Grand Trunk Ry. Co. of Canada and City of Montreal v. McDonald

OF

CANADA

THE

CITY

OF

MONTREAL (DEFENDANTS)......................

MAUD McDONALD APPEAL from a decision of the Superior Court of the Province of Quebec (1), sitting in review at Montreal, affirming the judgment of Guerin J. (1), with a jury and condemning the defendants jointly and severally to pay $6,000 and costs.

The material facts of the case are fully stated in the judgments now reported.

THE JUSTICE.-This is an appeal from the judgment of the Court of Review, Montreal, which confirmed a judgment of the Superior Court in an action of damages for negligence.

The issues of fact were tried by a jury. From the facts proved, the inference of negligence was drawn by the jury with the concurrence of the trial judge and, on appeal, the verdict was confirmed.

The respondents, plaintiffs below, are the mother and daughter of one Scarff, in his lifetime an employee of the railway company, who was killed in the course Cief of that employment.

Three questions are raised on this appeal: (1) From the facts proved might negligence be legitimately inferred by the jury against both defendants?

(3) Are both appellants, as joint authors of the wrong, jointly and severally liable for the whole damage, or, in other words, are both appellants jointly and severally liable for the consequences of an accident caused by independent acts of negligence committed by the servants of both on the same occasion, or in connection with the same occurrence, and contributing directly to that accident?

In my opinion, the first and third questions should be answered in the affirmative.

To dispose of the third question, which is purely one of law, I adopt the opinion expressed by a learned writer in the "Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Civil," 4 (1905), p. 341, who puts the question and answer in these words:- The jury having found on sufficient evidence that the accident resulted from the common negligence of the employees of the city and the railway, they are both in law jointly and severally liable for the damage- 1106 C.C. Vide Piper v. WIinnifrith (1).

Dealing now with the first question, I am satisfied that from the facts proved, and I have read the evidence with great care, the jury might legitimately draw the inference of negligence against both defendants.

The circumstances of the accident are not very fully given by the witnesses. Although referred to, no plan of the locality was filed at the trial, probably for the reason given by Mr. Lafleur at the argument here. The place was so well known to the jurors that each of them was presumed to have a photograph of it in his mind. The deceased, who was the chief actor, was not present to speak for his wife and children, and the jury was obliged to rely for the details of the occurrence almost exclusively on the version of those to whose fault the accident was attributed; interested as they were to exculpate themselves and their employers. All of which tends to give additional weight to the verdict. The accident occurred at the intersection of the railway, at rail level, by the street formerly known as Ste. Elizabeth, now De Courcelles street, a very busy thoroughfare in the city of Montreal.

When the crossing was made originally (1900) the city assumed ^RAND the obligation to put up gates and keep a watchman constantly in attendance.

By reason of the increased traffic, in 1911, the Railway Board ordered the city to put up modern gates. The railway had the right of way, and the municipality assumed the obligation to protect the traffic using the crossing.

At the time of the occurrence a number of empty passenger cars were being moved from the railway station to a place immediately beyond and westward of the DeCourcelles street crossing. The train consisting of 14 empty cars was moving reversely, the engine pushing the cars. Brunet, the company's foreman, was in charge, and it was his duty to direct the whole operation, having special regard to the protection of the public using the street crossing. To do this effectively, Brunet required to be in touch with the engine driver who controlled the motive power, and Scarf, who was at the end of the train as it approached the crossing. There was a curve in the line which made it necessary for Brunet to place himself in the middle of the train so as to be in communication with both ends. It was obviously necessary for him, before giving instructions to the engine driver, to know the conditions at the crossing.

Scarff's duties are thus defined in the company's plea:

The traffic at DeCourcelles street crossing was controlled by the city, under the order of the Railway Board, by gates which were opened only when the man in charge, Racicot, saw that there was no train in the vicinity. His instructions were verbal and, when examined as a witness, he says:- He had no time table or other means of knowing when the trains reached the crossing; he was dependent on his own judgment as to his action with respect to the gates.

In answer to a question from the bench, Mr. Lafleur admitted that the shunting operations continued until the cars were stowed away, i.e., had reached their destination west of DeCourcelles street.

