Canada & Gulf Terminal Ry. Co. v. Fleet and the King

An appeal lies to the Supreme Court of Canada under section 37 of the "Supreme Court Act" from the judgment of the Court of King's Bench in the Province of Quebec in an appeal from a riding of the Quebec Public Utilities Commission which had affirmed its own jurisdiction to accord running rights to the Intercolonial Railway over the Canada & Gulf Terminal Railway (Fitzpatrick C.J. and Idington J. dissenting).

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The Public Utilities Commission, constituted by R.S.Q. 1909, art. 718, is not a "court" in the sense of that word in the "Supreme Court Act."

APPEAL from a decision of the Court of King's Bench, appeal side, Province of Quebec, maintaining the jurisdiction of the Public Utilities Commission in this case.

The Public Utilities Commission granted a petition of C. J. Fleet and ordered the appellant to permit the Intercolonial Railway to run its engines and cars over the railway line of the appellant.

The appellant made an application for the cancellation of this order on the ground that the Commission had no jurisdiction in the case but the application was refused.

On appeal to the Court of King's Charles Fitzpatrick C.J. and Davies. Idington, Anglin and Hiredem .1.1.

Bench the jurisdiction of the Public Utilities Commission was affirmed.

The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada and applied to the registrar to affirm the jurisdiction of the court and to have the security approved, which application was granted for the following reasons.

is an application to affirm the jurisdiction of the court coupled with a motion to allow a bond offered as security for the appeal. Mr. Walker appears for the motion, Mr. Darveau appears for the King. No exception is taken to the nature of the security offered if the court has jurisdiction. The facts appear to be as follows:- R.S.Q., art. 718, establishes the Quebec Public Utilities Commission and art. 742, as amended by 1 Geo. V., ch. 14, sec. 4, provides that the Commission should have general supervision over all public utilities subject to the legislative authority of the province, and. may make such orders regarding equipment, appliances, safety devices, extension of works or systems of reporting and other matters as are necessary for the safety or convenience of the public or for the purpose of carrying out any contract, charter, or franchise involved in the use of public property or rights.

C. J. Fleet, Esq., K.C., residing in Montreal, on the 11th June, 1917, presented a petition to the Commission asking that an order should be made requiring the Canada & Gulf Terminal Railway Company to permit the Intercolonial Railway to run a train over the line of the former company from Mont Joly Junction to Little Metis; and thereupon the Commission made an ex parte interim order granting the petition and ordered the Canada & Gulf Terminal Railway Company to permit the Intercolonial Railway to run its engines and cars over the railway line of the Canada & Gulf Terminal from Mont Joly Junction to Little Metis. It also provided that the Intercolonial should furnish the necessary motive power and the crew for operating its trains and directed the Canada & Gulf Terminal and Intercolonial Railways to appear before it on the 26th June, 1917, for the purpose of determining the compensation to be paid by the latter company to the former. Both companies appeared before the Commission and the Canada & Gulf Terminal Company confined its objection to the question of jurisdiction of the Commission and asked for the cancellation of this order on the ground that the Intercolonial Railway was not subject to the jurisdiction of the Commisslon, and because the Commission had no power to accord running rights to one railway company over another. This, objection was overruled on the 10th July following.

Art. 763 gives an appeal to the Court of King's Bench (appeal side) from any final decision of the Commission upon any question as to its jurisdiction or upon any question of law, but such an appeal can be taken only by permission of a judge of the said court given upon a petition presented to him within 15 days from the rendering of the decision.

The appeal was apparently regularly taken to the Court of King's Bench, which pronounced judgment on the 3rd April, 1918, affirming the jurisdiction of the court below (two judges, Carroll and Pelletier JJ. dissenting). The present application is based on the right of appeal conferred by sec. 37, s.s. a, of the "Supreme Court Act," which provides as follows:- The applicants contend, first, that the matter involved exceeds the sum or value of $2,000 and in any event his case falls within the words "matter in controversy involves the question of or relates to any title to lands or tenements, annual rents and other matters or things where rights in future might be bound."

