Dupuy v. Ducondu

title obtained from the Crown to 255 square miles of limits for a sum on bloc of $20,000, the respondents ceded and transferred u.u a9 with warranty against all troubles generally whatsoever" to the DecoxWu appellants, two other limits containing 50 square miles; in the description of the limits given in the deed, the following words are to be found: "Not to interfere with limits granted or to be renewed in view of regulations." The limits were, in 1867, found in fact to interfere with anterior grants made to one H. Held, That the respondents having guaranteed the appellants against all troubles whatsoever, and at the time of such warranty the said 50 miles of limits sold having become, through the negligence of respondent's auteurs, the property of H., the appellants were entitled, pursuant to Art. 1518 C. C., P. Q., to recover the value of the limits from which they had been evicted propor. tionally upon the whole price, and damages to be estimated according to the increased value of said limits at the time of eviction, and also to recover, pursuant to Art. 1515 C. C., for all improvements, but as the evidence as to proportionate value and damages was not satisfactory, it was ordered that the record should be sent back to the court of first instance, and that upon a report to be made by experts to that court on the value of the same at the time of eviction the case be proceeded with as to law and justice may appertain.

Per Henry and Gweynne, J. J., dissenting, That the only reasonable construction which could be put npon the words " with warranty against all troubles generally whatsover " in the deed, must be to limit their application to protecting the assignee of the licenses against all claims to the licenses themselves, as the instruments .

conveying the limits therein described, and not as a guarantee that the assignee of the licenses should enjoy the limits therein described, notwithstanding it should appear that they were interfered with by a prior license. But, assuming a different construction to be correct, there was not sufficient evidence of a breach of the guarantee.

APPEAL from a judgment rendered by the Court of Monk, Ramsay and Cross, 3.3.), confirming ajudgment of the Superior Court, Toliette (Olivier, J.), whereby the action of T. H. Cushing, plaintiff, now represented by appellant, against the respondents, was dismissed. The facts of the case are briefly these: The late Edioard Scallon, of Toliette, lumber merchant, by pro- Vt.] SUPREM mise of sale, dated 10th July, 1858, agreed to sell to Benjamin Peck or his assigns, " a saw mill built of stone, situated on the L'Assomption river, in the second range of township of Keldon, in the parish of St. Charles Borromde, in the said district of Joliette, with its saws, straps, gearing, water power, booms, chains, anchors. "The right of using the road leading from the Queen's highway to said mill.

" Four acres of land bounded as follows: in front by the Queen's highway, in rear by the brink of the hill, on the north side by the road leading from the Queen's highway to the mill, on the south side by the land owned by the seller with the right of passing over the land of the seller along the bank of the river from the mill to the boom.

"All the right and title obtained by seller from the Crown to certain timber limits situated on the banks of L'Assomption river and its tributaries, the Black river and river Ducharme," in all thirteen limits covering an area of 256 square miles, for the sum of $20,000 and other considerations. After Scalion's death, his successors, represented by respondents, in execution of the promise of sale, by notarial deed of the 16th March, 1865, " did cede, transfer and abandon with promise of wharranty against all troubles generally," to the appellant as Peck's assign, the immoveables and rights which the late Edward Scallon had promised to sell to the said Peck, giving the description verbatim as in the promise of sale of the 10th July, 1858.

The sellers by this deed also acknowledged that the $20,000, price of sale of the said limits, had been paid to the said late Edward Scallon in the manner stipulated for in the paper-writing of the 10th July, 1858. They recognized also having received from the said B. D. Peck, his representatives and assigns, the costs of the renewal of all the licenses for said limits dating from 10th July, 1858, ap to the 16th March, 1865. [VOL. Vi. It was, however, afterwards discovered that there was a deficiency of fifty square miles in the extent of the timber limits sold, and thereupon P. E. McConville, as agent for the respondents, for the purpose of making good the above deficiency of fifty miles of timber limits, by another notarial deed dated 22nd October, 1866, " did cede and transfer, with warranty against all troubles generally whatsoever, to the appellant present and accepting thereof, an equal quantity of fifty miles of timber limits on the L'Assomption river, and described as follows in the English language, to wit:

"No 25.

" Commencing at the upper end of 25 square miles ( limit No 94, on. the south west side of L'Assomption river, granted to late Edward Scallon, and extending five miles on said river, and five miles back from its banks, making a limit of twenty-five square miles, not to interfere with limits granted or renewed in virtue of regulations."

" No. 26.

Commencing on the north-east side 25 square miles ( of L'Assomption river, at the upper end of limit No. granted late Edward Scallon, and extending five miles up the river, and five miles from its banks, making a limit of twenty-five square miles, not to interfere with licenses granted or to be renewed in virtue ofregulations." And the licenses for the year 1866, 1867, were handed to Mr. Cushing, and a sum of $500 for all claims whatsoever up to that day was paid by respondents.

With a view to work these 50 miles of limits, and to bring the wood down by the river L'Assomption, the plaintiff in 1867-1868, caused the rocks to be blasted, and the obstructions existing in the river to be removed, and constructed four dams to hold in the water and facilitate the bringing down of the wood from said limits.

But it was found that these limits also interfered VI.i CANA)A.

with limits granted to George B. Hall, and the matter having been referred to the Crown Lands Department, it was ascertained that the limits assigned by ) the last deed of 22nd October, 1866, to appellant by respondents did not exist, and were covered by the licenses previously granted to Mr. Hall as far back as Conformably to the foregoing facts plaintiff (appellant) brought his action and prayed for a condemnat'on against the defendants in the sum of $58,200, leaving them, however, the option of immediately placing him in possession of the quantity of 50 miles of limits, either those sold him by the deeds of 10th July, 1858, and of the 16th March, 1865, or else those above described, and in either case asking condemnation for $8,200 damage only.

The defendant, Dame Clothide Scallon, pleaded separately from the other defendant, but she, as well as the others, set up against the action a defense en fait followed by a peremptory exception.

By the latter plea the defendants allege :

That by the deed of 22nd October, 1866, the plaintiff acknowledged having received from the defendants the licenses for the two timber limits which he pretended then to be deficient upon those sold him by the late Edward Scallon, and the said defendants.

That by the same deed the plaintiff acknowledged having received from the defendants a sum of $500 for all rights and claims whatsoever that he might have had until that time against the defendants by reason of the deeds made by said Edward Scallon, or by the defendants in favor of said plaintiff or his predecessors (auteurs.)

That the parties to the said deed reciprocally and in good faith gave to each other a general acquittance of all claim that might exist on one side or the other. There was a cross -action, but the judgment rendered on the cross-action was not appealed from.

The plaintiff, by his answers to the defendants' per- Dupu emptory exceptions, alleged that it was only in consideration of the cession and abandonment made to him, in full ownership, by defendants of the 50 miles of limits in question, and of the undertaking on their part to secure him in the enjoyment thereof with warranty against all possible disturbance, encroachment or trouble of whatever nature or kind, and upon the payment to him made of the sum of $500, that he consented to grant acquittance of the claims he had against the defendants, the said acquittance relating chiefly to divers claims which the plaintiff had against the defendants for encroachments they had made upon his limits and other properties.

Upon this issue the parties went to proof, and judgment was rendered against the plaintiff dismissing his action, which judgment was confirmed in the Court of Queen's Bench (appeal side.)

The action in this case arises out of an agreement, dated 22nd October, 1866, between T. H. Cushing, appellant's representative and the respondents, by which the latter expressly sold and conveyed to said Cushing, with promise of warranty against all hindrances, 50 miles of limits, Nos. 25 and 26, in lieu of limits 97 and 98 that were wanting in a previous transaction. Cushing only found out in 1868 that he could not get possession of limits 25 and 26, the Government having previously sold them to one Hall, and thereupon this action was commenced against Scallons's estate upon a breach of the express warranty contained in the agreement. The Superior Court and the Court of Appeal- dismissed our action on the ground that the warranty did not extend to these licenses; in other words, that the warranty only meant the seller had the licenses and the buyers stood in his room and place with the Crown.

p'~ I submit that view is erroneous. These licenses are 9' issued under Con. Stat. Can. ch. 23, and under Order in Council August, 1851, licentiates were entitled to renewal perpetually, and the Courts of Quebec have so held.

Watson v. Perkins

Under the code, art. 1592, they are bound to deliver us what is sold to us, and having found Hall in possession they were bound to put us in possession; the burden is upon them to show that Hall had no right to be there.

We say also that, under the departmental regulations, it is provided, if any conflict between adjoining owners arises, it shall be determined in the office, and we say the Commissioner having given his decision against 'us, that was practically an eviction and there was no need on our part to produce Hall's licenses. The bargain was, that they were to give us licenses which would have been renewed frQm year to year, and we complain that they had no such licenses to give us. We have given legal evidence that we could not get possesion as Mr. Hall had been lumbering for ten years on this land. Harper v Charlesworth

As to the obligation of the seller I will cite arts. 1491, 1492, and 1493, 1500, 1505.

See also Tropiong Vente

Now as to the warranty--The respondents, by notarial deed, acknowledge their obligation in the most formal manner to make up the deficit of these fifty miles, and they convey to plaintiff, with express warranty against all hindrances whatsoever, not the licenses simply, but the specific quantity of 50 miles of limits indicated in the licenses set forth in the deed. It can- OF not have been meant to weaken or impair the warranty Dur in the prior part of this deed.

The danger of prior title was one it was quite competent for Scallon's representatives to warrant against, which was legally and appropriately done by just such a warranty clause as was used. Every grant from the Crown, whether of timber limits or of the soil itself, is made subject to the conditions stated in the deed or the statute authorizing it, that in cases of a prior grant, and in other instances also, the grant shall be void; but it could not surely be pretended that the holder of such a title or a person holding a quit claim deed could not be held to the consequences of a sale with warranty, because for the purpose of indicating the property sold, the original title was recited in the deed of sale, especially as in the case in question in this cause, the sale was avowedly made to effectually replace a like quantity which the purchaser had the most undoubted right to have from the vendors, and the warranty stipulated has no meaning unless attaining that object or its legal equivalent.

If the appellant is right, as he believes, in claiming that warranty against non-delivery exists in his favor, this, it seems, is decisive of the case, for the other points mentioned in the judgment and invoked by respondents have no force to prevent reversal of the judgment appealed from.

It is clear that the five hundred dollars cash paid by respondents at the execution of the deed of 22nd October, was in no way meant to stand alone as a sufficient consideration for the deed, if the fifty miles of limits failed, and that the right of appellant to indemnity for failure to convey these fifty miles is unaffected by the payment of said sum, which appears to have been paid as the difference in value between limits Nos. 97 and 98 and Nos. 25 and 26

If it be a fact that the possibility of not getting the limits was foreseen at the execution of the deed of the 22nd October, this is all the more reason why it is covered by the warranty, especially when this was the only thing to which the warranty could apply. See articles 1506, 1507, 1508, 1524, 1511, 1512, 1514, 1515, 1516, 1487, C. C.

Then that there was good cause and consideration for the stipulation fully appears in the deed itself.

These licenses were represented to the -buyer as having been all renewed. Now, it appears that Scallon, instead of renewing all the licenses, put the money in his pocket, and therefore we find his succession recognizing that he was obliged to make them good.

