Pouliot v. Town of Fraserville

Per Anglin J.-By section the charter the application the provisions the "Towns Corporations Act," arts. 4165 et seq. R.S.Q., is expressly confined to expropriations within the town; section was not excluded from the charter nor impliedly repealed by the amendment to section and the appointment arbitrators by the judge was an usurpation the jurisdiction conferred by articles 5754d and 5754e, R.S.Q., (54 Vict. ch. sec. upon the Attorney-General the province. APPEAL from the judgment of the Court of King's Bench, appeal side, affirming the judgment of Letellier J., in the Superior Court for the District of Kamouraska, which dismissed the plaintiff's action with costs. The circumstances of the case are stated in the judgments now reported.

DAVIES J.-The single question upon which I have entertained any doubt in this case is whether the appointment of arbitrators to determine the damages to which the appellant was entitled for or by reason of the expropriation by the respondent of certain lands of his outside of the Town of Fraserville should have been made by the Attorney-General under the provisions of the general "Expropriation Act" or by a judge of the Superior Court under the articles of the "Towns Corporations Act"--4561 to 4569-and the subdivision sec. 11 "Expropriation for Municipal Purposes."

The respondent, on the other hand, contends that so far as the construction of its electric light works was concerned this limitation on the town's power of expropriation "to lands, buildings and structures within the town" was removed by article of the amendment to its charter in 1906, and that the methods by which this power of expropriation so extended should be exercised are to be found in the articles 4561 to 4569 of the "Towns Corporations Act" under the general heading of "Expropriation for Municipal Purposes."

The respondent invokes in support of its argument articles 4178 and 4179 of the " Towns Corporations Act" the first of which declares generally that the provisions of this chapter apply to every town etc. and and the latter of which enacts

Article 4561 of the "Towns Corporations Act," R.S.Q., 1888, title XI., conferring power of expropriation upon towns within the scope of the town's jurisdiction was amended, in 1903, by article 193 of ch. 69, 3 Edw. VII., limiting that power to land etc. "in the town" but this limitation, so far as the construction and maintenance of the electric works of the town were concerned, was done away with by the amendment of 1906 before referred to, and the land of the appellant, outside of the town, was under- that amending power legally expropriated for the electric purposes of the This extension of the limitation put upon the town's powers of expropriation then, it is said, necessarily left the provisions of the "Towns Corporations Act" as to the method of procedure applicable and so do not admit of the application of the general "Expropriation Act."

I admit the difficulties in reaching a conclusion and have given the point much consideration. After reading the carefully prepared opinion of Mr. Justice Brodeur, I have concluded that his construction of the different statutes is right, that the proceedings taken to appoint the arbitrators under the "Towns Corporations Act" were correct and that the appeal should be dismissed with costs.

J.-I agree in the main herein with the reasons assigned by the courts below.

But I have had some difficulty in trying to reconcile the enactment of section 193 of 3 Edw. VII., ch. 69, of Quebec, with the provisions necessary to be observed in the case of expropriation outside the town.

It is quite clear the peculiar wording of that section never was necessary, for the scope of the jurisdiction of the town, as it stood in the section thus supplanted, covered and was limited to that needed.

I think the section 6 of 6 Edw. VII., ch. 50, three years later, amending section 193 of the first mentioned Act may be taken as an implied repeal of the limitation implied in the word "town" in said section 193, so much in evidence in the argument.

I~conclude the two cannot stand together and the later one should prevail. Then the general provisions of the "Municipal Act." relative to town corporations does the rest.

I do not overlook the alternative properly and forcibly presented by Mr. St. Germain.

His proposition relative to the general enactment providing for the Attorney-General naming the umpire or a sole arbitrator in case of disagreement, does not cover the whole ground involved in the questions raised herein. I need not elaborate.

In short the legislation has to be given some sort of sensible meaning.

At this stage it should not be expected of us to reverse the finding as to-amount (especially when two of the board were selected by a judge) of the award of arbitrators acting within their powers when unanimously maintained by the courts below.

I admit the appellant has presented some plausible and, possibly, cogent reasons for his contention. But I fail to see anything more therein than what in the last analysis is matter of opinion of what the market value is of that taken.

Special advantages have been and must be tested by their value; not by what the owner may imagine and try to dictate as a price.

There does not seem any good reason to believe all these things were ignored by the majority of the arbitrators.