The jury found that the accident was attributable to two distinct acts, both of which contributed directly to the death of Scarf. In the course of the shunting operations, it was necessary to pick up a car which was on a track alongside the main line on which the train was being moved from the station, and for that purpose the whole train was backed up till within 40 or 50 feet of the crossing and there brought to a standstill. The train was then broken in two, i.e., a certain number of the -cars nearest the engine were detached and run on to the siding to pick up the car that was there, and all were then moved back to the main track where the other cars had been left. When all the cars were coupled, on a signal from the foreman Brunet, the train in the process of shunting was moved towards the crossing, and Brunet then left his post on the outside and stood on the steps of one of the cars, where he was no longer in touch with the engine driver or Scarff, as found by the jury. In the meantime, Racicot, seeing the cars nearest the crossing stopped, assumed that he might safely open the gate, which he did, thus permitting a large number of people to get on the track. Seeing the imminent danger in which these people were placed, as the train was approaching the crossing running reversely, and unable to signal the engineer through Brunet, who had left his post, Scarff rushed forward to reach the signal cock so as to notify the engine driver of the danger, and in the attempt lost his life. It is said that he was negligent in what he did. Scarff may have assumed very heavy risks and even acted imprudently, but it must be borne in mind that he was dealing with a state of things due to the defendants' negligence.

And, having read the evidence, I am satisfied that the finding of the jury, that in the circumstances he was free from fault, is fully justified. In a most trying emergency, he did his best (Laurent 20, p. 520, No. 489), and the jury evidently -did not believe Menard's story about the removal of the signal whistle.

So that, on the whole, I am fully satisfied that the finding of the jury to the effect that the accident was attributable exclusively to the acts of both Brunet and Racicot is borne out by the evidence.

Some questions were raised as to prescription and insufficiency of the notice. The acts of the employees of both the city and the company contributed to the death of Scarff, and the notice to the city was sufficient. The action was taken en temps utile against the company, and that was sufficient to interrupt prescription against the city (Laurent, vol. 17, Nos. 304 & 294; articles 1106 & 2231 C.C.).

On the whole, this appeal should be dismissed with costs.

J.-I concur in dismissing these appeals; but I do so with much doubt: which, however, has not ripened into a conviction that the judgment appealed from was erroneous. My duty, as I conceive it, therefore, is to dismiss the appeal.

J.-I am of opinion that the evidence herein was such that the learned trial judge was right in submitting it to the jury and that their findings of fact bind us to apply such relevant law thereto as may be applicable.

In all its essential features I agree with the lucid statement of the case as presented by the judgment of Mr. Justice Lane on behalf of the Court of Review in support of the judgment appealed from.

I need not repeat, however, but may add what the argument here has suggested.

A perusal of the entire evidence in the case, except part of Menard's, which calls for little attention, convinces me clearly of one thing. It is that the stories of Racicot and of Benoit are in absolute conflict, in regard to the essential facts which furnish a crucial test of the weight to be given Racicot's version relative to his opening and shutting the gates.

He tells of a rush as it were of 5 or 6 vehicles from each side, when he opened the gates and that they all disappeared before the accident in question except a waggon loaded with brick which had not quite reached but was approaching the track on which the accident took place.

That story of their complete disappearance as the result of successful crossing by so many vehicles at one opening of the gates, before Benoit had been able during same opening to travel the short space he did to get where he saw deceased gesticulating in despair, is quite untrue if Benoit's story is even only approximately correct.

I can see no reason for disbelieving a word Benoit has said.

He was not a stranger to the crossing nor an idler, but knew well he had at such an hour to be prompt in entering when the gate, for the raising of which he had waited and watched, should permit him doing so. The suggestion of the appellants' counsel in answer to my questions for explanation of this feature of the case that Benoit had wasted time watching some leak in an auto does not seem warranted by anything in the evidence. If counsel at the trial had imagined that Benoit had loitered behind others, pushing onward, he certainly should, and doubtless would, have pressed him on the point in a way that -is not apparent.

Again Benoit swears to a delivery waggon approaching as he did and thus unintentionally demonstrates that Racicot's story is incorrect.

