Veuillette v. The King

Per Anglin and Mignault JJ.-Though the terms of the trial judge's charge may be open to criticism, the prisoner's evidence was open to comment by him as that of any other witness.

Per Idington, Anglin, Brodeur and Mignault JJ.-After the election by the accused for and the empanelling of a mixed jury, he had a right to have the case conducted in both English and French. Per Brodeur J. dissenting:-The. failure by the trial judge to have summed up the case in French constituted a "substantial wrong" to the appellant: the conviction should be set aside and a new trial ordered.

APPEAL from the judgment of the Court of King's Bench, appeal side, Province of Quebec, (1) affirming Louis Davies C.J. and Idington, Anglin, Brodeur and Mignault JJ.

(1) Q.R. 28 K.B. 364.

[VOL. LVIII. the judgment of the trial court, with a jury, at Bryson, District of Pontiac.

The accused, appellant, was found guilty of murder but he prayed for a case to be reserved for the Court of King's Bench.

The questions submitted in the reserved case stated by the trial judge and the circumstances of the case are fully. stated in the above head-note and in the judgments now reported.

THE have carefully read and considered the reasons for their judgment in this case given by the learned judges of the Court of King's Bench and weighed carefully the able argument presented at bar by Mr. McKeown on the prisoner's behalf.

The Chief Justice of the Court of King's Bench having dissented from the judgment of the majority of that court on the first and fourth questions reserved, this appeal comes before us and is limited to those two questions.

Assuming for the purpose of the argument that the failure of the trial judge to charge .the jury in both languages, French and English, brings the case within section 1019 of the Criminal Code as "something not according to law done at the trial," we are by that section expressly prohibited from setting aside the conviction or directing a new trial unless in our opinion f"some substantial wrong or miscarriage" was occasioned thereby.

I am quite clear in my judgment that under the special facts and circumstances of this case no such "substantial wrong or miscarriage" was so occasioned at the trial to the prisoner either in the fact of the trial judge not having summed up the case to the jury in French nor in the fact of his having commented "upon Justice.

the failure of the prisoner" (who had elected to give evidence) "to testify to the effect that he had not actually committed the murders mentioned in the indictment."

I would, therefore, dismiss the appeal.

J.-I agree so entirely with the reasoning of Mr. Justice Cross in his opinion given in the court below that I adopt same so far as applicable to that part of the reserved case presented for our consideration.

There is no other class of criminal trials which produces such a strain upon the minds of those concerned as does a trial for murder. There would inevitably result, from a repetition in two languages of all that was expressed, a prolongation of the trial tending to fatigue and inattention on the part of the jurors and possibly a confusion of thought W which tiresome reiteration is apt to produce.

The just rights of an innocent man might be needlessly jeopardized in such a case.

The statutory right given an accused and now in question had originally a deeper import than the mere right to the use of the two languages.

The latter right in substance is recognized in the due and proper administration of justice wherever and whenever, and so far as necessary; though not carried to the extent that the law in question does relative to the selection of a jury.

The right to a jury de inedietate linguae is entirely of English origin, tracing back to Edward I., and so clearly formed part and parcel of English law that I imagine it was by reason thereof that it became law in so many of the United States, until abolished in all save Kentucky.

If, instead of what happened by steps needless to dwell upon here, the English law had finally become the law of all Canada as result of the Conquest, it would have been as, of course, part thereof, but the final settlement of that vexed question carried with it modifications of the French law, of which this is one and it, no doubt, was intended to protect him accused from racial prejudices in the jury panel.

To impose upon him accused and thus protected the additional risks I have adverted to, when and so far as needless, might tend to force him to waive his privilege, when standing in need of its exercise, for no other reason than that he might desire and need the sympathetic hearing of those of his own or like origin to counteract the possible prejudice of those of another origin. I do not think he should be driven to make such a choice.

At the same time I must not be understood as implying any limitation upon his right to insist, if so advised, upon the two languages being used throughout the trial.

