The King v. Hearn

Per Idington J.-The cardinal rule to be observed in expropriation proceedings is to allow the market value only, except in cases where the taking has incidentally damaged the owner's business or other material interests; and the advantages to be derived from the construction of the works for the promotion of which expropriation is made must be excluded in determining such market value.

Per Brodeur J.-The indemnity to be paid is the value to the owner of the property expropriated and such value is determined by the advantages, present and future, of the property; but the actual value only of these advantages, at the time of the expropriation, must be taken into consideration.

.-In an appeal to the Supreme Court from the award of an arbitrator, when the question of value has been fully discussed before him and no mistake of law or fact is alleged, the mere suggestion that the amount of compensation is excessive or inadequate ought rarely to be considered a sufficient ground of objection to the award; and this principle must be applied with even more force in the case of an appeal by the Crown, the Exchequer Court being its own tribunal.

APPEAL from the judgment of the Exchequer Court of Canada (1), awarding, in expropriation Charles Fitzpatrick C.J. and Idington, Duff Anglin and Brodeur JJ.

proceedings taken by appellant, for the value of land taken and damages to parts of land adjoining, the sum of $133,976.03.

The Supreme Court of Canada, allowing the present appeal, reduced the amount to $81,767.60.

The material facts of the case are fully stated in the judgments now reported.

(dissenting)-By the "Expropriation Act" (R.S.C. (1906) ch. 143), Parliament has authorized the Attorney-General, in any case in which land is acquired, for any public work, to exhibit in the Exchequer Court an information which shall be deemed the institution of a suit, and in and by which the compensation to be paid shall be ascertained and all claims, other than such as may be allowed, shall be barred. But though Parliament has set up this special machinery for reference of claims to compensation to the court which it has erected for the adjudication of claims against the Crown in right of the Dominion, yet the proceedings, though judicial in form, are in reality no different from the settlement of such cases by arbitration, the usual procedure in cases between private corporations or individuals. In appeals to this court from the award of an arbitrator and recently in the appeal from the Exchequer Court of the Capital Brewing Company and The King, I have expressed the view that where the question of value has been fully discussed and no mistake of law or fact is alleged, the mere suggestion that the amount of compensation is excessive or inadequate ought rarely to be considered a sufficient TE KING ground of objection to the award.

HEARN.

The case I have just mentioned was an appeal The Chief by the owner of the land taken, and I think the re- Justice.

marks which I then made apply with even more force in the case of an appeal by the Crown, the Exchequer Court being its own tribunal, the decision of which other parties may not always.be so content to accept as they would that of arbitrators of their own choice or at all events independent of the parties and matters in dispute.

In the appeal, this year, by special leave, to the Privy Council, of Ruddy v. Toronto Eastern Ry. Co. (1), in which an award of arbitration under the "Railway Act" was called in question, their Lordships, after stating that in their opinion such an award was in a position similar to that of the judgment of a trial judge, continue:

From such a judgment an appeal is always open both upon fact and law.

But upon questions of fact an appeal court will not interfere with the decision of the judge who has seen the witnesses and has been able, with the impression thus formed, fresh in his mind, to decide between their contending evidence-unless there is some good and special reason to throw doubt upon the soundness of his conclusions.

* * * In the present case, as far as the question of fact is concerned, their Lordships see no reason whatever to justify interference with the award.

The arbitrators appear to have scrutinized and examined the evidence on both sides with great care, and, in addition, they paid at least two visits to the property and made a careful inspection for themselves.

It would be in a high degree unreasonable to interfere with such a finding of fact, based on such materials.

The principle so laid down, with which I am in entire accord, seems to have its application very fully in the present case.

We cannot overlook the fact that the assistant judge of the Exchequer Court has a vast experience of this class of cases with which indeed (1) 38 Ont. L.R.

a great part of his time is constantly occupied. An immense volume of evidence was taken, and no doubt carefully weighed by the learned judge who delivered an elaborate judgment. With all the advantage of a The view of the premises, he has fixed on each lot separately Justice. the amount of compensation which he concludes is fair and reasonable.

No doubt the amount is large, but I am unable to find any sufficient reason for disturbing an award so arrived at. That the value of property in the City of Quebec has risen enormously in recent years, there can be no doubt, and excluding the increase in the value of the respondents' property attributable to the particular public work for which the lands are expropriated, their property must have shared in the general increase. This must necessarily have been the case, if we consider how strictly limited is any space available for harbour accommodation within the port of Quebec.

I am myself intimately acquainted with the property expropriated and indeed with the whole locality, and to this extent, at any rate, I have the same advantage as the assistant judge derived from his view of the premises.

