Shives Lumber Co. v. Price Bros. & Co.

Per Brodeur and Mignault JJ.-The requirements of Regulation No. are the nature rules of proeedure, and the approval of the Minister covers any previous informality in the fulfillment of these requirements.

Alexandre v. Brassard followed.

.-Upon evidence, the intention the Deputy Minister in approving the report of the Superintendent of Surveys was to give the approval required by Regulation No. 24.

*Present:-Sir Louis Davis C.J. and Idington, Anglin, Brodeur and Mignault JJ.

Bench, appeal side, reversing the judgment of the Superior Court, District of Rimouski, which dismissed the plaintiff's action.

The material facts of the case are fully stated in the & above head-note and in the judgments now reported. Alex. Taschereau K.C. and J. Hall Kelly K.C. ior the appellant.

(dissenting).-This is an appeal from the judgment of the Court of King's Bench which reversed a judgment of the Superior Court and awarded the respondent, Price Brothers & Company, the sum of $1,367.45 as damages for wood cut by the appellants upon the respondent's timber limit.

The dispute between the parties was as to boundary lines of their respective timber limits and that dispute depended largely, if not altogether, upon the result a survey of these limits made by surveyor Addie, the plans and report of which survey Addie had reported to Mr. Girard, the Director and Inspector of Surveys, who in his turn had formally submitted Addie's report to the Hon. Jules Allard, Minister of Crown Lands, with very full explanations as to certain changes in the instructions for the survey which had been made by him and the reasons why they had been made. This latter report had been approved of by the Deputy Minister of the Department of Lands and Forests on the 7th April, 1914, and it is conceded that the approval of the Deputy Minister is equivalent by statute to the approval of the Minister himself. The main contention of the appellant Shives Lumber Company on the appeal was that the report of Girard, the Director and Inspector of Surveys, was only one relating to the changes he had made in the "instructions" for the survey and did not cover the survey itself which consequently had not been approved & Co.

of as required by statute before it becomes binding The Chief

Justice.

upon interested parties.

I am quite unable to accept this argument. It is true Girard deals at length in his report with the reasons why he had altered the original instructions, such reasons being that both the parties interested had desired and consented to the changes 'Made, because while one would on the altered instructions gain somewhat on the west the other would receive compensation on the east.

The conclusions of his report, however, contain its pith and substance and read (as I translate) as follows: (The italics are mine.)

I will draw your attention also to the fact that said instructions were modified in March, that the line in question was run according to them, in 1913, giving therefore to the Shives Lumber Co. all the time necessary to oppose said instructions before the work was done on the ground, and that the protest was handed over to Price Bros. and to the Department only on the 15th March last

To the present report I attach a copy the local map, shewing in yellow the dividing lines between the timber limits belonging to the Shives Lumber Co. and the Price Bros., as well a blue copy of the plans of the work of Surveyor Addie dividing the timber limits belonging to two companies on River Remouski as well as on River Kedzwick. respectfully submit the whole matter.

In my opinion this. report of Girard. with its accompanying map and plans the work Surveyor Addie dividing the timber limits belonging to the two companies on both rivers contains all the essentials required by the law to enable the Minister to approve or otherwise of the report of the survey, and when approved by the Deputy Minister became binding on the parties. Many other questions were argued by counsel at bar. I have had the opportunity of reading the reasons for judgment prepared by Mr. Justice Mignault on all of these points and his conclusions are quite satisfactory to me and need not be repeated. In a. letter of the 14th August, 1914, sent by the Deputy tie Minister of the Department to each of the parties and enclosing copies of the report of Mr. Girard, Superintendent of Surveys, the Deputy says expressly: "This report has been approved by this Department." Nothing could be plainer or clearer than this as shewing departmental approval.

This appeal should be dismissed with costs.

J.-This is an action by the respondent claiming by virtue only of being licensee of the Crown on behalf of Quebec, of a right to cut timber on the Crown domain, to recover from the appellant, which also is a licensee of -the said Crown, the value of certain timber alleged to have been cut by the latter.

The licences issued by the Crown for such purposes are somewhat indefinite in regard to the exact area supposed to be covered thereby. They transfer no right of property. They are mere licences to cut. The fruits thereof are not such tangible things that trespass or trover may lie for, against one claiming as of right (whatever might be such right against a third party who was a mere tort feasor), unless and until the area covered thereby has been delimited.

The parties hereto are rival claimants.

