Per Fitzpatrick C.J. and Anglin and Brodeur JJ.-Under the law governing proof in the Province of Quebec, the testimony of experts in handwriting by comparison is admissible.
Per Brodeur J.-Evidence by experts cannot be set aside in a court of appeal, when it has been admitted without objection at the trial. Schwersenski v. Vineberg (19 Can. S.C.R. 243 ) followed. Judgment of the Court of King's Bench, appeal side, reversed, Davies J. dissenting.
APPEAL from the judgment of the Court of King's Bench, appeal side, reversing the judgment of the Superior Court, Drouin J., District of Three Rivers, which maintained the plaintiffs' action with costs. The materiil facts of the case are fully stated in the judgments now reported.
Alex. Taschereau K.C. and Fabre Surveyer K.C. for the appellants.
Belcourt K.C. and St. Laurent K.C. for the respondent.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE.-This is an action to set aside a will as fraudulent.
The testator, Edouard Voisard, was a farmer and a bachelor.
He died on the 11th September, 1915, at the age of 76, shortly after meeting with a serious accident. He left an estate valued at about 840,000.
*PRESENT:-Sir Charles Fitzpatrick C.J. and Davies, Idington, Anglin and Brodeur JJ.
At the time of his death, he had, living with him, his nephew, Narcisse Voisard, and two old women named Louise and Olivine Lescadre.
These women, who were sisters, had kept house for him, and his father before him, for many years.
In answer to the inquiries of the relatives who attended the funeral, Louise Lescadre said that she knew of no will made by the deceased. But four days later she produced a holograph will dated 15th August, 1915, which she said she had found under the mattress of the deceased's bed. This will, which was proved on the 29th September, 1915, is the one now sought to be set aside.
At the trial documents admittedly in the handwriting of the testator and of Louise Lescadre respectively were put in for the purpose of comparison. Mr. Justice Drouin, by whom the case was tried, observes that the writings of the testator shew him to have been a man of education, capable of expressing himself correctly, whilst in the will we find:- And, comparing the writing of Louise Lescadre with that of the will, he says:and further:- The learned judge also says that as a witness Louise Lescadre shewed herself unworthy of credit, and he concludes that the will in its entirety was composed and written by her.
- The Court of King's Bench reversed the judgment, Cross and Carroll JJ. dissenting.
Mr. Justice Pelletier, who delivered the judgment of the majority of the court, admits, as every one necessarily must, that at first sight a comparison of the handwritings is most convincing in favour of the appellant's theory. But, he says:- It must, indeed, be admitted that proof by comparison of handwriting is not infallible. But, where it is so certain, as the trial judge has found, it must have great weight. For, in many cases, what other evidence of forgery could be made? Evidence in support of or against it can, however, of course, be offered.
Counsel for the respondent strenuously argued that "under the law governing proof in the Province of Quebec, the testimony of experts in handwriting by comparison is not recognised or admitted."
And in support of this general proposition, reference was made to Paige v. Ponton (1); Deschines v. Langlois (2); Banque Nationale v. Tremblay (3).
The same objection must exist to all opinion evidence, whether it be medical testimony or that of a chemist, engineer or other scientist, and the disastrous results that would necessarily follow from the adoption of such a principle must be obvious to all who are concerned with the administration of justice. This objection, cannot, in my opinion, be maintained in view of the provisions of articles 1204, 1205 and 1224 of the Civil Code. The language of article 1205 seems wide enough to include evidence of handwriting experts. True, it is merely opinion evidence, but if given by honest and competent s persons, it must be of assistance to the court.
And, in PRATTE a case of this sort, it is difficult to see how the alleged VoISARD. forgery could be exposed except by experts and com- The Chief petent opinion evidence.
The rule contended for by Justice. the respondent would, I repeat, frequently be a serious obstacle in the administration of justice, and, as was recently said:it would, if adopted, create unlimited opportunities for designing persons to forge the name of deceased persons to important documents and then swear it through.