It is in evidence that when the, plaintiff wished to take possession of these limits he found there another person (Hall) who had been in possession of them for a period long prior to the deed of 22nd October, 1866. Was he therefore obliged to take recourse by petitory action against Hall, or had he not the right to take a direct action against the respondents ? It seems to us that this last course was open to him, for he had never had delivery of the limits from defendants according to terms of art. 1493 of the Civil Code. Several witnesses were examined, and all agreed in saying that the greater part of the land comprised in these licenses was covered by prior licenses granted to Hall. If. counsel permits evidence to be gone into, it is too late afterwards to object, and I submit that point was waived.

Then the decision given by the. Commissioner of Crown Lands is binding.

See Kennedy v. Lawlor (1), and in this court Farmer v. Livingstone

Independently of that, we contend the proof of Hall's right of preference to the limits in question is legally proved by the official documents and plans of the Crown Dever Lands Department.

Then it is argued also on the other side, that there is no proof of McConville's agency with power to give this warranty, but they themselves rely on this deed, and it is too late now for them to raise that point here. McConville was a witness for the defence, and there was no dispute as to his power to enter into the deed. As to damages I refer to art. 1511.

Mr. Trenholme followed on behalf of the appellant: The case of Watson v. Perkins (1) clearly establishes that the right and title in timber limits is a real right, and that the same rules apply in cases of sale of timber limits as of immoveable property. Now, this being admitted, can it be said that a man who goes into the market and pays $50,000 for limits, and it turns out there are no limits, is not even entitled at least to a return of the price paid? This brings me to discuss the judgment appealed from.

I will now say that they were bound to give us the deed of 1866.

By the promise of sale in 1858 they sold their right and title; if these words are used it is because they are descriptive of the species of ownership which they had, and does not mean there is any defect in the title, and when the property is specified, the seller is responsible in damages, for when a party sells, he warrants by law that he is the owner of the thing sold, and express warranty covers all defects. See are Duranton Laurent

If it were true that the warranty clause was inserted not by mistake but deliberately; if it were true that Hall had prior licenses, and that Scallon had been guilty of pocketing $800; that plaintiff never had possession, and that all the parties interested had agreed to submit the difficulty to the commissioner, and he had decided against us, we admit we would be bound, and this appeal would have to be allowed. But we deny all these propositions, and we contend that the documents produced show that these assertions are without foundation. The point for decision in this case is whether we have fulfilled our original agreement by which we sold simply our rights to these limits. Now,. in 1865, when it became necessary to fulfil the agreement entered into between Scallon and Peck, instead of following the original agreement of 1858, by which we sold simply our rights to cut timber on 256 miles of timber limits, the notary at the beginning of the deed inserted a general warranty clause which is to be found in all printed forms of notarial deeds of sale. It was evidently a lapsus calami, the intention of the parties clearly to fulfil the promise made in 1858, and nothing more. Peck had bought Scallon's licenses such as they were, at his own peril; all licenses were issued with such reservations under a statute, and under regulations published in the official Gazette of August 16th, 1851.

Peck therefore made the risk his own by bargaining for " all the right and title obtained from the crown to certain timber limits, and also " the right of using and cutting timber on said limits is now given to the full extent which the said Edward Scallon possesses from the crown," and no more. Under such circumstances, and for either of these two reasons, to wit, the knowledge of the danger of eviction and the fact that he bought at his own risk, Peck could not claim back any portion of the price paid for such limits already granted to other parties or covered by former licenses in that wild, unsurveyed and unexplored part of the country, unless there be a positive and clear clause of warranty (1510, 1512, 1523, C. ; and even then he could not claim any, damage at all.

The undertaking by Edward Scallon, to give a good and sufficient deed to Peck on the payment of the price stipulated, had reference only to the mill, and went no further. There is an express stipulation to that effect. There was no occasion to grant a deed for the timber limits, as the licenses were yearly renewed, and in 1855 were renewed in the name of the plaintiff, andwere, together with his possession, the only deeds that could be granted to him and that he required. Scallon transferred to Peck the right he had to the renewal of the licenses, and Peck was to possess all the rights, under such licenses, that Scallon would have had. The licenses for the then current year were sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to a renewal in his own name; and it is not denied, but admitted that he availed himself of this right.

However, on discovering that licenses for Nos. 97 and 98 were missing, the appellants, by deed of 22nd October, 1865, substituted for them Nos. 25 and 26. Now, this deed shows that it was made for the purpose also of giving effect and fulfilling the bargain of 1858 in so far as the timber licenses were concerned. It is stated that, under and by the terms of this bargain, Mr. Scallon had agreed to sell to Mr. Peck 256 miles of timber limits; this declaration can have no further extension than the writing of 1858 will warrant; it simply means therefore that Mr. Scallon had sold and transferred over to Mr. Peck such rights in timber limits intended to cover an extent of 256 miles, as he himself held-under licenses from the Crown, and no more.

As to our pocketing $800, it is not stated or proved that we received the amount, but simply that all dues of the Crown were paid. It was stipulated that Cashing should pay ground rent, but there is no evidence that Cushing ever paid for these two licenses. The plaintiff held at that time licenses from the crown, and was perfectly well aware that they could not avail as against a former grantee; and further, the licenses themselves contained that reservation.

Under such circumstances, he accepted licenses Nos. 25 and 26 at his own risk, and no guarantee of any nature existed on the part of the defendants: art. 1020, 1523, C. 0.; Pothier (1); Troplong (2). A timber limit is something in- its nature more aleatory than a venal office, on account of the uncertainty of its value, and even of its existence, against which the statute and the license itself forewarned the grantee. The statute (R. S. C. ch. 23) enacts that if, by reason of inaccuracies in the surveys, or for any other cause, a license should include lands already granted, the license last in date is of no effect, and no claim shall lie against the crown.

' What the defendants meant to guarantee was not the existence of the limits, but that of the license; all they transferred was the license and the rights that might. accrue under it.

If it were intended that the guarantee should go further, it should have been expressly declared and warranted that the license was the one first issued, that D .

the limits did exist, and that the plaintiff would have the peaceful enjoyment of them. In the absence of such a special guarantee, all the plaintiff can claim is that he shall enjoy the benefit of the licenses just as the defendants would have done.

We see an example of such *a guarantee in 2 Boniface, p. 119, where the seller of a venal office stipulated a guarantee against the suppression of the charge, and was held liable in damages on account of new offices being created.

Also in art, 1577 0. which provides that when a debt or other incorporeal right is sold, and the seller, by a simple clause of warranty, obliges himself for the solvency of the debtor, the warranty applies only to his solvency at the time of .the sale; if there is no clause of warranty, he is only responsible for the existence of the debt.

The learned counsel then reviewed the evidence and contended that the plaintiff had not proved that Hall held licenses covering the territory included in limits 25 and 26.

Let us now examine the plaintiff's other propositions necessary to establish his demand, that the Crown Land Commissioner was the proper authority to decide upon a question of timber limits or berths.

Under the rules and regulations adopted on 8th August, 1851, " in cases of contestation as to the right to berths or the position of bounds, the opinion of the surveyor of licenses at Bytown, or agent for granting licenses elsewhere, is*to be binding on the parties, unless and until reversed by arbitration within three months after notification of such opinion has been communicated to the parties, or their representatives on the premises, or sent to their address, or by decision of court." The licenses for Nos. 25 - and 26 were issued under these regulations, which were revoked and replaced by new regulations only on 13th June, 1866, as appears from official Gazette of 28rd June, 1861, not fyledin-this cause.

By these new regulations, disputes as to berths were to be settled by " the decision of the crown timber agent of the locality, or the inspector of crown timber agencies, or other officer authorized by the commissioner of crown lands." Never was the commissioner or his assistant invested with this supreme authority of deciding upon disputes between grantees of timber limits; practical men are always chosen. But we have only to look at the regulations of 1851 under which both the licenses of Mr. Hall and licenses Nos. 25 and 26 to estate Scallon were issued, and the only persons with that right are the surveyor of licenses at Bytown, or agent for granting licenses elsewhere.

Plaintiff was asked under oath to produce a copy of any claim in writing made by him with the commissioner; he answered that he could not find any copy. The defendants then applied to the crown lands department for a copy of any claim filed by the plaintiff, and the result is the production of a memorandum dated 13th November, 1869, made and signed by plaintiff on behalf of Theophilus Cushing, the then proprietor pro formd of the limits.

All he claims, then, by that memorandum is to be maintained in the possession of Nos. 94, (29), and 96, (30) to the exclusion of Mr. Hall, who advanced pretensions even against a portion of them.

This very im-!ortant fact shows conclusively that the plaintiff did not lose his right to limits Nos. 25 and 26 (of 1866) through a decision of the crown lands commissioner rendered in 1874, as the question was not submitted to him, and plaintiff had virtually given them up in 1869 and even in the fall of 1868, when he gave way without resistance before Mr. Hall's men and V. agents, then in 1869 by this document, and next year by ceasing to renew the licenses.

Art. 1521 0. C. rules the present case.

Finally, supposing it to be true that the whole of Nos. 25 and 26 are covered by licenses issued in 1853 in favor of Mr. Hall, the plaintiff is precluded from claiming a cent from defendants on that ground, because he accepted them, together with $500, in full settlement of all claims whatever against the defeidants; he accepted these licenses 25 and 26 issued in 1866, such as they were, as he had accepted No. 97 and 98 in 1858, such as they were at that time, whether they were prior or posterior to Mr. Hall's.

The present claim is but an attempt to take an advantage of an evident lapsus calami in order to have all the benefits of, and be relieved of, all the risks assumed in a bond fide contract, fairly executed by respondents. As to bad habits of notaries introducing clauses of style. Trolong de la Prescription ; Laurent de Villargue Repertoire (2).

Mr. Trenholme, in reply.

J.:- It is quite clear that the release contained in the deed of the 22nd of October, 1866, does not extend to or in any way affect the warranty contained in that deed in relation to the fifty miles of limits thereby conveyed to the plaintiff; therefore the peremptory exception of defendants must fail, the replication of the plaintiff being a good and sufficient answer.

There is nothing whatever in the evidence or circumstances surrounding this transaction to justify our going behind the deed of 22nd October, 1866. My brother Fournier has made this so manifest in the judgment he is about to deliver, which he has kindly permitted me to peruse, and in which I entirely agree, that it would be waste of time for. me to discuss the question at greater length. Agreeing then, as I do, with the learned Chief Justice of the Queen's Bench that:

on the same principle I am at a loss to conceive' how it can be invoked by the respondents to defeat any rights the appellant may have acquired by the deed of the 22nd October, 1866, or to control or in any way prevent that deed from having its full effect in accordance with the terms and provisions therein contained, by which the rights of both parties must, in my opinion, be governed.

" It is, therefore, " as the the learned Chief Justice says, " under this last deed alone that the appellant can have any claim against the respondents, and any reference to other deeds, and to the obligations of the respondents under those deeds, is only calculated to create confusion, as such reference can have no effect whatsoever on the determination of this case."

By the, deed of 22nd October, 1866, compensation is made to Cushing, assignee of Peck, for the deficit fifty miles of the 250 miles of limits Seallon had, by deed of 6th March, 1865, agreed to sell to plaintiff in these words:

se trouve un d6ficit de cinquante mille pour compl4ter la dite quantit6 do deux cent cinquante six milles c4d6s au dit H. e.

