Canadian Pacific Rway. Co., v. Albin Idington J

APPEAL from a decision of the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia

The defendant, to secure a debt due by one Holmes to the plaintiff, wrote his name across the back of a promissory note made by Holmes in favour of the plaintiff who afterwards wrote his name under that of defendant.

The note was protested and an action brought against defendant as an indorser. courts below held him liable.

In Robinson v. Mann (6), the respondent's liability on the note was not the issue.

THE CHIEF am of opinion that the unanimous decision of this Court in the case of Robinson v. Mann (1), that under section 56 of the "Bills of Exchange Act," 1890, a person who indorses a promissory note not indorsed by the payee may be liable as an indorsee to the latter, is conclusive in this appeal. I myself was a party to that judgment. It has remained now for many years unquestioned and been accepted throughout Canada as law.

I see no reason for raising any doubt now upon its correctness. J.-It seems to me that the question raised in the appeal herein is decisively concluded by the decision in Robinson v. Mann (1), and therefore that this appeal should be dismissed with costs. J.-This appeal should be dismissed with I concur in the unanimous judgmeit of the court below that it is governed by the decision of this court in Robinson v. Mann (1).

J.-The appellant, intending to become a surety for the maker to the payee, wrote his name across the back of a promissory note.

On precisely similar facts this court in Robinson v. Mann (1), held the defendant liable as an indorser by virtue of section 56 of the "Bills of Exchange Act" of 1890-now section 131 of R.S.C. 1906, ch. 119, made applicable to promissory notes by section 186. That decision has been uniformly accepted as the law of Canada in the provincial courts and by text writers of repute. The respondent makes the following references:- Slater v. Laboree(1); McDonough v. Cook(2); Knechtel Furniture Co. v. Ideal House Furnishers(3); Johnson v. McRae(4), Falconbridg on Banking (2nd ed.) 701; Maclaren on Bills and Notes (2nd ed.) 334. I had occasion shortly after becoming a member of this court to examine with some care how far the doctrine conveniently designated stare decisis should be held to govern it. Stuart v. Bank of Montreal (5), at p. 536. I have had no reason to change the views there expressed. Holding them, this case is for me concluded against the appellant by Robinson v. Mann. I may add that personally I agree with the interpretation there placed on section 56 of the "Bills of Exchange Act" of 1890.

J.-This case is concluded by the decision of this court in Robinson v. Mann (6).

By section 131 of the "Bills of Exchange Act," it is provided that when a person signs a bill otherwise than as a drawer or acceptor, he thereby incurs the liabilities of an indorser to a holder in due course and is subject to all the provisions of the Act respecting indorsers.

This section contains an important addition to the corresponding section of the Imperial Act and it would not be advisable then to follow the British decisions.

In the case of Ayr American Plough Co. v. Wallace decided in 1892 on a promissory note made before the above addition, Sir Henry Strong stated that if the case were under the new law the defendant would have been held liable. This dictum was followed in the Province of Quebec where the doctrine had always existid. (Pothier, Trait6 du change, no. 132, art. 2311 C.C.) and also in some other provinces.

1892 Balcolm v. Phinney (2).

1894 Watson v. Harvey (3).

1895 Fraser v. McLeod (4).

1897 Pegg v. Howlett (5).

The question, as I said before, was finally settled by this court in 1901 in the case of Robinson v. Mann (6), where it was held that the Molsons Bank were holders in due course of a note made payable to their order and which the defendant had indorsed above them and that his indorsement was a form of liability which the "Bills of Exchange Act" had adopted. I do not see any reason why this decision which has been followed should be changed.

The appeal fails and should be dismissed with J.-The point to be decided in this case is a very simple one.

The appellant signed his name across the back of a promissory note whereby one Holmes promised to pay to the respondent $500.00 twelve months after date with interest at 8% per annum as well after as before maturity. He claims to have thus signed the note as security for Holmes.

He now contends that he is not liable as an indorser of the note.

Section 131 of the "Bills of Exchange Act" (R.S.C., ch. 119), which applies to both bills of exchange and promissory notes, states that that In Robinson v. Mann (1), a similar case, it was said by this court, under the authority of section 56 of the "Bills of Exchange Act," 1890, now section 131, that a person who indorses a promissory note not indorsed by the payee may be liable as an indorser to the latter.

