Montreal Tramways Co. v. Séguin

Per curiam.-Where an order has been made for trial with a jury, according to the provisions of articles et seq of the Code Civil Procedure of Quebec, and both parties have acquiesced that form of trial, objection to the right to trial jury cannot urged for the first time on an appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

An action for damages, under article of the Civil Code, brought dependents of a person whose death was caused in consequence of dlit or quasi-ddlit is an action resulting from personal wrongs within the meaning of articles et seq. of the Code of Civil Procedure of Quebec in which there may trial jury. Fitzpatrick C.J. contra.

Per Fitzpatrick C.J., dissenting.-The right of action given to the dependents, under article of the Civil Code, is purely statutory, and not a representative right (see Robinson v. Canadian Pacific Railway Co, ( (1892)

; consequently, the pendents, who have suffered no personal wrongs, are not entitled to trial jury under the provisions of chapter of the Code of Civil Procedure of Quebec.

Per Idington, Duff and Anglin JJ.-In his charge to the jury, the judge is entitled to express his opinion on questions of fact if he does in such a manner as will not lead the jury to think that they are being given a direction which it would be their duty to follow.

*PRESENT:-Sir Charles Fitzpatrick C.J. and Idington, Duff, Anglin and Brodeur JJ.

sitting in review, at Montreal, affirming the judgment entered by Guerin J., upon the verdict of the jury at the trial in favour of the plaintiff.

The plaintiff brought the action, under article 1056 of the Civil Code, claiming damages on behalf of herself and as tutrix to her minor children, in consequence of the death of her husband, the father of the children, caused, as alleged, by the negligence of the defendants. By the judgment appealed from, the verdict of the jury, damages were awarded for $3,100 to the widow and $1,000 to the children. The questions in issue on the present appeal are stated in the judgments now reported.

THE (dissenting).-At first, I was inclined to think that the action might be said to be But, on further consideration, I have come to the conclusion that the right of action in this case is purely statutory and, if so, the right to trial by jury would not exist.

The foundation of the right is article 1056 C.C,, which gives an action for the damages occasioned by the death of the injured person to his consort and his ascendant and descendant relations.

The "Quebec Act," 25 Geo. III., ch. 2, the provisions of which are now to be found in article 421 of the me1

Code of Civil Procedure, gives the right to trial by jury only in certain enumerated cases amongst which are

By article 1056 of the Civil Code, where the person Justice.

injured by the commission of an offence dies in consequence without having obtained indemnity or satisfaction, his consort has a right to recover from the person who committed the offence all damages occasioned by such death. The pecuniary loss caused by the .death

The measure of damages is not the loss or suffering the deceased, but the injury resulting from his death to the family, so that a jury, in assessing damages, cannot take into consideration the mental sufferings of the plaintiff in respect of bereavement. Blake v. Midland Railway Co. (1852) (1).

The Privy Council held in the case of Robinson V. Canadian Pacific Railway Co. (2), and in subsequent cases, that the right of action given by this article is an independent and personal and not, as under "Lord Campbell's Act," a representative right.

This right is a statutory one. No wrong has been done to one of those to whom the right of action is given for which any claim could be advanced were it not for the statute.

Speaking of "Lord Campbell's Act," Lord Selbourne said, in Seward v. The "Vera Cruz"(3) and does not merely remove the operation of the maxim actio personalis moritur cum persond, because the action is given in substance not to the person representing, in point of estate, the deceased man who would naturally represent him as to all his own rights of action which could survive, but to his wife and children, no doubt suing in point of person in the name of his executor. See also per Grive J. in Bradshaw v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Co. (1875) ; Leggott v. Great Northern Ra'ilway Co. (1876) (2) ; Potter v. Metropolitan District Railway Co. (1874) (3) ; British Columbia Electric Railway Co. v. Gentile(4); British Columbia Electric Railway Co. Turner

Such a statutory claim is not essentially dependent on any wrongdoing by the party made liable in damages. He may not have committed any wrong to the deceased or any wrong at all. As an instance of the latter, I may refer to section 298 of the "Railway Act," R.S.C. 1906, ch. 37.

The Privy Council in the case of Canadian Pacific Railway Co. v. Roy(6), held that the defendant having been guilty of no negligence, was not liable for setting a fire on' lands adjoining the railway whilst exercising the rights conferred on it by the legislature.

