Desrosiers v. The King

HOSPICE DESROSIERS (Sup- PLIANT).......................

APPELLANT AND

Feb. 3. HIS MAJESTY THE KING

(DEFENDANT) ..................

RESPONDENT. ON APPEAL FROM THE EXCHEQUER COURT OF CANADA. Under the Quebec civil law, the recovery of a judgment against the agent, who had contracted in his own name, will not, as long it remains unsatisfied, affect the creditor's right to pursue the principal afterwards discovered.

. Per Anglin, Brodeur and Mignault JJ.-English decisions should not be cited as authorities in cases from the Province of Quebec which do not depend upon doctrines derived from English law. Judgment of the Exchequer Court Canada Ex. C.R. 461) reversed, Idington J. dissenting.

APPEAL from the decision of the Exchequer Court of Canada (1) dismissing the petition of right of the appellant.

The appellant sold hay to one McDonnell and sued him for the recovery of the purchase price. During the trial, McDonnell declared that he had bought the hay on behalf of the Imperial Government.

The appellant obtained judgment against McDonnell.

Later on the appellant discovered sufficient facts to establish that McDonnell had bought the hay as agent of the Crown Idington, Duff, Anglin, Brodeur and Mignault JJ.

on behalf of the Dominion of Canada.

For obvious reasons I feel we should not only abstain from invading, but conform to, the settled jurisprudence of Quebec.

In this case there is no settled jurisprudence of Quebec in regard to the question raised by this appeal. And, so far as the principles applicable thereto are concerned, the rule adopted in English decisions is in accord with. reason and justice, as well as that practical business sense which always tends to minimize the operation of the purely litigious spirit.

Moreover there appears in the statement of defence a pretty clear statement from which I infer that the transactions in question were, if at all, entered into by the Dominion of Canada, as the agent of the Imperial Government, which would constitute the respondent itself as mere agent.

106- The allegation I admit might have been made more complete in that regard.

Are we entitled to so decide in such a way the legal novelty submitted, that hereafter it may be said this court has laid down as law, that no matter how numerous the principals or chain of agents concerned in bringing about a contract, a litigious third party may select one after another of such agents and principals and sue to judgment unless and until one or other of numerous judgments so recovered has been satisfied, and that with costs ? I submit we should not run any such risks but accept that jurisprudence, even if not absolutely binding, which manifestly in principle violates nothing in law or justice.

For the foregoing reasons and those assigned by the learned judge appealed from, I am of the opinion that this appeal should be dismissed with costs.

J.-I am of the opinion that this appeal should be allowed.

J.-The sole legal question raised by the defence in this action which might properly be disposed of before the trial, under R. 126 of the Exchequer

Court, is whether under the Civil Code of Quebec the mere recovery in the courts of that province of judgment on a contract against an agent, who had entered into it in his own name, debars the plaintiff's right of recovery against the principal.

Following Priestly v. Fernie, (1) and Kendall v. Hamilton, (2) Mr. Justice

Audette has held that it does.

With deference, in applying these authorities the learned judge would seem to have attributed to the Quebec judgment obtained by the plaintiff against the agent, McDonnell, consequences dependent in English law upon views held with regard to the nature of the liability of the and the agent in such cases and the effect of a judgment upon the contract sued upon which do not obtain in the Quebec system of jurisprudence. The reasons for his acceptance of these English decisions as authority on this question of the civil law of Quebec appear in the following paragraph of his judgment:

In the case in this court to which the learned judge alludes V. Hudon Cotton Co. v. Canada Shipping Co. (1) Mr. Justice Strong alone expressed the view-already taken by the majority in the court of King's Bench, Dorion C.J. and Ramsay J. dissenting (2), that the liability of the principal, even where he is undisclosed and the agent contracts in his own name, created by Art. 1727 C.C., and put beyond controversy by the concluding clause of Art. 1716 C.C., imports a correlative or reciprocal right on his part to sue upon the contract as recognized in English commercial law. Fournier J. (p. 405) and Henry J. (p. 414) were of the contrary opinion.