Thdophilus H. Cushing par I'aote de d6p6b, cession et transport du DuooNDU. seize mars mil huit cent soizante et cinq, le dit Sieur McConville RithieC.J.pour et au nom qu'il ag:t, vou'ant compl6ter le d6ficit qui se trouve a, par les pr6sentes, c6d6 et transport4 avec Ia garantie de tous troubles g6n6ralement quelconques au dit M. Thdophilus H. Cashing, ici pr6sent et- acceptant, la dite quantit6 de cinquante mille de limites sur la dite rivibre 'Assomption, et d6sign6e comme suit, en langue anglaise, savoir:

No. 25. 25

Commencing at the upper end limit No. 94 on Square miles the south west side of L'Assomption river, granted to' late Edward Scallon and extending five miles on said river, and five miles back from its banks, making a limit of twenty-five square miles, not to interfere with limits granted or .to be renewed in virtue of regulations.

And for the damages in these words:

De plus, le dit M. Thdophilus Oushing d6clare que le dit M. McConville pour et au nom qu'il agit lui a pr6sentement pay6 Ia somme de cinq cent dollars cours actuel pour toutes r6olamations g6n6ralement quelconques qu'il aurait pu avoir contre la succession du dit feu Edward Scallon et ses repr6sentants l6gaux, d6clarant en outre au moyen des pr6sentes qu'il n'a plus rien A pr6tendre ni r6olamer pour aucunes fins, causes ni raisons contre oes derniers, lui r6sultant soit d'actes ou faits jusqu'd ce jour, leur donnant quittance et d6charge gdn6rale et finale.

And

Et de son o6t0, le dit H. Mc~onville pour et au nom qu'il agit donne au dit M. Thdophilwa H. Cushing et A tous autres qu'il appartiendra quittance g6n6rale et finale, et d6clare en outre pour et au nom qu'il agit, qu'il n'a plus rien A pr6tendre ni r~clamer en aucunes fagons, causes, ni raisons queloonques contre le dit H. TAdophilus H. Gushing, et r6sultant & la dite succession do feu Edward Scallon ses h6ritiers on l6gataires universels sus-nomm6s jusqud cejour, et lui en donne quittance et d6charge g6n6rale et finale, saus quo les pr6sentes ne puissent prAjudicier en aucunes fagons queloonques aux droits et recours quo la succession du dit feu Edward Scallon, ses repr6sentants 16gaux, peuvent exercer contre James Payton, commercant de bois, de township de Rawdn, & raison d'une vente de billots par lui faite an dit feu H. Edward &allon suivant contrat.

It is claimed that the " guarantie de troubles g6n6ralement quelconques " does not guarantee that the licenses were valid and subsisting, conveying to the holder the right purporting to be thereby conveyed, but that the same were to be taken and accepted sub- ject to the proviso in the licenses contained, that they were not to interfere with limits granted or to be renewed in virtue of regulations.

The decision of the Court of Queen's Bench turns upon the assumption that respondents, having obtained licenses from the Crown for the limits in question, and having transferred those limits to the appellant, they have fulfilled their obligation, and that the appellants assumed the risk of any loss which might arise from the existence of a previous license for the same, or any. portion of the same limits, and as to which the .warranty did not extend, and that there was no cause or consideration for the guarantee. This is in truth the main and substantial question in the case, and was so treated by the respondent in his factum.

I think there was a clear case of misinterpretation of the contract.

It seems to me the guarantee is not limited in any such way, and so to read it would make it meaningless; the clause in the license is for the protection of the Crown, the guarantee in the deed is for the protection of the assignee and to prevent his being subjected to the trouble and loss which would result from the limits having been already granted, and therefore subject to be renewed to other parties in virtue of regulations.

If this was not the intent and object for which the guarantee was given, it simply meant nothing, and if licenses, valueless by reason of the ground being already licensed to other parties, could be held as within the contemplation of the parties, how could the deficit be made good, and the object of the parties and of the giving of the deed be accomplished, viz:-" Pour compl6ter la dite quantit6 de deux cent cinquante six milles ?"

DucNM.

It is very clear to my mind that the original quantity c).having fallen short and the parties representing Scallon, being liable and ready to make up the deficiency, as by the giving of the deed of the 22nd October it is clearly admitted they were bound to do, did it by transferring these limits with a. warranty that they were good, valid and subsisting licenses, and if they were not they would guarantee the holders of the licenses against all troubles whatsoever that might thereafter arise, by reason of the insufficiency to convey the right thereby purported to be conveyed.

Without this guarantee, if the licenses should prove ineffective, the deficiency would not be made up as intended; with the guarantee, in such an event, the guarantee would furnish an equivalent, and so the evident intention of all parties that the deficiency should be made up, successfully carried out; therefore, while the respondents did not and could not convey to the appellant an indefeasible title to these timber limits, they undertook to convey such a title as the timber licenses granted by the Crown professed to give, and, in effect, guaranteed that if the licenses did not convey such a title they would indemnify the appellant against any loss which might arise to him by reason of the insufficiency of the licenses; in other words, by their guaranteeing, they assumed the licenses were, at the time of the transfer, in force, entitling the appellant to all the rights and advantages accruing to a license under a valid subsisting license and with which no other person had any right to interfere, that is to say, that they did not when so assigned interfere with limits already granted or to be renewed in virtue of regulations, and that they would guarantee the appellant against any trouble that might arise by reason of any such outstanding or prior right.

Then, again, it is said there is no cause or consideration for this guarantee; but it seems to me the very best cause and consideration appears on the face of the deed itself; the representatives of Scallon discover that they cannot make good the undertaking of Scallon, that he having agreed to sell 250 miles they were fifty short, by reason of which Cushing representing Peck had a claim on them, to settle and dispose of which, it is agreed that they will give Cashing $500 for damages sustained, or difference in value of lots, and fifty miles of other limits in lieu of the deficiency, which they propose to do by transferring two other limits of fifty miles by a good and sufficient title.

To make good this deficiency, it is absolutely necessary that they should have right to those limits, that the licenses they claim the right to transfer should be valid and sufficient to convey the fifty miles, for if not valid and sufficient for that purpose and not conveyed by a good and sufficient title, matters would remain just as they were, the deficiency would not be made up, and without a guarantee of title, Cushing, while relinquishing his claim under the deed of 16th March, 1865, would have no security that he was actually obtaining what they proposed to give in lieu of such claim, viz., fifty miles of limits.

In consideration of Cushing releasing the succession of the late Scallon generally from all claims up to the date of the deed, they agree to pay him $500 damages, and to cede to Cushing, with guarantee against all troubles whatever, the limits in question, by which operation the deficiency is secured to Cushing under the license if good and valid, or under the guarantee should the lease prove valueless. A better cause or consideration for a guarantee I cannot very well conceive. As to I cannot see there was anything of the kind in this case; had the licenses been issued and been good, valid and effectual at the time of transfer, and on the termination the Crown had refused RitoecJ.

to renew them, I can readily understand how, in such a case, respondents should be held to have fulfilled their undertaking, and should be held harmless as to any loss the appellant might make by such refusal. I think it is abundantly clear from the evidence in the case, as well on the part of the defendant as on that of the plaintiffs, that the limits in question were held by Hall, and in his possession at the time of the giving of this guarantee under a prior license, and so the license proposed to be transferred was of no effect and consequently there was a breach of the guarantee.

As to the damages, I think they should be estimated as follows:- The whole purchase money or value of the mill, etc., and all the limits having been $20,000, experts shall ascertain the value of the mill and the land, and deducting the amount from the said $20,000, the balance will be the price of all the limits sold, viz., 250 square miles; a fifth of this balance will be the price paid for the fifty square miles, from which, deducting $500 already paid by respondents as being the difference in value between. the fifty miles which were wanting and the substituted fifty miles, the balance arrived at will be the amount to which plaintiff is entitled to on account of his purchase money, together with interest from 22nd October, 1866; and if the property at the time of eviction has increased in value, then plaintiff would be entitled to recover such increased value in addition to the price paid, of which the experts could be directed to enquire; but the eviction being so soon after the 22nd October, 1866, there would be probably no increase in the value.

And finally, experts to ascertain also the amount expended by plaintiff in improvements, and this Dueur amount, with interest from the date at which it was eipended, being added to the above balance of purchase money - and increased value, if any, shall be the total sum which the plaintiff is entitled to recover, with costs in the different courts.

SToNo, J., concurred in the judgment of Fournier, J. La premisre question 'a examiner et A r6soudre eat de savpir exactement en quoi consiste le contrat intervenu entre les auteurs des parties pour la vente du moulin et des limites qui faisaient l'objet de la promesse de vente du 10 juillet 1868 entre Edward Scallon d'une part et Benjamin D. Peck de l'autre, ainsi que du contrat de vente en date du 16 mars 1865 fait en ex6cution de cette promesse de vente. Est-il Trai, comme le pr6tendent les Intim6s que la vente n'est que du moulin et des quatre acres de terre avec un certain droit de passage, et qu'elle ne comprend aucunement les droits et titres obtenus de la Couronne par le vendeur, aux treize limites 6numfr6es dans la promesse et dans l'acte de vente ? O'est-a-dire qu'aucune partie des $20,000, prix de vente, n'a 6t pay6e comme la consid6ration de la cession de ces limites, lesquelles auraient 6t6 donnbes sans consid6ration i l'acheteur, comme le pr6tend le conseil des Intim6s, -ou bien, cette vente n'est-elle pas au contraire, la vente de plusieurs choses ne formant qu'un tout,-qu'une seule exploitation, comme 1'6tait le moulin en question et lea limites qui fournissaient le bois de commerce n6cessaire & son alimentation ?

La solution de cette question se trouve dans lea termes de la promesse de vente et surtout dans 1'acte de vente qui a d6finitivement fix6 lea droits des parties.

.

Pour appuyer leur pr6tention que les limites de bois Duur ne font pas partie de la vente, et qu'aucune consid6ration n'a 6 fournie pour icelles par 1'acheteur, les intim6s se fondent sur certaines expressions de la promesse de vente,, J qui, si elles 6taient prises seules et sans 6gard aux termes formels de l'acte de vente, pourraient rendre assez plausible leur pr~tention. En effet on y trouve le passage suivant au sujet des limites:

Et cet autre concernant le moulin:

O'est sur les mots " now given " dans la pre mibre citation que les intim6s appuient leur proposition que les limites ont 6t6 donn6es sans consid6ration, et ils invoquent pour la confirmer les expressions qui se trouvent dans la seconde " the above sums as specified for payment of the .*aid mill."

Ce n'est pas en prenant des expressions isol6es que l'on doit interpr6ter un acte; lorsqu'il y a doute sur sa signification, c'est par I'examen de l'ensemble des conventions qu'il contient que 'on doit arriver A connaitre la v6ritable intention des parties. En faisant applica tion de ce principe A la promesse de vente en question, on y d6couvre facilement la nature du contrat des parties. Par cette promesse Edward Scallon , sur paiement de $20,000 s'obligeait de 'vendre (has agreed to sell) A B. D. Peck, non pas seulement le moulin comme le pr6tend les intim6s;mais, comme on le verra par la citation ci-aprbs, quatre diff6rentes propri6t6s: lo d'abord le moulin et ses agrbs, etc, etc.; 2o le droit de se iervir du chemin conduisant du chemin public au moulin; 8o quatre acres de terre y d6sign6s; 4o tout droit et titre qu'il a obtenu de la couronne a certaines limites Duur dans les termes qui suivent:- De me. *

KNOW all men by these presents, that I, EDWARD SCALLON, of Iridustry village, in the district of Joliette, Canada East, stand Jourier, J. bound and obliged to Benjamin D. Peck, Esquire, of Portland, State of Maine, in the full and just sum of thirty thousand dollars. The condition of this obligation is this, that this day I, Edward Scallon have agreed to sell to the said Benjamin D. Peck, or his assigns : A saw mill built of stone, situated on the ILAssomption river, in the second range of Township of Keldon, in the parish of St: Charles Borrom6e, in the said district of Joliette, with its saws, straps, gearing, water power, booms, chains, anchors.