The fact that the payee, Scott, when he placed the note in the hands of the Royal Bank for collection, also indorsed the note, and he did so under the signature of the appellant, does not take the case out of the operation of section 131, and I cannot follow the argument of the appellant when he says that the respondent was not a holder in due course, for he clearly was one as the word is defined by section 56. Robinson v. Mann(1), is conclusive authority that the payee can hold as an indorser a person who signs the bill or note otherwise than as a drawer or acceptor. Appeal dismissed with costs. Solicitor for the appellant: Finlay Macdonald.

DEFENDLANT

Nov.10.

ANT)..........................

AND

JAMES SLANEY (PLAINTIFF) .........

RESPONDENT. ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF NOVA SCOTIA. Municipal corporation-Negligence-Care of streets-Duty to repair- Ice on sidewalk.

A municipality under a statutory obligation to keep a street in repair fails to discharge such obligation if ice is allowed to remain on the sidewalk in a condition dangerous to pedestrians, and is liable in damages to a person injured by reason of such condition. APPEAL from a decision of the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia(1), affirming, by an equal division of opinion, the judgment at the trial in favour of the plaintiff.

Municipality of Pictou v. Geldert(2); and see City of Vancouver v. McPhalen(3).

*PRESENT:-Sir Louis Davies C.J. and Idington, Duff, Anglin, Brodeur and Mignault JJ.

(2) [1893] A.C. 524.

As to the duty of the city in regard to the sidewalk Palmr Cty f Toont(1)CITY

OF see Palmer v. City of Toronto(1). See also German v. City of Ottawa (2).

This case is governed by City of Vancouver v. McPhalen(4).

JUSTICE.-Accepting as I do the findings of fact of the trial judge, confirmed as they are by the full court in Nova Scotia, and giving proper weight to the frank admissions of the learned counsel for the city appellant on the argument at bar, I find myself, after giving the facts and admissions much consideration, unable to hold the city not to be liable for the injuries sustained by the plaintiff.

The city's statutory duty to keep the street in repair on which the accident to the plaintiff happened was certainly not discharged by the simple giving of a notice to the "frontager" to remove the frozen slush and ice.

That notice given in pursuance of its by-law was one of the means adopted by the city of having its statutory duty with respect to the streets discharged. Whether neglect on the part of the frontager after such notice to remove the dangerous snow and frozen slush would render him liable to an injured party is quite another question not now before us. But it is clear that the giving of such a notice would not in itself be a discharge of the city's statutory obligation and duty.

The injuries sustained by the plaintiff from the dangerous condition of the sidewalk were, therefore, in my opinion, attributable to the defendant's negligence in not causing the frozen slush to be sanded or otherwise made reasonably safe for pedestrian traffic.

In Ontario the legislature has deemed it necessary for the due protection of cities and municipalities to provide that for injuries which may be sustained by pedestrians and others by reason of ice and snow on their sidewalks they shall only be liable for "gross negligence."

But there is no such provision in the legislation of Nova Scotia.

That provision or limitation upon the city's liability may account for some of the decisions in cases which at first sight may seem at variance with the conclusion I have reached as to the city's liability in this case.

The appeal must be dismissed with costs.

J.--The liability of the appellant rests upon section 249 of the Act incorporating it as a city, which reads as follows: - There might be a doubt arise, from the peculiar wording of the limitations therein, as to whether or not this street in question fell within the definition of the streets in regard to which the duty to keep in repair was imposed; but for the clear admission in the statement of defence relative to paragraphs one, two, and three of the statement of claim.

The said third paragraph alleged that

The facts found by the learned trial judge amply justify the conclusion he reached.

It is now well settled jurisprudence relative to the V, measure of responsibility imposed upon municipalities by legislation providing for their repair of highways I that on such facts as he finds the municipality is liable.

The appeal should, therefore, be dismissed with J.-I concur in the view that section 249 of the Sydney "Corporation Act" gives a right of action to persons who suffer harm in consequence of default in performance of the duty thereby imposed on the municipality to repair certain streets. I think the contention fails that George Street is not one of those streets in respect of which this duty arises. Accepting the construction suggested by Mr. Justice Mellish and urged upon us by counsel for the municipality that the sections confer upon the city council the power of determining by resolution what streets shall be kept in repair and that the statutory duty exists only in relation to such streets-I think there was sufficient evidence to establish a prim 6 facie case that responsibility for repairing George Street had been accepted by the municipality.