But more marvellous than all is that neither the man who had the load of brick is forthcoming as a witness, nor a single other one of the ten to a dozen like witnesses seemingly available to.corroborate Racicot by shewing that they had crossed as he says.

The accident was far too important for either appellant interested in demonstrating that it had discharged its duty to the public to say nothing of what is involved in this action, to accept such a remarkable conflict of evidence as not requiring further inquiry and production of the testimony if Racicot's story is true.

There was a coroner's inquest at which both these witnesses testified.

The jury herein evidently disbelieved Racicot and accepted Benoit's story.

There are a number of minor things in Racicot's story which I need not dwell upon but which doubtlessly helped the jury to reach the conclusion they did. I must not, however, pass thus what he tells of the number of times that these gates would be opened in the course of a day.

Perhaps four or five hundred times a day was his reply when questioned there anent, adding he had never counted.

There were three men, as I understand him, each taking his turn on such duty in the course of the 24 hours.

No doubt the jury knew without being told that of the needed raising and lowering of gates thus spoken of by far the greater part would fall within a comparatively few hours. A man loaded with such a task at the noon hour with three gates to keep an eye upon and the possibilities of sixteen tracks to be watched without the aid of any system but his own eyes can hardly be charged with wilful false swearing if he happen to get confused and shrinking from blame- for the life of another persuades himself that there was only one raising and lowering of the gates in question within a given time which he had no accurate means of measuring.

I think the jury was quite right in accepting Benoit's story in preference to that given by a single witness under such circumstances, and especially so when the latter's story was left uncorroborated and could have been corroborated, if true, and a proper effort made to procure testimony from such a stream of travel as indicated.

This is not the defence of a poor helpless creature for whom a semblance of excuse might be found, but of a city armed with the necessary equipment for tracing and bringing forward these missing witnesses. Evidently Racicot confuses the occasions of his opening and shutting of gates and forgets the one testified to by Benoit and which is the one we have to deal with.

The case rests upon inferences to be drawn by the jury from'established facts, and I cannot say that O. any single one of their findings must be held such as twelve or nine out of twelve reasonable men could not properly arrive at on the evidence presented.

The findings of fact are quite sufficient in law to maintain the judgment appealed from.

The city appellant claims that it has no responsibility for the failure to protect the public using the crossing and tries to get some support for such contention in the wording of the order made by the Board of Railway Commissioners.

That order is not the sole * basis of its responsibility and indeed has very little to do with it.

The agreement entered into between the two appellants must be looked at, as well as the order of the Board and back of both the law upon which they were founded.

That agreement was entered into on the 8th November, 1900. It sets forth that the crossing of the railway company's yards by an extension of Ste. Elizabeth street is to be permitted by the railway company, that the city will place crossing gates and watchmen to operate said gates, at its own expense, and then by clause 3 agrees as follows:- The law upon which this rested is the " Railway Act" of 1888, as amended and interpreted and construed by the judgments in several cases. This court, in The City of Toronto v. The Grand Trunk Railway 1-1

Company held that a municipality in which a highway crossed a railway was a person interested within the meaning of sections 187 and 188 of said Act, and that the Railway Committee of the Privy Council had jurisdiction to make the order it had made, and -which was there, in question imposing the obligation upon the municipality to bear a share of the expenses of guarding and protecting the crossings such as there in question. Leave to appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was refused.

The story of the struggle between railway companies and municipalities, up to that time, relative to the possible responsibility of the municipality appears in the several cases cited in the report of the argument in said case.

The powers formally exercised by the Committee of the Privy Council in this regard became by the legislation creating the Board of Railway Commissioners vested in that Board. And the effect thereof was exemplified by an appeal to this court in the case of Ottawa Electric Railway Company v. The City of Ottawa and the Canada Atlantic Railway Company (2) to test the power of the Board in that regard. The power was maintained by the judgment of this court. That establishes the principle of law upon which, by anticipation of its affirmation as it were, no doubt the parties concerned as appellants here had acted in entering into the agreement I have referred to and in which they, by a clause thereof, shew that the expedient of gates and watchmen was only temporary, for they evidently, as the agreement shews, expected a bridge over the railway as a substitute therefor to be constructed at their joint expense some day.