If well advised, common sense will generally govern him and his counsel in regard to the exercise of any such rights. And the court must always be ready to accede to his wishes, as I have no doubt it did herein. I cannot imagine that any wrong or miscarriage of justice ensued herein by reason of the course pursued at the trial; with the concurrence of all concerned, , The case was not one that, so far as we are informed, needed anything but the ordinary conversational skill in use of language to apprehend what was said. Cases are conceivable in which terms might be used calling for more than that degree of skill.

Then, of course, care must be taken that each set of jurors fully understands the import of what is said.

In cases of trial for murder, where there is a possible alternative, of the crime being reduced to one of manslaughter, it frequently happens that nice distinctions of law need to be observed and in explaining such distinctions it might be well for a judge charging a jury to make such distinctions clearly understood by using both languages, lest a juror might not understand same when addressed in another than his mother tongue, even if he had acquired the facility of carrying on an ordinary conversation in another language. But in a murder trial such as this happened to be where it was inevitably either murder or nothing, all the jurors had to understand was the statement of plain ordinary every-day facts.

I am of the opinion that the appeal should be dismissed.

J.-The facts of this case sufficiently appear in the judgments delivered in the Court of King's Bench.

The appeal to this court was confined to two of the four questions submitted by the reserved casethe first and the fourth-on which the learned Chief Justice of Quebec dissented from the majority view in the Court of King's Bench adverse to the prisoner. The first question is as follows:- Having regard to the facts, that the accused elected to be tried by a jury composed of one-half of persons skilled in the French language, THE and that the jury in question was in fact composed one-half of persons skilled in the said French language, was there error of law on the part of the presiding judge, occasioning substantial wrong or miscarriage, in not having summed up the case to the jury in the French language in addition to the summing up made in the English language?

I L On the reserved case submitted, it may properly be assumed that the appellant was entitled to be tried by a jury composed for the one-half at least of persons skilled in the language of his defence

(in this case French), that upon arraignment he duly demanded such a jury (27 & 28 Vict., ch. 41, sec. 7, subsec. 2), and that at least six members of the jury impanelled were found in the judgment of the court to be skilled in the French language.

I am inclined to agree with the learned Chief Justice of Quebec that after the election of the accused for a mixed jurv, and after the impanelling of such a mixed jury, the case should have been conducted in both languages.

That, in my opinion, was a right of the accused implied by the statute. If not, its obj ct would be purely sentimental and no right rea and substantial in character would be conferred by it. There. is not a little in the record to indicate tacit consent by the accused to the trial being conducted entirely in English. The learned Chief Justice questions the sufficiency of this consent although apparently of the view that the consent of the accused expressly obtained and recorded would have justified that course being adopted. find it unnecessary to pass upon this aspect of the case. No question is presented as to the effect of the omission to translate into French the evidence given in English. The question submitted is confined to the failure of the trial judge to repeat his charge or summing up in French.

Assuming in favour of the appellant that the omission to repeat, at least in substance, the charge or summing up was error in law, it would have constituted something not according to law done at the trial and would justify setting aside the conviction and ordering a new trial only if

"in the opinion of the court of appeal some substant'al wrong or miscarriage was thereby occasioned on the trial."

of the court of appeal some substantial wrong or miscarriage was thereby occasioned on the trial." Crim. Code, sec. 1019.

The question submitted properly so assumes. The stated case informs us that each and every one of the jurors stated to the court at the time of their selection that they understood and spoke both languages. When the first witness speaking English gave his evidence, the Frenchspeaking jurors were asked by the court if they understood the evidence, and they all replied that they did.

The Crown prosecutor, in explaining the case to the jurors spoke only in English, and Mr. McDonald. attorney for the accused, in addressing the jury after the evidence had been received, spoke only in English. He was followed by Mr. Gaboury, Crown prosecutor, who addressed the jury in English only and was followed by the presiding judge who addressed the jury in English only.

No objection was made by the defence and no request preferred that the charge of the jury be repeated in French.

It was also stated at bar that the accused himself gave his evidencc wholly in English.