The only other matter of legal principle involved in the appellant's allegations, upon which we could properly act, is that relative to the expropriation being in part founded upon a resolution instead of by-law. He has not so much to complain of in that regard as either plaintiff had in the cases of Larin v. Lapointe (1), reversed in the Privy Council under the name of Lapointe v. Larin(2), and Robertson v. City of Montreal In the former the non-observance of forms of procedure as prescribed by statute did not seem of importance in the court above when the unanimous council in fact had directed something to be done without pursuing the method laid down in the statute; and in the latter case the majority of this court held a similar departure from the prescribed path by way of a by-law when substituted by using a resolution was not ultra vires or at least so far so that a ratepayer or contracting party could complain.

I think the appeal should be dismissed with costs. J.-There is only one point requiring discussion.

It arises in this way.

The legislative charter of the Town of Fraserville, which is contained in an Act of the Legislature passed in the year 1903, was amended in 1906 in such a way as to provide that, for the purposes of establishing and maintaining a system of electric lighting, the municipality should have compulsory powers of expropriation as regards immovables both within and without the town.

(Sec. 183, ch. 69, 3 Edw. VII., as amended by 6 Edw. VII., ch. 50, sec. 6.) The municipality in acquiring for these purposes property outside its territorial limits has proceeded on the assumption that the machinery for expropriating land outside as well as that inside the town is the machinery provided by articles 4562 to 4569 of the "Towns Corporations Act," R.S.Q., 1888, which with certain immaterial modifications became incorporated in the charter of 1903 by force of article 4178, R.S.Q., The appellant denies that these provisions of the "Towns Corporations Act," although incorporated in the charter and applicable to expropriations within the town, have any operation when an expropriation of property beyond the limits of the town is in question.

Admittedly if the appellant is right in this contention the proceedings now impeached before us are invalid because if these enactments of the "Towns Corporations Act" are not the enactments by which such proceedings are governed then the method of procedure which it was the duty of the municipality to follow in such expropriations was that prescribed by the " Expropriation Act " and admittedly the procedure so prescribed was departed from in essential respects. The question for determination is: Was the municipality, in expropriations of property outside the town, entitled to avail itself of the provisions of the "Towns Corporations Act " above referred to?

The point of the difficulty can, I think, be most clearly put by first explaining the contention of the The articles 4562 to 4569 of the "Towns Corporations Act" relating to expropriation which the municipality says are applicable and the appellant denies to be applicable to such expropriations are preceded by article 4561 which is the first section in a fasciculus under the sub-title "Expropriation for Municipal Purposes."

This article is in the following words:- The charter of 1903 did not adopt article 4561 as it stands. The first section of a group of sections of the charter bearing the sub-title "Expropriations" is section 193 which deals with that article as follows:and it will be observed that the article which by this enactment is, as regards the Town of Fraserville, substituted for article 4561 expressly confines the powers thereby given to cases of expropriation within the Now the appellant argues that the effect of this substituted article and especially of the words is to, limit the application of the "dispositions suivantes," that is to say, of articles 4562 to 4569 of the "Towns Corporations Act" to such expropriations.

The appellant assuming that point to be safely reached, has, of course, no difficulty in establishing the conclusion which indeed necessarily follows that the charter itself neither explicitly nor by reference to the "Towns Corporations Act" provides any machinery for the expropriation of the property outside the town and consequently that for such purposes the municipality must resort to the "Expropriation Act."

Not only is this argument a plausible one but it must, I think, be conceded that the view advanced by the appellant of the construction and effect of section 193 of the charter of 1903 is an admissible construction; indeed, at the conclusion of the argument I was strongly inclined to think that it was the right construction and that effect ought to be given to it.

There is, of course, some degree of a priori probability against the inference that the legislature intended to prescribe in respect of compulsory powers exercisable for the same object and by the same municipality one machinery where the property to be taken is within the municipality and a different machinery where the property to be taken is outside the municipality; where it is admitted that one set of machinery is not better adapted than the other set to either class of expropriation-as is the case here.

I feel at liberty to adopt the respondent's construction if it appear from the point of view of verbal interpretation to be a reasonably admissible one, even . though from that standpoint alone the appellant's construction should be in some degree the preferable. I find no difficulty in holding that the respondent's construction is a reasonably admissible construction. I have already pointed out that section 183, which confers compulsory powers simply, neither in the charter of 1903 nor in the amendment of 1906 -has anything to say on the subject of machinery.