The right of using the road leading from the Queen's jighway to said mill.

Four acres of land bounded as follows: in front by the Queen's highway, in rear by the brink of the hill, on the north side by the road leading from the Queen's highway to the mill, on the south side by the land owned by the seller with the right of passing over the land of the seller along the bank of the river from the mill to the boom.

All the right and title obtained by seller from the Crown to certain timber limits situated on the banks of L'Assomption river and its tributaries, the Black river and river tDucharme as here enumerated and numbered as follows :

No. 94, twenty-five miles situated on the I/Assomption river. No. 96, twenty-five miles situated on the L'Assomption river. No. 97, twentyfive miles situated on the I/Assomption river. No.. 98, twenty-five miles situated on the I/Assomption river. No. 27, twelve miles situated on the Black river.

No. 27J, twelve miles situated on the Black river.

No. 28, twelve miles situated on the Ducharme river.

No. 93, eighteen miles situated on the L'Assomption river. No; 92, twenty-four miles situated on the L'Assomption river. No. 91, eighteen miles situated on the L'Assomption river. No. 90, twenty-four miles situated on the L'Assomption river. No. 132, eighteen miles situated on the Black river.

No. 133, eighteen miles situated on the Black river, being in all Wn area of 256 miles.

La promesse de vente est done d'un ensemble de propri6t6 compos6 de quatre lots diff6rents. L'expreesion de la consid6ration qui suit 1'6num6ration des propri6t6s ne pent laisser aucun doute sur ce sujet: "This bargain is made for and in consideration of the " sum of twenty thousand dollars, five thousand the - ," said seller acknowledged having received, &c." J Les mots " this bargain " ayant rapport A toute la transaction font bien clairement voir que la consid6ration de $20,000 est pour toutes les propri6t6s d6crites et non pas pour une seule en particulier.

Les mots " now given " au sujet des -limites, venant aprbs 1'expression dela consid6ration de $20,000, ne penvent pas signifier " donner " dans le sens d'une donation gratuite, ils signifient dans cette phrase, donner pour la consideration ci-dessus exprim6e. Le mot " donner " doit avoir ici la signification qu'il a dans 1'art. 1472, C.0. d6finissant la vente: " Un contrat par lequel une personne donne une chose A une autre moyennant un prix en argent que la dernisre s'oblige de payer." II faut encore observer que les mots now given ne se rapportent qu'au droit d'entrer en possession des limites et de les exploiter imm6diatement, sans 6gard aux d6lais qui doivent o'6couler pour le paiement du prix de vente avant que 1'acheteur puisse obtenir un titre d6finitif.

en est de m~me de 1'expression " The above sums as specified for payment of the said mill." Le mot mill n'est seul employ6 que pour abr6ger, en 6vitant de r6p6ter l'6num6ration de toutes les propri6t6s, que dans la premisre partie Scallun s'obligeait de vendre et qui sont comprises dans 1'expression de la consideration "This bargain is made, etc., etc."

Si cette interpr6tation n'tait pas bien fond6e, il n'y aurait pas que les limites qui auraient 6t6 donn6es, il y awrait encore le droit de passage et les quatre acres de terre. Une telle interpr6tation serait manifestement contraire L 1'intention des parties.

En effet, pourquoi les limites auraient-t-elles 6t6 donn6es ? Est-ce paice que ce genre de propri~t6 eat sans valeur, ou bien encore, est-ce que les conventions Dews en question font voir de la part de Scallon une intention de faire une lib6ralit6 a Peck ? Ni l'une ni F I'autre de ces suppositions ne sauraient 6tre accept6es pour un seul instant.

Ind6pendamment de la preuve faite en cette cause, il est de notoriet6 publique que les limites ou licences pour exploiter le bois de commerce sur les terres de la couronne ont une grande valeur. s'en vend fr6quemment et pour des prix consid6rables, dbpassant presque toujours la valeur des moulins qui servent A leur exploitation. Dans une vente comme celle dont il s'agit, l'objet principal de la vente 6tait sa.; a doute les limites-le moulin n'6tait qu'un acessoire assez facile i remplacer, tandis que le moulin soul, sans limites, n'aurait eu A pen prbs aucune valeur. Si, aprbs un examen attentif des conditions de la promesse de vente, il pouvait rester encore un doute sur 1'intention des parties, les citations ci-aprbs faites de l'acte de vente le feront bient6t disparaitre.

Comme on l'a deja vu par les termes de la promesse de vente, ce n'est qu'aprbs le paiement entier du prix de vente que Scallon s'obligeait de donner " a good sufficient title." ce que ses repr6sentants out fait en faveur de I'acqu6reur des droits de Peck par l'acte de vente du 16 mars 1865, consenti en ex6cution de la promesse de vente, dans le but de donner a good suYlcient title que Scallon s'6tait engag6 de fournir.

Pour mieux faire ressortir le pen de valeur des argaments des intim6s, concernant la vente des limites, je serai oblig6 de citer d'assez longs extraits de I'acte de vente.

Apr6s 1'6nonciation des qualit6s des parties, et une d6claration do d6p6t de la promesse de vente ci-dessus citbe, 1'acte de vente prochde ainsi :

execution audit aote du dix juillet mil huit cent cinquante-huit, Dr dont d6p6t est ci-dessus fait, elles cdent, transportent et abandon. nent avec promesse de garantir chacun en droit soi, de tous troubles g~n6ralement quelconques, au dit Monsieur Th6ophilus Hamil- Foner, ;.ton Cushing, comme 6tant aux droits et repr6sentant le dit aieur Benjamin D. Peck, i ce pr6sent et acceptant pour et au nom du dit M. Th6ophilus H. Cushing, ES hirs ayant cause et sucOesseurs, le dit Frangois Benjamin Godin, Ecuier. son procureur comme susdit, les immeubles et droits que le dit feu Edward Scallon avait promis et s'6tait oblig6 de vendre dit sieur Benjamin D. Peck, desquels immeubles et droits la d6signation et description est ci-apres donn6e litt6ralement et verbatim et telle qu'elle se trouve en langue anglaise au dit acte du dix juillet mil huit cent cinquante-huit, savoir: Suit la description des propri6t6s vendues exactement dans les mames termes que ceux de la promesse de vente cit6e ci-dessus, et immbdiatement apr~s cette description et l'6num6ration des limites A bois, 1'acte continue ainsi:

Ainsi que le tout se trouvait, comportait et 6tendait de toutes parts circonstances et d6pendances au dix juillet mil huit cent cinquante. huit, 6poque de la promesse de vente faite par le dit feu M. Edward Scallon, au dit Benjamin D. Peck, lexception cependant du bois qui a pu 6tre coupS par ce dernier, ou ses repr6sentants sur lea dites limites depuis la passation du dit acte en dernier lieu mentionn6 jusqu'd ce jour, ainsi que le dit acqu6reur le reconnait et dont et du tout il se d6clare content.

Pour par le dit sieur acqu6reur partie de seconde part jouir, u r faire et disposer do touprdaentement vendu en toute propridtd en vertu des pr6sentes.

Lee dites parties do premi~re part s-qualit6s d6clarent que In somme de vingt mille dollars, cours actuel, prix atipu]6 dans Facte du x juillet mil lhuit cent cinquante-huit pr~cit6, pour lequel le dit feu M. Scallon s'6tait oblig6 de passer titres en bonne et due forme du tout prdeentement vendu an dit Benjamin D. Peck ou repr~sentants aussitat que le paiement int~gral en aurait 6t6 effectu6 suivant les termes portis au dit ate du diz juillet mil huit cent cinquante huit en capital et int~r6t, qu'icelle dite somme aurait 6t6 entibrement et finalement pay6e tant en capital qu'en int~r6ts accrus aur lea divers termes d'6ch6ance stipul6s dans la dite promesse de vente, et en donnent & qui de droit quittance g6n6rale et finale.

En cons6quence, en vertu des pr~sentee, les dites parties de premiare part As.qualitbs mettent et subrogent le dit M. Th6ophilus Hamilton Cushing partie de seconde part en tous drouts, soms, raisons, actions et privilages qui pouvaient r6sulter au dit feu X. Edward Dw Scallon our lea dites limites, et lui ont pr6sentement remis toutes lea dites licences entre lea mains du dit sieur Godin son procureur com. me suadit, ainsi que ce dernier le reconnatit et en donne s-qualit6 Fou-r, J. quittance A qui de droit, except6 celles de mil huit cent cinquantesept et mil huit cent cinquante-huit et celles de mil huit cent cinquante-huit et mil huit cent cinquante-neuf qui n'ont pas 66 d61ivr6es, celles de la pr6sente ann6e n'ont pas 6t0 d6livries n'ayant pas encore 6t6 retirbes du bureau de Pagent des bois de la Couronne pour P'Ottawa inf6rieure, mais lea dites parties de premiere part s'obligent de remettre au dit H. Cushing lea dites licences ou copie d'icelles A leurs frais et d6pens A demande.

Do son cONi, le dit M. Thiophilus H. Cushing par son dit procureur promet et s'oblige de conformer A toutes lea r~gles et r6glements auxquels lea dites limites peuvent 4tre assuj6ties envers le gouvernement do Sa Majest6 en cette province, comme aussi de lui payer tous lea droits qui peuvent 46re dus pour la coupe du bois sur les dites limites.

Au moyen de tout ce que dessus exprim6 lea dites parties de premiare part As-qualit4s ont c6d6 et transport6 au dit M. Th6ophilus H. Cushing partie de seconde part, pour lui sea hoirs et ayant cause, tous droits de propri6t6, fonds. tras fonds, noms, raisons, possession et autre choses g6n6ralement quelconques qu'elles pourraient avoir demander ou pr6tendre en on sur ce que dessus vendu, dont et du tout elles se sont d6mis et dessaisis pour en vitir le dit M. Th6ophilus H. Cushing, sea hoirs et ayant cause, consentant qu'il en soit saisi et mis en possession par et ainsi qu'il appartiendra, constituant A cette fin pour procureur le porteur des pr6sentes lui donnant pouvoir de ce faire ; car ainsi, etc.

