficult question: Was the policy as with illegality by reason the purporte(l contract being a contract entered into for the purpose of assisting the respondent in carryin- on an illegal business by her indemnity against loss of property by fire while the property was being employed for an illegal purpose ?

The facts are that the house and personal effects, the subjects insured, were at the time of the application in the possession of the respondent who carried on in the house and used the furniture for the purpose of carrying on the business (as it is described in the application) of a "sporting house," in other words, a house of ill-fame.

This fact, being stated in the application, was, of course, known to the company. At the time the fire occurred the house was not occupied by the respondent, but was in the care of a caretaker who slept there at nights. The usual premium charged, there being no augmentation because any special hazard that might be supposed to exist by reason -of the character of -the occupation, and there is no suggestion that this last mentioned circumstance in itself, according to insurance practice, would n .

le regarded as entailing any special hazard or as affecting the character of the risk from the actuarial point of view. It appears further that the appellant company was unwilling to accept the risk and directed the cancellation of the policy as soon as they became aware of the facts. The point, however, upon which the appellant company based its objection was a rather narrow one.

The officials of the company appear to have had no objection to accept a risk of this character if the place was situated within what was described as a "licensed district," in other words, if the place was permitted to flourish by the openly understood sanction of the police.

The house in question not being as I have said within a "licensed district" these officials decided to put an end to the risk.

I have come to the conclusion that this view does not furnish the governing rule for the decision of this appeal; but I am far from suggesting that there is not a great deal of force in the strictly legal considerations that may be adduced in support of it, however little one may be disposed to look with anything but impatience upon the posture of this company whose interest in the public morals finds adequate expression in a distinetion between bawdy houses protected by the police, according to clearly understood convention, and bawdy houses whose toleration is more irregular and precarious.

The question is, of course, a dry question of law. This contract of insurance is not in itself illegal in the sense that it is a contract directly forbidden by law or in the sense that it is intended to create an obligation to do anything forbidden by law. If the appellant company had paid the respondent's claim, nothing in the making or the performance of the contract could be described as illegal. A contract, however, on the face of it collateral to an unlawful act or to an unlawful course of business or to an unlawful design may be so connected with the illegality as to be vitiated by it; the question as Marshall C.J. said in Armstrong v. Toler(1) very often is a question of considerable nicety whether the connection is or is not of such a character as to have that effect.

There is a number of decisions in cases similar to this in which the insurance contract is treated (1) as an agreement to indemnify against the consequences of an illegal course of action or (2) as a mere incident in the carrying on of some transaction or business forbidden by law.

The former is the interpretation which has been given to marine policies insuring a voyage illegal in its inception, such policies being held void as attempts to contract for indemnity against the loss suffered reason of carrying out an unlawfil enterprise. See IFilson Rankin ; Insurance Co. Pollcys(2). The latter is the interpretation upon which rest certain decisions in the American courts, notably in the courts of Massachusetts in which policies of insurance effected upon stocks of liquor held for sale by unlicensed dealers in violation of the law have been thought void as transactions in reality constituting in part the carrying on of an unlawful business. These interpretations cannot, I think, be said to fit the case before us.

The fact that in accordance with settled practice an applicant for insurance is required to'state the business, if any, carried on on the premises proposed for insurance, and the fact that the business named is illegal and the fact that this statement with other statements in the application constitute 'the basis ,of the contract do not justify the interpretation of the contract as a contract to indemnify against loss incurred by reason of the carrying on of an illegal business; the policy being in the usual form, the risk insured against being the risk of fire from causes usually insured against in a policy in that form, the premium, as I have already said, being the-usual premium. One would not think of describing a policy of insurance upon his office furniture taken out by a. promoter whose chief business was to effect mergers obnoxious against the provisions of the Criminal Code as an agreement to indemnify against loss incurred in the course of his illegal business; and yet the parallel if not exact is approximate.

Neither ought the latter of the above imentioned viel s (vhiclh has been given effect to in Massachisetts the uses referred to) to govern in this case. It would be a quite unreasonable interpretation of the intentions of the parties to this contract to hold that the terms of the bargain in any way turned upon the character of the business carried oi.

One could better interpret their intentions by saying that the contract was made in spite of the fact rather than because of the fact that the occupation was of the character mentioned.

A distinction suggested by a series of English cases dealing with the enforceability of contracts made with persons of the respondent's class may, I think, well serve as a key to the solution of -the question before us. In Lloyd v. Johnson(1) Mr. Justice Buller, in Bowry v. Bennett(2) Lord Ellenborough, and in Pearce v. Brooks(3) the Court of Exchequer had such contracts before them and the net result, I think, of the au-thorities of which these are typical examples, is summed up with necuracY the treatise on contracts Mr. Manisty, in Hlalsburv Laws of England, vol. p. 400, these words:- In Pearce v. Brooks(3) Baron Braniwell, who had tried the action, says:- This insurance company, no doubt invites us to hold that when they do enter into contracts for the insurance of such places (being, of course, let it be well understood, within a "licensed district") they do so with the object of enabling the proprietors to exercise and to assist them in the exercise of their immoral calling. In fact, of course, it is not so and it would be ricdiculous to say that they ever thought of assisting the respondent in the exercise of her trade or of supplying her with anything that had any special reference to her trade or of contracting with her in any other character than that of the proprietor of a furnished dwelling simply.