Fournier J. (p. 409) notes, as did Dorion C. J. at page 362, that while Pothier explicitly asserts the right of action of the third party against the principal, "he gives none to the principal

3no ajainst the third party". "Obligations", Nos. 82, 447 and 448; "Mandat", No. 88.

The other three members of this court (Ritchie C. J., Taschereau aid

Gwynne JJ.), dismissed the appeal on what they deemed an admission of liability in the proceedings, expressing no views on the point dealt with by Mr.

Justice Strong.

But, with respect, I find nothing in that learned judge's opinion to sustain the sweeping inference drawn by Mr. Justice Audette in the passage I have quoted.

On the contrary, alluding to Pothier as the source of the doctrine embodied in Arts. 1727 and 1716 of the Quebec Civil Code, he merely notes, en passant, that in the particular matter with which he is dealingthe principal's right to enforce the contract, which in his opinion should "by an extensive construction" be held to be involved-the law of Quebec, as he views it, corresponds with English rather than with modern

French law. In the latter notwithstanding that the language of Art. 1998 C.N. seems quite as comprehensive as that of Art. 1727 C.C., a contract made by an agent in his own name imposes no direct liability on his principal (28 Laurent No. 62).

The commissioners themselves in much the same way signalize the fact that Pothier's view upon the liability of the principal coincides with English, Scotch and American law.

6th

Rep. 312.

To each comment-that of Strong J. and that of the commissioners-the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius-would not seem inapplicable.

In English law the liability of the principal and the agent in a case such as that at bar is alternative.

The contract being one and entire creates but a single debt (though not a single cause of action as in the case o _ of a joint liability since, in addition to the facts constituting the cause of action against the agent, his authority from the principal must be proved as part of the cause of action against the latter, Cooke v. Gill, (1) on which but one of the two may be held liable as principal. Yet the agent, having contracted in his own name, is bound as a principal; and the undisclosed principal is likewise bound because the agent in fact acted by his authority. But both cannot be liable as principals simultaneously and jointly. Imposing the status of principal on the former involves according that of agent to the latter. The agent as such is not liable. Correlatively, treating the latter as principal involves a rejection of his agency, and by implication a relinquishment of any claim against the real principal. Either may be pursued; not both.

The conclusive operation of a judgment against the agent to debar the recourse against the principal, though often referred to-and with high authorityas the consequence of an irrevocable election of remedies (1 Hals L. of E. No. 445;

7 Ibid.

No. 937; Morel Bros. & Co. v. Westmoreland,) (2) depends rather upon the doctrine of English law that the single debt arising out of the contract has been merged in the judgment-transit in rem judicatam-as Lord Cairns points out in Kendall v. Hamilton, (3) , and Vaughan-Williams L. J., in Hammond v. Schofield, (4) See too, Sullivan v. Sullivan, and 13 Hals. L. of E. No. 470 in fine. Although the application of the doctrine of election is easily defensible where, as here, the principal is known as such to the plaintiff before he takes his judgment against the agent, "" it is not so where that knowledge is lacking; and yet the judgment is then equally conclusive in its effect. Kendall v. Hamilton

A man can scarcely be held to have elected between two remedies of the existence of one of which he is in fact ignorant and is not presumed in law to be cognizant.

The fact that, if the judgment against the agent is subsequently set aside as the result of an adjudication that it was erroneously pronounced (Partington v. Hawthorn), (2) the alternative right to sue the principal revives (although the same result apparently does not ensue if the judgment be vacated merely by consent, Hammond v. Schofield, (3) per Wills, J.; Cross & Co. v. Matthews, (4) I Hals. L. of E. p. 209, note p.) presents another difficulty, since a valid election between remedies once made is irreversible.