If the cases relied upon at the argument are carefully examined, it will be seen that they afford no support for the respondent's somewhat startling proposition. The judges who sat in these cases merely say that the evidence of an expert will be given weight according to the reasons given in support of it. In Paige v. Ponton (1), Sanborn J. says, at p. 158:- There is, undoubtedly, great uncertainty in the proof of writing whether by general knowledge of handwriting or by experts; but, it is difficult to see why proof from comparison is less objectionable in principle than proof from having acquired a knowledge of a person's writing, by forming a standard in the mind from having frequently seen the person write.
This is not very illuminating. Then the learned judge concludes by saying:- I find nothing in the expression of opinion by judges who have dissented from the rule of the old law indicating that a writing could be solely proved by comparison of a disputed writing with a genuine by experts.
It has been urged merely that it might supplement weak proof of the writing by strictly legitimate means; I do not think that alone it is plenary.
The headnote of that case is:- The signature to writing which is forged cannot be proved solely by comparison of the disputed signature with other signatures which are admitted or proved to be genuine, and in Deschines v. Langlois,(2) Boss4J. said (p. 390)
(2) Q.R. 15 K.B. 388. I am of the opinion that the learned trial judge was guided by this principle in the appreciation .of the evidence in this case.
It is quite true that expert evidence under modern practice is rapidly becoming of little value for any judicial purpose, because even men of the highest character and integrity are apt to be prejudiced in favour of the party by whom they are employed, and that the better procedure is that prescribed by the ordinance of 1667 and still followed in France. The court should, whenever necessary, appoint upon application of either party or of its own motion disinterested experts, to be procured and paid in such a way as to secure their freedom from bias as in the case provided for in articles 392 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But those articles do not apply to a case like this; -no such application was made, and here the evidence was taken without objection. I would add that the difference between the admittedly genuine signature of the deceased and the signature to the will is so obvious that any one at all familiar with handwriting could readily discover it, and we can make the comparison for ourselves.
The handwriting of the will, the language in which the testator's intentions are expressed, together with the suspicious circumstances connected with the production of the will by Louise Lescadre, lead me to the same conclusion as Mr. Justice Drouin. And, as he had the inestimable advantage of hearing and seeing the witnesses, I have no hesitation in saying that we are practically bound to acc3pt his finding.
There seem to be two main reasons for the judgment now under appeal. First, the improbability of dishonesty in this old servant of the deceased; and second, the comparative smallness of the benefit which .she takes under the will.
As to the first, it must be noted that it was not a question in any event of dishonesty towards her late master personally, whose wishes she might indeed have thought she was furthering if she did write the will. Towards his relatives other than his nephew and legatee, Narcisse Voisard, it is certain that she entertained no friendly feelings.
As regards the second reason, it must have been obvious to Louise Lescadre that to have appropriated the whole or great part of the property would have afforded grounds of suspicion against the will. The testator had years before brought his nephew, the respondent, from California to live with him, and the respondent was still residing with and helping him to work his farm at the time of his death. It may be well supposed that in view of their long service, the testator would have desired to make some provision for Louise Lescadre and her sister after his own death; but there was certainly no reason why he should do more than make a reasonable provision, such indeed it might well be as is made by the will. It would have been highly improbable that he would have left to them the bulk of his estate to the exclusion of his nephew and other relatives, with all of whom he appears to have been on good if not intimate terms.
I think, moreover, one requires to consider the point of view of such a person as Louise Lescadre, placed in the position in which she was. Obviously the case would be entirely different from that of the common criminal and professional forger.
She would never have thought of or desired fortune.
She is one of those of whom it is said: "Their wants but few, their wishes all confined."
Would she not have been most likely to put into the will what she had hoped her master would have done himself?
She and her sister had lived thirty years in the house, and would wish to remain there with the succeeding member of the family to the end of their lives.
She already had a little money of her own, and with the legacy of $1,200 probably she would have all she required. In giving the property to the member of the family best entitled to it, and in making such provision for herself and her sister as she doubtless considered herself entitled to, she might not unlikely persuade herself that she was merely giving effect to the testator's intentions. This, I think, is the most probable explanation of her action.