Whilst, as I have said, the amount awarded is large and perhaps more than I should have felt justified in giving, had I been in the place of the learned judge, I am still unable to concur in the judgment of the majority of the court.

IDINGTON J.-The Exchequer Court has awarded, in expropriation proceedings taken by appellant, for the parts of ten parcels of land so taken and damage to the remainder, the sum of $133,796.03, of which $133,196.03 is directed to be paid the Hearn estate, represented by three of the respondents.

From this judgment appeal is taken herein, and THE KING the contention of appellant is that the learned trial judge had not adhered to the cardinal rule to be Idington J. observed in such cases, of only allowing the market value, unless in such cases (of which this is not one), as where the taking has incidentally, in doing so, damaged the owner's business or other material interests. The case is a remarkable one and by no means easy of solution. The difficulties are created chiefly by the obvious failure of the witnesses for the respondents, representing the Hearn estate, including one of themselves, giving valuations that were not based on a strict adherence to the rule to which I have referred. Indeed I doubt if any one of these witnesses correctly apprehended what he was called upon to testify as to. In perusing their evidence, I do not find a single one of them pledging his oath to his belief that a sale could have been made, wholly uninfluenced by the advantages to be derived from the construction of the works in question and before the expropriation, of any of these properties, for the prices at which each of the respective witnesses says he values it or them. The learned trial judge has referred to them in comprehensive terms as follows:- The Crown has expropriated from these properties the right of way for the National Transcontinental Railway, coming into the city on the water front as far as the old Champlain market, and took all the land, belonging to the defendants, on the river side from the north line of the right of way, thus leaving the defendants with a certain piece of land on the northern side of the right of way to Champlain street. The part or piece of land so left to the defendants is, with the exception which will be hereafter mentioned, covered with dwelling houses with a small yard at the back. These buildings are being used for residential purposes and are subdivided into small lodgings to the one house and are occupied by tenants of the labouring class, yielding very small net revenues.

The back part of their property, that is the part on the water front, is in some cases partly covered by old wharves running out at various distances.

These wharves were built many years ago for a trade which no longer exists and for a number of years back have practically remained unused and indeed shew the result of wear and tear occasioned by time and age.

THE While indeed, these properties at some time back, when the timber business and shipbuilding were at their best in Quebec and when large rafts of timber towed down the river St. Lawrence to Quebec and J placed in the several coves adjoining the city, and while the water Idington J. fronts of some of these properties were then used for retaining the logs and timber by booms stretched in front of them, these properties then commanded quite a value; on the other hand, this trade has now almost completely vanished and dissappeared from Quebet since a number of years, with the result that his water front property has gone down to a very little value on the market at the present time and at the date of the expropriation. In fact, it is a question as to whether there would now be a market for such property at Quebec, but for the public works now going on.

In connection with what I have just now said relative to market value, I would call particular attention to the last sentence of that just quoted. That and the rest of the quotation expresses with fairness the impressions I have received from an examination of the case and due consideration of the arguments advanced, as well as those derived from a perusal of the evidence of those witnesses I have referred to.

I agree with the observations of Rowlatt J. quoted by the learned trial judge herein, from his judgment in the case of Sidney v. North Eastern Railway Co. (1), at page 637, and other authorities he cites, bearing upon the exclusion from consideration of the market value, the advantages to be derived from the construction of the work in question for the promotion of which expropriation is made.

Yet I cannot help thinking that the respondent, Hearn, and his witnesses failed to observe any such distinction in giving their evidence.

Hearn himself says in speaking of two of these parcels, as follows:- Q.-In connection with the land lots Nov. 2402 and 2410, are there any special circumstances which make them more valuable in (1) (1914) 3 K.B. 629.

your opinion?

A.-Well, I would think the very fact of their being very close to this railway terminal, that has been decided upon, should give them value.

Q.-Could you give us an idea of what you mean by saying it was Idington J worth more 5% or 10%? A.-Probably more.

I am dealing entirely with my own property. I know just what I would have accepted for it in 1900 and what I would want for it in 1913, had it been let to me as it was.

Q.-That is the basis of your valuation?

A.-Yes.

Q.-May I say it was made in the same way as you said your estimate of No. 2376 was made, viz., the price you would have been willing to take in 1913? A.-Exactly.

Q.-I think I asked you this question before. In the different estimates in which you have put the prices of these different lots, I think you said that the figures you had placed were the figures at which you were willing to sell; that is the basis on which you arrived at these figures? A.-Yes, the prices I felt they were worth. I was not prepared to accept less than what I thought the properties were worth.