Section 298 of the "Railway Act," however, expressly provides that notwithstanding a railway company may have been guilty of no negligence it shall be liable for any damages caused by a fire started by a railway locomotive to the extent of $5,000.

The provision in article 421 C.P.Q. does not inlude such cases of statutory actions and, howevei suitable we might consider it that such claims should Justice.

be submitted to a jury, we cannot extend the privilege to a class of cases which is clearly beyond what tho statute .has authorized.

The damages which the -deceased might have recovered during his life for the wrong -done him, are different from those which his widow is entitled to recover under article 1056 C.C.; Robinson v. Canadian Pacific Railway Co..(1). The legislature has provided by article 431 C.P.Q. for the assessment of the former by jury, but has made no similar provision for the latter.

There certainly has been a certain amount of practice in accordance with the course complained of; but that claims under article 1056 C.C. have frequently been tried with a jury is easily explained, when we remember that, until the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Robinson v. Canadian Pacific Railway Co. (1), above referred to, it was thought that such actions were of a representative character and that the widow was authorized to sue in derogation of the legal maxim "actio personalis moritur cam persona."

Since the time when the nature of -the action was established by the above decisions, it has not hitherto occurred to any one to notice that this difference removed the action out of the class of actions in which article 421 C.P.Q. gives an option of a trial by jury. I would allow the appeal with costs.

J.-I think the objections taken to tho learned trial judge's charge, which it is to be observed were not taken at the trial, are untenable.

The objection that this is a case not triable by a jury comes rather late in view of the fact that appellants assented to that mode of trial, acquiesced in all that was done in that behalf, and only took the objections for the first time in the appellate court. If there is in law anything in such objections, then in view of all that has transpired, it might well be urged that this is an appeal from a trial in and by a tribunal selected by the parties, and from whose judg, ment no appeal can lie to this court. See the cases of Attorney-General of Nova Scotia v. Gregory(l) ; The Canadian Pacific Railway Co. v. Fleming (2) ; Burgess v. Morton(3) ; White v. Duke of Buccleugh(4) ; Craig v. Duffus(5) ; Dudgeon and Martin v. Thomson and Patrick (1854) (6) ; Robin et al v. Hoby et at (1856) (7 ).

I am afraid the objection is rather late in another sense. The article of the Code as well as preceding legislation in same sense having been so long inter-. preted as giving the right of trial by jury in the class of cases to which this belongs makes it rather difficult for us now critically to examine the article and declare all that so done was the result of grave error of law. Besides we are asked to apply a mode of interpretation and construction which might have commended itself more readily to the courts of long ago when dealing in over refinements, than to us now. The distinction counsel makes between the right of action a survivor passing through the ordeal of such an accident as in question would have and that given his representatives in case of his death, would have been looked on -as very substantial at one time and is to be so yet in the proper application thereof; but, in these times when the point of view has changed so sadly to apply it as a necessary means of interpreting this article 422 C.P.Q. would be going far, and especially so under all the foregoing circumstances. If, however, any one thinks the question worth raising, he should begin at the right stage and not try to do so after such acquiescence as exhibited herein.

I think the appeal should be dismissed with costs. J.-There are two points argued by the appellants: First, that the learned trial judge misdirected the jury in expressing his opinion that the appellants' theory of the accident was not a reasonable cne. The learned trial judge was entitled to express his opinion on the point so long as he did not lead the jury to think that he was giving them a direction it would be their duty to follow and it is quite clear that he did not err in this respect.

Secondly, it is argued that this was not a case for trial by jury under article 421 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Article 1056 of the Civil Code involves a declaration that the dependents entitled to compensation thereunder have an interest in the life of the member of their family standing to them in a relation entitling them to recover under that article. I can see no good reason for saying that this is not an action for damages arising from a personal wrong within the meaning of article 421 C.P.Q.

If I had doubts upon the proper construction of article 121 C.P.Q. it would be too late now, I think, in view of the course of interpretation to adopt the construction proposed by the appellants.

Thirdly, an order directing trial by jury was made and the case was tried without objection. The objection comes too late. Pisani v. Attorney-General for Gibraltar(1).