Having regard to all these facts, I agree with Mr. Justice Pelletier that the accused suffered no prejudice no substantial wrong or miscarriage was occasioned on the trial-by the failure of the trial Kixa. judge to repeat in French his entire summing up or the substance of it.

The affidavits of some jurors tendered by the appellant are, in my opinion, inadmissible and I have not considered them for any purpose.

The fourth question reserved is as follows:- Was there error of law occasioning substantial wrong or miscarriage in that the judge who presided commented upon the failure of the prisoner to testify to the effect that he had not actually committed the murders mentioned in the indictment?

Although the dissent of the Chief Justice is in terms confined to the first and fourth questions the reasons which he assigns rather indicate that he was not entirely satisfied that the third question should be answered in the negative. Perhaps, however, broadly construed-and I so deal with it-the fourth question may cover the ground of objection which the learned Chief Justice had in mind when he said:- In his address the judge said to the jurors that the accused did not dare to swear that he did not kill the murdered man. Such a comment, in my opinion, is against the spirit of the law. It was not a fair comment and it was of a nature to cause a substantial wrong and miscarriage of justice.

The prisoner having testified on his own behalf his evidence was open to comment and observation by the presiding judge in addressing the jury as was that of any other witness. Mr. Justice Cross disposed satisfactorily of this branch of the case.

Dealing with the third question, he says of the portion of the charge to which the learned Chief Justice takes exception:- It is to be observed that the jurors were there to hear the evidence and that if there were inaccuracies upon the facts in what the judge said they would not constitute misdirection unless it could be said that they had, or were likely to have, some such effect as to lead the jury to think that some question which they ought to consider was in law excluded from their consideration, or otherwise mislead them as to the law.

Whatever may be thought of the learned trial judge's charge from other points of view, however open to criticism it may be as a departure from the standard of impartiality which judges entrusted with the administration of the criminal law in the English courts have thought it proper to adopt, I cannot find in it any error of law such as may properly be made the subject of a reserved case under arts. 1014 et seq. of the Criminal Code.

I entirely agree, however, with Mr. Justice Pelletier's observation:- The appeal, in my opinion, fails.

J. (dissenting).-L'appelant, Veuillette, a 6t6 trouv6 coupable de meurtre et a demand6 au juge qui pr~sidait A son proc6s de r~server certaines questions pour la d6cision de la cour d'appel, et notamment celle de savoir si dans le cas oi il y a un jury mixte le juge doit faire son allocution (charge) dans les deux langues.

Le juge ayant refus6 cette demande, Veuillette s'est adress6 h la cour d'appel pour obtenir l'autorisation d'appeler de cette d6cision.

a produit au soutien de sa demande les affidavits de quatre jur6s de langue frangaise qui ont d~clar6 n'avoir qu'une connaissance imparfaite de l'anglais;

et l'un d'eux, le nomm6 Demers, a mime ajout6:- La cour d'appel a accord6 sur cette preuve la permission d'appeler (art. 1015 Code Criminel). Quatre questions ont 4t6 soumises k la Cour d'Appel. La premibre est dans les termes suivants:- Having regard to the facts that the accused elected to be tried by a jury composed one-half of persons skilled in the French language, and that the jury in question was in fact composed one-half of persons skilled in the said French language, was there error of law on the part THE of the presiding judge, occasioning substantial wrong or miscarriage, in not having summed up the case to the jury in the French language in addition to the summing up made in the English language?

En vertu de la loi actuellement en force dans la province de Qu6bec, oi'i ce procks criminel a eu lieu, -le prdvenu, s'il est frangais ou anglais, peut demander, lors de sa mise en accusation, un jury mixte et alors il sera jug6 par un jury compos6 pour moiti6 au moins des personnes qui

*

*

* seront

*

*

* versdes dans la langue du pr6venu.

(1864, 27-28 Vict., ch. 41, sec. 7).

Comme on le voit par le texte mime du statut, c'est un droit absolu pour un anglais ou un frangais dans la province d'6tre jug6 par six au moins de ses concitoyens qui parlent sa langue maternelle. Ce n'est pas m~me laiss6 A la discr6tion du juge de d6cider s'il y a eu lieu ou non d'accorder cette demande du pr6venu pour un jury mixte.