Then one of the witnesses, Nesbitt, says:- Q.-How did you arrive at the valuation of the lots?

A.-From my general experience of values round the city, within the city and outskirts.

Q.-In the city and outskirts generally? A.-Yes, generally. Q.-Any special reference to Champlain street? A.-No, I can't say any special reference to that part particularly.

And Conway says:- Q.-In view of the rentals and other revenues of these different properties and the amount of business that has been carried on upon the different properties for the past twenty or forty years, do you still consider those prices reasonable? A.-I do not consider the rentals on the revenue at all.

Q.-What do you consider the proper revenue of, say, the wharves on 2376? A.-I don't know, I did not consider that.

Q.-I want to know what the revenue would be. I want to know where the value lies. How could you make money out of it? A.- I would consider it a good property to hold and sell to men who would come there for shipping purposes and build a wharf and including that part in it.

Q.-The prospective value of the property is what gives it the value that you name. Is that right? A.-That is right.

Mr. Taschereau's views were also evidently unduly impressed with the possibility of future development in the city.

Whether for the reasons I suggest or other good reasons, the valuations of these witnesses has not been accepted by the learned trial judge in arriving at his award.

There was evidence adduced on behalf of the appellant which was ostensibly based on transactions relative to similar properties next or near to those here in question.

The learned trial judge has not accepted that either, but seems, though he does not say so, to have reached his conclusions by a compromise between these two sets of evidence.

It is to be observed that the respondent's witnesses, referred to, also relied upon some transactions relative to properties of which the nearest was half a mile distant from the properties in question, except where Mr. Taschereau refers to those of one Evoy and another Picard deal, to be referred to presently. The latter, as explained in appellant's factum, is hardly worth mentioning. The other is claimed to have been no real transaction, but the evidence on which that contention is set up is not cited, and if it exists, has escaped me.

The respondents make no argument based or bearing upon them.

On the other hand, there are a number of transactions relied upon by appellant relative to properties in the immediate neighbourhood of those in question based upon prices, which if to be accepted as evidence of market value of property, seem strongly to maintain the contention of the appellant.

Some of these are the result of decisions of the Exchequer Court relative to expropriations for the same purpose as now in question.

These should have considerable weight in the same court. Obviously, however, the parties concerned as owners may not have taken the sanie care in presenting their case as the present respondents Idington J. or they may have given a grudging assent through failing to appeal.

For these and the like reasons they cannot carry the same weight as bargains made between parties relative to properties next to or in the immediate neighbourhood of those in question.

For that reason I look on the latter as a safer guide. And, as I have said in other cases heretofore, such bargains should, when there is no reason shewn to impeach their value as such, be taken as a safe guide touching the question of market value. There are at least three instances herein presented by the appellant of such bargains bearing upon the issue presented.

I refer to that called "The Molson Macpherson sale," that known as "The Allen sale," and that belonging to the Belanger estate.

The first and lastly named seem directly in point though some objections are taken as to the Allen sale, which renders it of less value, yet of very great value, if correctly understood. A number of other properties referred to are not quite as clearly in point and would require an inspection and study of their relative situation to render sales thereof as valuable in evidence as those I specially refer to.

Men so instructed and so acting frequently give evidence of greater value than experts retained, as it were, to promote the views of him retaining them, when often they may be unconsciously influenced by the interested suggestions of him whose cause they represent.

For these several reasons I think their estimates are more reliable than those presented by respondents' witnesses.

Again I observe that the latter seem herein prone to cite sales of property a long way from the property in question.

No doubt such illustrations as shew a rapid rise in properties elsewhere in same city are of value for that purpose, but not beyond the surmise that in time all may be more or less appreciated thereby. Any one of experience knows that properties may only be a very short distance from some others in the same city, yet by reason of many circumstances, sometimes puzzling to understand, be much inferior in value and much less responsive to any general rise in values in the city.

Hence the nearer any property sold is to that expropriated renders a sale of same of greater value than any sales beyond the district where the expropriated land is situated.

For these various reasons I attach great importance to the sales, already referred to, in the district in question, few though they be, and am inclined favourably towards the evidence of those Crown experts who approached the valuation in question herein from that point of view I have referred to.

Again the prospective rise. in value is of no weight unless the market value of that possibility is directly borne in mind and testified to.

There are a number of other considerations I am about to present which tell very strongly against the respondent's claims as being of a most exaggerated character.

I observe how far they exceed any estimate made by their witnesses.

These properties had been acquired by the late Mr. Hearn who died in 1894, and had then, I think, become worth a great deal less than when first acquired, or at all events less productive of revenue.