City of Victoria v. Patterson(l).

It has repeatedly been decided that natural accuinulations of snow and ice on a highway may amount to disrepair within the meaning of statutes requiring municipalities to keep highways in repair; and counsel for the appellant did not deny that these decisions may legitimately be appealed to as a guide for the construction and application of the statute now before us. There can, I think, be little doubt that the accumulation of ice and snow which occasioned the respondent's injury constituted a serious danger to pedestrians, though proceeding with ordinary care, a condition which amounts to disrepair within the contemplation of the statute.

It is desirable, I think, to add a word of comment upon an argument based upon the supposed necessity of notice to the municipality of the dangerous condition of the street as one of the conditions of liability. The statutory duty is to keep in repair. That does not, of course, involve absolute responsibility for disrepair.

Such provisions, it has been many times held, do not create liability for the consequences of a state of things which has not arisen through the failure of the municipal authority to observe reasonable precautions to prevent it. Jamieson v. Edmonton Hammond v. Vestry of St. Pancras(2); Bateman v. Poplar District Board of Works(3).

But where the disrepair complained of consists in a condition such as that in question here in a frequented street a condition, not to put it moderately, outside the purview of reasonable anticipation in a Nova Scotia winter, then the municipality can only escape responsibility by shewing that the measures taken came up to the standard of reasonableness and this may include a proper system of inspection.

I concur in the opinion of the majority of the court below that the municipality failed to discharge its duty.

J.:-I would dismiss this appeal. I agree with Chisholm, Russell and Ritchie JJ. that the City of Sydney is civilly liable to a person injured through non-repair of streets in respect of which the city charter (s. 249) imposes the obligation to repair where such non-repair is due to inattention to the duty so imposed sufficient to constitute negligence. I accept Mr. Justice Russell's view that

With him also

The facts in evidence establish a condition amounting to disrepair likely to be productive of danger known to the city authorities at all events on the day before the plaintiff met with his accident. It was the duty of the city officials to see to it that that state of affairs was remedied and they had abundant opportunity to do so. The finding of negligence is supported by the evidence.

It follows that there was a breach of statutory duty resulting in an injury to the plaintiff which entailed civil liability on the part of the city.

J.-The only question in this case is whether the appellant municipal corporation has been negligent.

The snow had been permitted to accumulate on the sidewalk at the place where the respondent fell, and the slush which the mild weather had formed was converted into ice as a result of the night frost. The sidewalk became dangerous for pedestrians. City of Sydney is bound by the law to keep in repair all its streets.

That would involve the duty to take reasonable precautions against the streets becoming dangerous by reason of the ice and snow.

I would distinguish this case from Pictou v. Geldert and Sydney v. Bourke(2), because no duty to repair was imposed by the statute then under consideration.

It is not contended at bar that the duty to repair would not cover the removal of the ice and snow on the sidewalk, or the sanding of the sidewalk. As a question of fact, the sidewalk had been sanded some time before; and by a by-law of the city the snow should be removed by the riparian owners.

The question is whether the municipality has discharged its duty in a reasonable manner. That becomes then a question of fact and the concurrent findings of the courts below in that respect should not be disturbed.

J.-On the findings of fa'ct of the learned trial judge that the accident was caused by the slippery condition of the sidewalk; that the appellant was aware of the-condition of the sidewalk and allowed the snow to remain there for some time, when, to the knowledge of the city officials, a lowering of the temperature was very likely to take place and the slush to be frozen over night; that the street in question was one of the principal streets of the city, travelled over by thousands of people by day, or at all events on Sunday; that its condition on the day of the accident could have been prevented, the city having the means to clear the sidewalk and having failed to employ these means; and on the admission of the learned counsel for the appellant that to leave ice on the sidewalk for an unreasonable time would be a lack of repair, an admission which I think he rightfully made-I am of the opinion that the judgment of the learned trial Y 9 judge should not be disturbed.

The statute obliged the city council to repair the streets and it failed to fulfil this obligation and under the circumstances it is liable for the accident.

My. 8, 4

MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA APPELLANTS; AND OTHERS (DEFENDANTS) ........

AND

WILLIAM WILLIAMS AND W.