The Crown owns the land and the timber and, in order, I presume, to keep in its own hands.the control of the delimitation of such lands as a licence may be applicable to and cover, and avert the possibility of confusion arising from mistakes, or worse, on the part of any of those under such licences and consequent loss of revenue, as- well as for the protection of all concerned, there are, amongst others of a like kind, regulations passed by the Lieutenant-Governor in Council, authorized by statute, of which the important one now in question is as follows:- There had been instructions by the Deputy Minister, presumably pursuant to another regulation, issued to a surveyor at the request of respondent, to make a survey which might, if fully executed and the results had been duly adopted by the Minister, have been held to have delimited the line between these parties. That work, however, was interrupted upon the appellant complaining to the Minister or his Department. I am unable to see how the respondent can found upon that alone any claim.

Indeed it is not pretended that in law such work as done thereunder can of itself support the respondent's claim.

It is useful as an historical introduction to that which transpired later and then coupling what had been so done with later work founded upon a variation of the prior instructions it is contended the whole proceedings constituted a compliance with the above quoted regulation, and thereby in law finally deter- .

mined the line between.the parties and consequently the right of property in that in question.

It is not seriously disputed, I imagine, that if such a line had been duly established then the appellant must be held on the facts to have cut some timber within the respondent's limit so established.

It is clear that there was a meeting, after the interruption of the survey as directed, of some persons representing in some capacity or other the parties concerned, in presence of the Superintendent of Surveys.

It is surprising that they should have left the nature of their decision, if any, of a clear definite nature ever reached, to be the subject matter of dispute, as it is herein, instead of putting in writing what the above quoted regulation requires, namely, "a joint written request of holders of adjacent limits" to a Crown timber agent or other authorised person, which I presume the Superintendent of Surveys was.

Even then the Minister must previously have approved of the instruction to execute the purpose of said owners before proceeding therewith.

Instead of such a simple and direct method of procedure as the "joint written request," we are asked to accept instead thereof what-may be extracted from an involved, long drawn out correspondence from which assent or conditional assent by each party might be found in the nature of ratification or a willingness to join in such written request.

I cannot think that should be accepted as a substitute for the express requirement of the regulation.

Nor can I accept in substitution for the previous approval of the Minister, required by the regulation, a later adoption thereof long after the work relied upon had been completed.

And much less so when there is the gravest reason to doubt the import of that which is relied upon as approval.

Long after the work now relied upon as establishing the line in question was done pursuant to such loose unbusinesslike methods as I have adverted to, upon appellant complaining of the original instructions having been improperly changed, there seems to have been a request made by the Deputy Minister to the Superintendent of Surveys, to report upon that subject.

I infer from the contents of the report itself that such was the nature of the request the Superintendent refers to, for we have not in the record the written request for a report.

Why that is so, I am at a loss to understand but must do the best I can with the material placed before us.

I cannot, under these circumstances, draw from the initialled mark of approval by the Deputy Minister any such sweeping conclusions as we are asked to do from such dubious mark of approval. That was no more nor less than a proper exoneration of an officer charged with erroneously having interpolated something into the original instructions his predecessor had framed, and which the Minister had acted upon.

It was an entire work, founded entirely upon instructions previously given or approved by the Minister, that the exigencies of the situation demanded. . What is produced and relied upon as in conformity with the exacting requirements of the regulation falls very far short thereof.

Indeed no ratification would seem permissible under the regulation in the way of substitution therefor, no matter how desirable.

Ratification was beyond the power of the Minister or his deputy.

Nor could the assent of the parties concerned either previous to or after the work was done alter the nature or quality of the proceeding or its results.

The rights of the Crown the dominant proprietor could not be thus disposed of.

& Until the relation between the Crown and each of its licensees in question herein had been accurately determined or the lines thereof laid down as required by law, there was no property vested in respondent, or even right of property which it could assert.

It is conceivable that two such licensees as those in question might frame a contract between them providing that in certain contingencies in relation to such districts as in question either should pay or indemnify the other for some supposed wrong done to the other's interest under its licence and thus found a something out of which an action at law upon that contract might arise even if independent of the regulation in question. But nothing of that sort exists in fact herein nor is any such like claim pleaded or attempted to be proven. . The action is founded upon a supposed wrong done in or upon or in relation to property which had not yet in law or fact become the property of respondent. I can see no possibility of such a right of action being maintainable at present under existing circumstances.

Nothing is existent capable of supporting a claim for damages or enabling the proper assessment thereof.