The respondent, Hearn, who seems to have had them in charge, gives an account of the revenue for five years preceding the year 1913, which shews a total of less than a thousand dollars per annum, after deducting taxes and insurance.

He does not seem to have kept any accurate account of repairs which no doubt wo'uld still further reduce the net revenue given. He intimates the results would be pretty much the same for the time back to his father's death. Is there any conceivable reason why properties worth what he says, or any of his witnesses says, should be held for such a long period of time producing no more than he testifies to?

I have not heard of any prohibition against their being sold. The only reason that has occurred to me is that they were quite unsaleable at any such price as these gentlemen estimate them to be worth, or anything more than the . Crown's witnesses have estimated them at.

Is it conceivable that any business man who could undoubtedly reap 6% per annum on a capital investment of say fifty or sixty thousand dollars, would hang on for twenty years to a property he could sell for that and reap such an income, yet would not sell it, if he could, even if in that time, it increased in value 25%? In other words, why did he, with such gloomy prospects as that decayed part of Quebec presented, accept less than a thousand dollars a year, with all the worries of weary waiting for something to turn up, face his steadily losing say two thousand dollars a year? At the best, admitting a rise of 25% in nearly twenty years, he would be winning in that time twelve to fifteen thousand dollars, and losing the compound interest on the surplus from a new investment.

I can find no answer except that it was quite impossible to realize even fifty thousand dollars on these properties.

And when we come to contemplate a possible one hundred and twenty to one hundred and thirty thousand dollars the proposition to hang on seems still more absurd, unless on the hypothesis that, as they could not be sold at all, the :owners might amuse themselves by imagining such values.

I do not suggest that a non-productive property is valueless.

All that I submit is there must exist some reasonable probability of its use to give it a value. Then let us turn to the assessed values.

We find them running from $14,250 in 1903, on a rental basisi to $38,700 in 1913, when a new basis of actual values seems to have been adopted for assessment purposes. The latter system admittedly increased the assessment values, as it generally does.

The assessment, I admit, varies so much as not to be a very reliable guide to exact actual values, but what a difference between $38,700 and $133,169! Can it be possible that the assessment was so far below what it ought to have been?

But when we come to contemplate the sworn return of values for purposes of succession tax duties we find these properties, in 1894, valued at $7,250 and that accepted by the provincial authorities on the spot as right, or near enough to make it not worth contesting.

Assuming they were undervalued, how came it that the provincial authorities, sitting in Quebec, did not find anything worth quarrelling about?

A slight difference of say even double or treble, might not matter for all the province could reap. But is it at all conceivable that any one then imagined they were, then, in 1894, worth forty thousand dollars or thereabouts? It would require that to bring them, allowing for rise since in value, up to what the agents of appellant placed them at in 1913.

And when we come to think of $133,169 it seems something unthinkable.

True such estimates do not bind those entitled to claim the true value for another purpose, but they do bind the conscience of the respondent Hearn and lead us to weigh his evidence accordingly.

I cannot, in view of all these considerations, see how we should allow more than the estimate made by the appellant's witnesses, save to add thereto the usual 10% for expropriation.

But then there are the questions of title which may make some slight variation in the result.

It will depend on the opinion of the other members of this court, as to valuations, whether it is necessary or worth my while entering upon that phase of the matter.

If their estimate exceeds mine to any very substantial extent that may cover the utmost possible margin of difference arising from the view to be taken by appellant's witnesses of the titles and consequent area to be considered.

But I, by no means, admit that extra area, liable to be covered by water, equal to that not so when we find no present use for watered lots.

The appeal should, in any event, be allowed with costs.

J.-The award should be reduced to $81,767.50.

J.-I agree with the learned assistant judge of the Exchequer Court that, having regard to the statutory right of the Hearn Estate to maintain and use the wharves owned by it, it was unnecessary to determine the question of title raised as to the lands below low water mark on which portions of those wharves are erected. The estate had practically all the benefit and advantage of full proprietorship and was entitled to compensation on that basis. I therefore accept the areas adopted by the learned judge as the proper basis on which to compute compensation. The general views expressed by the learned judge a§ to the principle on which compensation should be awarded and the elements that should enter into the computation are not open to criticism. But, making due allowance for the advantage which he had in viewing the property, I am, nevertheless, with great respect, of the opinion that the amounts allowed for compensation are so clearly and so grossly excessive that it is apparent that he failed to make a correct application of the principles which he had correctly stated in the abstract.