Judge Pelletier states that he has given the case much time and attention, as is indeed apparent from the elaborate judgment in which he has set forth the reasons for the conclusion at which he has arrived. Certainly I have not come to an opposite conclusion without devoting to the matter most careful consideration, realising as I do its importance, not merely on account of the value of the property at stake, but because of the serious reflections on the respondent which my judgment necessarily involves.
I would allow the appeal.
J. (dissenting)-The question to be determined in this appeal is the validity or otherwise of the holographic will of the late Edouard Voisard, a farmer residing in the Province of Quebec, dated the 3rd day of August, 1915.
The will was duly probated on the 29th September, 1915; and these facts which are important for our decision with regard to the deceased, P namely, his relations towards Louise Lescadre, the alleged forger, his fortune, his relatives and his condition of life, etc., stated herein, are either admitted or not denied.
His death took place on the 11th September, 1915. At the time of his death Voisard was 76 years old and a bachelor.
Some short time before he had been gored by his bull, which, it is alleged, had seriously injured him and had probably hastened his death. He had been all his lifetime a farmer and lived on and cultivated the land devised in the will in question here. Louise Lescadre and Olivine Lescadre had been in his service and that of his father before him, one for thirty years and the other for forty years, receiving no salary beyond board, lodging and clothing. Narcisse Voisard, the respondent, universal legatee under the will in question, was testator's favourite nephew and had been brought back from California by the testator some six or seven years prior to his death to live with him and to look after the cultivation of the land, with the understanding that he was to be the testator's universal legatee. The testator had no relatives other than Narcisse Voisard except a number of nephews and nieces, all of whom lived in the United States or other distant places and with whom the testator had little or no communication and in whom he took little or no interest. The trial judge declared that the will in question was false in its entirety and consequently null; but on appeal to the Court of King's Bench this judgment was reversed and the action dismissed with costs.
At the conclusion of the argument before us, I confess I entertained grave doubts. That the testator made a will and made it upon blue paper just as that now produced before us as his genuine will, I have no doubt whatever. The evidence of Pageau and Frangois Beland satisfies me upon that point.
The former states that he went to testator's house some time before his death, in the evening, about eight o'clock, and found him at his table writing; and asking him what he was writing was told he was making his will.
The other witness, Beland, speaks of a conversation he had with the deceased on the 11th of August, which would be six days after the date of the will produced and three weeks before the testator's death, in which the deceased Voisard told him that he had made a will and shewed the witness a blue sheet of paper which he said contained his will. Upon being shewn the will in dispute he said that the paper which Voisard shewed him was a paper similar in colour to that on which the will now before us was written.
Then again there is the evidence that some time before his death he went to his notary and asked him whether he could make or write his will himself and was told he could.
The fact that he was carrying about his will with him in his pocket supports the contention that he did not put it with his other papers in his box, presumably because he did not want others to read it or know its contents, and for the same reason that in his last sickness he placed it under one of the mattresses of his bed, where he knew it would be found and where Louise Lescadre, the alleged forger, says she found it when making up his bed after the death or funeral.
These facts, coupled with the admission on all sides that in the circumstances under which the deceased lived, he possessed of a fortune of about $40,000, his will was not an unreasonable or unnatural one in any respect, assist partly in convincing me that the document produced as his will and found, as she says, by Louise Lescadre under the mattress after the funeral is the genuine will of the testator and not a forged document, as contended. The majority of the Court of King's Bench, consisting of the Chief Justice and of Lavergne and Pelletier JJ. have so found; and in my present state of mind I do not feel justified in finding Louise Lescadre guilty of the crimes of forgery, perjury and destroying.a genuine will.