So it must be observed when the article is narrowly examined, that article 4561 of the "Towns Corporations Act" is primarily concerned not with machinery but with the conferring of substantive powers.

It is a comprehensive provision which declares that when the municipality orders works that it has jurisdiction to order the municipality shall have authority to take the .

necessary land.

It is quite true that the article adds that this may be done by complying with the subsequent provisions, but this phrase adds nothing to the construction which would have been put upon the article and the subsequent provisions if it had been absent and it certainly is not necessary to read it as restricting the scope of the succeeding articles by limiting their application to cases of expropriation by the municipality under the general powers conferred by the article 4561 itself. What effect then is to be attributed to section 193 which declares that article 4561 is replaced by an article in which the general powers of expropriation thereby conferred are limited in their application to those cases in which the property required is situated within the town. The answer to this question is dictated by the fact that the substituted article, like article 4561 itself, is primarily a provision dealing with substantive powers of expropriation, a comprehensive provision applying to all cases not specifically provided for in which it is necessary to take land for municipal purposes within the The charter contains a number of sections conferring such powers for specific purposes. Must we conclude that the machinery provided by the succeeding articles is available only in cases of expropration under the residuary powers thus conferred? repeat, such is not the necessary result of the limiting words.

There is nothing in the language of the substituted article and nothing in that of articles 4562 to 4569 which are part of the charter requiring us to hold that the machinery provided by these articles is not available for proceedings in exercise of powers given for specific purposes under other provisions of the charter such as that found in section 183.

These in outline are the reasons (they are, I think, in accordance with those of my brother Brodeur) from which I have concluded that we are entitled to hold that the judgment of the court below was not erroneous.

J. (dissenting).-In my opinion the appellant is entitled to succeed on the ground that the application of the expropriation provisions of the "Towns Act" (R.S.Q., 1888, arts. 4561 et seq.) is by section 193 of the charter of the Town of Fraserville, enacted in .

1903, expressly confined to expropriations within the town. The French version of section 193 puts this restriction beyond any possibility of doubt.* The method to be pursued in the case of expropriations outside the limits of the town, which have, since 1903, been authorized by section 182 of the charter for waterworks purposes, and are now by an amendment to section 183, passed in 1906, also authorized for the purposes of the town electric lighting system, is not expressly provided for in the charter.

If, notwithstanding the fact that article 4561 of the Revised Statutes of Quebec, 1888, has been "replaced for the town" by a section which restricts the application of the method of expropriation provided by the succeeding group of articles in the Revised Statutes to expropriations within the town, that group of articles applies also to expropriations. outside the town, the restriction thus imposed would be meaningless and ineffectual-a result so abhorrent to sound construction that it can be accepted only if inevitable.

Articles 4562 et seq. of the Revised Statutes of Quebec, 1888, were not excluded from the town charter: they necessarily had their place in it subject to the "express modification" made by section 193 of the town charter of 1903. Articles 4178 and 4179 of the Revised Statutes of Quebec, 1888, therefore, do not conflict with the view I take of the effect of section 193 of the charter, which is that, for the Town of Fraserville, articles 4562 et seq. of the "Towns Act" (arts. 4178 et seq., R.S.Q., 1888), must be read as if article 4561 had been originally enacted in the terms of section 193 of the town charter.

So reading them, it would, I think, be clearly impossible to hold articles 4562 et seq. applicable to outside expropriations under section 182 of the charter, enacted concurrently with section 193, and there is no reason for outside expropriations authorized by the amendment of 1906 being in a different plight so long as section 193 of the charter was left unaltered.

The corporation in making these outside expropriations, whether under section 182 or under the amendment to section 183, was thus driven to resort to the provisions of the general expropriation law contained in articles 5754 (a) et seq. of the Revised Statutes of 1888 (54 Vict. ch. 38, sec. 1), which are expressly made applicable in all cases where powers of expropriation are conferred by a statute that does not determine the mode in which they are to be exercised. Counsel for the respondent contended that inasmuch as the power to expropriate outside the limits of the town for the purposes of its electric lighting system was not given by the town charter as consolidated in 1903, but was conferred only by an amendment of 1906, upon the adoption of that amendment the restriction effected by the words "in the town" in section 193 the charter of 1903 should be deemed repealed by implication.

I cannot agree with that contention. There is no repugnancy or inconsistency such as it requires as a foundation.

It takes no account of the existence in the charter of 1903 of the provision made by section 182 for outside expropriations.