C'est un droit absolu et incontestable.

Et du moment qu'il manifeste ce d~sir, le juge est tenu d'en prendre note et de voir A ce que le jury soit mixte.

Cette 14gislation n'est pas nouvelle.

Elle remonte aux premiers jours de la domination anglaise. En 1764 le gouverneur Murray, dans son ordonnance du 17 septembre, d6clarait que

In all tryals in this court, all His Majesty's subjects in the Colony to be admitted on juries without distinction.

Les canadiens de langue anglaise se sont trouv6s fort micontents de voir que cette ordonnance mettait les anglais et les frangais sur le m6me pied; et, dans un m6moire en date du 16 octobre 1764, ils disaient que persons professing the religion of the Church of Rome

* * * have been empannelled on Grand and Petty Jurys even where tivo protestants were parties.

Ils rappelaient cette disposition de la loi James the Third, ch. 5, sec. 8, qui d6clarait que et s concluaient en disant:- (Constitutional Documents, Shortt & Doughty, p. 154.) Leurs plaintes furent r6fir6es en Angleterre oii les' officiers de la couronne d6cid~rent que les catholiques pouvaient agir comme jur6s. Et en 1766, le ler juillet, une nouvelle ordonnance, destin6e A faire disparaitre la plainte des anglais qu'ils 6taient expos6s A Atre jug6s par des jur4s tous frangais a t signee d6crdtant que dans les actions

Shortt & Doughty, idem,.p. 173.

Le jury mixte 6tait 6tabli et ce sur les repr~sentations et h la demande des canadiens de langue anglaise. Nous retrouvons le principe de cette 16gislation dans nos Statuts Refondus du Bas-Canada, dans la section du ch. 84.

Ce dernier statut ayant 6t abrog6 en 1864, la disposition en question a t6 reproduite dans le statut de 1864, 27 & 28 Vict. ch. 41, sec. 7. C'est la loi maintenant en force.

Maintenant, quelle est I'6tendue du droit qui 6tait confir6 aux pr6venus?

On a pr6tendu que ce droit ne consistait que dans le choix des jur6s et ne comportait pas l'obligation pour la cour de voir A ce que toutes les proc6dures soient conduites dans les deux langues afin d'6tre bien comprises par tous les membres du jury.

Ce serait, suivant moi, un droit bien illusoire si, malgr6 le droit qu'aurait un anglais, par exemple, de choisir un jury mixte, il 6tait permis A la couronne de faire entendre les t6moins en langue frangaise et de ne pas traduire leurs timoignages en anglais de manidre A ce que la teneur de ces t6moignages ffit comprise par les jurds de langue anglaise.

Cela constituerait un grave d6ni de justice.

Il en serait de m~me pour le r6sum6 (charge) du juge.

Ce dernier devrait voir A ce que son allocution soit comprise de tout le jury.

II est vrai que la loi est silencieuse sur la manibre dont une cause devra etre conduite devant un jury mixte. Mais je ne veux pas de meilleure interpr6tation de la loi que cette pratique, constamment suivie depuis plus de cent cinquante ans, que dans le cas de jury mixte les depositions des t6moins sont traduites dans les deux langues et le r6sum6 du juge est 6galement fait ou traduit en anglais et en frangais.

Le gouverneur Murray sentait si bien la n6cessit6 pour les prdpos6s de l'administration de la justice de connaitre les deux langues, que, dans un rapport qu'il faisait aux autoritds imp6riales i se plaignait que De fait, quelques mois apris les autoritis impiriales, sans motiver leurs raisons, remplagaient le Juge en Chef et le Procureur General.

Shortt & Doughty, idem, p. 178.

Mais on dit: Il n'y a pas eu de protestation dans la cause actuelle quand le juge a omis de parler en frangais, le prisonnier a donn6 son t~moignage en anglais, son avocat n'a par16 qu'en anglais quand il a f ait son allocution aux jur6s, et, de plus,!on a demand6 aux jur6s frangais s'ils connaissaient l'anglais et ils ont r6pondu que oui.