Nor can there be unless and until, if ever, the delimitation of the properties under licence has been established either pursuant to the section quoted above or the following sec. 25 of the regulations which does not seem to have been invoked herein as foundation for present claim.

I assume above it had originally been acted upon but was not pursued in such a way as to lead to any definite results.

I am, therefore, not surprised to find that upon appellant pressing its complaints on the attention of the Minister that he finally decided to refer the question to the law officers of the Crown and as a result thereof & that he found it necessary to inform these litigants that he had decided that the modification of instructions, not having been officially made, were of no value and proceedings would have to be taken " to have this error straightened up," to use the phrase announcing the result.

The respondent saw fit to take and prosecute this action instead of abiding thereby.

It thus assumed the heavy burden of proving a compliance with the regulation and attempted it by circuitous methods which I find failed.

The onus of proof resting upon it, the proper and direct method would have been to call the Minister or his deputy as a witness.

I infer that by reason of the impossibility of shewing that the surveyor's instructions, as amended, had the previous approval of either the Minister or his deputy, which was needed to render same valid, either would have failed to supply the needed proof.

I, therefore, am of opinion, that the appeal should be allowed with costs throughout and the action be dismissed with costs without prejudice to the new survey being had under either regulation-24 or 25-with the approval of the Minister or his deputy and to such, if any, rights as the result thereof may disclose the respondent to have.

Since writing the foregoing I find that I am alone in the result just reached, and to render a judgment of the court possible I assent to the result expressed by those desiring a new trial as being nearest of the divergent opinions of my colleagues to what I conceive right.

J.-I concur with Mr. Justice Brodeur. J.-Il s'agit dans cette cause du bornage de terres -publiques sur lesquelles l'appelante et l'intimbe ont des permis de coupe de bois qui leur ont & 6t6 octroy6s en vertu des articles 1597 et suivants des Statuts Refondus de la province de Qu6bec.

Le bornage de ces concessions forestibres ne peut pas se faire de concert entre les propri6taires voisins, ou par l'intervention de l'autorit6 judiciaire, ainsi que les articles 504 et 505 du Code Civil le prescrivent pour les terrains des particuliers, mais il ne peut avoir lieu que sur les instructions de 1'autorit6 administrative et il ne devient effectif et 16gal qu'apris avoir 6t6 approuv6 par le ministre ou le sous-ministre des Terres et Forits (arts. 24 et 25 des Rglements des Bois et Forts; et arts. 1527 et 1597 S.R.P.Q.).

Toute la question dans cette cause est de savoir si le bornage invoqu6 par la demanderesse intim6e a 6 fait suivant des instructions valables de l'autorit6 administrative et s'il a t6 approuv6 par le sousministre.

Il devient nicessaire de raconter bri~vement les faits importants qui ont donna lieu au litige. Je citerai cependant d'abord le texte de Particle 24 des R~glements des Bois et Forts qui d6termine dans quelles conditions l'arpentage doit 'se faire, et quel en est l'effet:

J'ai soulign6 dans cette citation les parties qui portent sur le pr~sent litige.

Voici maintenant les faits de la cause.

En 1909, la compagnie Price s'est adress6e par &

6crit au D6partement des Terres pour faire faire le Brodeur J. bornage de plusieurs concessions forestibres qu'elle avait dans la rigion de la rivibre Rimouski et de la rivibre Kedzwick.

Des instructions furent pr6paries par M. Gauvin, qui 4tait alors surintendant des arpentages, approuv6es par le sous-ministre du temps, M. Tach4, et transmises A l'arpenteur Addie. Cette proc~dure 6tait irr6gulibre, car cette demande de bornage devait se faire, suivant 'article 24 des Rglements, par les deux parties int6ress6es conjointement. II n'y a que dans le cas odt l'un des possesseurs (art. 25) refuse de se joindre A son voisin pour faire le bornage que ce dernier a le droit de faire seul la demande. n'y a pas de preuve dans le cas actuel que la compagnie Shives ait refus6 de faire une demande conjointe. Mais ce d6faut initial a t certainement couvert par les d6marches subsiquentes de la compagnie Shives qui, en 1911, a demand6 A la compagnie Price de faire ce bornage en commun et, sa demande ayant 6t accept6e, les compagnies ont toutes deux fait I'organisation n6cessaire- pour que l'arpentage de leurs lignes de division soit effectu6 suivant les instructions qui avaient 6t approuvdes par le sous-ministre; et elles ont toutes deux envoy6 des reprdsentants pour assister I'arpenteur Addie et surveiller ses op6rations.