Bi la promesse de vente du 10 juillet 1858 ne contient pas une clause de garantie aussi pr6cise que celle de 1'acte de vente ci-dessus cit6, c'est qu'elle ne constituait pas le titre d@REnitif, mais elle contient cependant l'obligation formelle d'accorder cette garantie dans la promesse de donner a good sujcient title aprbs paiement entier du prix de vente. Peut-on dire que les h6ritiers Scallon auraient ex6cut6 cette convention en offrant & Cushing un titre sans. garantie on m~me un titre dont la clause de garantie aurait 6t6 omise ? Non, car il est de principe que 1Q vendeur est tenu de garantir d moins de stipulation contraire-mais il y a plus Dupur dans le cas actuel, la condition de fournir un titre bon et suffisant (a good and sufficient title) contient 1'obli- -gation de donner un titre avec garantie. Un titre sans J.

garantie ne pourrait 6tre consid6r6, d'aprbs la loi de la province de Qudbec, un titre bon et suffisant. C'est ainsi que les h6ritiers Scallon 1'ont compris en ins6rant la clause de garantie ci-dessus, laquelle, au lieu d'6tre un lapsus calami de la part du notaire, eat 6videmment en ex6cution de la promesse de donner un bon titre. 6, La clause de garantie ins6r6e dans cet acte est la clause ordinaire que 1'on trouve dans toutes les ventes s6rieuses et importantes. Elle est d'un usage g~n~ral, et personne, on peut dire, n'aurait 1'id6e, dans la province de Qudbee, d'acheter des propri6t6s de l'importance de celle dont il a'agit sans cette stipulation de garantie. Les intim6s ne pouvant nier avec succs 1'existence de cette clause, essaient d'en restreindre 1'effet A la vente du moulin, mais contrairement A leura pr6tentions, cette clause est g6n6rale et s'applique A toutes les propri6t6s vendues par Scallon. Elle ne contient pas de restriction-elle couvre toutes les propri6t6s en propres .

termes par les expressions suivantes : " Avec promesse " de garantir chacun en droit soi, de tons troubles g~n6- " ralement quelconques, au dit M. T. B. Cushing, etc., "etc., les immeubles et droits que le dit feu Edward " Scallon avait promis et s'6tait oblig6 de vendre au dit " sieur Benjamins D. Pack, desquels immeubles et droits " la d6signation est ci-apr6s donn6e litt6ralement et ver- " batim et telle qu'elle se trouve en langue anglaise au " dit acts du 10 juillet 1858, savoir, etc , etc." Cette r6f6rence A la description contenue dans la promesse de vente, ind6pendamment de la g6n6ralit6 des termes, fait bien voir que la garantie devait s'appliquer aux licenses ou permis de coupe de bois, comme aux autres immeubles vendus.

En examinant lea termes de la promesse de vente, j'ai dit que l'obligation de vendre embrassait comme un ' tout les diverses propri6t6s y d6crites. L'acte de vente D * rend 6vidente cette interpr6tation, en ne r6f6rant A ces Founer, propri6t6s que comme un tout. Apr~s leur description, il est d6clar6 que la vente en eat faite, ainsi que le teut se trouvait et comportait et 6tendait, etc., etc.

en eat de mome de la clause de saisine qui est en ces termes : " Pour par le dit sieur acqu6reur partie de seconde part, jouir, user, faire et disposer du tout pr6sentement vendu en toute propri6t6 en vertu des pr6sentes." On retrouve encore la m6me qualification dans la clause portant quittance du prix de $20,000, " pour lequel le dit feu sieur Scallon s'6tait oblig6 de passer titres en bonne et due forme du tout pr6sentement vendu, etc., etc." S'il fallait ajouter encore & cette d6monstration, on pourrait recourir & 1'acte du 22 octobre 1866, qui contient encore dans lea termes lea plus clairs et les plus positifa l'admission que la vente a 6t0 faite avec garantie de tous troubles des immeubles et droits que feu Edward Scallon s'6tait oblig6 de vendre. II faut done conclure de tout cela que la vente a t6 faite de toutes lea propri6t6s en question comme un tout et pour une seule consid6ration, $20,000.

S'il existait r6ellement quelque diff6rence importante entre lea conventions de la promesse et 1'ex6cution de la vente, n'est-ce pas le dernier acte qui doit lea r6gler. Le contrat entre les parties n'est devenu parfait et d6finitif que par ce dernier acte. C'est lui qui contient leure vritables conventions; s'il y a eu quelque d6rogation, ce que je n'admets pas, c'est du consentement des deux parties. S'il y avait en erreur, on aurait sans doute attaqu6 1'acte pour cette cause. Cela n'a pas 6t6 fait, lea conventions contenues dans l'acte de vente restent entibres. L'obligation de livrer 266 milles de limites n'ayant pu recevoir son exz6cution parce qu'il s'est trouv6 un d6ficit de 50 milles pour compl6ter la quantit6 convenue, I'acte en dernier lieu Duruy cit6 a 6t6 pass6 entre les m6mes parties dans le but ap6cial de combler le d6ficit. Par cet acte les intim6a out cdd et transporld, avec la garantie de tous troubles g6n6ralement quelconques au dit L.

Les licenses de ces limites pour les ann6es 1866-7 furent alors remises au dit Cushing, pour par lui le dit M. Cushing, ses hoirs ayant cause et successeurs, jouir, faire et disposer du tout comme bon lui semblera, d'exploiter et couper du bois dans et sur les dites 1imites-A la charge de se conformer en tout aux r6gles et r~glements auxquels les dites limites peuvent 6tre assuj6ties envers le gouvernement de Sa Majest6 en cette province, comme aussi de lui payer tous les droits qui peuvent Atre dus pour la coupe du bois sur les dites limites. La preuve fait voir que le deficit qu'il s'agissait de combler par cet acte provenait de ce qu'une partie des limites en premier lieu c6d6es se trou-rait alors sujette aux droits ant6rieurs de G. B. Hall, comme premier concessionnaire. Malheureusement il en a 6t6 de mome pour les limites c6d6es en second lieu.

s'agit maintenant de d6terminer '6tendue de la garantie des intim6s en vertu du dernier acte. C'est avec connaissance parfaite de la cause qui avait amen6 Duruy le d6ficit, et dans le but 6vident de se garder contre une semblable 6ventualit6 qu'a 6t6 faite la deuxisme cession. . La garantie stipul6e devait donc, dans 1'esprit des parties, porter sur cette cause d'6viction. O'est sans doute pour cette raison que la clause qui la contient eat si g6n6rale et si absolue.

Les intim6s pr6tendent cependant qu'elle ne Pest pas, qu'au contraire, elle contient plusieurs restrictions, la 16re que les limites en second lieu c6d6es n'interviendront pas avec d'autrea limites d6ja c~dbes ou qui peuvent tre renouvel6es en vertu des r6glements ; la 2ibme que cette cession est faite, comme la 16re, " A la charge de se conformer en tout aux ragles et riglements auxquels les dites limites peuvent itre assidties." Quant & la 16re restriction, celle prot6geant la Couronne contre les consequences d'une concession ant6rieure, il est clair qu'elle ne se trouve pas dans la clause de garantie, c'est dans la description de la limite qu'elle est ins6rbe, et, en faveur de la Couronne seulement. Les intim6s n'ont pas fait de cette r6serve de la Couronne une restriction A leur garantie, elle ne se trouve mentionn6e que dans la description de la proprith c~d6e, et ne peut, cons~quemment, aucunement affecter leur convention de garantie qui a pour but pr~cisement de couvrir ce danger. Si, d'un c6t6 on peut dire a Pappelant que dans tous les cas, il 6tait averti par les termes de la license de la cause probable d'#viction, de l'autre, il peut r6pondre que c'est contre ce danger pr6vu, et dont il avait d6ja t la victime, . qu'il s'est pr6muni par la clause de garantie.

Pour 6viter les cons6quences de cette garan tie, les intim6s pr6tendent encore assimiler leffet de cette r6serve en faveur de la Couronne a une 6viction pour cause de force majeare ou fait du prince.

Cette pr6tention n'est aucunement fond6e, car en loi, on ne doit consid6rer le fait du prince comme un cas fortuit et une force majeure que lorsque personne ne peut le pr6voir ni 1'empecher. Certes, ce n'est pas le cas actuel, car nonseulement le fait 6tait pr6vu, mais il 6tait dbj& ac-ompli au moment de la cession.

Rien n'6tait plus facile pour les intim6s que-de s'en assurer, puisque c'est par le fait de leur auteur Scallon que la priorit6 du titre qu'il avait sur Hall a 6t6 perdue. Si on ne peut pas assimiler le cas actuel au fait du souverain, les intim6s auraient encore bien moins raison de pr6tendre que ce pr6tendu fait du souverain, pr6vm et m6me accompli, ne pouvait pas en loi faire le sujet de la garantie. La jurisprudence 6tablit le contraire, comme on peut s'en assurer en r6f6rant R4p. de Merlin. Vo. "F ait du souverain."

Si la garantie n'avait pas lieu dans le cas actuel, il faudrait contrairement A cette autorit6 conclure que 'on ne pent pas 16galement stipuler la garantie contre le fait du souverain. Ce qui serait une erreur 6vidente.

L'viction dont Cushing a 6t la victime n'a 6t6 amen6e par aucune infraction aux obligations que lui imposaient ces r6gles et r~glements auxquels il devait se soumettre.

Elle n'a 6t6 caus6e que par la n6gligence de Scallon A faire r6gulibrement ses renouvellements de licences.

Cette n6gligence ayant pour consquence de permettre aux licences de Hall de prendre effet, il s'en est suivi devant l'assistant commissaire des terres et ses employ6s, conform6ment A la loi, et aux r~glements du d6partement, les proc6d6s qui ont eu pour r6sultat 1'6viction de Cushing.

Les intimbs soutiennent qu'ils ne peuvent Atre tenus responsables des cons~quences de cette 6viction, parce que Cushing ne les a ni notifies ni mis en cause pour le d6fendre. S'il se fdit agi d'une action devant les tribqnaux au lieu de proc6d6s administratife, lea intim6s pourraient sans doute se plaindre de n'avoir pas "t6 appel6s en garantie dans lea d6lais voulus. Mais il est v' clair que lea proc6d6s du code de proc6dure ne pouvaient s'appliquer A la d6cision de questions unique- Fourner, J. ment de la comp6tence du d~partemement des terres. D'aprbs lea lois et rbglements concernant ces sortes de contestations, le D6partement n'avait A d6cider que sur lea pr6tentions respectives de Hall et de Cushing. Ces lois et r~glements n'6tablissent aucun mode de faire intervenir on mettre en cause dans ces proc6d6s d'autres parties pouvant y avoir des intbrats. En n'appelant pas lea intim6s en garantie dans ces proc6d6s, Cushing ne a'est done rendu coupable d'aucune n6gligence qui puisse compromettre sa position.

Tout au plus, tombe-t-il sous 1'effet de 1'art. 1520. C. C. " La garantie pour cause d'6viction cease loraque " l'acheteur. n'appelle pas en garantie son vendeur dans " lea d6lais prescrits par le code de proc6dure civile, si " celui-ci prouve qu'il existait des moyens suffisants " pour faire rejeter la demande en 6viction."

Les intim6s n'ont pas fait cette d6fense pour la raison 6vidente qu'il n'y avait aucun moyen d'empecher 1'% viction de Cushing, r6sultant de la n6gligence de Scal- Ion A renouveler sea licences, et du fait qu'il avait vendu avec garantie des limites qui avaient cess6 de lui appartenir au temps m6me de la vente.

La deuxi6me restriction consistant dans l'obligation de se confdrmer aux rAgles et r~glements du d6partement des terres ne porte que sur la manibre d'exercer lea droits conffr6s en vertu de la licence. II n'y a aucune plainte A ce sujet contre Cushing, et c'est, comme on 1'a vu plus haut, pour une autre cause que l'6viction a en lieu.

Les motifs ci-dessus expos6s m'am~nent i la conclusion que 1'acte de cession du 22 octobre 1866 contient une garantie expresse contre le danger d'une seconde 6viction pour cause de priorit6 de titre.