With respect to the amount involved, an affidavit is filed by the vice-president of the applicant company in which he says that the amount involved exceeds the sum of $2,000, while the traffic manager of the Canadian Government Railways files an affidavit in which he .says that the compensation which should be allowed to the applicant for the use of the railway for the season of 1917 should be materially under $2,000. The only other evidence bearing on the amount involved is the petition of Fleet presented to the Commission, in which it is said that the Intercolonial Railway had offered $2,000 for the running rights during the year and that the applicant company had demanded $5,000.

The Commission never determined the compensation owing to the objection taken to its jurisdiction. If I had to determine the application solely on the question of the amount involved for the privilege of using the applicant's railway, I should have little hesitation in holding that it must exceed $2,000 as the order which has been made is not limited to one year. I am, however, of the opinion that there is jurisdiction because titles to lands or tenements, annual rents and other matters or things where rights in future might be bound are involved. ' This provision of -section 37 is substantially the same as section 46 (b) which has been the subject of consideration by the court in a number of cases. The right conferred upon the Intercolonial to use the ' roadbed and rails of the applicant company is quite as much an interest in lands under this section as are the servitudes which have been declared to confer jurisdiction in the cases of Macdonald v. Ferdais(1), and the other cases to be found collected in Cameron's Supreme Court Practice, at pp. 225-228.

I am therefore of the opinion that the court has jurisdiction and grant the motion. Costs in the cause.

(Sgd.) E. R. The respondent then made a motion, by way of appeal to the Supreme Court, to reverse the decision of the registrar.

C. V. Darveau K.C. for the motion.

H. N: Chauvin K.C. contra.

(dissenting)-In my opinion this appeal should be allowed.

The case does not come within sec. 36 of the " Supreme Court Act " and I cannot quite understand how section 37 can be applied. The Public Utilities Commission is not a court (vide section. 740 R.S.Q.) and the statute which creates the Commission provides for an appeal to the Court of King's Bench subject to limitations which shew that it was the intention of the legislature to limit appeals to certain specified questions and to the Court of King's Bench in an advisory rather than a judicial capacity (vide sections 763 et seq.of the R.S.Q.).

Moreover, in the present instance the Commission exercised the jurisdiction formerly vested in the Railway Committee of the Provincial Executive Council.

The appeal should be allowed.

DAVIEs J.-I am to dismiss the appeal from the registrar with costs and to affirm our jurisdiction to hear this appeal.

J. (dissenting)-The constitution of a Public Utilities Commission in Quebec does not create a court in the sense of that word in the "Supreme Court Act" and hence there does not seem to be any place in that Act for appeals from the Court of King's Bench (appeal side) rendering a judgment pursuant to the provisions of art. 763 of the revised statute; of Quebec. It is manifest that such a proceeding as in question herein did not originate in any superior court and hence the jurisdiction given by section 36 of the "Supreme Court Act " cannot be invoked to support an appeal here.

No more can section 37 of same Act which in the first part thereof giving jurisdiction in cases originating in other courts reads as follows:- It is to be observed that this section relates only to judicial proceedings which the exercise of power given the Utilities Commission is not. The nature of the powers given are purely administrative and not judicial.

The power conferred upon the King's Bench to determine whether or not the Commission has acted within its jurisdiction, and according to law is of course a judicial jurisdiction, but that did not originate in any other court as contemplated by the section I have just quoted.

The proposed appeal should be quashed with costs of the motion.

J.-Although at first of the opinion that the appeal from the registrar's order affirming jurisdiction should succeed, further consideration has led me to the contrary conclusion. Admittedly not within section 36 of the " Supreme Court Act" because the proceeding did not originate in a superior court, the appellant maintains that this appeal is within our jurisdiction under section 37 (a) on the grounds: (a) that the matter in controversy involves a question of or relating to title to lands or tenements and (b) amounts to or exceeds the sum or value of $2,000. As the registrar points out, it has been established by affidavit that the value of the running rights granted by the order of the Public Utilities Commission exceeds $2,000. Their annual value is said to be over $1,000 and the order is for an indefinite term. While the matter in controversy on the proposed appeal is merely the jurisdiction of the Public Utilities Commission to make the order which it did, the matter in controversy in the proceeding is the running rights; and it has been determined in a number of cases that the words "the matter in controversy" in section 37 (a) mean not the matter in controversy on the appeal but the matter in controversy in the proceeding. While I cannot think that it was ever intended that an appeal should lie from these provincial boards to this court, section 37 (a) in terms covers this case. I would dismiss the appeal with costs.