C'6tait dans l'hiver 1912.

Les concessions forestibres de la compagnie Shives sont entour6es au nord, A l'est et A l'ouest par celles de la compagnie Price.

L'arpenteur Addie a d'abord commenc6 A l'ouest de la concession Shives, sur rivibre Rimouski, et, suivant les instructions qu'il avait [VOL. LVIII. *5 du d6partement, il proc6da A tirer les lignes en droite ligne astronomique.

Cette op6ration faisait gagner environ sept milles de terre ) la compagnie Shives. Quand I'arpenteur fut arriv6 pour d6terminer la ligne orientale de la concession Shives, il a naturellement suivi la mbme direction; mais alors la compagnie BrodeurJ. Shives s'est opposde 6nergiquement A ce que l'arpenteur continuit ses operations; et ce dernier, accompagn6 des parties int6ress6es, s'est rendu h Qu6bec pour voir I'arpenteur g6n6ral du d6partement, qui 6tait alors M. Girard.

Celui-ci, apr~s avoir entendu les parties et leurs suggestions, a reconnu que l'arpentage A angle droit avec les rivibres serait plus juste; et, pour donner effet A ce qu'il consid6rait le consentement des int6ress6s, il a modifi6 les instructions de l'arpenteur.

Mais, par oubli ou autrement, il n'a pas fait approuver cette modification par le ministre ou le sous-ministre. L'arpenteur muni de ces nouvelles instructions en a fait tenir une copie A la compagnie Shives le 23 mars 1912 et cette dernibre en a accuse r6ception en disant: Quelques jours plus tard, la compagnie Shives demandait combien la compagnie Price Bros. se trouverait A gagner de terrain dans,la ligne ouest par ces nouvelles instructions; et l'arpenteur lui a r6pondu, par lettre du 4 avril 1912, qu'elle gagnerait environ 7 milles. La ligne fut dans l'hiver suivant, en .1913, tir6e suivant les nouvelles instructions et la compagnie Price s'est trouv6e A reprendre les sept milles de terrain qu'elle avait perdus par I'arpentage de l'hiver pr6c6dent. D'un autre c6td, la compagnie Shives se trouvait A gagner consid6rablement de terrain dans sa ligne est. L'arpenteur d~posa au ministbre son rapport, ses notes d'arpentage et le plan du bornage fait et il fut pay6 de ses frais d'arpentage par les deux compagnies; P.

la compagnie Shives fit ce paiement sous prot~t, en disant que la compagnie Price avait eu plus de & terrain qu'elle n'avait droit d'en avoir.

Elle se rendit alors aupris du d~partement pour s'objecter A ce que le rapport et le plan de l'arpenteur fussent accept6s parce que les instructions de ce dernier n'avaient pas t au pr6alable approuvdes par le ministre ou le sous-ministre.

Les choses en rest~rent ia pour un an environ, quand le surintendant des arpentages, M. Girard, le 7 avril 1914, fit un rapport au ministre sur la plainte faite par la compagnie Shives.

Il reconnait dans son rapport qu'il a peut-6tre eu tort d'avoir modifi6 les instructions sans en avoir regu l'autorisation du d6partement; mais, cette modification ayant td basde sur le consentement des parties, il ne croit pas qu'il y aurait lieu maintenant de changer de nouveau ces instructions sans le consentement de la compagnie Price.

II d6clare aussi que les descriptions des locations forestibres pouvaient 6tre interpr6t6es de diff6rentes manibres et que c'est la raison pour laquelle il a fait le changement demand6 par les int6ress6s.

II annexe A son rapport une copie du plan de l'arpentage.

. Ce rapport, autour duquel roule tout le litige, a 6t6 approuv6 par le sous-ministre actuel en y inscrivant le mot "app." suivi de ses initiales: "E. M. D." et des chiffres "8-4-14,"

ce qui signifierait, suivant la preuve, approuv6 le 8 avril 1914.

Il s'agit de savoir si cette action du sous-ministre constitue l'approbation requise par larticle 24 des R6glements au sujet du plan de l'arpenteur ou bien si l'approbation du sous-ministre porte simplement sur la conduite de M. Girard et de la modification faite par lui dans les instructions.