Scarfe v. Jardine, (5). On the other hand, while, at first blush, such a decision as that of the Court of Appeal in French v. Howie, (6) where a judgment for part of the plaintiff's claim entered against the agent on admissions, under a special rule of a court allowing that to be done without prejudice to the plaintiff's right to proceed with the action to recover the balance of his claim, was held to debar a suit against the principal, is perhaps more easily upheld under the doctrine of election than under that of merger, it is equally maintainable on the principle that there can be but one judgment for a single and entire debt, to which the entry of a judgment for part of a claim permitted by the rule of court is merely a special exception statutory in its nature. But the "O conclusive character of a judgment against one of the two parties alternatively liable for a single debt, which likewise extends to the case of joint liability as understood in English law (King v. Hoare, (1) approved in Kendall v. Hamilton, (2)) is not found in a judgment against one of two debtors who are liable severally, or jointly and severally, since here there are two debts and the judgment on one is no bar to an action on the other, Lechmere v. Fletcher, (3) Isaacs & Son v. Salbstein, (4).

Nothing but satisfaction or release will extinguish a debt which has not passed into judgment. Now under the Quebec Civil Code the principal and the agent who has contracted in his own name seem to be severally liable as an English lawyer understands that phrase; and the mergey implied in the maxim transit in rem judicatam, as understood in English law, has no application in the legal system of that province.

Arts. 1727 and 1716 C.C. read as follows:- I agree with Mr. Surveyer's contention that the concluding word, "also", of Art. 1716 C.C. is more consistent with the idea of a dual recourse successive or simultaneous, than with a single optional recourse. The purpose seems to be to create cumulative obligations for the fulfilment of a single contract, which can be discharged only by satisfaction, release or the expiry of a period of limitation.

The learned counsel also referred to Art. 1108 C.C.

found under the heading "Debtors jointly and severally obliged", which reads as follows:- But the undisclosed principal and his agent would seem not to be joint and several debtors within the group of Articles 1103-1120 C.C.

They satisfy the definition contained in Art. 1103 C.C.

The fact that they are "obliged differently" does not exclude them.

The difficulty presented by the inconsistency of the obligation of indemnification legally inherent in their relationship (Art. 1720 C.C.) with Arts. -1117-8 C.C.

appears to be met by Art. 1120 C.C. But the obligation to the creditor is not strictly a joint obligation.

That of the agent arises directly ex contractu. That of the principal is imposed on him by law as a consequence of his mandate to the agent.

Hence Pothier's designation of it as "accessorial".

I therefore doubt the direct applicability of Art. 1108 C.C.;

but of that of the principle which it embodies--quite unnecessarily, says Langelier (Vol. IV, p. 33)-I have no doubt.

The commissioners in referring to Art. 1727 C.C.

(6th Rep. p. 12) expressly state that that article is based on Pothier's statement of the mandator's liability where the agent has contracted in his own name and without disclosing the relationship and reject Troplong's view to the contrary, adding that

(in this respect) "English, Scotch and American Law coincides" with Pothier's view.

See top p. 87 of the text, s. II Art. 23.

In dealing with Art. 1716 C.C., at p. 10 of the same report, the commissioners note that it has no counter part in the Code.Napoleon and "that the group of which it is a member declare (s) useful rules of undoubted authority in our law"- "contiennent des rigles utiles qui ne souffrent aucune difficult6 dans notre droit"

(sec. II.)

At. p. 85, s. II Art. 14, the authorities on which the article is based are cited as follows:- Paley is cited for the first clause of the article as is also

Story, par. 163 and Troplong.

The passage from Pothier, however, and par. 266 and the concluding words of par. 269 of Story bear on the question immediately under consideration and leave little room for doubt that the liability intended to be created was a several liability of both the principal and the agent as co-debtors (each being "obliged to the same thing in such manner that each. of them singly may be compelled to the performance of the whole obligation and that the performance by one discharges the other towards the creditor", (Art. 1103 C.C.) and to that extent having the characteristics of the joint and several liability of the civil code but neither the alternative nor the joint liability of the English law. Pothier (Mandat, No. 88) is in the following terms: dant, en cas, est cens6 acc6der A toutes les obligations que le mandataire contracte pour son affaire; et de cette obligation accessoire du mandant nait une obligation qu'on appelle utilis institoria, qu'ont contre mandant ceux avec lesquels le mandataire a contract6 pour I'affaire du mandant.