J.-I s'agit d'un appel, de la part de lintimb, d'une decision du Rgistraire de cette cour qui a d~clar6 que nous avions juridiction pour entendre la pr6sente cause.

Sa ligne se raccorde & Mont Joli J. avec le chemin de fer Intercolonial.

Une demande a 6t6 faite devant la Commission des Services d'Utilit6 publique de Qu6bec sous L'autorit4 des dispositions des articles .740 et suivants des statuts refondus de la province de Qu6bec pour que la compagnie appelante soit tenue de donner un droit de passage sur sa voie A certains trains de l'Intercolonial.

La compagnie appelante s'est object~e A cette demande en alliguant que la Commission des Services d'Utilit4 publique n'avait pas le pouvoir et la juridiction n6cessaire pour accorder cette demande.

La Commission a le 10 juillet 1917 maintenu la demande. Suivant les dispositions de Larticle 763 des Statuts refondus de la province de Qu6bec, un appel a t institu6 devant la Cour du Banc du Rof par la compagnie appelante de cette decision de la Commission des Service d'Ulilit4 publique.

Le jugement de la Commission a td confirm6 et la Compagnie Canada & Gulf Terminal institue le present appel.

Par Larticle 36 de l'acte de la Cour Supreme, il est d~clar6 qu'il y a appel A cette cour de tout jugement final de la plus haute cour de dernier ressort 6tablie dans toute province du Canada, que cette cour soit une cour d'appel ou une cour de premibre instance, dans 1e cas oi la cour de premidre instance est une cour sup6rieure.

Par la section'37 de Facte de la Cour Supr~me, il est d~clar6 cependant qu'il peut y avoir appel de tout jugement d~finitif de la Cour du Banc du Roi de Qu6bec mme quand la poursuite n'a pas pris naissance devant une cour sup6rieure, si l'affaire en litige

Cette cour a 4t6 appele A plusieurs reprises A interpr6ter une disposition semblable qui se trouve A la section 46 de l'acte de la Cour Supreme et il a t d~clard que les poursuites concernant les droits de passage affectaient le titre d'une propridt6 et, par consdquent, pouvaient donner lieu A un appel devant cette cour.

Voir Macdonald v. Ferdais(1), et les autres causes qui sont mentionndes dans Cameron's Supreme Court Practice, pp. 225 et 228.

Mais on dit: La Cour d'Appel, en vertu de l'acte, ne peut intervenir dans les causes qui ont origin4 devant la Commission des Services d'Utilit6 publique que dans les questions de droit ou de juridiction; et alors la matibre qui est en litige devant nous n'est pas la question du droit de passage que l'on demande sur la propri~t6 de l'appelante, mais simplement la question de savoir si la Commission des Services d'Utilit6 publique a jurisdiction ou non.

Je crois qu'en adoptant ce point de vue-l on arriverait A des cons6quences assez 4tranges. Les montants en litige qui sont g6n6ralement demandds par la poursuite entrainent presque toujours la d6cision de questions de droit et faudrait-il dire alors que nons n'avons pas juridiction parce que le fonds du litige repose sur une question de droit seulement? Evidemment non.

faut aller aux sources; il faut examiner la nature de la demande faite devant les tribunaux inf6rieurs; et si cette demande a pour objet une somme d'argent exc~dant $2,000 ou un droit de servitude et si cette demande ne peut Atre accord~e que dans le cas od la cour superieure aurait juridiction Co. it n'en reste pas moins vrai que la matibre en litige sera de savoir si telle somme est due ou si telle servitude doit 6tre accord6e ou refus6e.

J. Le jugement que nous aurons A rendre dans cette cause-ci est, suivant les dispositions de P'article 51 de l'acte de la Cour Supreme, celui qui aurait db. Stre prononc6 par la Commission des Services d'Utilit4 Publique, c'est-&-dire refuser ou accorder la demande qui lui a t6 faite pour un droit de passage sur la propri~t6 de la compagnie appelante.

J'en suis donc venu & la conclusion que nous avons juridiction pour entendre cet appel et que le jugement rendue par le r6gistraire doit Atre confirm6 avec d~pens. Motion dismissed with costs.