J'aurais 6t d'abord port6 A croire que cette signature du sous-ministre sur le rapport de M. Girard constituait une approbation non-seulement des in- Broer structions donn6es A l'arpenteur mais aussi du rapport et du plan d'arpentage faits par cc dernier. Mais M. Girard, dans sa d6position, nous dit que le ministre ou le d6put6-ministre n'a pas pris action sur le plan de Voici le texte de cette partie de sa d6position:- Il me semble qu'il aurait 4t6 n6cessaire d'avoir sur ce point. le t6moignage du sous-ministre pour savoir exactement ce qu'il a entendu approuver quand il a mis ses initiales sur ce rapport, d'autant plus que l'action du d~partement, en transmettant une copie du rapport tel qu' approuv6 aux parties int6ress6est, a t6 interprt6e par I'intimb comme signifiant que le bornage fait par Addie 6tait approuv6 par le sousministre et que certaines expressions relev6es dans les lettres de l'avocat de la compagnie Shives nous portent A croire que, dans son opinion, I'approbation du rapport Girard par le sous-ministre mettait A ndant les prtentions de cette compagnie quant A la 16galit6 de l'arpentage.

Il est important de mettre fin A ces difficultis entre les deux compagnies.

Je ne serais pas pr~t, pour ma part, renvoyer l'action de la demanderesse si, par oubli ou autrement, on n'avait pas mis au dossier le t6moignage du sous-ministre, car en renvoyant l'action les parties auraient h proc4der de nouveau au bornage et A encourir des frais bien plus consid6rables que la valeur du bois en litige.

S'il s'agissait d'un bornage entre particuliers oi l'autorit6 judiciaire pourrait elle-mime faire tracer les bornes (art. 504 C.C.) nous pourrions, je crois, disposer du litige avec les piices que nous avons devant nous.

Mais les tribunaux, dans le cas de concessions forestibres, n'ont rien A faire avec la 16galit6 du bornage.

Cette question est du ressort exclusif de l'autorit6 administrative.

Dans la pr6sente cause nous avons d'abord A rechercher si le bornage a t6 approuv6 par le d6put6 ministre.

Le document que nous avons devant nous est certainement ambigu.

Le rapport de M. Girard nous indique bien les circonstances dans lesquelles il a modifi6 les instructions de l'arpenteur; et comme son rapport est approuv4, il en r~sulterait alors que les instructions qu'il a pr6par6es sont 6galement approuv6es.

Il est bien vrai que ces instructions n'auraient pas alors 6t approuvdes avant d'avoir transmises k Mais la ratification post6rieure de ces instructions par l'autorit6 administrative serait suffisante pour les valider.

C'est ce qui r6sulte de la d6cision rendue par le Conseil Priv6 dans la cause de Alexandre v. Brassard ou Lord Macnaghten, en parlant de ce qui devait se faire devant I'autorit6 religieuse pour l'6rection canonique d'une paroisse, disait:- Dans le cas actuel, c'6tait aux autorit6s administratives du D6partement des Terres de d6cider si les instructions avaient 6t0 6mises r6gulibrement ou non. Et comme le sous-ministre a approuv6 la conduite de son officier, M. Girard, il a, par lh mime, suivant moi, approuv6 les instructions qu'il avait donndes A Et quand subs6quemment il envoyait copie du rapport A la compagnie Shives et disait que ce rapport avait 6t6 approuv4, il ne faisait que porter h la connaissance de cette partie le fait que 'on d6cidait que ces instructions 6taient valides et accept6es comme telles par le ministre.

On dira peut-6tre que la demanderesse ne pourrait pas faire la preuve testimoniale du fait que le sousministre a approuv6 non-seulement les instructions pr6par6es par M. Girard mais aussi le rapport et le plan de M. Addie.

La rigle 6dict6e par larticle 1234 C.C. est que la preuve testimoniale ne peut pas Atre admise pour contredire ou changer les termes d'un 6crit valablement fait. Les termes de cet article sont 6videmment pris de Greenleaf on Evidence, qui est d'ailleurs cit6 par les codificateurs sous cet article 1234 C.C. Cet article 1234 C.C., dans la version anglaise, se lit comme suit:- Greenleaf, au paragraphe 275, cit6 par les codificateurs, 6nonce la mime rigle en se servant des termes suivants:- L'article correspondant du Code Napol6on, qui est l'article 1341, est dans des termes plus restrictifs, vu qu'il dit qu'il n'est regu aucune preuve par t~moins contre et outre le contenu des actes.