Toutes ces circonstances ne sauraient prouver qu'il y a eu acquiescement formel A cette ill6galit.

Je me demande mime si dans un procks pour meurtre un acquiescement formel serait suffisant.

La loi criminelle exige que dans les procks qui peuvent entrainer la peine capitale toutes les pr6cautions doivent Atre prises pour que toutes les r~gles de la proc6dure soient suivies avec la plus grande rigueur.

(Russell on Crimes, vol. 3, p. 2156.)

Nous avons au dossier une preuve 6nongant que certain jur6 n'avait pas une connaissance suffisante de l'anglais pour comprendre tout ce qui a 6td dit par le juge et les t6moins.

Nous avons 6galement au dossier un fait qui ne porte pas, il est vrai, sur la question que je suis A examiner, mais qui d6montre bien l'importance d'avoir tous les timoignages bien traduits. L'un des t6moins donne son t6moignage en anglais et rapporte une conversation de 1'accus6 qui 6tait cependant tenue en frangais.

On lui demande de r6p6ter en frangais le texte de cette conversation.

Il y a une variante importante.

On la signale au timoin et il est oblig6 de dire:- Ce t6moignage est des plus importants dans la cause.

Nous voyons que la version anglaise donnde par le t~moin de cette conversation incrimine bien plus l'accus6 que les mots dont ce dernier se serait servi d'apris ce mime t6moin quand il rapporte le texte frangais.

Ce texte frangais ne parait pas avoir it6 traduit en anglais aux jur6s et nous trouvons dans le dossier le fait que certains jur6s ne comprenaient pas du tout le frangais.

Tout cela d6montre l'importance qu'il y a de conduire la cause dans les deux langues et le danger qu'il y a de ne pas le faire.

Pour maintenir le verdict, I'intim6 se base aussi sur le fait que l'avocat de la defense n'a pas parl6 aux jurbs en frangais.

L'accus6 6tait 6videmment un adolescent bien pauvre, sans famille et sans protection.

II a trouv6 dans son jeune d6fenseur un homme bien d6vou6 qui a 6videmment entrepris cette cause sans l'espoir de toucher un sou d'honoraire.

Mais, comme cet avocat le dit lui-mime dans son factun

J'en suis venu A la conclusion que dans les circonstances le fait pour le juge de ne pas avoir fait son r6sum6 dans les deux langues constitue un tort r6el A l'accus6 (art. 1019 Code Criminel); et en cela je partage l'opinion de l'honorable juge en chef de la province.

Le jugement a quo qui a r6pondu n6gativement A la question dont j'ai donn6 le texte plus haut devrait etre renvers6.

La sentence devrait etre annule et un nouveau proc~s devrait avoir lieu.

L'appel devrait 6tre maintenu avec d6pens.

J.-L'appelant, qui a 6t6 trouv6 coupable de meurtre par un jury dans le district de Pontiac, province de Quebec, aux assises criminelles y tenues en avril 1918, pr~sid6es par l'honorable juge Weir, a obtenu de la cour d'appel que quatre questions de droit fussent r~servies pour l'opinion de la dite cour. Aprbs avoir entendu le conseil de l'appelant et le conseil comparaissant pour la couronne, la cour d'appel r~pondit ndgativement aux questions soumises et confirma le verdict et la sentence de mort prononc6e contre l'appelant, l'honorable juge en chef exprimant son dissentiment quant aux r6ponses donnies A la premibre et A la quatribme des questions ainsi r6serv6es, auxquelles il 6tait d'avis de rdpondre dans l'affirmative. KING.

Ce dissentiment ayant permis un appel devant cette M'ignault J. cour, I'appelant nous demande d'infirmer la d6cision de la cour d'appel, son appel se trouvant restreint aux questions au sujet desquelles I'honorable juge en- chef a exprim6 son dissentiment.