The only benefit she takes under the will is the sum of $1,200; and it was not contended that that sum was excessive, or more than she reasonably might have expected him to leave her for the care she had taken of him in his lifetime and of his father before him. The only possible motive which counsel could suggest for the forgery charged was this bequest of $1,200 to Louise Lescadre, the alleged forger. In view of the value of testator's estate and of the services she had rendered him for a period of over thirty years, this legacy cannot be held to be unreasonable. It is, on the contrary, such a legacy as an honourable man possessing the estate he had at his death would, under the circumstances, make.
I admit there are some strong arguments in favour of reaching the conclusion that the will was a forgery. The trial judge so found and Cross and Carroll JJ. dissented from the judgment of the majority of the Court of King's Bench and agreed with the conclusions of the trial judge.
I was strongly impressed during the argument with the contention that the signature of the witness to the will produced was the geniune signature of Louise Lescadre and her statement that it was not and that her signature had been written there by the deceased, who told her that he was making his will and that he would put her name as a witness, was untrue. The photograph of the will, 'which the appellant produced, rather confirmed that contention; but an examinatio n J. of the will itself convinces me that the photograph copy was greatly misleading and shewed a different colour in the ink used in the witness' name and that used in the deceased's own name, which difference was not apparent at all in the will itself, and was greatly calculated to mislead and did for a time mislead me.
The two expert witnesses called by the appellant gave what seemed to me plausible reasons for their conclusion that the signature to the will in dispute was not the same as the genuine signature produced on the documents produced in the evidence. I confess that at one time I shared their opinion; but it must be remembered that such expert evidence as was given at the trial was not evidence which, as a rule, should have very great weight attached to it and none at all if at variance with controlling facts proved.
The admissibility of this evidence was challenged by Mr. Belcourt; but I do not consider it necessary to give any opinion on his objection and treat the evidence as properly admitted. It must be remembered, however, in weighing the opinions of these experts and the reasons for them, that Voisard, who at the time of the making of the disputed will was about 76 years of age, had a few weeks before been gored by his bull and had suffered in consequence somewhat in health. It was not unfairly urged that this would account for some slight want of firmness in the writing of the signature to the disputed will. The signatures to the genuine documents appear certainly more firm and in the formation of a few of the letters a difference appears between the genuine signatures and the disputed one; but making every proper allowance for these slight differences, after examining for myself the several admitted genuine signatures most carefully and comparing them with the disputed signature to the will, I find myself unable to conclude that this signature to the disputed will is not a genuine one.
Weighing all the evidence most carefully, I am not satisfied that the findings of fact of the appeal court are wrong and am glad to find myself able to dismiss the appeal, and so amongst other things preserve to Narcisse Voisard, the absolutely innocent universal legatee, the just fruits of the property devised to him. J.-This appeal should be allowed with costs throughout and the judgment of the learned trial judge restored.
I agree with the reasons he assigned therefor as well as in the main with those respectively assigned by the learned judges dissenting in the court of appeal. What seems to me above all else should be held as an insuperable barrier in the respondent's way of maintaining the judgment in appeal is her repeated denials of the existence of such a will when interrogated on the subject of the existence of any will after the death of the alleged testator when the circumstances confronting her constituted an imperative demand to assert the truth. If what she now says was the truth she could have no just reason for withholding it from somebody. She is not, like some persons who may accidentally have found a testator's will in a most unexpected place and thus discovered it for the first time.
She professes to have seen it written and signed and to have known all about it.
The learned trial judge was not impressed with her veracity at the trial.
He had, in seeing her and hear-ing her story in the witness-box, an advantage over any appellate court and his judgment should not, I most respectfully submit, have been disturbed to give effect to such a marvellous and I submit an incredible tale. J.-After full consideration of all the evidence and the most critical examination of the handwriting of the alleged will and the most careful comparison of it with the many admittedly genuine samples of the writing of the deceased in the record of which I am capable, I am very clearly of the opinion that the *alleged will propounded is not in the handwriting of the late Edouard Voisard.
The question is purely one of fact. To detail the grounds on which my conclusion rests would serve no good purpose.
