Peterson v. The King

IDINGTON J.-I am of the opinion that the evidence of Brunner that he gave appellant the cheque in question was, in the language of section 1002 of the Criminal Code, "corroborated in some material particular *

* * implicating the accused" by the evidence of Smith, the manager of the bank, that on the same day on which the cheque was dated and-alleged to j. have been given, the appellant was in possession thereof and that it was cashed by him.

I therefore think the appeal should be dismissed. J.-The question presented by this appeal as argued before us is really an academic question, because the argument very largely proceeded upon an abstract from the facts, not by any means presenting the full force of the case made by the Crown. The facts I am about to state in themselves shew the contention of the appellant to be beyond the pale of argument. At a meeting of the executive committee of the Licensed Victuallers' Association in Regina, it was arranged that the appellant Peterson was to use money in connection with the Association's opposition to a bill then before the legislature of Saskatchewan, and the appellant and one Brunner, who was the treasurer of the Association, were authorized to employ the funds of the Association for that purpose. The occurrences at this meeting were proved by the evidence of the witness, George Sharpe. Brunner's evidence is explicit to the effect that on December 13th, 1913, he gave Peterson a cheque for $4,000, a cheque of the Licensed Victuallers' Association, signed by Brunner as treasurer, and by another officer of the Association; and Smith, the bank manager, proves by his evidence that on the same day a cheque answering the description of that which Brunner says he gave the appellant was cashed by the appellant.

The evidence of the appellant, upon which the charge is based, was to the effect that he "did not get from Frank Brunner a cheque for $4,000 upon the account of the Licensed Victuallers' Association." The ground of appeal is alleged non-compliance with the condition of section 1002 of the Criminal Code, which prescribes that upon a charge of perjury, the accused shall not be convicted on the evidence of one witness

It appears to me, as I have already said, that in view of the evidence of Sharp and Smith the contention is not seriously arguable. The principle to be applied is stated by Mr. Justice Wightman in Reg. v. Boyes(1), at p. 320.

In the circumstances mentioned, Brunner's official position as treasurer of the Association, the authority given by the Association to Peterson and Brunner jointly to employ the funds of the Association, the fact relied upon as corroborative evidence that on the very day on which Brunner says he gave the cheque to Peterson, Peterson had such a cheque and cashed it affords, it appears to me, superabundant corroboration within the requirements of section 1002.

J.-The question on this appeal is whether there was any evidence proper to be submitted to a jury as corroboration of the testimony of Frank Brunner that he had given to the appellant Peterson a cheque for $4,000 upon the account of the Licensed Victuallers Association.

Section 1002 of the Criminal Code prescribes that upon an accusation for perjury the accused shall not

. The appellant was charged with having committed perjury in swearing that he

The corroboration relied on by the Crown was the testimony of Mr. Smith, manager of the Bank of Ottawa, that the appellant had brought to his bank, on the same day on which Brunner swore that he had given it to him, a cheque for $4,000 on the account of the Licensed Victuallers Association, and that this cheque was cashed and its proceeds handed to the appellant.

In my opinion, the facts deposed to by Smith, that on the very day on which Brunner swore he had given Peterson the cheque, the latter was in possession of it and cashed it, was evidence implicating the accused, which the learned trial judge could not properly have withdrawn from the jury as corroborative in material particulars of the testimony of Brunner, within the meaning of section 1002 of the Code. The weight to be attached- to it was, of course, entirely for the jury to determine. But that it might confirm the jury in the belief that Brunner was speaking the truth, seems to me not to admit of question; Reg. v. Boyes(1); Rex. v. Daun(2); Rex v. Scheller (3); Radford v. Macdonald(4).

Appeal- dismissed with costs.