Je vais done me borner A ces deux questions, la premibre et la quatribme. Having regard to the facts that the accused elected to be tried by a jury composed one-half of persons skilled in the French language, and that the jury in question was in fact composed one-half of persons skilled in the said French language, was there error of law on the part of the presiding judge occasioning substantial wrong or miscarriage, in not having summed up the case to the -jury in the French language in addition to the summing up made in the English language?

Le droit d'avoir un jury mixte dans la province de Qu6bec a 6t6 reconnu par la loi pass6e par le parlement du Canada en 1864, 27-28 Vict. ch. 41, sec. 7, soussection 2, qui se lit comme suit:- 2. Si le prdvenu, lors de sa mise en accusation demande un jury compos6, pour une partie au moins, de personnes parlant la langue de sa d6fense, si cette langue est le frangais ou l'anglais, il sera jug6 par un jury compos6 pour moiti6 au moins des personnes dont les noms se trouvent successivement les premiers sur le tableau et qui lors de leur comparution n'6tant pas 16galement rdcuses seront, d'apris l'opinion de la cour, versdes dans la langue du prdvenu.

Cette disposition 16gale est en pleine vigueur, et il a td jug4 que l'abrogation qu'en a pritendu faire la l6gislature de Quebec par la loi 46 Vict. ch. 16, d6passait la comp6tence de cette 16gislature, le droit criminel et la proc6dure criminelle 6tant du ressort exclusif du parlement canadien.

The Queen v.- Yancey (1). En 1873 la cour d'appel, composde du juge en chef Duval, et des honorables juges Drummond, Badgley, Monk et Taschereau, a jug6, dans la cause de Reg. v. Chamaillard (2):- (2) 18 L.C. Jur. 149. (1) Q.R. 8 Q.B. 252.

That where it discovered after verdict, in a case of felony, where half of the jury were ostensibly sworn as being skilled in the French language (being that the prisoner) that one such half not . skilled in the French language, the trial and verdict are unlawful, null and void, and will be vacated and set aside on a reserved case by Mignault J. the judge in the court below.

En 1897, le juge Wurtele a d6cid6 dans la cause de The Queen v. Shehan (1), que

When the accused asks in the Province Quebec for a mixed jury, it must be granted as a matter of right; the abandonment, by the accused, of the order for a mixed jury is not, however, a matter right, but may be allowed by the judge.

Plus tard, dans la cause de The Queen v. Yancey (2), le m~me juge a d6cid6 que

.

The words "language of the defence," in subsection section 7 of the statute of the Province Canada, 27-28 Vict., ch. which still in force in the Province of Quebec, mean the language of the prisoner, and not the language in which his defence is to be conducted. The privilege the prisoner is to claim a jury composed for one-half at least of jurors speaking or skilled in his language.

Enfin, en 1892, la cour d'appel, compose du juge en chef Sir Alexandre Lacoste, et des juges Blanchet, Hall, Wurtele et Ouimet, a jug6 dans la cause de The King v. Long (3),-que

Where an English-speaking prisoner in the Province of Quebec is represented at his trial by counsel speaking the French language, and no request is made for a translation the testimony of French-speaking witnesses into English, for the benefit of the prisoner, failure to translate as to enable the prisoner to personally understand the evidence is not a limitation of his right to make "full answer and defence" to the charge, and will not invalidate a conviction.

Le juge Wurtele a parl6 au nom de la cour d'appel, et on voit qu'il ne s'agissait pas 1A d'un prochs criminel instruit devant un jury mixte, mais du choix librement accept6 d'un jury compos6 entiarement de personnes de langue frangaise.

Le cas ne se pr6sentait pas sous 1'opetation de la loi 27-28 Vict. ch. 41, et l'opinion du (1) Q.R. Q.B.

Q.R. Q.B. 252. Can. Cr. Cas. 493.

mime juge dans les causes de The Queen v. Shehan (1), et The Queen v. Yancey (2), fait voir la distinction qui existe entre ces espices.

Enfin, je dois mentionner une cause du Manitoba, ou le jury mixte existe 6galement, mais dans 1'esp~ce on ne parait pas avoir proc6d6 devant un jury ainsi compos6.