&

Cependant Bonnier, Trait6 des Preuves, p. 120, no. 143, en commentant cet article d6clare que:- Langelier, De la Preuve, nos. 584-585, apris avoir d6clar6 que les r6dacteurs de notre article ont copi6 la rbgle du droit anglais plut6t que celle du droit frangais et apris avoir 6nonc6 au no. 603 la r~gle que l'on ne pourrait prouver par t6moins la manibre dont les parties A un acte l'ont elles-mimes entendu, dit au no. 604 que si l'6crit donne une d6signation de chose qui peut s'appliquer k plusieurs choses, on peut prouver quelle est la chose que l'auteur de l'6crit a voulu d6signer ainsi.

Le mime principe est 6nonc6 dans Taylor, on Evidence, 10th ed., p. 855, par. 1194, et dans Best, on Evidence, 10th ed., p. 208, par. 226.

Dans la pr6sente cause on pourrait donc prouver par t~moins si le sous-ministre entendait, en approuvant le rapport de M. Girard, approuver en m~me temps le plan de l'arpenteur qui lui 6tait soumis.

Les tribunaux pourront ensuite avec cette preuve d6cider d'une maniare certaine si le bornage fait par l'arpenteur Addie a 6 approuv6 par l'autorit6 administrative et si l'action de la demanderesse 6tait bien fondde. Partant du principe que les tribunaux n'ont pas juridiction pour d6cider de la 16galit6 d'un arpentage de locations forestibres, mais que c'est li une question dont la d6cision appartient exclusivement au ministre ou au sous-ministre des terres; 6tant donn6 le fait que nous avons A interpr6ter une ambiguit6 cachie (latent ambiguity) et que la preuve 6crite ne dit pas clairement si le sous-ministre a approuv6 le bornage, je serais d'opinion, dans ces circonstances, de renvoyer lo dossier en Cour Sup6rieure pour qu'on y prouve si le sous-ministre, en initialant le rapport Girard, a ou non approuv6 le & bornage et a eu ou n'a pas eu l'intention de donner lui-mime !'approbation requise par Particle 24 des r~glements.

Les frais de cette cour, ainsi que des cours inf6rieures, devront suivre le sort de la cause.

J. (dissenting)-At first sight this case appears quite a complicated one, but when the voluminous record and the lengthy factums are examined, the question to be decided is restricted into a very narrow compass.

The appellant and the respondent hold adjoining timber licences from the Government of the Province of Quebec.

The respondent has, towards the west, timber limit River Rimouski No. 1 East, and, towards the east, timber limit Itedzwick No. 2.

Between these limits, going in an easterly direction, the appellant holds timber limits River Kedzwick No.

3 and Kedzwick East. Consequently, the parties occupy neighbouring territory both on the east and on the west, and the difficulty between them arose in connection with the running of the boundary line between their respective concessions.

It is to be remarked that in as much as timber licences confer no right of ownership in the land, the provisions of the Civil Code as to boundaries are without application.

The whole matter is governed by the provisions of the Quebec revised statutes concerning public lands, and by regulations made by order-in-council under these provisions (art. 1534 R.S.Q.).

regulation governing the parties in this case is Regulation No. 24 of the Wood and Forests Regulations and reads as follows:- It is common ground between, the parties that, although the approval of the Minister of Lands and Forests is required by this regulation, the approval of the Deputy Minister is to the same effect and is binding upon the licensees.

Some time in 1909, the respondent applied to the Crown Lands Department to have boundaries run between their respective limits, and Mr. George K. Addie, provincial land surveyor, was charged with the tracing of these boundaries under instructions issued by the Department.

This was not the joint written request required by Regulation 24, but the correspondence exchanged between the appellant and the respondent in 1911 and 1912 shews that the latter company agreed, and even proposed to the respondent, to join it in having the survey made jointly and to pay one-half of the expense, and in view of this agreement it is somewhat singular that the appellant should now raise the technical objection that a joint request from both parties for the survey should have preceded the instructions given by the Department in 1909.

I think the appellant should not be heard now to urge this objection in view of the .CE full consent which it gave to the survey being made at the joint expense of the parties and of its participation & C. therein.

Iignault I may, moreover, dispose of the objections of the appellant that, under Regulation 24, a joint written request of the parties should have preceded the instructions given to the surveyor, and that these instructions should have been previously approved by the Minister, by stating that, in my opinion, all these requirements, and also the approval of the field notes, strenuously insisted on by the learned counsel of the appellant at the argument, are of the nature of rules of procedure and are not a condition precedent to the validity of all subsequent proceedings.