J.-The appellant attacks the judgment against it on two grounds;-that there was misdireetion by the learned trial judge, and that the right to trial by jury exists only- in cases in which it has been specially provided for and that this is not such a case. The alleged misdirection consisted in the expression by the learned trial judge in his charge to the jury of his own opinion upon the evidence on one point in the case. What is complained of the learned trial judge immediately followed by this statement:- The course taken by the learned judge was, in my opinion, quite within his rights and affords the appellant no ground of complaint.

By article 421 C.P.Q. the right to trial by jury is conferred, inter alia,

Giving to the words "personal wrongs" the most restricted meaning contended for by Mr. Rinfret, i.e., wrongs causing injury to person or reputation, as distinguished from injury to source of revenue, means support, property or estate, I think this action is within the purview of article 421.

The plaintiff sues under article 1056 C.C. to recover damages occasioned by the death of one Couvrette, who was injured by a fault of the defendant. The damages sought to be recovered resulted from the personal wrong thus done by the defendant to the deceased Couvrette, although the plaintiff does not sue as representative of the deceased or upon the cause of action which he had. That the personal wrong caused to the deceased by an offence or quasi-offence of, or chargeable to, the defendant is the basis of the new cause of action given by article 1056 C.C. for the recovery of the damages resulting from it to the consort and relations is made still more clear by the fact that that right of action exists only if the deceased had not himself obtained satisfaction or indemnity. Had the deceased survived he would have been entitled to recover compensation for any loss of income and diminution in his earning capacity ascribable to the injury which he sustained. That he would have had the right under article 421 C.P.Q. to have his claim for these damages disposed of by a jury the appellants concede, and it seems to me indisputable that they would have resulted from the personal wrong done him. The failure of income and other elements of loss for which article 1056 gives the consort and relations a right to recover damages result just as surely and directly from the personal wrong done to the deceased as would his own loss of income and diminished earning capacity had he survived. They are not the same damages as the deceased would have sustained, and could have sued for. The right action to recover them does not flow 'directly and imanediately from the injury to the deceased. His death is the condition on which it arises and the statute itself is its source. But while it is the statute which confers the right to recover them, and the death of the deceased is the condition of that right coming into existence and is in one sense the immediate cause the damages to the consort and family (yet the death is an effect rather than a cause-an effect from which further consequences flow), the damages themselves result from the personal wrong which caused the death entailing them as a consequence neither remote nor indirect.

Article 421 C.P.Q. does not prescribe that the wrong resulting in the damages sued for should be to the person of the plaintiff or to the persons of those on whose behalf she sues. It suffices to bring the case within the letter of the article that the damage claimed should have resulted from a personal wrong whether the injury itself was to the person of the plaintiff or to that of another. I find nothing in the spirit of the article or in its history which requires that it should be given an application more restricted than is called for by its literal terms.

I express no opinion upon the question whether in the phrase "suits for the recovery of damages resulting from personal wrongs," now found in article 421 of the C.P.Q. of 1897, which replaced article 348 of h

...

hc elcdatce38o the C.C.P. of 1867, which, in turn, was founded on the Consolidated Statutes of Lower Canada of 1860, ch. 83, sec. 26, continuing the right to trial jury originally conferred by the 25 Geo. III. (L.C.), ch. 2, in the words the words "personal wrongs" are susceptible of a construction which would include the wrong or injury done to the consort and relations by the death of the victim of the defendant's fault.

Hundreds of actions brought under article 1056 C.C. and the earlier legislation (10 & 11 Vict. (Can.), ch. 6; Con. Stat. (Can.), 1859, tit. 9, ch. 781), havo been tried by juries, many of them having been carried on appeal to this court and to the Judicial Conmittee without any question of the competence of the trial tribunal having been raised. The statutory provision for jury trials thus interpreted and acted upon for many years has at least three times re-enacted without alteration.

Ca-sgrain Atlantic and North- West Railway Co. (1), at p. 300.

The weight of authority in the few cases in which the question has been raised in the provincial courts, also seems to support the right to have such actions as this submitted to a jury. Steele v. Canadian Pacific Railway Co. (2) ; Robinson v. Montreal Tram ways Co. (3). Moreover, I incline to think that the objection of the defendants, if otherwise good, having been taken for the first time in review and after acquiescence by C . them in all the proceedings leading up to the submis- St -IN. sion of the case to jury, is probably too late. I would dismiss the appeal.

J.-La principale question qui se preseute dans cette cause est de savoir si une action en dom. mages-intbrts institue par la veuve et les enfants de la victine d'un accident peut Stre soumise h un procks par jury.