On a y jug6 (Reg. v. Earl (3)):that try it Revenant maintenant A la disposition de la loi 27- 28 Vict. ch. 41, il est clair que cette disposition serait illusoire si, dans un prochs instruit devant un jury mixte, les t6moignages n'6taient pas traduits du frangais en anglais, et r6ciproquement, et si l'adresse du juge pr6sidant le prochs n'6tait pas faite, du moins quant A ses parties essentielles, dans ces deux langues. Telle a toujours 6t6 la pratique en la province de Qu6bec, et le savant conseil de l'intim6 devant nous, Mtre. Gaboury, en r6ponse A une question que je lui ai pose, a admis que cette pratique 6tait aussi suivie dans le district de Pontiac.

Je suis done d'opinion que le prisonnier qui demande un jury mixte a le droit d'avoir un prochs instruit dans les deux langues, frangaise et anglaise, ce qui comprend bien I'adresse du juge au jury.

On invoque le fait que dans cette cause les jur6s de langue frangaise ont d6clar6 lors de leur assermentation qu'ils comprenaient l'anglais, que lorsque le premier t6moin a timoign6 en anglais, les jur6s de langue frangaise, interrog6s par le juge, ont r6pondu qu'ils avaient compris son t6moignage, que le d6fenseur du prisonnier avait parl6 langlais dans son plaidoyer au jury, et que le prisonnier lui-mime avait rendu son timoignage en anglais.

De 1 on conclut qu'il y a eu acquiescement du prisonnier A l'instruction du prochs dans la langue anglaise.

J'h6siterais beaucoup A conclure du silence du prisonnier, ou m~me du fait qu'il a donn6 son t6moignage en anglais, qu'il a renonce A un droit indubitable qui d6coule de son choix d'un jury mixte, celui de faire instruire son prochs dans les deux langues. Mais puisje dire qu'il y a dans cette cause ce que la question soumise appelle "substantial wrong or miscarriage," sans quoi, aux termes d6 l'article 1019 du Code Criminel, un nouveau proc~s ne peut Atre ordonn6?

Mon honorable coll~gue, M. le juge Brodeur, signale un point tris important de la cause, les d~clarations du prisonnier quant A ses agissements le jour du meurtre, oia uni timoin lui pr~te des paroles diff6rentes selon qu'il rapporte ses paroles en anglais ou en frangais, ce qui semble indiquer que le t6moin ne se rendait pas bien compte du sens de ses expressions quand il parlait une autre langue que la sienne. Cependant en d6cidant s'il y a lieu d'ordonner un nouveau proc~s, nous sommes lies par la disposition formelle de l'article 1019.

On Code Criminel. Il ne suffit pas, en effet, aux termes de cet article, il faut encore que tort Je suis bien d'avis qu'il a 6t6 fait quelque chose de non conforme A la loi pendant le prochs, c'est-A-dire que I'accus6 avait droit A ce que le prochs fct instruit dans les deux langues, et A ce que l'adresse du juge au jury fdt faite ou traduite, au moins dans ses parties essentielles, dans les deux langues, mais puisque le Code Criminel exige en outre que je sois d'opinion qu'ii en est r6sult6 un tort r6el ou un d6ni de justice, je ne puis, dans toutes les circonstances de cette cause, aller jusque

Je dois done, et non sans regret, concourir dans la d6cision de la cour d'appel sur cette premibre question. Je r6pondrai n6gativement. A cette question, car puisque le prisonnier a volontairement donn6 son t6moignage, le juge pouvait faire des commentaires sur ce qu'il avait dit ou omis de dire

J'adh~re pleineinent A ce que mon honorable colligue, M. le juge Anglin, dit de ces commentaires.

Qu'ils aient 6t0 excessifs, je suis tris respectueusement porte A le croire, mais il n'y a pas IA erreur de droit.

Sur ce point done je partage l'opinion de la majorit6 de la cour d'appel.

Je suis d'opinion de renvoyer l'appel.

Appeal dismissed.