These rules are useful ones for the guidance of the Minister and to permit him to give a sanction, by his approval, to the. survey made with the concurrence of the holders of contiguous timber limits, but the whole matter is one for the consideration of the Minister alone, and if he gives his approval to the survey and tracing of the boundary, this approval, when sufficiently expressed, covers any previous informality of the proceedings.

Support for the position I take is afforded by the decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the case of Alexandre v. Brassard (1).

The question there was whether a decree of the Archbishop of Montreal, followed by civil recognition, canonically erecting the parish of St. Blaise, which had been formed by the dismemberment of three old parishes, could be sustained in view of the fact that it was alleged that the requirements of the Quebec revised statutes concerning the erection of parishes and their civil recognition had not been complied with.

And it E was contended that, although it was not competent for the court to set aside a canonical decree for the erection of a parish for ecclesiastical purposes, the court was at liberty to inquire into the proceedings which gave rise to the decree and that if these proceedings were found not in accordance with the provisions of the law, the decree could'not be treated as a decree available for the purposes of founding civil recognition.

Answering this contention, Lord Macnaghten said, at p. 307 of the report:- I would apply this test to determine the validity of all the proceedings previous to the approval of the Minister, and state that, in my opinion, it is for the Minister alone to decide as to the validity of any objection with regard to the regularity of the proceedings.

If he gives his approval, it precludes any question being raised as to the regularity of the proceedings.

Returning now to the recital of the pertinent facts, I may say that Mr. Addie went on the ground in February and.March, 1912, and proceeded, in presence of representatives of the parties, to run these boundaries. Without any opposition whatever he ran the boundary between River Rimouski No. 1 East, held by the respondent, and River Kedzwick No. 3, occupied by the appellant.

He then prepared to run the boundary between Kedzwick East (the appellant's) and Kedzwick No. 2 (the respondent's), when Mr. Dickie, representing the appellant, objected to the manner in which Mr. Addie desired to trace the boundary, and, in view of this opposition, Mr. Addie suspended operations and with, or followed by, representatives of & the parties, he returned to Quebec.

J. Next in sequence in the recital of the facts comes a meeting, on 20th March, 1912, between Mr. Addie and representatives of the parties, to wit, Mr. Anderson on behalf of the appellant and Mr. Sissons on behalf of the respondent, in the office of Mr. Plamondon, an employee of the Department, at which Mr. Girard, Superintendent of Surveys, assisted.

Mr. Addie returned on'the ground in February and March, 1913, and then and there, in presence of the representatives of the parties, and without any opposition from them, he ran new boundary lines between- River Rimouski No. 1 East and River Kedzwick No. on the one hand, and between Kedzwick east and Kedzwick No. on the other.

On the 14th May, 1913, he made a full report to the Minister, with a plan of his operations and his field notes thereunto annexed.

He also sent a full report to the appellant on the 27th May, 1913, with a copy of his report to the Minister and duplicates of the plans accompanying the latter report.

The appellant, on the 7th June, in a letter to Mr. Addie, acknowledged receipt of this report, sent to Mr. Addie a cheque for $1,085.54, for its share of the J. expenses of the survey, but stated that it was not at all satisfied with the result as it could not understand why there should be the great difference between the first and last lines that Mr. Addie ran out.

Some months later, 8th October, 1913, the Hon. Mr. John Hall Kelly, K.C., Legislative Councillor, wrote to the Department on behalf of the appellant expressing the same dissatisfaction, and asking for a copy of all instructions given for the survey.

It does not appear what answer was made to this letter, but nearly six months after, 14th March, 1914, Mr. Kelly caused to be served on the respondent and on the Minister a formal protest against the running of the line. At least one ground of this protest, that the line was run without the consent of the appellant, appears to me contrary to the facts proved in this case.

Mr. Kelly followed this protest by a letter to the Minister of the 28th March 1914, in which he alleges that the first instructions were changed at the request of the respondent, an assertion also controverted by the evidence.

Mr. Kelly asked the Minister to give the matter his consideration at once, as otherwise It is under these circumstances, and in view of these letters and protests and of the request of Mr. Kelly that the Minister should give the matter his consideration at once, that Mr. Girard, Superintendent of Surveys, made his report to the Minister of Lands and Forests on the 7th April, 1914, in which he refers to Mr. Kelly's letter of the 28th of March, and in which he makes a complete report of all the operations connected with the survey and the running of the'line, frankly admitting that he had made some changes in the instruc tions to the surveyor without the authority of the & Department.