And Story (On Agency No. 266):

In the next place, a person contracting as agent will be personally responsible, where, at the time of making the contract, he does not disclose the fact of his agency; but he treats with the other party as being himself the principal; for, in such a case, it follows irresistibly, that credit is given to him on account of the contract. Thus, if a factor or broker, or other agent, buy goods in his own name for his principal, he will be responsible to the seller therefor in every case where his agency is not disclosed.

But we are not therefore to infcr that the principal may not also, when he is afterwards discovered, be liable the payment of the price the same goods; for, in many cases this sort, as we shall hereafter abundantly see, the principal and the agent may both be severally liable upon the same contract.

The concluding sentence of par. 269 of Story on Agency reads as follows:- But it by no means is to be taken as a natural or necessary conclusion, that, because the agent is personally bound, therefore the principal is exonerated; for we'shall presCntly see that both may in many cases be equally bound, if not in form, at least in substance, by the contract, so that a suit may be brought by or against either.of them. The same author in Par. 270 says:- Where the agent contracts in his own name he adds his own personal responsibility to that of him who has employed him.

In par. 163 he had referred to Pothier's view that the obligation incurred by the principal is accessorial, citing "Obligations," Nos. 447-9, where the sense in which that learned writer uses the phrase "obligation accessoire" is fully explained.

But.under the 79089-81

1civil law an obligation is "conjointe" whenever there is plurality either of creditors or of debtors; Baudry- Lacantinerie, Obligations, No. 1107.

Ordinarily it entails a division of the right or of the liability, so that in the one case each creditor may recover an equal share of the debt, but no more, from the common debtor and in the other each debtor is liable for an equal share of the debt, but no more, to the common creditor.

(26 Dem. 105, 110, 112).

There are as many distinct credits or debts as there are creditors or debtors.

This is obviously not the sense in which the word "conjointement" is used by Pothier.

But it also clearly excludes the alternative liability of the English law, since it is the antithesis of "disjunctive"

liability, Baudry-Lacantinerie,

No. (n), which is most rare in modern civil law, 26 Dem. In Pothier's text it merely signifies simultaneous liability upon the same obligatqon (26 Dem. 107), each debtor being liable for the whole. But how? Jointly or severally?

"Severally" says Story, using the word as an English lawyer, in par. 266 above quoted, cited by the commissioners.

The passage quoted from par. 269 in which he speaks of the creditor's right to bring suit "against" either of them serves to make it clear that the joint liability of the English law was not contemplated.

Story may in this latter passage have intended to indicate the liability to be alternative as it is understood in English law; but, if he did, the fact that the commissioners explicitly state that Art. 1727 C.C., which imposes the liability on the mandator, is based on the doctrine tiaught by Pothier makes it probable that Story was not so understood by them.

Pothier's conjoint accessorial liability of the principal is not a disjunctive alternative liability.

His comparison of it with the liability of a surety while indicating the distinctions between the two, makes this reasonably clear. The principal and the surety are several debtors. An J. unsatisfied judgment against the principal does not preclude a judgment against the surety.

(Arts. 1956 and 1958 C.C.).

Art. 1716 C.C. read in the light of the commissioners' report and the texts they cite was, it seems reasonably clear, intended to assert neither the joint nor the alternative liability of the English law, but a several liability of the principal and the agent subject to the latter's right, and the former's obligation, of indemnification.

(Art. 1720 C.C.). In Vol. 5 of Langelier's Cours de Droit Civil, at p. 304, we read under Art. 1716:- Lorsque le mandataire a contract6 en son propre nom, ceux avec qui il a contracth ont le droit de le tenir responsable personnellement, mais peuvent-ils aussi s'en prendre au mandant?

Notre article rdpond dans l'affirmative.

Les tiers peuvent-ils alors poursuivre et le mandant et le mandataire?

L'affirmative ne me paralt pas douteuse. D'abord il n'y a pas de doute que les tiers peuvent poursuivre le mandataire, puisque notre article le dit en toutes lettres. Et comme ce meme article leur r6serve leur recours contre le mandant, cela veut dire qu'ils peuvent poursuivre les deux et pour le tout.