Without laying too much stress on this feature of the case it is, to say the least, astoundingand something which certainly called for a better explanation than was given of it-that, although, according to the testimony of John G. Hearn, the increase in value in the interval had probably not exceeded 25%, the executors of the Hearn Estate for purposes of succession duties in 1894 valued on oath at $7,250 the entire property for the taking of a portion of which the estate in this proceeding has demanded as compensation $281,181.18 and has been actually awarded, as of the 8th November 1913,

$133,796.03.

The municipal valuation for assessment purposes of the whole property, of which part was taken, was in 1903, $4,250, in 1908, $21,500 and in 1913, $38,700.

After giving to the whole evidence the best consideration of which I am capable, the valuations of the Crown witnesses on the basis of area on which they were made commend themselves to .my judgment as sound and reasonable, erring, if at all, in favour of the respondents.

I see nothing to be gained by discussing the evidence in detail or setting out the analysis of it on which this conclusion is based.

Applying the figures of the Crown witnesses to the greater areas for which I think compensation should be made, I would modify the judgment in appeal by reducing the sum of $133,796.03, the amount awarded in the Exchequer Court, to $81,767.50, including 10% for compulsory taking.

It seems to me to be unnecessary, as the learned trial judge has found, to determine in this proceeding any rights inter se of the Crown and the Quebec Harbour Commissioners in regard to beach and deep water lots.

The appellant is entitled to the costs of the appeal to this court.

J.-Il s'agit d'un appel de la Cour d'Echiquier concernant l'expropriation de terrains pour le Transcontinental National dans le hAvre de Qudbec.

La Cour a accord6 aux intim~s une somme de $133,196.03.

Les trois points qui se prdsentent dans la cause ont trait lo. au droit de propri~t4 des intim~s.

2o. A l'6tendue des terrains qui leur appartiennent. 3o. A leur valeur.

Droit de propri6td.

Le nombre de lots expropri6s est de dix; mais il n'y a divergence d'opinion quant au droit de propri6td que pour trois, savoir les lots 2376, 2404 et 2410. Tous ces lots sont situds sur le c6t6 sud de la rue Champlain et se prolongent dans le fleuve St. Laurent. Des quais y out t construits depuis un temps immemorial, probablement dans la premiere partie du si6cle dernier.

La Couronne 6tait alors propri~taire de ces lots de grove et ces quais ont dd 6tre faits avec son autorisation, sinon formelle, dumoins tacite. Aussi quand la Commission du HAvre de Quebec a cr66e en 1859 (22 V. ch. 32), il a 0t d~cr~td que la Commission devenait propri~taire en fiddicommis du lit de la rivibre A partir des hautes eaux et qu'elle devenait la crdancibre des rentes constitudes qui avaient 6t6 stipuldes lors de Poctroi des lots de grove. Mais la loi ajoutait que les personnes qui avaient construit des quais ou d'autres travaux dans les limites du ha^vre continueraient A en 6tre les propridtaires. En 1871, le cadastre d'enr6gistrement a t fait sous l'autorit4 du Code Civil et l'un des terrains dont les intim6s sont maintenant en possession a 6t4 ddsign6 par le lot No. 2376.

Le plan d~crit ce lot comme comprenant non seulement la terre ferme, mais aussi 1--7 une partie du hvre couverte par les eaux A haute et basse mardes.

Le livre de renvoi lui donne une superficie de 34,440 pieds. mesure anglaise.

Plus tard, en 1882, ce No. 2376 a t6 vendu par le sh6rif et achet4 par l'Honorable John Hearn, dont les intim~s sont les ex~cuteurs testamentaires.

La description du lot dans l'acte de vente du shdrif est comme suit:

Cette description est 4videmment erron~e. Ce lot ne peut pas avoir 34,440 pieds, s'il ne comprend que le terrain couvert par les hautes eaux; et d'ailleurs une partie du quai qui en d6pendait se trouvait 9 eau profonde.

La description n'6tait pas conforme d'ailleurs A celle du livre de renvoi.

En vertu de larticle 2168 du Code Civil, il est statu6 que le numdro donn6 & un lot sur le plan et le livre de renvoi est la vraie description de ce lot et suffit dans tout document quelconque et notamment dans la vente faite par le shbrif.

II n'est pas n~cessaire d'indiquer ses tenants et aboutissants, except4 dans le cas oi il s'agit d'une portion d'un immeuble. Dans le cas actuel, le sh~rif, en indiquant que ce lot 6tait born4 par les limites de la basse marde, a donn6 un aboutissant qui n'6tait pas exact et cela n'a aucun effet 16gal; Caron v. Houle (1);

car le plan couvrait incontestablement un morceau de terrain au dela des eaux basses.