Such an implied repeal as is contended for might possibly follow if the statutes did not contain the general provision above referred to for cases in which the mode of expropriation is not defined by the law conferring the right. But with that provision available necessity for extending the scope of section 193 does not arise, and short of absolute necessity there is no sufficient ground for an implication of repeal of the limitative words which it contains.

The ground of appeal, which should thus, in my opinion, prevail, is, no doubt, technical and, in view of the concluding sentence of article 5566 of the Revised Statutes of Quebec, 1909, as, amended by 1 Geo. V., ch. 56, sec. 19, is of no importance except in the present case.

Yet it may not be rejected on that account since it involves the jurisdiction of the arbitrators. If the provisions of articles 4562 seq. of the Revised Statutes of Quebec, 1888, did not apply, the judge of the Superior Court usurped the jurisdiction conferred by articles 5754d and 5754e (54 Vict. ch. 38, sec. 1) on the Attorney-General of the province. The appellant has never acquiesced in the appointments made by the Hon. Mr. Justice Cimon, who purported to act- as persona designata. Canadian Northern Ontario Ry. Co. v. Smith(1). His order was not appealable. The respondent's plea of res adjudicata is, in my opinion, not well founded.

I think I should add that upon the other grounds taken the appeal, iii my opinion, fails for the reasons stated by the learned Chief Justice of the court of appeal.

J.-l s'agit d'un appel de la d6cision de la Cour di Bane du Roi, qui a confirm6 unanimement un jugement de la Cour Sup~rieure dans une action en nullit6 de sentence arbitrale.

La Ville de Fraserville, l'intimbe, d6sirant exproprier certains terrains appartenant A l'appelant et dont elle avait besoin pour son systime d'6clairage, a donn6 avis d'expropriation sous les dispositions de l'acte des corporations de ville de 1888; et, comme l'appelant refusait de nommer son propre arbitre et le tiers arbitre, la corporation intim6e s'est adressie A un juge de la Cour Sup6rieure pour faire la nomination (arts. 4565- 4569a S.R.Q., 1888).

L'appelant a comparu devant le juge et a pr6tendu que la corporation n'avait pas le droit de s'approprier les terrains en question parce qu'ils 6taient en dehors du territoire dans lequel elle pouvait exercer son droit d'expropriation.

Le juge, ayant d6bout6 l'appelant de ses pritentions et ayant donn6 acte AL ce dernier de ses objections, a nomm6 comme l'arbitre de l'appelant celui qu'il lui avait d~sign6 et il a 6galement nomm6 le tiers arbitre. L'arbitre de l'appelant et le tiers arbitre ont rendu une sentence arbitrale par laquelle on lui accordait une somme de pr~s de 85,000.

L'arbitre de la corporation 6tait d'opinion qu'une somme moindre devait 6tre payee.

La decision de .a majorit6 des arbitres fut accept~e par la corporation et le montant fut dfiment offert.

Il ne peut done y avoir de contestation s6rieuse quant au montant de l'indemnit6.

L'appelant pr6tend cependant avoir droit A une OF plus forte somme. Mais comme les trois arbitres sont d'opinion que le, montant offert l'indemnise suffisamment et comme ils ont proc6d6 d'une manibre juste, l6gale et 6quitable, la sentence arbitrale de la majorit6 d6vrait 6tre maintenue.

L'appelant demande en outre que la sentence soit mise de c6t6 sur le principe (1) que la nomination de son arbitre et du tiers arbitre aurait due 6tre faite non pas sous les dispositions de l'acte des corporations de ville (art. 4565 et 4569a).mais sous les dispositions de l'acte g~ndral des expropriations de 1890 (54 Vict. ch. 38), (2) que la corporation n'avait pas les- pouvoirs statutaires requis pour exproprier ses terrains. 1.-NOMINATION ARBITRES.

La ville de Fraserville 6tait r6gie lors de l'expropriation en question, en 1908, par un acte spicial de 1903 Edw. VII. ch. 69) et par l'acte g6ndral des corporations de ville (arts. 4178 et suivantes des Statuts Refondus de 1888).

L'acte g6ndral des expropriations de 1890 (54 Vict. ch. 38) d6clarait que ses dispositions s'appliquaient aux cas oii la l6gislature n'avait pas autrement pourvu au mode d'expropriation.