The city appellant is clearly liable by virtue of its agreement to indemnify the railway company.

The later order of the Board was, no doubt, made by reason of some one complaining of the inefficient protection given up to that time but it does not affect this case one way or another any more than if the order had been to paint the gates red or white.

But for the supervision of that Board, experience teaches that neither of such like parties will always maintain in a high state of efficiency -such like expedients for accommodating and protecting the travel-, ling public.

The city sets up that this action was barred as to it by the special Statute of Limitations in its charter. I do not think so. I hold they were jointly liable to respondent.

The appeal does not raise any question for us to decide as between them* who ultimately may have to bear the burden of their neglect.

Whatever might have been said at one time as to the right of a railway company to shift its own legitimate burden on to municipalities, there is none of that here in question.

The creation of the crossing in question and its operation was a joint enterprise no matter how they divided the necessary labour attendant thereon and the results following therefrom and incidental thereto must be borne jointly, even though in part there is involved the duty by the company towards its servants, in that as well as in other respects. Each contributed more than its due share to the result that is before us. As between them and others the obligation was jointly within the meaning of the code. The appeal should be dismissed with costs.

J.-For the reasons stated by my Lord the Chief Justice and my brother Brodeur, I agree in their opinion that if both the defendants were responsible for the death of the plaintiff's husband, their liability is joint and several. It follows that the plea of preor scription made by the city of Montreal fails.

We should also decline to disturb the ruling of the "

learned trial judge that the plaintiff's failure to give notice of her claim to the city corporation within 30 days after her husband was killed was excused by her ignorance of the fact that the city controlled the gates at the DeCourcelles street crossing. She believed, not *unreasonably, that they were operated by the Grand Trunk Railway Company.

While I might have taken another view as to the proper conclusion to be drawn from the evidence if dealing with it as a trial judge, I agree with Mr. Justice Lane, who delivered the judgment of the Court of Review, that the jury may not improperly have preferred to rely upon Benoit's evidence rather than on that of Racicot, and may not unreasonably have drawn the inference that the latter had carelessly opened the crossing gates after the Grand Trunk train had started to move towards the crossing. This inference would negative any neglect of duty on the part of the deceased Scarff in giving the signal on which that train moved, which, of course, should not be presumed.

I have not been convinced that the jury was not warranted in holding that Scarff's attempt to stop the train by opening the angle-cock under the foremost car coming towards him-which undoubtedly cost him his life--did not amount to fault or contributory negligence. Unless he was responsible for the air whistle not being in place and available for use, he was not to blame for the existence of a situation which left him no other means of attempting to save the lives put in jeopardy by Racicot's negligent opening of the gates. In an emergency, he imperilled his life in an effort - to save others, praiseworthy not merely because of its heroism, but also because it evidenced zeal in the discharge of duty and in safeguarding the interests of his employers. An act done upon such an impulse, although under other circumstances inexcusably rash, may well be held not to have been a fault.

The jury evidently did not believe Menard,. the chief witness whose testimony would establish that Scarff was himself responsible for the air whistle not having been in its place, and it is impossible to say that in doing so they were clearly influenced by any improper motive or were manifestly wrong. Yet I cannot help thinking that, even rejecting this testimony, had the jury found that Scarff had failed to place or to keep the air whistle where it should have been and could have been used by him without danger, such an inference from the proven facts would have been warranted and could not have been disturbed. Indeed, I am not entirely satisfied that it is not the most rea sonable inference from the rest of the evidence, omitting entirely that given by Menard. But the jury has found otherwise and I am not prepared to say that their finding is so clearly against all the evidence that it should be set aside.

Upon the argument I also entertained grave doubt whether the action of Brunet in entering the train where he was unable to see Scarff after transmitting his s&gnal to start, instead of remaining on the platform about 10 feet from the side of the train, where he could have seen Scarff in order to take any further signals that the latter might find it necessary to give, imputed by the jury as a fault attributable to the railway company, should properly be so regarded.

I understand, however, that a majority of my learned brothers are of the opinion that it should.