En outre de Ia question de garantie, il y en a plu- F e J. sieurs autres qui out d6cidbes par le jugement de sla Cour Sup6rieure, mais sur lesquelles la Cour du Banc de la Reine n'a point exprim6 d'opinion. L'opinion de cette cour sur la question de garantie rendait inutile une d6cision sur lea autres points. La majorit6 de cette cour adoptant une conclusion diff6rente, on doit s'assurer si, malgre son droit A une garantie, 1'appelant n'a pas failli dans la preuve de faits essentiels au succ~s de sa cause.

Un des consid~rants du jugement est que d'aprbs Particle 1204 du Code Civil du Bas-Canada, la preuve offerte doit 6tre la meilleure dont le cas, par as nature, soit susceptible, et qu'une preuve secondaire ou inf& rieure ne peut 6tre reque A moins qu'au pr6alable il n'apparaisse que la preuve originaire on la meilleure ne peut Atre fournie, et que Particle 14 du dit Code Civil frappe de nullit6 ce qui est fait en contravention d'une loi prohibitive.

Ces propositions de droit sont sans doute bien fond6es. Mais la preuve faite en cette cause donne-t-elle lieu A leur application ? Il efit, sans doute, 6t mieux de produire les licences de Hall que d'en faire la preuve par d'autres documents. Cette preuve consiste dans les exhibits No. 14 et D, produits A l'enqu~te et dans les plans des lieux provenant du d6partement des terres.

Cette preuve ne laisse aucun doute sur Ia priorit6 des licences de Hall. Est-il vrai de dire que ces documents ne font qu'une preuve secondaire on inf6rieure ? Ce serait le cas, si par plusieurs tetes de nos lois ils n'6taient d6clar6s la meilleure preuve que l'on puisse faire, celle qui r6sulte de la production de documents, rev6tus du caractbre de 1'authenticit6. Un acto authentique pass6 devant notaire a-t-il plus de force probante qu'un autre acte auquel la loi accorde 6galeinent I'authenticit6.

Y a-t-il des degr6s dans la force proban te des actes d6clar6s authentiques par le code civil on par un statut ? Certainement non. font tons pleine foi de leur contenu au m6me degr6. Les exhibits cit6s, 6tabhssant l'existence des limites de Hall sont de la cat6gorie de ceux que Particle 1207 C.C., d6clare authentiques et faisant preuve de leur conten.

Un des paragraphes de cet article s'exprime ainsi: " Les archives, r6gistres, journaux et documents "publics des divers d6partements du gouvernement "ex6cutif et -du parlement de cette province."

La 82e Vict., chap. 10, (stat. de Qudbec, 1869) bontient les dispositions suivantes sur le m~me sujet, s.-s. 2, " les archives, registres, journaux et documents pu- "blics des divers d6partements du gouvernement ex&cutifs de cette province;-s.-s. 3, les copies et extraits "officiels des livres et documents et 6crits ci-desas men- "tionn6s, les certificats et tons les autres 6crits qui peu- "vent 4tre compris dans le sens 16gal de la pr6sente sec- "tion quoique non 6num6res."

Ces autorit6s font voir que la legalit6 de la preuve de 1'existence des limites do Hall est 6tabli par le Code Civil aussi bien que par les statuts. Cola doit certainement suffire, Un autre motif de cejugement est que le demandeur (appelant) n'avait pas le droit de soumettre & une d6cision A 1'amiable la verification des lignes de divisions des limites en question.

Ce consid6rant ne me parait pas mieux fond6 que le pr6c6dent.

Cushing troubl6, comme il 1'6tait par Hall, dans son exploitation qu'il fut forc6 d'abandonner, devait-il croiser les bras ? On me f6pondra peut-6tre que non, mais on dira avec les intim6s qu'il ne s'est pas adress6 au tribunal qui avait juridiction dans une contestation de ce genre, savoir, celui de l'inspecteur des licences A By town (Ottawa) en vertu des 16me et 17me articles des r~glements du dbpartement des terres, en date du 8 Dupy aofit 185 1. Cette objection serait s6rieuse si la loi n'avait pas modifi6 ces r~glements en donnant au Commissaire et A 1'Assistant Commissaire des terres les pou- Fournier, J. voirs les plus amples pour la d6cision de ces sortes de contestations. L'appelant avait le choix de deux tribunaux, celui de l'Inspecteur des licences ou celui du Commissaire ou de son assistant. Les deux lai 6taient ouverts.

Peut-on lui reprocher de s'8tre adress6, comme il 'a fait, 4 la plus haute autorit6.

avait indubitablement, comme on le verra par la citation ci-aprs, la facult6 de s'adresser an d6partement des terres dont le Commissaire et son assistant avaient tons les pouvoirs n6cessaires pour adjuger sur cette contestation. La 86me Vict., ch. 8, sec. 1, s.s. 1, contient la disposition suivante sur le sujet.

Cette section ne laisse certainement aucun doute sur la comp6tence de l'assistant commissaire & prononcer sa d6cision sur la r6clamation qui lui a 6t6 soumise par Cushing.

Du fait que la dur~e des licences ne doit tre que du ler juin au 30 arril de chaque ann6e, et que I'ann6e 1866 s'est 6coul6e sans que Cushing ait 6prouv6 aucun trouble, 1'lonorable juge de la Cour Sup6rieure en a VOL. Vt.] SUPREME COURT OP CANADA.

tir6 la conclusion que los d6fendeurs avaient satisfait & leur obligation.

Mais on ne pent en arriver 1& qu'en oubliant qu'au moment de la cession du 22 octobre . les repr6sentants de Scallon c6daient des droits qu'ils n'avaient plus. De plus, ils s'6taient oblig6s de J. ceder une licence contenant la condition de pouvoir tre renouvel6e en se conformant aux r~gles du d6partement des terres. Ces renouvellements sont la volont6 du concessionnaire, licenciate. II est i pen pros sans exemple qu'an concessionnaire qui n'a contrevenu i aucune de sea obligations se soit vu refuser un renouve'lement. Cette tenure, quoique en apparence trbs prcaiTe d6pend en r6alit6, pour sa dur6e, de la volout6 du concessionnaire. Il est de notorit6 publique que les marchands de bois ont toujours conserv6 A volont6 leurs limites en d6pit de cette pr6carit6 qui semble n'avoir 6t6 impos6e que comme un moyen puissant de forcer les concessionnaires d'6tre exacts dans le paiement des droits de la couronne. En c6dant une licence qui ne pouvait pas tre renouvel6e pour la raison qu'elle appartenait ' Hall, les intim6s ne remplissaient done pas leur obligation. Il est vrai que c'est aprbs avoir pris lui-meme les renouvellements des licences c6d6es que Cushing a 6t6 troubl6 par Hall, mais ce trouble n'a pu avoir lieu que parce que les renouvellements se trouvaient sans effet, en cons6quence de la violation de 1'obligation de c6der des licenses ' des limites sur lesquelles personne n'aurait de priorit6 de titre. Si Cushing n'a pu faire de renouvellements effectifs, c'est en cons6quence de l'insuffisance de son titre, et c'est aux h6ritiers Scallon A r6pondre des cona6quences en vertu de leur garantie.

Enfin, 1'honorable juge a admis un autre moyen invoqu6 par les intimbs. C'est ceui tir6 du d6faut de production des procurations autorisant Mc Conville, & agir comme procureur des parties qu'il repr6sentait aux divers actes cit6s dans la declaration et notamment Duerr celui du 22 octobre 1866. C'est sans doute un moyen 1r6s rigoureux-si surtout 1'on considare que ces m6mes actes sont invoqu6s par les Intim6s dans leur exception p6remptoire. Mais il est vrai qu'ils ont eu le soin d'accompagner cette exception d'une d6fense au fonds en fait g6n6rale-ce qui aurait n~cessit6 la production des diverses procurations si les intim6s eussent persist6 jusqu'd la fin dans leurs d6n6gations. Mais dans leurs r6pliques aux r6ponses du demandeur i leur exception p6remptoire en droit perp6tuelle, les intim6s ayant invoqu6 eux-memes 1'acte du 22 octobre 1866, sans cette fois 1'accompagner de la d6fense au fonds en fait, ils doivent 6tre consid6r6s comme *s'6tant d6partis de leur injuste d6n6gation. Cette r6plique contient une admission de l'acte du 22 octobre 1866 qui rend inutile la production des procurations. En bonne proc6dure iI 6tait du devoir des intim6s de renouveler leurs d6n6gations on de d6clarer qu'ils persistaient dans celles qu'ils avaient deja faites,-par cette omission ils ont r6par6 celle commise par le demandeur en ne produisant pas ces procurations. Aucune des objections que je viens de passer en revue ne formant d'obstacle s6rieux contre la demande de 1'appelant, je suis venui la conclusion qu'en cons6quence de 1'6viction que Cushing a soufferte il y a lieu 9 des dommages et int6rets conform6ment & 1'art. 1518, c'est-A-dire que 'appelant a droit de r6clamer des intim6s : lo. La valeur des limites dont il a 6 6vinc6, proportionnellement au prix total de $20,000. 2o. Les sommes d6pens6es dans les ann6es 67-68 pour le nettoyage de la rivibre afin d'y faire flotter le bois de commerce, aussi celles employ6es i la construction de chemins et de maisons et 6curies necessaires A I'exploitation des dites limites. II aurait aussi droit & l'accroissement de valeur que pouvaient avoir les dites VOL. Vt.] SUPREME COURT OF CANADA.

limites en 1868, 6poque i laquelle Cushing en a 6t 6vinc6 de fait.

Pour arriver a la d6termination exacte du montant des dommages et int6r~ts il manque dans la preuve un 616ment indispensable, c'est la valeur des limites en question proportionnellement au prix total de vente qui 6tait de $20,000.

C'est cette proportion du prix de vente qui devait 6tre accord6e A l'appelant, l'augmentation de valeur, plus lea sommes ci-dessus mentionn6es, dbpens6es en travaux d'am6liorations. Pour 6tablir cette proportion je suis d'avis que la cause devrait 6tre renvoy6e A la cour inf6rieure, etc., etc., pour y 6tre proc6d6 par experts, etc., etc., pour constater cette proportion.

J.

I have not prepared a written judgment in this case, as my brother Gwynne favored me with the reading of a lengthy one prepared by him some time ago, and which embraces my views on the several points to which it refers. I may add, however, that admitting the respondents are liable under the covenant, the appellant is not entitled to recover for several reasons:

1st. He has shown no eviction. The purchaser went into full possession of all the lands and premises he purchased, made roads through the "limits " and cut a number of logs which he voluntarily abandoned to a party who claimed the land on which they had been out without, as I can see, any reason whatever. He therefore, by his own act, gave up possession and the right to the limits now in dispute.