Il y 6tait d~clard que si une partie refusait de nommer son arbitre alors l'autre partie pouvait demander au Procureur-G6ndral de la province de faire la nomination d'un seul arbitre. Et si chaque partie avait choisi son arbitre alors le tiers arbitre 6tait nomm6 par le Procureur-Gn6ral.

Dans l'acte des corporations de ville le pouvoir d'expropriation pour une ville 6tait d'abord d6cr6t6 par l'article 4561 S.R.Q. (1888) et les articles suivants (4562 A 4570) d6terminent la proc6dure A suivre dans les expropriations.

Dans les articles 4565 et 4569a il y est d6clar6 que si une des parties refuse de nommer son arbitre ou le tiers arbitre, alors un juge de la Cour Sup6rieure aura jurisdiction pour faire cette nomination.

Brodeur Alors la diff6rence entre l'acte g~n6ral des expropriations et l'acte des villes c'est que dans le premier cas le Procureur-G6nral fait les nominations d'arbitres et que dans le cas des expropriations par des villes elles sont faites par le juge de la Cour Sup6rieure.

L'appelant pretend que "I'acte G6ndral des Expropriations" s'applique au cas actuel parce que les terrains sont en dehors de Fraserville vu que la 16gislature, dans le cas de Fraserville, aurait d6clar6 que le mode d'expropriation des corporations de ville ne s'appliquerait que dans le cas les expropriations auraient lieu dans les limites de la ville.

Il se base sur la section 193 de l'acte sp6cial de 1903 qui a rappel6 l'article 4561 des corporations de ville et l'a remplac6 par un nouveau.

L'article 4561, tel que nous le trouvons dans les Statuts Refondus de 1888, se lisait comme suit:- L'amendement fait par la section 193 de la charte de Fraserville est comme suit:- Cet article 4561 des Statuts Revis6s de 1888 avait pour but, comme on le voit, de donner aux villes le droit d'expropriation.

Comme il ne r6f6rait pas aux bAtisses, il fut d6cid6 dans le cas de Fraserville d'ajouter ces mots "et les bAtiments ou constructions" au mot terrain afin de rendre bien clair le droit de la ville de Fraserville d'exproprier non-seulement les terrains mais les bAtisses qu'on y aurait 6rig6es. Et il 6tait d6cr6t6 aussi en mime temps que ces expropriations ne pouvaient se faire que dans la ville.

C'6tait en 1903 que l'article 4561 fut ainsi amend6.

Mais en 1906 de nouveaux pouvoirs d'expropriation furent accord6s A la ville pour son systime d'6clairage et cette fois la ville ne fut pas restreinte A son propre territoire mais on lui a donn6 le pouvoir d'aller en dehors dans les municipalitis avoisinantes.

La l6gislature, cependant, lui a donna ce pouvoir additionnel non pas en retranchant les mots "dans la ville" de Particle 4561 tel qu'amend6 en 1903 mais en faisant une nouvelle section. Cette nouvelle section est claire et non ambigue et personne ne pr6tendra qu'elle ne met pas A n6ant les restrictions impos6es par l'article 4561 tel qu'amend6.

Si par la loi de 1903 la ville de Fraserville ne pouvait exproprier que dans les limites de son territoire pour son systime d'6clairage, I'amendement de 1906 lui donne clairement le droit d'aller au dehors de son territoire pour perfectionner son systime d'6clairage.

Ces deux dispositions sont donc contradictoires et quoique larticle 4561, tel qu'adopt6 en 1903, n'ait pas t6 formellement rappel6 en 1906 il devient inconipatible avec la loi de 1906 et alors la derniare doit privaloir, vu qu'elle contient la volonti du l6gislateur telle qu'exprimbe en dernier lieu.

Lord Tenterden disait dans la cause de The King v. The Justices of Middlesex(1)-- Where the proviso an Act Parliament directly repugnant to the purview of it, the proviso shall stand and be held a repeal the purview, as it speaks the last intention the makers.

"The usual rule as stated" par sa seigneurie le juge Farwell dans la cause de In re Cannings and County Council of Middlesex(1)- Brodeur J is that where there are two public general Acts with inconsistent provisions the later Act prevails.

La proc6dure en expropriation qui doit suivie pour les terrains situ6s en dehors du territoire d'une ville est celle indiquie par les articles 4562 et suivants S.R.Q.