ON APPEAL FROM THE APPELLATE DIVISION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ALBERTA.

Trade unions-Inducing dismissal of non-unionists threatening strike-Right to damages-Liability of individual members-Practice and procedure-Unincorporated body-Representative action. The respondents, being miners and members of the Local Union appellant, were employed by the Rose-Deer Mining Company. manager of the company, becoming dissatisfied with the actions of the Union, closed the mine down with the object, successful for a time, of destroying the weight of the Union; but he opened it again, and the respondents returned to work, agreeing to the condition not to pay any Union dues.

The respondent Williams then received an anonymous letter calling him a "scab."

The manager of the company having taken the ultimate decision to live at peace with the Union for the security of his own interests, a new Local Union was organized, but both respondents refused twice the invitation to become members until the matter of the letter was "cleared up."

Later on, the manager of the mining company advised the respondents that they would be discharged unless they settled with the Union as he had received notification that the Union would declare a strike if they continued to work. This notification was given by the appellants Young and Stefanucci.

The respondents then applied for membership in the Union, but were refused, though the Union withdrew the objection formally taken to them as co-workmen in the mine. The respondents, having been subsequently discharged took an action against the individual appellants on the ground of conspiracy to injure them by inducing their dismissal and against the Local Union for unlawful intimidation by the threat of a general strike. The Local Union was not incorporated, nor registered under the " Trades Union Act"; and an application was made at the close of the trial to amend the statement of claim by making the individual appellants defendants in their representative capacity, but this was not granted.

Held that, upon the evidence, the respondent's action should be dismissed, except as to the appellants Young and Stefanucci; Idington and Mignault JJ. dissenting; Duff J. would have dismissed the action in toto.

Per Duff J.-The conduct of the appellant Young cannot be construed as intimidation or coercion by "threat" and did not expose him to an action in damages in the absence of the characteristic elements of a criminal conspiracy to injure. Quinn v. Leatham (1901) A.C. No. 1562, 495, discussed.

MINE Per Duff J.-The object of "The Industrial Disputes Act" is to interpose investigation and negotiation with a view to conciliation between the institution of a dispute and the culmination of it in a strike or lockout; but there is nothing illegal (notwithstanding REES. the legislation) in an employer or his workmen deciding to pay no attention to outside advice or decision but to insist upon their or his terms and to enforce them by all legal means and nothing illegal in making this known to the other party to the dispute. Per Anglin and Brodeur JJ.-In the absence of legal evidence that they were present at the meetings where the acts complained of were authorized or that they had otherwise sanctioned them, mere membership in the Local Union would not render the individual appellants personally answerable in damages for. the results of these acts.

Per Anglin, Brodeur and Mignault JJ.-The dismissal of the respondents was the direct and intended outcome of the action of the Local Union's committee, such action amounting to a coercive threat and being therefore an unlawful means taken to interfere with the respondents' engagement, the liability of the Local Union appellant if suable is established, and the delivery of the message of the committee by the appellants Young and Stefanucci to the manager of the mining company, having regard all the circumstances, makes them personally liable towards the respondents.

Per Anglin and Brodeur JJ.-The issue of want of legal entity was sufficiently raised by the explicit denial of the allegation that the Local Union was a body corporate.

Per Anglin and Brodeur JJ.-No action lies against an unincorporated and unregistered body in an action of tort such as the present one. Per Anglin and Brodeur JJ.-The rule of practice by which, when numerous persons have a common interest in the subject matter of an action, one or more of such persons may be sued on behalf of all persons interested, which rule was invoked in support of the application for an order for representation, cannot properly be applied in an action of tort such as the present one without evidence that the individual appellants could fairly be said to be proper representatives. Idington J. contra.

-The Local Union having throughout the litigation acted as if rightly sued, it is too late now to urge the objection of want of legal entity; and per Mignault J., the judgment of the trial judge should not be interfered with on a matter of procedure.

*PRESENT:-Idington, Duff, Anglin, Brodeur and Mignault JJ. court being equally divided, the judgment of the trial judge, Simmons J.(2), and maintaining the respondents', plaintiffs', action.

The material facts of the case and the questions in issue are fully stated in the above head-note and in the judgments now reported.