2nd. It is admitted that the limits sold and covenanted for covered the lands originally, and the evidence, to my mind, shows that if the right to the limits was subsequently lost or interfered with, it was a loss for which the purchaser was liable, and not the covenantor. 3rd. No title was shown to the locus by Hall, who air claimed under the adverse licenses. They were not produced on the trial, nor their contents shown, nor was any survey of them shown. It was not, therefore, shown Jthat they touched or included any part of the locus. It is, on the other hand, shown by the evidence, that even had they been put in evidence the rights under them would have been restricted to the one side of the height of ground between two rivers, while the locus was on the other. I think the decision of the assistant commissioner of crown lands-not having been made under the proceedings provided by the statute-is not binding on the respondents who got no notice of the proceedings before him, and were no parties to them. I concur, then, in the judgment to which I before referred, and think the appeal should be dismissed with costs. J. :- With great deference to my learned brothers, with whom I am unable to agree, I must say, that in the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench, Montreal, in appeal, as well as in that rendered by the learned judge of the Superior Court of the district of Joliette, before whom the case was originally tried, I entirely concur. If I am in error in the view which I take, it is at least a satisfaction to me to be in such good company. By the deed of the 10th July, 1858, after reciting therein an agreement made by Edward Scallon to sell to Benjamin D. Peck, or his assigns. a saw mill built of stone, and four acres of land annexed thereto, together with all the straps, gearing, water-power, booms, chains and anchors to the mill belonging and the right of using a road leading from the Queen's highway to the mill; and all the right and title obtained by Scallon from the crown to certain timber limits situate on the banks of the River l'Assomption and its tributaries, the Black River and the River Ducharme particularly enumerated by numbers, among which were Nos. 97 and 98 (stated as covering each miles on the river l'Assomption), and being in all 13, and stated as covering an area of *. 256 miles, at and for the price or sum of $20,000, of which $5,000 was acknowledged by the deed to have J. been then paid, and the balance was made payable in five annual instalments of $3,000 each, with interest, Scallon bound himself in the penal sum of $80.000, with a condition thereunder written, that if, upon payment of the above sums as specified for payment of the said mill, the said Edward Scallon should give a good and sufficient deed of the above mill, then the said bond or obligation should be null and void. The deed also contained the following clause: " The right of using and cutting timber on said limits is now given to the full extent which the said Edward Scallon possesses from the crown."

As to these licenses it was also by the deed agreed that they should be renewed in the name of Scllon, and that the cost and expenses of such renewals should be paid by Peck as well as the moneys which should accrue to the crown for the limits and for timber duty to be cut on the limits, and that Peck should conform to the regulations of the Crown Land Department, and that after the last instalment of the $20,000 should be paid, the licenses might be taken out in the name of the purchaser.

Now, by this deed it appears that all the title Scallon agreed to give for the timber limits mentioned therein, including -hose numbered 97 and was such title as he had ane no more: and that title he did give; all his title to those limits passed by the deed. The vendee, however, by the deed agreed that the renewals to be taken out for them, which were to be taken annually, should be taken out and paid for by the vendee inScallon's name until the last instalment of the $20,00 should be paid, when the vendee might procure their issue in his own name. These numbers 97 and 98, it may be here ay remarked, covered the following limits: namely, 97, ten miles in length up the river l'Assomption, measuring Jfrom the upper boundary line of No. 94, and on the left bank as you ascend the river and extending to a line back 2* miles from and parallel with the river; and 98, the like length up the river, measuring from the upper boundary line of No. 96, which is a continuation of the upper boundary line of limit No. 94, and extending 2J miles from the river on its right bank as you ascend it. For the protection of his own rights, the onus lay upon the vendee to see to the renewal of those licenses which he undertook to do in Scallon's name, whose only interest was to see that they should be renewed by the vendee in his (Scallon's) name, as security to the latter until his last instalment of the $20,000 should be paid. The agreement itself vested in Peck all Scallon's title to those timber limits which was all in relation to them that he had sold or agreed to sell.

Why Peck and his assigns did not, if they did not, enjoy the benefit of those limits numbered 97 and 98, or why renewals of them were not issued from year to year, does not clearly appear. The onus of taking what proceedings might be necessary to procure the renewals, lay upon Peck and his assignees.

It was alleged by the plaintiffs, but I see no proof of the allegation, that Peck and his assigns paid yearly the moneys payable for their renewal to Scallon who neglected to renew Nos. 97 and 98, and appropriated to his own use the moneys paid to him to be applied for their renewal amounting to $800.

The only evidence which the plaintiffs offered in support of this allegation, is a passage referred to by them in a deed dated the 16th March, 1865, executed by the plaintiffs and the heirs of Scallon, who was then dead, which does not support the allegation. The deed at the place referred to declares that the whole $20,000 had been paid, and further, that the cost of the renewal of the timber licenses transferred to Peck by the deed of 1858 had been paid by Peck and his assigns, and that those licenses had been renewed each year in the J. name of Scallon as had been undertaken by Peck. This passage is obviously no proof of the allegation that Peck or his assigns had paid the moneys for renewal of the licenses to Scallon; the passage simply amounts to a declaration or admission by the parties to that deed that Peck and his assigns had, at their own cost and charges, renewed the licenses in Scallon's name, as in the terms of the deed of 1858, it was their duty to do.

The plaintiffs also offered evidence which was objected to as not the best evidence procurable upon the point-that by the books of the department in the possession of a witness named Bell, but which books were not produced, it appeared that for the year 1858, or any subsequent year, no renewal had been obtained for Nos. 97 or 98. This evidence was objected to upon the ground that if this appeared by books in the department, these books should have been produced to enable the parties sought to be affected by such entry to see if it, in truth, were so, and if so to examine the parties making the entries as to their correctness, and in explanation of the cause of. the non-renewal; but assuming the fact to be as suggested, that at the time of the execution of the deed of 1858 Scallon had not renewed his licenses for the limits 97 and 98 for that year, it appears by the regulations of the department put in evidence that he had still the right to do so, and that he transferred such right to Peck, who could have procured the renewal of the licenses for those limits to be issued in right of Scallon for 1858, and each subsequent year, if non-payment of the license fees was 470'

SUPREME COURT OF CANADA.

[VOL. VI. all that stood in the way of their being issu-3d, for it is Duu not alleged or pretended that in consequence .f Scallon's D .

omission to renew in 1858, his right to renew was lost by reason of a subsequent grant of the same limits by the J. Crown Land Department to any other person.

So that the fact of Scallon not having renewed his licenses for limits 97 and 98 in 1858, if true, would not have afforded any reason for the non-renewal of these Nos. 97 and 98 by Peck in virtue of the provisions of the deed of 1858 in the subsequent years.

The true reason for the non-renewal of the licenses for those numbers is to be found, I apprehend, in the fact which appeared in evidence, that by reason of an error in the measurement of the limits lying lower down the river than Nos. 94 and 96, the upper boundary lines of those latter limits were placed higher up the river than they ought to be, and that, in truth, there was no such distance as ten miles higher up the river l'Assomption to represent the whole extent in length of the limits 97 and 98; and if that was the reason then the defect was not one which would give any claim whatever under the deed of 1858 against the heirs of Scallon, or against Scallon himself, who by that deed only agreed to give just such title as he had to those limits, and no more. Now that this was the reason for Nos. 97 and 98 not being renewed, I think, appears by the fact which does plainly appear in the evidence, that in 1866 the Crown Land Department issued licenses Nos. 25 and 26, the former in substitution for 97, and the latter for 98, and that these licenses, Nos. 25 and 26 respectively, comprise limits extending only five miles up the river instead of 10, from the upper limits of 94 and 96, aid five miles in width from the river, instead of 2J miles, covering the same quantity of land as did 97 and 98 respectively, although differently shaped and covering one-half of the precise land comprised in 97 and 98 respectively. These licenses Nos. 25 and 26 were issued from the same office of the Crown D,,, Land Department as 97 and 98 had been issued from, . and the limits therein described were granted to and in the name of " the heirs of the late Edward Scallon J. from this form of expression the natural and reasonable presumption is that the licenses were granted to Scallon's heirs in right of Scallon who had been the licensee of 97 and 98, which covered respectively half of the identical limits described in 25 and 26. There can, I think, be no doubt that the limits described in 25 and 26 were granted as they were " to the heirs of the late Edward Scallon " in substitution for Nos. and 98, for the reason that there was found not to be ten miles up the river from Nos. 94 and 96 to meet the requirements of 97 and 98. We see here a good reason, and, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, I think we may take it to have been the real one, for the substitution and for the licenses for 97 and 98 not having been renewed. Now, immediately prior to the execution of the deed of the 22nd October, 1866, which is relied upon as containing what- is insisted upon as the guarantee for the alleged breach of which this action is brought, the condition of the parties was this: Scallon by the deed of 1858, had already transferred to Peck all his right, title and interest in the timber licenses enumerated therein, including Nos. 97 and 98. By the deed of 1865, the Scallon succession had conveyed the mill and the four acres of land thereunto annexed, with the roadway mentioned in that deed, in fulfilment of the condition of the obligation in that behalf, contained in the deed of 1858, upon the part of Scallon, his heirs and assigns, to be fulfilled; all therefore that remained for the heirs of Scallon to do was, as the parties named under -the designation of "the heirs of the late Rdward Scallon," as licensees the limits described in the licenses 25 and 26, to transfer them Durur to the assignee of Peck, who was entitled to receive v them as a fruit growing out of the right which Scallow had had by reason of his having been the licensee 6w reJ. named in 97 and 98, all which right he had transferred to Peck by the deed of 1858. In so far as Scallon's heirs were concerned, they were under no obligation to do anything more; and, although it appears that a sum of $500 was allowed by them to the plaintiff, for the reason that the haul to the river was greater in the limits Nos. 25 and 26, by reason of their greater depth from the river, than had been that of the limits described in 97 and 98, it does not seem to me that the Scallon succession was under any obligation to make such or any allowance; for that Scallon had a right. title and interest in the limits described in the licene-s Nos. 97 and 98 at the time of the execution of the de.'d of 1858, and that by that deed he did transfer to Peck all such right, title and interest, and that this was all he agreed to do, appears to me to be clear. All right to renew those licenses thenceforth belonged to Peck and his assigns, and if the Crown Land Department had, for any reason other than prior forfeiture by Scallon and a subsequent grant of the same limits to some other person, of which there is no evidence or pretence whatever, refused to renew such licenses, the loss consequent upon such refusal must have fallen upon Peck, who had acquired, as all that he was entitled to, allScallon's rights whatever they were on the 10th July, 1858; and when, therefore, Nos. 25 and 26 were issued to and in the name of the heirs of Scallon in recognition, as we must take them to have been, of Scallon's rights in 97 and 98, and in substitution for those latter, they enured in the hands of Scallon's heirs to the benefit of the assignee of Peck, as a fruit issuing from the rights of Scallon which had been transferred to Peck and his assigns by the deed of t858. The heirs of Scallon were, in fact, trustees of those limits for the plaintiff, the assignee of Peck, who cAuld have compelled their transfer to him. It would have been impossible for them to hav; resisted the rigxt of the plaintiff, as assignee of Peck under the deed of 1858, to have had those licenses Nos.

25 ad 26, which covered one-half of the precise limitt described in 97 and 98 respectively, and which were given the additional width to make up foi the diminished length, transferred by a legal intrument to the plaintiff. In such a state of things it's obvious that in any deed to be executed by the heirs 'f Scallon, transferring those licenses to the plaintiff, covenant or guarantee by them as to the goodness oi the title purported to be given by ti oso licenses, or te insertion of anything directly or i: di- .rectly imposig upon the heirs of Scallon any gre ter liability than as by the deed of 1858 imposed upon them, would b altogether out of place, improper and without any case, motive or consideration therefor;

March, 1865, of which immovables and rights the designation anc description is given literally and verbatim in the said deed of cessior, Deruv

.

as also it is found in the said deed of the 10th July. 1858.

And in virtue of this title, the late Mr. Scallon obliged himself to sell 256 miles of limits for cutting timber upon the crown lands Atuated on the river I'Assomption and its tributaries Black Riverand River Ducharme, and as there exists a deficit of 50 miles to conplete the said quantity of 256 miles ceded to the said Mr. Theophius H. Oushing by the deed of deposit, cession, and transfer of th 16th *

March, 1865, the said Sieur McConville, for and in the namef those for whom he acts, wishing to complete the deficit which eists, has by these presents ceded and transferred, with warranty gainst all disturbauces generally whatsoever, to the said Mr. Thophilue B. ushing, hereto present and accepting, the said quantityof limits on the said river 'Assomption and designated as follows i the English language, to wit:

No. 25.