In Huot v. Dufresne, (1) the judgment of the Court of Review contains this "consid6rant":- Considdrant que celui qui contracte avec un mandataire qui agit peksonnellement a recours contre ce mandataire, mais que, s'il d6couvre ensuite que ce mandataire agissait pour un autre, il a aussi recours contre ce tiers pour qui ce mandataire agissait, et ce, sous les dispositions du dit article 1716 du Code Civil.

In Wilson v. Benjamin, (2) in the judgment of the Superior Court we read:- Consid6rant que le mandataire qui agit en son propre nom est responsable envers les tiers avec qui il contracte, sans pr6judice aux (2) M.L.R. 5 S.C. 18. at p. 19. (1) R.L. 360, at p. 363.

droits de ces derniers contre le mandant qui est responsable envers eux pour tous les actes de son mandataire faits dans l'ex6Eution et les limites du mandat, except6 dans cas de l'article du Code Civil et dans le cas par la convention, ou les usages du commerce le mandataire Anglin J.

est seul responsable.

We have not been referred to and I have not found any other decisions in Quebec in which the nature of the liability of the principal and agent in such a case as this has been considered.

Those referred to by Mr. Justice Audette bear very remotely on the question under consideration.

On- the other hand, though not dealing with the precise question before us, the authorities now cited seem to indicate that the liAbility is several and the remedies cumulative, and that the recovery of a judgment against the agent will not, so long as it remains unsatisfied, affect the creditor's right to pursue the principal.

Apart from authority the terms of Art. 1716 C.C. seem plainly to imply these consequences.

The idea of the merger of the debt under a contract in a judgment obtained upon it is foreign to the Quebec system of Jurisprudence.

Rocheleau v. Bessette, (1) Turner v. Mulligan (2).

As Mr. Justice Hall says, in delivering the judgment of the Court of King's Bench in the former case:

As the consensus of both minds was necessary to create the contract, so both must consent before its nature can be changed, although the creditor may be free, within the limitation of the law to exercisc his own choice of remedies, and the jurisdiction in which he will enforce them. The judgment which he may obtain from a particular tribunal does not create the debt, but only declares its existence and orders its payment.

That it has not extinguished the debt is apparent from the fact that the creditor may renounce it by notice only to the debtor, and without the latter's consent, and thereupon the original debt may be sued upon anew, either in the same or any other jurisdiction.

Clearly this could not be the case if the judgment had effected (1) Q.R. 3 Q.B. 96, at pp. 98-9; 3 S.C. 320.

(2) Q.R. 3 Q.B. 523. While the Quebec law recognizes the maxim nemo debet bis vexari pro eddem causd in so far as it will not, speaking generally, permit a defendant against whom a plaintiff holds a judgment to be again sued by him for the same cause while that judgment subsists, by Art. 548, C.C.P. it is expressly provided that

It is therefore abundantly clear that in Quebec there is no merger of the debt in the judgment such as takes place under English law.

The maxim, una via electa non datur regressus ad alteram, has but a restricted application in French law, (8 Hue. No. 328;

17 Laurent, No. 139;

13 Baudry- Lacantinerie et Barde, Nos. 916-7-8;

but see Arts. 1541-2 C.C.) and the renunciation of a right or a remedy is de droit 6troit. "Il faut pour cela que les faits d'ou on l'induit le supposent necessairement." I am for these reasons of the opinion that English decisions holding that a judgment against the agent who has contracted in his own name debars recovery against the principal are not in point and that the defence denying the right of the plaintiff to proceed against the defendant as mandator under Art. 1727 C.C. expressly preserved by Art. 1716 C.C., is not good in law.

This case affords an excellent illustration of the danger of treating English decisions as authorities ""

in Quebec cases which do not depend upon doctrines derived from the English law.

The learned judge further expressed the view that the defendant was probably not liable under Art. 1736 C.C.

I would allow the appeal and set aside the order of the 12th February, 1919, with costs here and in the Exchequer Court.