He concludes by saying:- At the foot of this report we find the following:- This, Mr. Girard states, means:- I fail to see how it can be disputed that this was a decision by the Deputy Minister on the very point which Mr. Kelly had asked the Minister to consider. And although it is argued that this is merely an approval of Mr. Girard's explanation why the former instructions were modified, I am of the opinion that the approval so given extends to the whole report and to the plans and maps submitted with it. I cannot see the object of so initialling the report, if the intention was merely to accept Mr. Girard's explanation, and not to give official approval to the survey.

Mr. Kelly evidently placed this construction on the approval, for, on the 13th August, 1914, he wrote to the Minister, referring to a letter from the Department of the 16th April, enclosing a copy of Mr. Girard's report, and in this letter he says:and he expresses the regret that he had not been given the opportunity this letter Mr. Kelly submits that the instructions could not be modified without the written request of his clients and that these instructions should have been previously approved by the Minister, and he requests that these two points be submitted to the law officers, Finally, we have a letter of the 14th August from the Deputy Minister to the respondent, in which the .Deputy Minister transmits a copy of Mr. Girard's report, adding:- I cannot but believe that the intention of the Deputy Minister, in approving Mr. Girard's report, was to give the approval required by art. 24 of the Wood and Forests Regulations, for if the object of the Deputy Minister was merely to accept, as argued, the personal explanation of Mr. Girard and not to approve the report itself, there would have been no reason for writing a formal approval at the foot of the report itself. . And, as already stated, Mr. Kelly's letter of the 13th August shews that he placed the same construction on the approval.

It is true that, at Mr. Kelly's request, the Department. referred the points raised by him to its law officers and subsequently to the Attorney-General. It is also true that the Deputy Attorney-General reported that Mr. Kelly's objections were well taken, and that the Department thereupon notified the parties that a new survey and determination of the boundary would

S be necessary.

But I have, with deference, to disagree with the conclusions of the learned Deputy Attorney- General, and I think the approval of the Deputy

Minister, covering, as it does, the whole of Mr. Girard's report, necessarily carries with it approval of the J. instructions issued to Mr. Addie.

While no doubt it would have been more regular to insert the approval of the Deputy Minister on the plan itself, and the

Department should see that this is done now, I cannot take the responsibility of exposing the parties to the expenses of a new survey when I am convinced that there has been substantial compliance with the requirements of Regulation 24, and that, if there be any informality, the approval of the Minister disposes of any question as to the validity of the proceedings.

This is the only point on which this court is called upon to express any opinion, and it has not to say whether the lines run in 1913 gave to each party the territory to which it was entitled.

This is a point as to which the Minister, or his Deputy, is the sole judge, and as -I find that the Deputy Minister, by approving

Mr. Girard's report, has given his approval to the .line run by Addie, I can only concur in the exhaustive and very complete opinions of the late lamented Sir Horace

Archambeault, Chief Justice, and of Mr. Justice Carroll in the court below.

The lumber, the price of which is claimed by the respondent, was cut in territory which the survey of

1913 placed within the limits granted to it. The value of the lumber was admitted, and the appellant was condemned to pay it to the respondent. With this determination of the litigation between the parties I concur.

Some point has been made of the fact that the

Deputy Minister was not called as a witness to state what he intended when he wrote his approval at the foot of Mr. Girard's report. Another question would be upon whom rested the onus of so calling Mr. Dech~nes, on the respondent who relied on the approval Mignault J. as extending to the entire report, or on the appellant who sought to restrict this approval to the personal explanations of Mr. Girard?

My personal view is that the respondent could rely on the approval as extending, as its unqualified terms shewed, to the whole report, and that if the appellant desired to limit in any way the general effect of this approval, the onus of proving the limitations rested on it. At all events, neither party saw fit to call Mr. Dch6nes, and I do not think that the omission is one for which the respondent alone should be considered liable.

In my opinion substantial justice has been done to the parties by the judgment of the Court of King's Bench.

A new survey might possibly give the same result and would undoubtedly expose the parties to considerable expense.

It seems in every way desirable to bring the litigation to a close, and I would not lightly disturb so well considered a judgment as the one appealed from.

For these reasons, I am of the opinion that the appeal should be dismissed with costs.

Appeal allowed, new trial ordered.