Cette question a 6t6 soulev6e pour la premibre fois devant les tribunaux il y a deux ans et a donn6 lieu A une divergence d'opinions srieuse parmi les juges de la Cour Sup~rieure et de la cour d'appel dans les deux causes suivantes:

Steele v. Canadian Pacific Railway Co. (1) ; Robinson v. Mllontreal Tramways Co. La dernire de ces causes est maintenant pendanto devant le Conseil Priy6.

Le droit d'action de la veuve et des enfants de la victime d'une accident est exere sous les dispositionw de l'article 1056 du Code Civil, au chapitre des ddlits et quasi-d6lits et se lit comme suit:satisfaction, L'article du Code de Proc6dure Civile en vertu duquel la demanderesse a r6clamb un prochs par jury est Particle 421, qui se lit comme suit:- La demanderesse pr6tend que sa poursuite a pour objet de recouvrer des dommages "r6sultant de torts personnels" et que par cons6quent elle a le droit de demander le prochs par jury.

Que veulent dire les mots "torts personnels"? Cette 6xpression' a eu sa source dans notre droit. statutaire quand on a introduit, en 1785, le procks par jury. Cette loi avait t6 r6dig6e en anglais et la version frangaise qui en est publi6e dans les ordonnances de lP6poque d6montre qu'elle n'a 6t qu'une traduction de Panglais. L'institution du jury, comme on le sait, est une institution anglaise et nous pouvons nous autoriser de tout cela pour rechercher.dans les auteurs anglais l'interpr6tation de ces mots "torts personnels."

Je trouve que Bigelow, "On Torts," apris avoir, dans son introduction assimil6 le mot "wrong" au mot "tort," nous d6finit le "tort" comme 6tant la violation d'une obligation d6termin6e par la loi, breach of duty fixed by law, et il ajoute que "a tort" is distinguished from "a contract"

Pollock, "On Torts," assimile les "torts" aux "civil wrongs."

Il s'ensuit done que les "torts" ou "civil wrongs" du droit anglais comprennent les d61its et les quasid6lits de la loi civile.

L'adjectif "personnels" ajout6 au mot "torts" donne n6cessairement une portke restreinte i. ce dernier mot. Les "torts personnels" ne couvrent n~cessairement qu'une partie des d6lits, c'est-h-dire les delits, on torts concernant les personnes. Les d6lits const ax. cernant la proprit6 immobilibre n'y sont pas compris. en est de majne concernant les d61its concernant la propri~t mobilibre puisqu'en 1829 la 16gislature a oblig6 d'adopter une lo spciale pour permettre h ces derniers d6lits d'8tre soumis a un jury. Blackstone, Commentaries, vol. 3, p. 119 dit:- Wharton d6finit les mots "personal rights" qui sont l'antith~se des mots "personal wrongs" on "torts personnels" comme suit:- Ainsi le meutre, la blessure corporelle, la maladie, le libelle, la diffamation et lFemprisonnenent peuvent entrer dans la cat6gorie de torts personnels.

Comme le disait si bien lHonorable Juge Mathieu, dans la cause de Chouistard v. Raymond(1) :- Qu'avons-nous dans le cas actuel ?

Un homme a 6t bless6 par incurie ou n6gligence. II est incontestable que de son vivant il aurait eu le droit d'obtenir rdparation pour ces blessures. On lui avait caus6 un tort personnel.

La loi dit, cependant, que, s'il vient mourir de cet accident, sa femme et ses proches out un droit d'ac- J. tion contre l'auteur du d61it.

Est-ce que ce droit d'action ne rbsulte pas des torts inflig~s h la personne du d6funt? Je crois done que le droit d'action des demandeurs est bas6 sur ces blessures inflig6es a la personne du d6funt et tombe sous le coup de Particle 421 du Code de Procedure qui permet aux parties de soumettre leurs pr6tentions h un jury.

Si nous examinions la jurisprudence, nous voyons que toutes ces actions out toujour kt jugbes susceptibles du procs par jury.