I may add, however, that I entertain no doubt as to the admissibility of the evidence of the witnesses called as experts in handwriting challenged by Mr. Belcourt. I would allow the appeal in this court and in the Court of King's Bench and would restore the judgment of the learned trial judge.
J.-Nous avons A decider dans cette cause si le testament d'Edouard Voisard est vrai ou faux. Afin de determiner ce point, il est bon de rappeler la situation des parties et les circonstances dans lesquelles ce testament aurait 6t fait.
Edouard Voisard, le testateur, 6tait un riche cultivateur de la paroisse de la Rivibre du Loup. Il 4tait trbs ayant atteint prbs de quatre-vingts ans. Vivaient avec lui depuis au-deld de trente ans deux m6nagbres, deux soeurs du nom de Lescadre.
L'une appele Louise avait td institutrice et avait par cons6quent une certaine 4ducation.
Elles 6taient toutes les deux considr6es comme membres de la famille, vu qu'elles ne recevaient aucun salaire.
Edouard Voisard avait des neveux et des niaces; il ne paratt pas avoir de ni de frdres vivants. Ces neveux et ces ni~ces 6taienl assez indiff6rents son endroit. Par contre, il y avait un neveu du nom de Narcisse Voisard, le d6fendeur dans la. pr~sente cause, qu'il paraissait affectionner puisqu'il Ia fait reveuir de Californie pour rester avec lui et exploiter ses fermes.
Narcisse Voisard est un homme assez d~passant la soixantaine, et parait 6tre un homme extr~mement paisible et jouissant d'un excellent caractore. La reputation de Narcisse Voisard et des monagores 4tait excellente A tous 4gards.
Dans le cours de l'4t6 de 1915 Edouard Voisard eut un accident qui l'a emptch4 de travailler pendant quelque temps.
Cependant it continuait de sortir et de vaquer A ses affaires.
Mais aprbs quelques heures seulement de maladie grave il mourait le 11 septembre Les neveux et les nisces viennent A ses fundrailles et le jour mame ils envoient 'un d'eux pour demander s'il y avait un testament. Il me parait 6vident que Narcisse Voisard ne savait pas qu'il y edt un testament, car on le voit lui-m~me aller s'enqubrir chez le nobhire pour savoir si son oncle avait 6crit ses dernidres volontds.
D'un autre c6td, Louise Lescadre, I'une des m6nag~res, savait qu'il y avait un testament; cependant quand le repr~sentant de la famille est all6 lui demander s'il y en avait elle aurait r~pondu, d'apr~s son tmoignage, qu'il n'y avait pas de testament en sa faveur, A elle.
Elle a t un peu vex~e de voir que ces neveux et ces ni~ces, qui n'avaient jamais pris int~r~t A leur oncle, qui ne le visitaient qu'A de rares intervalles, s'empressent en foule quelques jours apr~s pour s'emparer des documents, pices, etc., qui se trouvaient dans la maison; et elle explique que c'est. cette conduite de leur part qui l'a incit~e A ne pas leur dire de suite toute ]a verit6. A tout 4v~nement, elle pr6tend que le samedi suivant les fundrailles d'Edouard Voisard elle a trouv6 le testament produit en cette cause sous la paillasse du lit de la chambre du d6funt.
Par ce testament, Edouard Voisard 14guait ses biens A son neveu Narcisse Voisard et il donnait en mme temps une somme de douze cents piastres ($1,200) A Louise Lescadre et exprimait le d~sir de la voir toujours rester avec son neveu.