En vertu de l'article 4178, qui est le premier article de l'acte des corporations de ville, il est d6clar6 que: les dispositions du present chapitre s'appliquent A toute municipalit6 corporation de ville 6tablie par la 16gislature de cette province, et A mains modification ou d'exception expresse font partie la charte. L'article 4179 est encore plus explicite et dit:- Pour empecher I'incorporation de quelques articles du present chapitre dans la charte, elle doit les en exclure expressiment en les disignant par leurs num6ros d'ordre.

Ox' se trouve la disposition de la charte de Fraserville qui d6clare express6ment en les d6signant par leurs num6ros d'ordre que les articles 4562 et suivants ne font pas partie de sa charte?

Y a-t-il dans la charte de Fraserville une seule disposition qui d6clare express6ment que les articles 4565 et 4569a qui pourvoient A donner au juge jurisdiction pour la nomination des arbitres ne font pas partie de sa charte?

II n'y en a aucune.

L'article 4561 invoqu6 par I'appelant ne s'occupe pas particulibrement de la proc6dure A suivre dans les expropriations mais d6termine le droit lui-m~me d'expropriation.

Et quant la proc6dure ! suivre, les dispositions des articles 4562 et suivants s'appliquent et serait ill6gal d'avoir recours A la loi g6ndrale d'expropriation qui ne s'applique pas aux corporations de vule. La nomination des arbitres a t d('ment et 1galement faite par le juge de la Cour Sup6rieure.

L'appelant d'ailleurs ne souffre aucune injustice puisque la corporation consent A lui payer le montant que son propre arbitre a d6cid6 de lui donner.

2.-PouvolR

Un autre point qui a t

6galement soulev6 par l'appelant est que la ville de Fraserville ne pouvait pas exproprier son terrain parce qu'il ne se trouvait pas dans une municipalit6 avoisinante.

La rivire et le lac en question sont situbs A environ une quinzaine de milles de Fraserville.

La ville, pour maintenir son systime d'6clairage, 4tait 6videmment oblig6e d'aller en dehors pour alimenter son pouvoir d'eau.

A certaines saisons de l'ann6e la rivibre od elle prenait son pouvoir s'ass~chait et ne pouvait fabriquer la lumibre n6cessaire.

II paraitrait que le lac et le cours d'eau poss6d6s par l'appelant 6tait les seules propridtbs propices qui existaient dans les environs. Il s'agaissait de faire avec ces lacs et ces cours d'eau des r6servoirs qui conserveraient l'eau que l'on distribuerait ensuite dans le cours de 1'6t6, lorsque le cours d'eau oi la ville prenait son pouvoir s'ass~cherait.

Elle a alors obtenue, en 1906, le droit d'exproprier des propri6t6s en dehors de son territoire par le statut (6 Edw. VII., ch. 50, sec. qui d6clare qu'elle pourra:- On se sert de l'expression municipalitis avoisinantes dans la version frangaise, des mots "adjoining mumcipalities" dans la version anglaise.

Le mot "adjoining"

me parait un peu plus restreint que celui "d'avoisinant"; et conune en vertu de la charte de Fraserville, sec. 297, il est d~clar6 que dans le cas de divergences entre la version frangaise et la version anglaise la version frangaise sera adopt6e de prdf6rence, je dis que nous devons alors consid6rer tout particulibrement le mot "avoisinant."

Le mot "avoisinant"

veut dire atre A proximitl d'un lieu, ne veut pas nicessairement dire inim6diatement voisin.

D'ailleurs le l6gislateur avait tellement peu en vue les municipalit6s attenantes A la ville qu'il n'y en a qu'une seule, savoir la paroisse de la Rivibre du Loup qui entoure Fraserville.

Quand il a autoris6, par cons6quent, la ville de Fraserville h exproprier dans les municipalit6s avoisinantes, il voulait 6videmment parler des municipalitis qui se trouvent 6tre h une certaine proximit6, mais qui ne sont pas n6cessairement attenantes A la ville.

Les terrains en question sont A une quinzaine de milles de la ville.

Ce sont les seuls que la ville pouvait exproprier pour son systame d'6clairage.

C'6tait certainement ceux qu'elle avait en vue quand elle s'est fait autoriser par la 16gislature.

Alors il ne peut pas y avoir de doute, suivant moi, que la corporation avait le droit d'exproprier les terrains de l'appelant.

Pour toutes ces raisons, je considbre que le jugement qui a renvoy6 l'action du demandeur est bien fond6e et doit 6tre confirm6 avec d6pens.

Appeal dismissed with costs.