Le lot cadastr6 a t 6videmment fait pour couvrir tout le quai, non-seulement la partie A d~couvert dans les eaux basses, mais aussi celle qui s'4tendait au del%. L'appelant allgue que le droit de propri6td des $7 intimbs est born4 par la ligne des eaux basses; et, en outre du contrat du shrif, il invoque un acte fait par la Commission du HAvre aux auteurs de l'Honorable Mr. Hearn en 1861 par lequel la Commission du HAvre a vendu une partie de ce terrain.

Il est loin d'6tre certain que cet acte de vente fut ndcessaire; car il est 4vident, par le r~cit des faits qu'il contient, que ce terrain 4tait occup6 par les acheteurs ou leurs auteurs en 1859, lors de la cr6ation de la Commission du HAvre, et par le statut, comme nous l'avons vu, il 4tait dcrt6 que les possesseurs continueraient A jouir et A se servir de leurs quais comme par le pass6.

Ces possesseurs cependant voulaient je suppose s'assurer i tout jamais de la validit6 de leur titre et c'est, ce qui les a incites A se faire donner un nouveau titre par la Commission du HAvre. Je suis d'opinion, avec le cour Inf6rieure, que la succession Hearn est propri6taire du lot No. 2376 jusqu'd l'extr~me limite du quai qui y est construit et ce, en vertu du statut crbant la Commission du HAvre. Elle a eu d'ailleurs possession paisible et indiscutable de cette partie du lot 2376, tant par elle que par ses auteurs, depuis plus de trente ans (art 2242 C.C.).

La cour Inf6rieure a fait mesurer la partie ainsi occupde par les intimbs et a trouv6 une superficie de 25,280 pieds.

J'en suis venu A la m~me conclusion que la Cour inf6rieure pour les autres lots au sujet desquels le droit de propri6t6 est contest6.

Etendue du terrain.

La cour inf6rieure a accord6 aux intimbs une indemnit4 pour cette partie appel6e Gore. Cela repr6sente une superficie de 888 pieds.

C'est une toute petite lisibre de terrain dont il a t question dans certains actes. Il me parait cependant que le mesurage des lots tel que fait sous 'autorit4 du cadastre et par l'arpenteur Tremblay ne saurait justifier les intim6s de r~clamer une indemnit6 pour ces 888 pieds.

Valeur.

Les propri~t6s exproprides, comme je l'ai d6j& dit, sont situdes en front sur la rue Champlain, & Qubbec, et s'4tendent vers et dans le fleuve St. Laurent, dans le hAvre de Qu6bec.

Des maisons sont construites A la rue Champlain et sur l'arribre des lots, on a 6rig6 des quais dont on se servait autrefois pour le commerce si considerable de bois qui se faisait dans le cours du si~cle dernier. La construction du chemin de fer le Transcontinental ne touchait pas aux maisons bities sur la rue Champlain, mais elle prenait une partie de ces quais; et afin d'6viter des reclamations en dommages assez difficiles A d6terminer, la Couronne a jug6 & propos d'exproprier tout le terrain couvert par les quais et mme jusqu'd la ligne frontibre de la Commission. Le traffic pour lequel ces quais avait t originairement construits n'existe plus ou n'est fait que sur une bien petite 4chelle; et, en r~alit4, comme dit l'honorable juge de la cour infrieure:- On voit d'ailleurs que la plupart de ces propri6t6s ont t vendues par le sh6rif et acheties A des prix extr~mement bas.

.

Il est possible que ces lots pourraient avoir plus tard une tr~s grande valeur si le gouvernement ou les autoritds du port y faisaient des travaux tellement consid6rables qu'un particulier ne saurait et ne pour- J. rait pas entreprendre.

Ces possibilit6s peuvent tre prises en considration quand on d6terminera la valeur actuelle.

C'est ce que le juge de la cour inf6rieure a fait.

L'indemnit4 qui doit 6tre payee est la valeur que le terrain expropri6 avait pour le propri6taire; et cette valeur consiste dans tous les avantages actuels et futurs que le terrain poss~dait; mais on ne doit consid~rer que la valeur actuelle de ces avantages. Cedar Rapids case (1).

Il y a une grande divergence .d'opinion entre les t~moins des propri6taires et ceux de la Couronne quant A la valeur des terrains: les premiers disent $281,181.18 et les seconds donnent une valeur de $38,700.

Les t~moins du propri~taire prochdent suivant diff~rents principes.

M. Hearn, I'intim6, lui-mIme nous dit qu'il peut fixer un prix et y tenir, sans prendre en consideration la valeur marchande du terrain dans les environs.