I chargeait en m~me temps son neveu de donner une bonne pension A l'autre m~nagbre,
Olivine, taint qu'elle vivrait, il faisait en outre un legs de deux cents piastres ($200) A une ni~ce, Emma Lambert, donnait une maison A Edouardina Voisard, une autre ni6ce, et d6clarait en outre dans le testament qu'il devait une somme A Louise Lescadre qui 6tait marquee dans son livre. Les dispositions de ce testament sont extr~mement raisonnables et extr~mement justes. Il n'est pas 4tonnant que le testateur ait institu6 l6gataire universel de ses biens ce neveu qu'il affectionnait d'une manibre tonte particulibre et qu'il avait fait venir des Etats- Unis six ou sept ans auparavant pour vivre avec lui. Il n'est pas 4tonnant non plus qu'il ait donn4 quelquechose, et cependant c'est bien peu de chose, A ses vieilles m6nag~res, qui avaient pass6 toute leur vie avec lui et qui l'avaient non-seulement servi lui-m~me, mais m~me son phre.
n'est pas 4tonnant, non plus, qu'il n'ait pas pourvu particulibrement A ses nombreux neveux et nices, 4tant donn4 le fait que ces derniers avaient paru 6tre assez indiffrents A son sort.
En m~me temps, il faut dire aussi que la preuve me parait bien certaine qu'il y a eu un testament de fait. Dans le mois d'aofit 1915, c'est-&-dire A l'4poque oa ce testament a 4crit, un de ses grands amis, un voisin, 4tant all6 le voir un soir, le trouva A 6crire quelque chose.
Sa m6nagre, Louise Lescadre, 4tait alors A c6t6 de lui et Edouard Voisard de d6clarer qu'il 4tait A faire son testament.
Cette preuve me parait irr~futable et a 6t donn~e par une personne dont la respectabilit4 et l'honorabilit4 ne font pas de doute.
Mais il y a plus. Vers'le m~me temps, Voisard va au, village, chez une connaissance, et cette dernidre de lui dire en badinant qu'elle esp6rait qu'iI ne l'oublierait pas sur son testament: et alors l'autre aurait dit: " Mon testament est fait "; et il aurait sorti de sa poche un papier bleuitre en lui disant: "Le voici." La couleur de ce papier correspond absolument A celle du papier sur lequel le testament en question est 6crit. II a dit la m~me chose aussi A Arthur Lacerte.
II n'y a done pas de doute, suivant moi, qu'il y a eu un testament de fait. Maintenant, est-ce celui que nous avons devant nous?
Plusieurs t6moins ont 6t6 entendus dans cette cause: et quelques-uns, qui connaissaient bien la signature d'Edouard Voisard, disent que ce testament n'a pas t sign6 par lui.
En m~me temps, le demandeur a produit au dossier une lettre de Louise Lescadre et une lettre 4crite par Edouard Voisard. Plusieurs regus qui avaient t donn6s par Edouard Voisard ont 6t produits 4galement. Mais les documents les plus importants pour 4tablir la comparaison des 6critures sont certainement la lettre de Louise Lescadre et celle d'Edouard Voisard.
La pr6tention des demandeurs appelants, c'est que le testament est 6crit entibrement de la main de Louise Lescadre; et je suis port4 A croire, aprs avoir examind VOL. LVII.]
avec soin ces pi~ces et avoir lu la preuve avec une attention toute particulibre, que leur pr~tention est bien fondbe.
Sur le testament le nom de Louise Lescadre apparalt comme t6moin. Elle a pr6tendu que ce n'6tait pas sa signature cependant, mais que le testateur, Edouard Voisard, en finissant d'4crire son testament lui aurait demand4 si elle avait objection A 6tre t~moin du testament et il aurait simplement mis son nom.
Pour moi, il n'y a pas de doute que la signature qu'il y a sur le testament et la signature qu'il y a sur la lettre de Louise Lescadre sont de la meme personne. Par cons6quent, ayant admis qu'elle avait sign4 cette lettre en question, elle n'aurait pas dit la v6rit4 quand elle a dit que ce n'4tait pas sa signature qui apparaissait sur le testament.
Pourquoi avoir cach6 & Narcisse Voisard lui-m~me l'existence de ce testament? Elle admet que le testament a t dcrit en sa pr6sence environ un mois avant la mort d'Edouard Voisard. Il est des plus surprenant qu'elle n'ait pas dit A Narcisse Voisard, avec qui elle paraissait 6tre en bonnes relations, qu'il y avait un testament qui avait t fait. Les h~ritiers la questionnent. II est vrai qu'elle a pu 6tre vex6e de la manidre dont ils se sont adress~s A elle; mais enfin il n'y avait pas de mal pour elle de dire qu'il avait fait un testament et qu'elle en avait eu connaissance.