J. (dissenting).-This appeal is taken jointly by all the defendants, condemned by the formal judgment of the learned trial judge, and maintained on appeal therefrom, by an equal division in the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court for Alberta. The respondents' statement of claim presents several causes of action and prays for relief in more ways than one.

The first of these causes of action as stated, and in respect of which relief was sought, seemed to raise the question of a legal right of each of the respective respondents to become a member of the said Union but nothing has been determned in regard thereto, or raised by this appeal, save indirectly.

The second cause of action is framed as if against half a dozen members of the said Union for conspiracy with each other and other persons to wrongfully, unlawfully and maliciously injure the plaintiffs, now respondents, by depriving them and each of them of their employment and to induce the dismissal of each from the employment of the Rose-Deer Mining Company, Limited, a mining company in Alberta. It is further charged that pursuant to such conspiracy and combination they, by intimidation of the company and threatening to go on strike and tie up the mine, succeeded without lawful reason or excuse in having respondents dismissed and deprived of employment.

There is ample evidence to support these claims against some, at least, of these parties. Hence they should not succeed herein.

Seeing that the money has been paid into court to meet the judgment for damages without regard to any distinction between or amongst these several appellant parties and hence if the judgment appealed against stands against a single one of the defendants the judgment will be satisfied, it seems to me the rest of the appeal becomes somewhat academic.

In deference to the views of others whereby elaborate argument was heard, notwithstanding the admission of the payment thus made, I have examined the various questions presented.

In view of the following several considerations: that the misleading use by the appellant of a seal which presumably would be supposed to indicate a corporate capacity in the Union, and of the fact that no steps were taken to remove such impression, save by a formal denial in the pleadings; that the proceedings for discovery, and examinations for discovery, and indeed the whole trial were each allowed to proceed as if the Union was at least registered and thereby liable to be sued as a corporation, and that the parties defendant all joined in one defence, and no motion at any time to set aside such clearly erroneous proceedings if, as now contended, the Union was not a legal entity, I think the learned trial judge should at once, when asked by counsel for the plaintiffs (now respondents), have allowed the amendment of the pleadings to make them conformable to the case presented by the evidence adduced without objection. Then he should, if the wUAMS defendants (now appellants) so desired, have given them an opportunity to answer the case so made. I J. presume as no objection made to amendment, or claim to adduce further evidence, appellants must have concluded nothing further in way of evidence for defence thereto was available.

Notwithstanding the case of Walker v. Sur(1), relied upon by appellant, I think the action of a representative character will still lie against an unincorporated union, for wrongs such as complained of. That case is easily distinguishable from the numerous other authorities relied upon by the respondents herein. I agree with the view of Lord Macnaghten in the Taff Vale Ry. Co. v. Amalgamated Soc. Ry. Servants (2), at page 438, where he says:and also with what Lord Lindley says in the same case on the same subject.

And I may add that the obvious reason for the qualification of the representative persons chosen is to avoid the possibility of the Union being bound by a collusive action, or by one not properly defended by all the force it might officially choose to bring in its own defence if made a party.

The Union itself having taken part in the defence and being beyond doubt the party actively defending, cannot now be heard to set up such a mere technical objection occasioned by a slip in the pleading.

Surely at this time of day when ,we, sometimes at least, try to get at and grasp the realities instead of the mere formalities, such an objection comes too late.

The party that says it is not a legal entity has had the courage to proceed as if it were, whilst saying it was not.

It strikingly illustrates in doing so the course J. pursued in the circumstances, out of which this action arises, by its refusing on the one hand to admit the respondents as members, though well qualified to become such, and in no way disqualified except by reasons founded on the evidence of highly probable motives on the part of those possessed of obvious hate and malice, being permitted to direct such a course of conduct, and on the other at one and the same time, offering to let them work whilst creating an atmosphere that rendered the doing so an impossibility. I hope our law, begotten of freedom and justice, has not grown so feeble as to tolerate such injustice. It is clear to my mind on the facts presented that such inconsistencies of conduct are attributable only to that malice in law by which the accused representatives of the Union are claimed to have been actuated. Being moved thereby they cannot claim they were simply defending their honest legal rights in what they And if the majority of the members of a union permit even a few of the master spirits to so illegally and improperly dominate the action of their union. then in law the union must suffer the consequences. Added to this the intimidation of a strike which was threatened, regardless of the law as enacted in "The Industrial Disputes Act," sec. 56, was evidently illegal.