Un autre t6moin nous d6clare que son 6valuation est basbe sur le mouvement de la propri~td dans la ville de Quebec et de ses environs, mais qu'il n'a pas pris en considdration les conditions actuelles des terrains exproprids et de leur participation dans ce mouvement g6ndral.

Un dernier t~moin base son 6valuation sur le prix qu'une compagnie de bateaux pourrait plus tard offrir, quand le commerce se d6veloppera et pourra utiliser ces quais.

Les t~moins de la Couronne 4taient des experts employds dans le but de faire l'4valuation de toutes les propridt6s A Atre exproprides pour le Transcontinental dans cette localitd, depuis le Pointe de Sillery A aller jusqu'au march4 Champlain. Les propridt6s en question dans cette cause 4taient parmi celles-ld.

Ils se sont mis au courant des ventes de terrain qui avaient t4 faites dans ces derniers temps et ont pris en consid6ration toutes les autres circonstances de nature A influer sur cette valeur. Ils ont 4galement consid6r6 les revenus que donnaient ces propridt6s et leur 6valuation municipale. .

La preuve nous d~montre que les revenus bruts 4taient annuellement d'environ $1,500 et que les revenus nets 6taient de $500 de moins, soit $1,000 environ.

Alors les 4valuateurs de la Couronne, en accordant $38,700 d'indemnit6, donnaient au propri6taire un capital qui produirait le double de ce qu'il retirait de ses propri6t6s.

II est A remarquer 4galement qu'en 1894, au d6chs de l'Honorable M. Hearn, I'auteur des propri~taires actuels, les propri6t6s ont 6t6 6valu6es par l'intimb M. J.

C'4tait bien loin de la somme de $280,000 qu'il r~clame aujourd'hui.

Il est int6ressant de lire la partie du t6moignage de M. Hearn qui nous parle de la valeur proportionnelle des terrains en 1890 et en 1913.

Il en est arriv4 A la conclusion que les terrains pendant cette p~riode ont peut-6tre augment4 d'une valeur de 10%. Alors comment peut-il expliquer qu'en 1890, il jurait dans sa d6claration au Tr6sorier Provincial que ces terrains valaient $7,250 et qu'aujourd'hui ils valent $280,000? Comment concilier ses d6clarations?

Voici d'ailleurs son t~moignage sur ce point:- THE KING Q.-You spoke to us about the value of this property, I suppose the values you were talking about were the values in 1913? A.-About Brodeur J. that, yes.

Q.-How would those valuations compare with say five years before? Was there any increase or decrease at all? I am not speaking about small differences.

A.-The value might have increased a little, that is five years ago or thereabout.

Q.-Five years before 1913.

Are you talking about? A.-Five years before 1913, 1 might possibly have sold the property for less than I would since 1913 in certain conditions.

Q.-Are the circumstances such, since 1913 and the time you now give evidence, as to make it proper or incumbent on you to ask a higher price to-day than you would have asked in 1913? A.-No.

Q.-Would you say there is any great difference in the value of property between the year 1913 and the year 1900? A.-I think in 1913, this property we are speaking of would be of more value than in 1900 had the railway not come in and destroyed it, had the railway remained at Cape Diamond.

Q.-Leaving aside for the moment any effect the railway might have had would the property have been worth approximately the same in 1900 as it would in 1913? A.-Eliminating any influence the railway might have had?

Q.-Yes. A.-I think it would be worth more in 1913 because of the general improvement of property in Quebec.

Q.-Could..you give us an idea of what you mean by saying it was worth more?

5% or 10%? A.-Probably more. I am dealing entirely with my own property. I know just what I would have accepted in 1900 and what I would want for it in 1913, had it been left to me as it was.

Q.-May I say, it was made in the same way as you said your estimate of No. 2376 was made, viz., the price that you would have been willing to take in 1913? A.-Exactly.

Q.-Would you compare the price in a general way, that you would have been willing to take in 1913 with the price you would have taken in 1900? A.-I would want more than I would want in 1900. Q.-Approximately what proportion or percentage? A.-Probably 25% or something of that kind.

Q.-Could you go as far back, from recollection, and compare in a general way, the value of the property in 1913 with the value in 1890? A.-No.

Q.-Can you say in a general way, whether the value of this property increased between 1890 and 1900?

A.-I think it would increase.