Le juge qui a pr~sid6 au prochs, qui a vu les tdmoins, notamment Louise Lescadre, dans la botte, d~clare formellement dans son jugement qu'elle a eu devant la cour une attitude qui d~notait un ind~niable manque de sinc~rit6.
Alors en presence d'une d~claration aussi formelle du juge, il me semble qu'il est bien difficile d'accepter le t6moignage de cette personne, d'autant plus que si l'on compare le testament avec une lettre 6crite par Edouard Voisard on voit de suite qu'il y une diff6rence considerable dans l'4criture et que le testament ne parait pas avoir t 6crit par celui qui a 4crit la lettre sign~e "Edouard Voisard;"
et i est inon.testable que cette lettre a bien t4 6crite et sign~e par lui.
La demande a produit des experts en 4criture pour exprimer leur opinion sur ces documents.
Aucune objection n'a t faite A cette preuve. Au contraire, je retrouve dans le dossier, A certains endroits, que les avocats de la defense se sont object6s A ce que certains tbmoins expriment une opinion sur les 6critures parce, qu'ils n'avaient pas d'abord d~clard s'ils 6taient ou non des experts en 4criture.
Le t~moignage de ces experts, Cartier et Bellinge, a t6 admis sans aucune objection de la part de la d6fense. Maintenant devant cette cour on pretend que ces t6moignages-lk devraient 6tre rejetis parce que notre code de.procdure civile n'autorise pas l'admissibilit6 de telle preuve.
L'ordonnance de 1667 avait une disposition formelle pour l'audition des experts en 4criture. Cette disposition de l'ordonnance ne parait pas avoir 6t suivie avant le code de procedure civile.
M. Belcourt pretend que le seul moyen de v6rifier les 4critures est suivant les dispositions de Particle 392 du code de procddure civile.
Par les dispositions de cet article le juge, s'il le trouve n~cessaire, peut nommer des experts pour l'4clairer sur certains points de la cause. II n'y a pas de doute que dans le cas actuel le juge aurait eu parfaitement le droit de nommer des experts en 4criture. Mais 6tait-il oblig6 de le faire? Et la preuve d'experts qui a t admise sans objection doit-elle 6tre rejetde? II a t6 d~cid6 par cette cour dans une cause de Schwersenski v. Viizeberg (1), que dans le cas oa une preuve a td admise pour contredire un 4crit, sans objection, cette preuve ne peut pas 6tre mise de c6tA J. subs6quernment par les tribunaux d'appel.
Je suis d'opinion, suivant la jurisprudence 6nonc6e dans la cause que je viens de mentionner, que dans le cas actuel si le d6fendeur voulait emp~cher cette preuve il aurait dd s'y objecter formellement.
II ne l'a pas fait et je ne vois pas de raison pourquoi nous pourrions .maintenant la mettre de c6td.
Comme je le disais tout A 1'heure, je suis convaincu qu'il y a eu un testament de fait. Maintenant qu'estil devenu?
Je ne le sais pas. A-t-il t6 d~truit par Louise Lescadre et s'en est-elle servi pour 4crire celui qui est maintenant devant nous? Je l'ignore 6galement. Mais, A tout 4vnement, je suis convaincu que celui que nous avons devant nous n'a pas t 6crit par Voisard.
Sur le tout, j'en suis done venu A la conclusion que le testament qui a t6 produit en cette cause n'a pas 6t0 4crit ni sign4 par Edouard Voisard et par cons4quent I'action des demandeurs doit Stre maintenue. Leur appel devant cette cour doit done 4tre maintenu avec dbpens de cette cour et de la cour d'appel et le jugement de la cour sup6rieure r6tabli.
Appeal allowed with costs.