J.-La question que nous avons A decider dans cette cause est de savoir si celui qui a obtenu jugement contre un madataire a le droit de pursuivre aussi le mandant.

Ceci nous amine examiner la port4e des articles 1716 et 1717 du Code Civil.

L'article 1727, sous la rubrique Des obligations du mandant envers les tiers, est dans les termes suivants: En confiant la gestion de ses biens A un agent, une personne devient par meme responsable des actes, de ce repr6sentant; et ce dernior peut se d6charger de toute responsabilit6 s'il fait connaitre son mandat aux tiers avec qui il contracte.

Cependant si pour des kno raisons particulibres le mandataire n d6clare pas qu'il repr6sente une autre personne, alors, dit P'article 1716, il est responsable envers les tiers avec qui il contracte et ce sans pr6judice aux droits de ces derniers contre le mandant.

Dans le cas qui nous occupe, le mandataire McDonnell n'a pas jug6 A propos, lorsqu'il a achet6 des marchandises de l'appelant, de lui falre connaltre qu'il repr6sentait la Couronne; et alors, en vertu de l'article

1716, il ne peut pas y avoir de doute quant A sa responsabilit6 envers Desrosiers; et ce dernier 6tait justifiable de prendre une action contre McDonnell et de le faire condamner A payer le foin qu'il lui avait vendu et livr6.

Mais lors de l'audition de la cause, McDonnell a.

d6clar6 pour la premiere fois qu'il n'agissait pas alors pour son bin6fice personnel; mais qu'il 6tait simplement le mandataire de la Couronne.

Jugement a rendu cependant contre lui; et je suppose que Desrosiers n'ayant pas pu obtenir de lui paiement de ce jugement pr~sente maintenant une p6tition de droit r6clamant de la Couronne le montant du foin qu'il avait vendu A

McDonnell.

La cour inf6rieure a d~cid6 que l'action devait 6tre renvoye parce que Desrosiers, ayant d6cid6 de poursuivre et de prendre jugement contre McDonnell, il n'avait pas le droit de poursuivre plus tard le mandant, c'est-A-dire la Couronne, s'appuyant en cela sur les d6cisions rendues en Angleterre dans les causes de Priestly v. Fernie (1) et de Kendaltv. Hamilton. (2)

Elle s'est bas6e 6galement sur l'opinion isol6e du juge po~ Strong dans la cause de Hudon v. Canada Shipping Co.

Dans le cas actuel, je suis d'opinion que les d6cisions Jrendues en Angleterre ne peuvent pas s'appliquer et ce pour deux raisons; premi~rement, parce que le code a des dispositions formelles sur la matibre; et, en second lieu, parce que le droit d'election qui existe en Angleterre ne peut pas 6tre invoqu6 dans Qu6bec, 6tant donn6 que c'est absolument contraire aux principes fondamentaux du code civil.

L'article 1727 du code civil d6clare formellement que le mandant est responsable envers les tiers pour les actes de son mandataire faits dans les limites de son mandat. L'article ne distingue pas entre le cas oh le mandataire a d6nonc6 sa qualit6 d'agent ou non. -Le mandant doit ex6cuter les obligations que son mandataire a contract6es, que ce dernier fit connu du tiers comme repr6sentant du mandant ou non. La loi ne fait pas de distinction; et dans tous les cas le mandant est responsable envers le tiers pour tous les actes de son mandataire.

Cet article est confirm6 par l'article 1716 C.C. qui dit que si le mandataire agit en son propre nom, s'il ne d6nonce pas sa qualit6, alors il est aussi responsable lui-mime envers les tiers, et ce sans prejudice aux droits que ces derniers peuvent avoir contre le mandant.

Ces deux articles, suivant moi, se complftent. Nous avons done pour ces tiers deux d6biteurs, le mandant et le mandataire; le mandant parce qu'il est d'ordinaire responsable des acfes de son mandataire, et le mandataire parce qui'l n'a pas jug6 A propos de d6noncer sa qualit6 d'agent.