The sooner that the mere offence of threatening S 2NION to disregard such a law or any other is understood, the better for all concerned.

I think this appeal should be dismissed with costs. J.-The view of the facts which I accept is that which is very fully and -lucidly explained in the judgment of Stuart J.(1).

Three or four events are of capital importance. The lockout by Tupper in Jan., 1917, with the object, successful for a time, of destroying the weight of the Union; the ultimate decision of Tupper to live at peace with the Union for the security of his own interests and the consequent re-establishment of relations between them; the invitation given twice to the plaintiffs to become members of the Union and their refusal to do so; the application (the first) by the plaintiffs on Dec. 21st, and the answer of Jan. 6th, refusing to accept them as members but withdrawing the objection formally taken to them as co-workmen in the mine. In order to prevent misconception, I ought to state, without passing any opinion upon the extent of the jurisdiction conferred by Rule 20 of the Alberta Rules (I need hardly say that I should hesitate before differing from the united opinion of Lord Macnaghten, Lord Lindley and Lord Dunedin) that this is not in my judgment, a proper case for amendment; and moreover, that in disposing of the appeal we are bound to give effect to the contention that the union is not a suable entity. I should also state explicitly that I concur with the conclusion of Mr. Justice Stuart that there is no evidence against Stefannuci, Gerew, Marcelli, Lorenzo and Kamuckle.

The case as presented in the Supreme Court was a case of conspiracy, it was tried as a case of conspir- Uosu acy and as such it must succeed or fail.

No. 1562, Looking at the course of events broadly and espe- MINE cially noting those just mentioned, the evidence of AMERICA actionable conspiracy seems to be too slight to support WILLIAMS an affirmative finding.

For the principle to be applied it is my habit in Duff J. these cases to resort to the charge of the trial judge in Quinn v. Leathem (Fitzgibbon L.J.)(1):- I told the jury that they had to consider whether the intent and actions of the defendants went beyond the limits which would not be actionable, namely, securing or advancing their own interests or those of their trade by reasonable means, including lawful combination, or whether their acts, as proved, were intended and calculated to injure the plaintiff in his trade through a combination and with a common purpose to prevent the free action of his customers and servants in dealing with him, and with the effect of actually injuring him, as distinguished from the acts legitimately done to secure or advance their own interests. To constitute such a wrongful act for the purpose of this case, I told the jury that they must be satisfied that there had been a conspiracy, a common intention and a combination on the part of the defendants to injure the plaintiff in his business, and that acts must be proved to have been done by which the defendants in furtherance of that intention which had inflicted actual money loss upon the plaintiff in his trade.

This statement of the law received the approval of the Lords of Appeal.

Subject to special legislation contained in the "Industrial Disputes Act, " as to which I shall have something to say presently, the union men were quite entitled to refuse as a body to work with non-union men and to advise their employer of their policy. Tupper appears to have been quite aware of the attitude of the union men and quite willing to take any course necessary to meet their views.

The whole weight of the case lies in the difficulties (1) [1901] A.C. 495 at page 500.

which are said to have been made regarding the reception of the plaintiffs as members of the Union. But the plaintiffs appear to have made no application until the end of December, the result being that the objection to them as miners was withdrawn.

The plaintiffs appear to have been reluctant to regularize themselves and I can see no ground for a finding that an earlier application would not have had the same effect as that of Dec. 21st.

I am quite unable to concur in a finding of intimidation or coercion.

As already mentioned, Tupper had decided upon his course long before the incidents in question arose and I am convinced that Tupper's only concern was to know with certainty the attitude of the men.

His course in consequence of that knowledge cannot fairly be attributed to anything which could properly be described as the imposition of their will upon his but should be ascribed to his deliberate choice of the policy of accepting the Union terms for the sake of peace and in his own interests.

The situation being quite well understood on both sides, I do not perceive the aptness of the description "threat" as applied to the communications made to Tupper.

The truth seems to be that the impulse behind those communications came from the men as a body and that the emissaries who interviewed Tupper were really the agents of the men and that in these communications they were faithfully imparting to Tupper (as he desired them to do) the facts as regards the terms on which the men could be induced to work. No authority so far as I am aware warrants the suggestion that such conduct exposes either the members of the Union as such, or the Union officials as such, to an action in the absence of the characteristic ele-