Q.-To any considerable extent? A.-Yes, I would think the property in Quebec during the last ten years increased generally. Quant aux ventes de terrain dans les environs, il est en preuve que le lot No. 2411, qui est voisin de l'un des lots expropri6s, a 6 vendu en 1901, avec les quais qui y avaient 6t6 construits, A raison de 16 cents du pied carr6, et un autre terrain, aussi contigu, portant le No. 2415, a t vendu aussi en 1901 pour 22Y2 cents. Cette difference dans le prix entre ces deux ventes 4tait probablement due au fait que. les quais 6taient plus spacieux dans le premier que dans le dernier cas.

Mais vers le mme temps od l'expropriation a eu lieu, des terrains semblables ont 6td vendus A la Couronne pour la construction du chemin de fer par les hritiers Molson, par Madame B6langer et par la Compagnie Allan. Les h~ritiers Molson ont vendu 65 cents du pied, Madame B6langer 85 cents et la Compagnie Allan 94 cents.

Ces terrains 4taient voisins des terrains de la succession Hearn et le prix qui a 6 pay4 peut nous donner une idde assez exacte de la valeur marchande des propri~t~s exproprides. Je vois que les terrains ainsi vendus A la Couronne ont 6 vendus A des prix difftrents, selon qu'ils 6taient plus ou moins rapproch~s du centre de la ville. Ainsi la propri~t4 Allan, qui est la plus pros, a 6t6 vendue A 94 cents, la voisine vers l'ouest, celle de Madame B6langer, A 85 cents, et enfin celle de la succession Molson, qui est la plus 6loign~e A 65 cents. Or, cette dernibre est justement voisine de la propri~t6 de la succession Hearn, la plus proche de la ville. Elle porte les num~ros du cadastre 2370 & 2371 et la propri~td voisine A l'ouest, qui appartient A la succession Hearn, porte le numdro 2376. La propri6t6 Molson, qui, comme la propri6t6 Hearn, est un lot de grove, est donc mieux situde que cette dernibre. Elle a 6 vendue cependant au prix de 65 cents le pied, tandis que la cour inf rieure a accord4 b. la succession Hearn une indemnit6 sur le pied de $1.88 le pied. Il n'y a rien dans la cause qui puisse justifier une si grande difference.

Les autres propri~t~s de la succession Hearn sont toutes situdes plus A l'ouest, c'est-&-dire de plus en plus 4loigndes du centre de la ville.

La cour inf6rieure a accord6 pour le No. 2381 une indemnit4 6quivalente A $1.35 du pied, pour le No. 2385..........

1.57 du pied, pour les Nos. 2393, 2394..... 1.17 du pied, et pour les Nos. 2402, 2403, 2404, 2409 & 2410, $1.64 du pied.

Ce dernier lot (No. 2410) est voisin d'une propri6t6 semblable qui a t6 expropride et pour laquelle il a 6t6 accord4 52 cents du pied.

Je crois que, dans les circonstances, une indemnit6 raisonnable, mdme lib6rale, serait accordde A la succession Hearn, si je fixais un prix uniforme pour tous ces lots et si j'adoptais pour cette fin la valeur payde A la succession Molson, soit 65 cents du pied. D'apr&s les calculs que j'ai faits, la superficie du terrain expropri4 se chiffrerait comme suit:- Lot No. 2376..................

25,280 Lot No. 2381 .....................

5,880 Lot No. 2385...................

2,529 Lots Nos. 2393 & 2394............

8,552 Lots Nos. 2402, 2403, 2404, 2409 and

2410......................

31,633 formant un total de..............

73,874 & 65 cents du pied, cela donnerait $48,018.10.

II faudrait ajouter A cela la valeur des quais. II est en preuve qu'il y a 15,833 verges cubes de quaiage et que, pour l'une des propribt6s voisines, il a 6t6 consid~r6 qu'une somme de $1.50 la verge 6tait raisonnable.

La Couronne, dans son factum, reconnait que la somme de $1.35 la verge serait une valeur raisonnable.

Je suis prt A accorder la somme de $1.50.

Alors cela ferait une somme additionnelle de $23,749.50.

Il conviendrait d'ajouter A cela la d6pr~ciation que la partie des lots restant A l'expropri6 va subir A cause de l'expropriation. Cette d6pr6ciation parait avoir

6valude par la cour inf6rieure A la somme de $10,000.00.

En ajoutant ces trois sommes de $48,018.10, de $23,749.50, et de $10,000.00 nous arrivons A un total de $81,767.60, qui serait certainement une indemnit6 juste et raisonnable. L'appel devrait tre maintenu avec d6pens de cette cour et l'indemnit6 devrait ftre rbduite A $81,767.60.

Les frais de la cour infdrieure seront A la charge de la Couronne.

Appeal allowed with costs.