Le point n'a 6t6 soulev6, que je sache, avant la cause de Steele v. Canadian Pacific Railway Co.(1), que dans une cause, savoir celle de Bouitssede v. Hamilton(2), jug~e en 1898, oft le juge Curran a d~cid6 Une multitude de causes semblables institues par la femme on les enfants de la victime sous Particle 1056 du Code Civil out kt soumises.h des jurys, ont fait Pobject de d6bats judiciaires tris importants devant cette cour et devant la Conseil Priv6 et on n'a jamais song A soulever le droit des parties de les soumettre

Yoyez, par exemple, Miller v. Grand Trunk Railway Co.(3), jug6e par le Conseil Priv6 en 1906 et qui a pass6 par la Cour Rup6rieure, la Cour de Revision, la cour d'appel et la Cour Suprime; Robinson Canadian Pacific Railway Co. ; Ravary v. Grand Trunk Railiay Co.(2), en 1869; Curran. v. Grand Trunk Railway ('o. (3). Une autre question qui se prbsente dans cette cause est de savoir si la d6fenderesse appelante peut maintenant pretendre que cette cause n'aurait pas du 6tre soumise au jury.

La denianderesse avait par son action opte pour un procis par jury suivant les dispositions de Particle 423 du Code de Proc~dure Civile.

Si la d~fenderesse voulait s'objecter it cette action, elle aurait du alors le faire et faire rejeter cette op, tion.

Non, elle ne conteste pas le droit r6clam6 par la demanderesse d'avoir un procks par jury. La contestation est lie entre les parties. Plus tard le 18 janvier, 1913, motion est faite sons 1'autorit6 de l'article 424 C.P.Q. pour d6finir les faits dont le jury doit s'enquirir.

Les deux parties, y compris Pappelante, fournissent an juge m6imoire des faits quI'elles croient necessaire de souiettre Pappriciation du jury. Jugement est rendu sur cette motion et sur ces m6moires. Il y a done chose jug~e sur ce point. II n'y a jainais eu d'appel on d'exception an jugement. L'acquiescement qui y est fait par la d6fenderesse lie cette dernibre et elle ne pent plus maintenant appel nous demander de faire mettre de c6t( un jugement qu'elle a accept6 et qui a force de chose juge. Le proes par jury est un mode d'instruction qui ne touche pas la comp4ence ratione niaterir des tribunaux.

La cause soumise a un jury est toujours sous le contr6le du juge de la Cour Sup6rieure. Les tribunaux peuvent 6tre un peu genes dans P'appriciation des faits de la cause A cause du verdict; mais ils n'en restent pas moins maltres de rejeter le verdict s'il est contraire au poids de la preuve (art. 498).

Quant aux questions de droit qui se soul~vent dans la cause, elles demeurent, qu'il y ait prochs par jury ou non, a lentibre discretion des juges.

Thomine-Desmazures, an volume ler, nos. 11, et 13, discute longuement cette question de comp6tence absolue et comptence relative.

II nous dit qu'une affaire peut donner lieu h une poursuite devant diff6rents tribunaux et cite le cas du cr6ancier d'une obligation qualifibe de lettre de change qui pourrait 6tre portbe devant le tribunal civil parce qu'elle peut 6tre regard6e comme simple promesse de payer. n'est pas absolument n~cessaire qu'elle soit soumise, vu son caract~re commercial, au tribunal de commerce.

Au no. 200, il dit:- Et plus loin, il ajoute, apr~s avoir cit6 plusieurs cas d'incomp6tence:- Je relve dans nos rapports judiciaires la cause de Rivers v. Duncan(1), il a t d6cid6:- Dans la cause actuelle la defenderesse n'a pas ellemime demand6 le procs par jury mais elle n'a pas contest6 P'option faite par la demanderesse et plus tard elle a particip6 et acquiesc6 an jugement qui a dbfini les faits a tre soumis au jury.

Les parties out toujours le droit de soumettre a certaines personnes qu'elles d6signeront (persona designata) les conflits qui s'61Mvent entre eux. La proe6dure dans la pr~sente cause 6nonce 1intention mutuelle des parties de faire juger leurs diff6rends par un jury. Il me semble qu'il s'est 6tabli un contrat judiciaire qu'elles ne sont plus libres de briser. D'autant plus que leur acquiescement a fait l'objet d'un jugement qui a la force de chose jug6e.

Je suis done d'opinion que la d6fenderesse ne peut pas en appel essayer de se faire relever de cet acquiescement et de ce jugement.

Pour ces raisons, l'appel doit 6tre renvoy6 avec d6pens.

Appeal dismissed with costs.