Although further consideration of the evidence has not dispelled my doubt, since it has not ripened into a clear conviction of error OCD on the part of the Court of Review as well as the jury, it does not justify a dissent.

J.-Il s'agit d'un accident de chemin de fer oa le mari de la demanderesse intimbe a perdu la vie.

La compagnie du Grand Tronc posshde dans les limites de la ville de St. Henri une cour spacieuse oii les trains A passagers, apr~s leur course ordinaire, sont lav6s et nettoyds. Cette cour est travers6e A niveau par la rue DeCourcelles sur une longueur d'environ 300 pieds.

Comme il y a beaucoup de trafic A cet endroit et vu le grand nombre de trains qui sont constamment en mouvement, la Commission des Chemins de fer a d6cid4 en 1911 que des barribres modernes seraient installdes et qu'elles seraient maintenues, entretenues et opdrdes par la Cit4 de Montrdal jusqu'A ce que la Compagnie du Grand Trone eeit 4lev6 sa voie.

Le jour de l'accident, le 21 aotjt 1915, un train compos4 de quatorze chars 6tait pouss6 dans cette cour par une locomotive.

Le char qui se trouvait A l'avant 6tait un char A bagages.

Trois personnes, outre l'ing6nieur et le chauffeur, 6taient en charge de ce train: savoir, Brunet, le contremaitre; Scarf la victime; et un nomm6 Marcotte.

Arriv4 pros de la rue DeCourcelles, sur la yoie No. 4, le train fut arrt6 pour que la locomotive pft aller chercher un char qui se trouvait sur une voie voisine. Scarff regut instructions de son contremaitre Brunet, de se mettre A la traverse de la rue DeCourcelles pour voir A ce qu'il n'y eit aucun accident pendant qu'on proc6derait A former le train et pour donner les signaux n~cessaires quand la rue serait libre. A cette fin, Scarff se tenait sur le trottoir & c6t6 du char A bagages; et quand le train a t reform4, it a donn6 un signal & Brunet que le train pouvait partir et traverser la rue et, A son tour, I'ingdnieur sur.le signal de Brunet mit le train en mouvement.

D&s l'instant que le train partit, Scarff a dih s'apercevoir qu'il y avait danger pour certaines voitures ou pi6tons qui traversaient sur la rue et alors il a donner le signal d'arrater; mais Brunet qui, dans l'intervalle, 4tait mont4 sur le char, vers le milieu du train, n'a pas vu ce signal; et alors Scarff, dans un moment de ddvouement qui est tout a sa gloire, s'est lanc4 a l'arribre du train pour l'arr~ter au moyen du robinet d'angle.

C'4tait une d6marche extr~mement dangereuse que celle qu'il faisait *a; mais il a cru, je suppose, devoir y recourir dans l'espoir qu'il pourrait sauver la vie de ceux qui allait 6tre frappds sur la rue et comptant probablement aussi sur sa propre agilit6; mais malheureusement il a 6t entrain en dessous du char et fut 4cras6.

L'action 4tait dirig~e originairement contre la compagnie du Grand Tronc; mais au cours du proc6s on a d~couvert que la barribre qui se trouvait A cette rue 4tait sous la garde d'un employ6 de la cit4 de Montr6al; et alors, plus d'un an apr~s I'accident, la cit6 de Montr6al fut poursuivie et mise en cause pour 4tre tenue conjointement et solidairement responsable avec la compagnie du Grand Tronc de cet accident.

La compagnie du Grand Trone et la cit4 de Montral out plaid4 que l'accident n'6tait pas dd A leur faute mais A la faute de la victime elle-m~me.

La cit6 de Montral a, en outre, plaid4 prescription d'un an, invoquant les dispositions de Particle 2262 C.C. La prochs a eu lieu devant un jury qui a trouv4 coupable de negligence la cit4 de Montr6al ainsi que la compagnie du Grand Tronc.

Ils ont exon&6 de tout blame Scarff.

La compagnie du Grand Tronc a trouve coupable parce que le contremattre n'4tait pas en position de pouvoir recevoir le signal qui lui avait t6 donn6 d'arr~ter le train et la cit6 de Montreal a t trouv~e en faute d'avoir par l'entremise de son employd lev6 les barribres lorsque le train 4tait en mouvement.