Commencing at the upper end limiNo. 94, on the 25 square miles. > south-west side of I'Assomption Yver, granted to late Edward Scallon, and extending five miles on sd river and five miles back from its banks, making a limit of 25 soare miles, not to interfere with limits granted or to be renewedfn virtue of regulations.

No. 26.

Commencing on the north-'ert side of I'Amsomp. 25 square miles. tion river, at the upper end ' limit 96, granted to lae Edward Scallon, and extending five mile up the river and five miles back from its banks, making a limit ofV square miles, not to interfere with licenses granted or to be reewed in virtue of regu. lations.

The licenses for the said quantity of py miles of limits for the years 1866 and 1867 have now been hared to the said Mr. Cushing, as he acknowledges and grants acquittace and discharge thereof to whom it shall appertain.

For the said Mr. Cushing, his heirusigns and successors, to enjoy, have and dispose of the whole aso him shall seem fit; to make operations and to cut timber in ar upon the said limits at the charge of conforming himself in all reEpcts to the rules and regulations to which the said limits maye subjected towards Her Majesty's Government in this province as also to pay thereto all the dues that may be exigible for cl,,an timber on the said limits * * * Firther, the said Mr. T'pkiP&1 H. CuAing declares that the said Mr. Mc~bnville for, a in the name of those for whom he is acting, hias now paid him t) sum of $500 currency for all claims generally waatsoever that binight have against the succession of the said la _e .Fdward Scom and his legal representatives i declaring, more. Now, with reference to this deed, it is to be observed that the. allegation therein, that in virtue of this title the late Mr. Scallon obliged himself to sell 256 miles of limits for cutting timber, is not a correct statement of the purport, tenor and effect of the deed of 1858, which is the only instrument containing the obligation which Scallon had in his lifetime entered into with Peck in relation to these timber limits. That instrument, as we have seen, only professed to sell and transfer, and did transfer to Peck and his assigns all the right, title and interest which Scallon had under and in virtue of the licenses -therein enumerated, which professed to cover 256 miles of limits, and the operation of the deed of 1866 is to cede and transfer the licenses No. 25 and 26, and all the right, title and interest of the licensees therein named, under and in virtue of such licenses, to the limits therein described, to have and to hold the same to the use of Gushing, his heirs and assigns, so as, however, not to interfere with limits granted, or to be renewed in virtue of regulations to which, if any such there should prove to be, the licenses 2 ) and 26 were in express terms made subject.

The contention of the plaintiff is, that the words " with warranty against all disturbances generally whatsoever " being inserted in connection with the words " ceded and transferred, operate as a warranty that the 50 miles of limits, as described in the licenses, had not, nor had any part thereof, been granted to any other person, and that no part of such limits was liable to be interfered, with by any other person whomsoever. So to construe these words would be to subject the heirs of Scallon to an obligation which by the deed of 1858 they were not subjected to, and Would make the gihw'antee to be altogether sans cause, as no cause, motive or 3onsideration whatever existed for the heirs of Scallon to give any such guarantee.

The interruption is alleged to have been m. de in virtue of a title conferred by a prior license isEued from a wholly different office, and describing limits situate upon a different river altogether. The fact that the description inserted in licenses so issued might overlap each other was an event so probable from the manner in which the licenses are issued, that the Crown Land Department takes the precaution of drawing the attention of all licensees to the fact by inserting in expresi terms in every license the provision that they cre liable to be interfered with by any prior license, if any theie should prove to. be, and by their regulations, which provide that in such case the subsequent licensee shall have no claim whatsoever against the government in respect of any such interference. Now, that any licensee, when selling one of these licenses, should give his guarantee that his license should not be interfered with by the owner of any previous license of the existence of which he was not and could not be aware, which in effect would be a guarantee that his liconse should not, in the hands of his assignee, be affected by the condition to which it was in express terms made subject, would be absurd in the extreme ; but the insertion of such a guarantee in a deed executed by the heirs of Scallon, situate as they were in the present case, could be attributed only to ignorance or inadvertence; the only reasonable construction, therefore, which can be put upon the words " with warranty against all disturbances generally whatsoever " in the deed of October, 1866, must be to limit their application to protecting the assignee of the licenses against Devr all claims to the licenses themselves as the instrumeatts V. . conveying the limits therein described, and not as a guarantee that the assignee of the licenses shall enjoy e, J. the limits therein described, notwithstanding it should appear that they are interfered with by a prior license, to which they are, in express terms, contained in the license themselves, made subject; or, in other words, that while holding the limits under the licenses they shall be relieved from the effect of a condition which constitutes an express term, subject to which alone the license can be held.

For these reasons I am of opinion that the judgment should be sustained, and that the appeal should be dismissed with costs.

But assuming the deed of 1866 to be subject to the construction put upon it by the plaintiff, there was no sufficient evidence given of any breach of the guarantee, construing it as th'e plaintiff desires to have it construed. As to license No. 25, which was a substitute for 97, no question arises, for no interference with -he limits described in it is pretended to 'have occurre3d. If any reliance is to be placed upon the map annexed to the printed case, it appears that the plaintiff hims subsequently to the transfer to him of license No. accepted from the Crown Land Department a licei-se, numbered 87, which that map exhibits as encroaching upon part of the limits described in No. 25, but that is a matter of no importance in the present case. I he plaintiff's claim is reduced to the alleged interference with the limits described in license No. 26, and no evidence whatever was given, which could affect the defendants, to show that Hall, the alleged claimant, had any prior license which interfered with the limits described in license No. 26, or that his licenses, which were admitted to be for limits upon the river Matawin, Duuy made those limits cross the height of land separating the watershed of that river from the watershed - Jof the river 1'Assomption and reach to the latter e J river; comprehending thus, not merely the additional width given to the limits described in license No. 26 over what had been described in license 98, but comprehending even the limits described n license 98, which was a subsisting license at the time when the license under which Hall acquired any rights was said to have first issued. What appeared in evidence was, that while the plaintiff was in possession and enjoyment of the limits described in license No. 26, and after he had cut a quantity of timber thereon, Hall, who claimed under a license issued to him for limits situate upon the river Malawin, whose watershed is wholly distinct from that of the river 1'Assomption, claimed the timber so cut, as cut upon his limits, to which claim the plaintiff, notwithstanding a strong and almost violent presumption that such claim could not be supported, appears to have at once yielded, and to have paid Ball a trifling sum for the timber, trifling for the reason which constituted the strong presumptive evidence against his claim, namely, that being cut within the watershed and valley of the 1'Assomption, by which alone the logs could be conveyed to market through lands covered by other licenses belonging to the plaintiff, to his mill at the mouth of the river, they were not available to Hall, whose mills were at -the mouth of the Malawin, to which river the logs could not have been at all hauled, or if at all, not at a cost which would have warranted their being conveyed to that river, and so were useless to Hall. The plaintiff, as dispensing with evidence of the contents of Hall's license, and of the limits which it described, and of its being prior to the plaintiff's OF license, and having precedence over it, relies upon a letter of the Commissioner of Crown Lands, dated 24th April, 1874, wherein he asserts that Hall had a license having priority over license No. 26, but this letter cannot deprive the defendants of their right to compel the plaintiff to prove, by legal evidence, an interruption of his possession by a superior title: true it is, that by the regulations of the department, subject to which the licenses are issued, the holders of the licenses for the time being are subjected to certain special provisions for determining disputes between contestants as to the right and position of berths or limits, but such special provisions being in derogation of the general law can only affect the parties actually contesting about the situation of the limits. There is nothing in the guarantee of the defendants, construing it as the plaintiff desires to construe it, which subjects them to any such mode of determining their liability. The matter relied upon by the plaintiff as a breach of their warranty must be established by evidence in accordance with the provisions of the general law; they have a right to insist upon strict legal evidence that the interruption was under superior title, and that, too, under the circumstances appearing in evidence, superior to the title granted, not only by license 26, but to that which had been granted by license 98, part of which is comprised in 26; and such evidence was the more important to be given in a case like the present, in which it appears that the plaintiff so readily submitted to the claim of Hall, made as it was, in the face of strong presumptive evidence against its validity. But, in truth, in whatever way the Commissioner of Crown Lands may have satisfied his mind of the matters asserted in his letter referred to, the evidence fails to show any proceeding to have been taken of the character of an investigation, whici, under the provisions of the regulations in that behalf, was made binding on the plaintiff. There does not apm appear to have been any contestation between Hall and the plaintiff as to the boundaries of their respective J limits brought under the notice of the proper authority by the statute and the regulations in that behalf authorized to decide between contestants.

The plaintiff submitted at once to Hall's demand. Hall, influenced, perhaps, by the fact that, if there were any more timber upon limit No. 26 (as to which there was evidence given by defendants calculated to create a doubt), he could not carry to his mill, or make it available, and, perhaps, doubting the goodness of his claim, and content with the easy success of his demand for the timber cut, or for some other reason, declined to become a party to any contestation with the plaintiff under the provisions of the regulations. The plaintiff took no steps to make him a party. The regulations provide that, as between contestants as to the right to * berths or the position of bounds, the opinion of the surveyor of licenses at Bytown, or agent for granting licenses elsewhere, is to be binding on the parties, unless and until reversed by arbitration within three months after the notification of such opinion has been communicated to the parties or their representatives on the premises, or sent to their address, or by decision of court ; and that the surveyor of licenses at Bytown and officer thereunto authorized elsewhere shall, at the written request of any party interested, issue instructions stating how the boundaries of timber berths should be run to be in conformity with existing licenses.

Now, there was no evidence whatever that anything of the nature here indicated occurred. There was, in fact, no evidence that anything was done which, by the special regulations in derogation of the general law, was made binding upon the plaintiff, or gave him an opportunity to appeal from the decision as erroneous. There was, in short, no evidence of anything which could give to the letter of the Commissioner of Crown Lands the character of an adjudication binding upon the plaintiff, nor, afortiori, upon the defendants, but even J. if the plaintiff was bound thereby, the defendants are not deprived of their right, when sued upon their guarantee, to insist upon strict proof of the breach relied upon, according to the course of the general law, wholly irrespective of the special regulations affecting owners of berths, by which regulations the defendants have not consented that any liability arising under their guarantee shall be governed. In a recent case, the Court of Appeal of the High Court of Justice in England (1) has held that, in the absence of special agreement, a judgment or an award against a principal debtor is not binding on the surety, and is not evidence against him in an action against him by the creditor, but the surety is entitled to have the liability proved in the action against him equally as it was necessary to have been proved against the principal debtor ; so in like manner, as it appears to me, the defendants in this action, upon their guarantee, are entitled to strict proof of Hall's title irrespective of anything which may have taken place between the plaintiff and him, which, as between them, could amount to an adjudication under the provisions of the regulations to which the licenses were subject.

It is unnecessary, in my opinion, to show, as could be readily done, that the plaintiff has offered no evidence entitling him to any damages, if his evidence had gone far enough to raise a question as to damages. Ii every particular necessary to the maintaining an action, plaintiff's case, in my judgment, fails.

There was evidence adduced by the defendants that at the time of the trial there was no valuable timber to