The above mentioned cases were applied in this court in the case of Clark v. Hagar(1), and the judgment of Mr. Justice Gwynne, who spoke for the majority of the court, contains an exhaustive but luminous exposition of the effect of 'the decisions and his conclusions are substantially in harmony with the passage quoted above from Mr. Manisty's treatise. Mr. Justice Gwynne's judgment was applied in a case similar to the present by the British Columbia Court of Appeal, Trites Wood Co. v. Western Insuralnce Co.(2).

I must not omit a reference to Bruneau v. Lalibert6(3) (Mr. Justice Andrews), in which it was held that a policy of insurance on the furniture of u91 a house of ill-fame was an illegal and immoral contract and non-enforceable.

The decision is, in part, based on an interpretation of Pearce v. Brooks(1), which is not, I think, an admissible interpretation; Duff J. and upon certain French authorities which were sup- posed to support the conclusion at which the learned trial judge arrived.

In France, however, the jurisprudence is by no means uniformly in favour of the learned judge's view as is shewn by the following passages from Carpentier, Rep. Suppl6ment, 2 Assurance contre 1'incendie, Nos. 64 and 207(2), giving the effect of two comparatively recent decisions of the Cour de Cassation:- Le contrat d'assurance contre 1'incendie pass6 par le tenancier d'une maison de tolrance ne peut tre annuld comme ayant une immorale, alors que, dans contrat, les prestations que les parties sont mutuellement promises consistaient, d'une part, dans paiement de l'assur6 des primes convenues. d'autre part, dans paiement par la compagnie d'une indemnit4 p~cuniaire. . son choix, dans la reconstruction la r~paration des batiments incendids et replacement nature des objets d4truits: prestations licites elles-memes, n'ont pu devenir illicites par cela seul que les risques assurds d4pendaient d'une maison tolrance, et elles sauraient consid&es comme avant vue la er6ation. le maintien on l'exploitation d'un 4tablisgement cette nature. Cass., mai,

Y a-t-il fausse declaration de la part du tenancier d'une maison toldrance qui qualifie loger garni?

La question s'est posde devant la cour de cassation.

Le pourvoi soutenant l'affirmative par motifs suivants: L'exploitation d'une maison toldrance, disait-il "pr4sente des risques consid6rables.

Le danger dincendie, en effet, est plus grand que partout ailleurs dans ue maison fr4quentke la nuit par des gens souvent avinds, 1'orgie est quotidienne, drame frequent, et dont le personnel par sa profession mame, est une perptuelle menace d'imprudence, sinon d'actes malveillants.

risques consid&rables entrainent les compagnies, quand elles consentent assurer les tenanciers maisons tol6r- (1) L.R. 1 Ex.

A

The appeal should be dismissed with costs. PonEuit J.-The first question in this case is whether the contract of insurance was valid.

In the application for insuring the premises, it was stated that the plaintiff (respondent) was keeping a "sporting house," which was understood as being a 'house of ill-fame.

The policy was procured through the appellants' agents in Calgary.

They had the power to accept risks, isubject to cancellation by the head-office, as is the usual insurance practice.

The head-office of the insurance company refused to maintain the policy and notice of cancellation was given.

The agents of the appellant company in Calgary immediately notified the broker through whom the application had been made. This broker, Carr, on the, same day, wrote to the plaintiff telling her the policy was cancelled and asking for its return.

He did not enclose the preniuim because, as instructed by the plaintiff, lie intended to try and -et insurance elsewhere.

This letter was not received by the plaintiff and subsequiently returned to Carr.

A fire having taken place on the premises, the present action has been instituted for the purpose of recovering the amount of the insurance.

The company claims that the contract was illegal because it facilitates inanoralitY.

It has been decided in a case of Bruneau v. Lalibert (1), by -Mr. Justice Andrews that an furniture Addison, on Con tracts, p. 72, suniunarises the matter in statingprostitution And Beach on Contracts, p. 2019, says that contract auxiliary Halshury, Laws of England, vol. 7, No. 829, p. 400, relyinl g on the case of Pcarcc v. IBrooks (2), says that if it appears that a work was done for the purpose of enabling a prostitute to exercise or assisting her il the exercise of her inunoral calling, no action would lie.

Pollock on Con tracts (7 ed.), p. 370, in speaking of transactions where there is an agreeinent for a transfer of property for a lawful consideration, but for the purpose of ni unlawful use being made of it, says thatlater authorities that part party that I find in Dalloz, R6pertoire Pratique, vo. "Contrats et Conventions en g~nral," Nos. 398 and 401, that L.R. 1 Ex. the contract whose consideration is the maintenance of a house of ill-fame is illicit and the action for the price of the service of a domestic in a house of ill- N fame should not be accepted.

I must say, however, Brour J. that this latter decision has been severely criticized by some authors.

Baudry-Lacantinerie, vol. 11, No. 313, says:- C'est l'obligation sur cause illicite que I'art. d4clare sans effet. Il en est autrement de 1'obligation dont le motif sculement illicite.

Ici done apparart encore l'utilitd la distinction entre la cause et motif. Cette distinction est nettement 6tablie dans quelques d4cisions judiciaires.

Mais beaucoup d'autres 1'ont perdue vue et la confusion a engendr6 des ddcisions vraiment fantastiques. N'a-t-on-pas vu le tribunal de commerce de la Seine, refuser sur fondement la cause illicite, tout effet a I'obligation contractde par le directeur d'une maison toldrance pour acquisition vins champagne destin~s A tre consommds dans son 6tablissement ? On that first ground, I would be of opinion that the contract of insurance was illegal and that it should be set aside.

The appeal should be allowed with costs.

Appeal allowed without costs.