Ce verdict a t4 unanimement confirm6 par la Cour de Revision.

La question qui se pr6sente est de savoir s'il y avait une preuve suffisante pour pouvoir justifier ce verdict. Les appelants pr6tendent qu'aucune preuve de negligence de leur part n'a 6t faite.

La preuve est tras longue et volumineuse et d6montre le soin qu'on i eu de mettre devant le jury tous les faits qui pouvaient affecter la responsabilit4 des appelantes. La faute trouv6e contre la compagnie du Grand Tronc m'a paru d'abord, je l'admets, peu fond~e et la preuve ne me paraissait pas la justifier. Mais apr~s avoir lu et relu avec beaucoup d'attention cette preuve, je vois que, de fait, le jury pouvait avoir raison de condamner la compagnie.

La compagnie a essay6 d'amener un certain t6moin pour 6tablir que Scarff 6tait en faute, vu qu'il avait h sa disposition un sifflet A air qui aurait pu lui permettre d'arr~ter le train et qu'il avait laiss4 ce sifflet sur le trottoir.

Nous n'avons pas eu occasion de voir ce tdmoin; mais, si j'en juge par les r~ponses qu'il a donnies, il n'est pas 6tonnant que le jury ne l'ait pas cru; et la Cour de Revision en est venu A la mime conclusion. Il me semble que le contremattre Brunet (et c'est la conclusion & laquelle le jury paratt en 6tre arriv6) aurait dG voir A rester dans une position de manibre A recevoir tout signal qui pourrait lui tre donn4 par Scarf. Scarff 6tait bien rest6 sur le trottoir, A c6t4 du train; pourquoi ne serait-il pas lui-m~me rest4 1? Ce train pouvait 8tre suivi au pas d'un homme, vu qu'il n'y avait que quelques pieds pour atteindre sa destination; et alors Brunet me parait avoir 60 coupable de n6gligence en montant sur le train et en perdant de vue Scarff qui avait 6t0 envoy6 pour donner les signaux n~cessaires.

Il est vrai que Scarff avait donn4 le signal du depart; mais vu la largeur consid6rable de la cour il pouvait arriver A tout instant qu'un signal d'arr~t efit pu 6tre donnd par Scarff; et alors Brunet aurait dfi rester dans une position de manidre A recevoir ces'signaux. Malheureusement il ne l'a pas fait; et lorsque le danger est devenu tr6s imminent, Scarff a t oblig4, vu que ses signaux ne pouvaient pas Atre regus, d'aller se mettre A l'avant du train pour essayer de l'arr~ter autrement et 4viter les accidents mortels qui allaient inbvitablement se produire. Brunet, qui 6tait mont4 sur un char vers le milieu du train, a vu tout & coup les signaux de d~tresse de la part d'un homme qui 6tait sur la rue et il a alors fait arr~ter le train; mais malheureusement il 4tait trop tard; ce pauvre Scarff 6tait 4cras4.

Quant A la cit6 de Montreal, le jury a trouv6 'que Racicot, qui 6tait en charge des barriares, a dd les lever aprbs le d6part du train. II jure le contraire; mais il est contredit sous ce rapport par les circonstances qui ont 6t0 prouvbes dans la cause. Je crois done que le jury 6tait justifiable de ne pas accepter sa version. Je trouve done que le verdict du jury tant contre la cit4 de Montreal que contre la compagnie du Grand Tronc est bien fond6 et qu'il n'y a pas lieu de le mettre de c6td.

Reste la question de prescription soulev6e par la cit4 d6 Montrdal.

La question est de savoir s'il y a eu solidarit4 entre la compagnie du Grand Tronc et la cit4 de Montrial et s'il y a eu interruption de prescription par Faction prise contre la compagnie du Grand Trone avant que la prescription fdit acquise. Les actions se prescrivent par un an pour injures corporelles, dit Particle 2262 C.C. Dans le cas actuel, il y avait eu interruption de prescription en tant que la compagnie du Grand Tronc est concern6e parce qu'une action avait 6t6 prise contre elle avant l'expiration de l'ann6e qui avait suivi l'accident (Art. 2224 C.C.). L'article 2231 P.C. nous dit que

Or, Particle 1106 C.C. declare que l'obligation r6sultant d'un dblit ou quasi-d6lit commis par deux personnes ou plus est solidaire.

La cit6 de Montr6al nous dit qu'il n'y a pas de solidarit4 dans le cas actuel parce que le ddlit dont elle a t trouv~e coupable par le jury n'est pas le m~me que celui qui est imput4 A la compagnie du Grand Tronc. Il y aurait eu, suivant elle, deux dWlits; et, en cons4quence, la solidarit6 ne.devait pas exister; et elle cite d ce sujet la cause de Jeannotte v. Couillard oa il a t jug4 ce qui suit:

Dans cette cause de Jeannotte v. Couillard (1), il s'agissait d'une poursuite contre un m6decin et un pharmacien; le premier pour avoir fait une erreur en 6crivant une prescription pour un malade et le second pour ne pas avoir rempli la prescription telle qu'on I'avait dcrite. Les deux fautes reprochbes au pharmacien et au m6decin 6taient bien distinctes. Il est vrai qu'elles ont concouru toutes deux A la mort de la personne qui a pris ces remdes; mais la Cour Supdrieure et la Cour d'Appel n'ont pas jug6 A propos de prononcer solidarit4.

Les faits sont diff6rents dans la prsente cause. D'abord, les d6lits se sont produits en m~me temps. En principe g6ndral, les co-auteurs d'un ddlit ou quasid6lit sont solidairement responsables du dommage caus6 A la victime de ce ddlit; et quand on se propose de r~gler l'4tendue de la responsabilit6 des co-auteurs d'un d4lit, on doit considrer uniquement I'influence que les fautes des divers agents ont pu avoir sur ce quasi-dblit; si elle est appreciable, chacun est astreint A la r6paration du prejudice dans la proportion oA il y a cooprd; et si elle ne l'est pas, on est autoris4 A consid~rer chaque faute comme ayant engendr6 le dommage tout entier et par suite, sans se prdoccuper de 1'6galit4 ou de l'in6galit4 des imprudences ou n~gligences commises de part et d'autre, on inflige aux divers co-auteurs une con- damnation totale.

Cette question s'est soulevde en France, et je trouve une decision de la Cour de Cassation rapport~e dans Dalloz, 1894-1-561, oti il a t ddcid4 que la reparation d'un fait dommageable, imputable A deux ou plusieurs personnes, doit 6tre ordonnie pour le tout contre chacune au profit de la partie lorsqu'il y a entre chaque faute et la totalit6 du dommage une relation directe et n6cessaire.

Il y aurait donc, suivant cette decision, solidarit4 m~me dans le cas oit chaque coauteur se serait rendu coupable de n6ligence par un fait distinct.

La Cour- de Cassation dans une cause rapport~e dans Sirey, 1827-1-236, a d6cid4 aussi qu'il y avait lieu de condamner solidairement A la r6paration du dommage caus4 A un propri~taire voisin divers propridtaires d'4tablissements industriels, sans qu'il possible de determiner la part pour laquelle chaque 4tablissement y avait contribu6.

Larombibre, commentant ce juge- Brr ment

La solidarit4 de l'impossibilit4 de s~parer, dans l'imputabilit4 d'un fait uni, des actions qui y ont simultandment concouru et qui y sont rattachdes par des liens de cause A effet.

Je citerai aussi sur ce point Aubry & Rau, 46me dition, vol. 4, p. 23.

A la lumibre de ces decisions et de ces jugements, 'en suis arriv4 A la conclusion que la Cite de Montr6al et la compagnie du Grand Tronc se sont rendues coupables d'une faute qui a amen6 I'accident dont Scarff a 4t6 la victime et qu'il y a en consequence solidarit4.

L'interruption de la prescription contre la compagnie du Grand Tronc a done 4galement interrompu la prescription contre la cit4 de Montrdal. Pour ces raisons, I'appel doit 4tre renvoy6 avec d6pens.

Walsh & Walsh.