L'intim6 dans son factum nous dit que les codificateurs d6clarent en termes formels

Je ne sais pas ou l'on a pris cette d6claration des commissaires qu'ils avaient refus6 d'adopter la r6gle du droit civil. Il est bien vrai que les commissaires ont d6clar6, en combattant l'opinion de Troplong, que cette opinion de Troplong 6tait en harmonie avec la doctrine du droit romain; et ils ajoutent:

Il n'est nullement question dans ce rapport des commissaires qu'ils avaient refus6 d'adopter les principes de la loi civile;

au contraire, ils prennent le texte de leur code en reproduisant la doctrine du droit civil telle qu'6nonce par Pothier. Ils ne disent pas, comme le pr6tendent les savants avocats dans leur factum, qu'ils pr6farent adopter la loi anglaise, avec laquelle Pothier coincide;

mais ils adoptent au contraire la r6gle de Pothier qui est d'accord avec les lois anglaises. He dois ajouter que Pothier n'a pas 6t le seul sous l'ancien droit qui ait exprim6 cette opinion, mais on la trouve 6galement exprime dans Domat, livre ler. tit. 15, sec. 2, no 1.

C'6tait done la r~gle du droit civil qui 6tait reconnue dans la province de Quebec quand le code a t r6dig; et d'ailleurs les codificateurs n'ont pas donn6 cette r6gle comme 6tant de droit nouveau mais comme 6tant la loi qui r6gissait alors le contrat du mandat.

Maintant quelle est la rigle de Pothier?

Nous la trouvons dans son trait6 sur le mandat, au no 88, dans les termes suivants:

J.

Quoique ce soit pour I'affaire qui fait l'objet du mandant, et en se renfermant dans les bornes du mandat, que le mandataire a fait quelque, contrats avec des tiers; lorsque c'est en son propre nom qu'il a contractd, et non pas en sa seule qualit6 de mandataire d'un tel, procureur ou fond6 de procuration d'un tel, c'est en ce cas,, le mandataire qui s'oblige envers ceux avec lesquels il a contract6; c'est lui qui se rend leur d6biteur principal.

Mais il oblige conjointement avec lui son mandant, pour l'affaire duquel il paraft que le contrat se fait: le mandant, en ce cas, est cens6 acc6der A toutes les obligations que le mandataire contracte pour son affaire; et de cette obligation accessoire du mansdant natt une obligation qu'on appelle utilia inatitutoria, qu'ont contre le mandant ceux avec lesquels le mandataire a contract6 pour I'affaire du mandant.

Au n' 449, obligations, il discute longuement et clairement cette question et 6nonce lA le principe de la manibre qui suit:

Pour qu'il y ait lieu A cette obligation accessoire du commettant il faut que le pr6pos6 ait contract6 en son propre nom, quoique pour les affaires du commettant; mais lorsqu'il contracte dans la qualit6 de facteur ou de fond6 de procuration de son commettant, cc n'est pas lui qui contracte, c'est son commettant qui contracte par son ministire (no 74): le pr6pos4, en ce cas, ne s'oblige pas; c'est le commettant seul qui, par le minist~re de son prdpos6 contracte une obligation principale. Lorsque le pr6pos6 contracte en son nom, pour qu'il oblige son commettant, il faut que le contrat concerne les affaires auxquelles il est pr6pos6, et que ce pr6pos6 n'ait pas excid6 les bornes de sa commis- "Les prdpos6s obligent leurs commettants tant que leur commission dure; et elle est toujours cens~e durer jursqu'A ce qu'ils aient t rdvoquds, et que la revocation ait 6t6 connue du public.

Comme on le voit, il 6nonce le principe que le mandataire qui contracte en son propre nom s'oblige comme d6biteur principal mais qu'il oblige en meme temps son commettant comme d6biteur accessoire, vu que ce dernier est cens6, en lui donnant son mandat, avoir consenti par avance A tous les engagements qu'il contracterait et s'en est tenu responsable.

Maintenant, que l'on traite ces obligations conjointes du mandant et du mandataire comme obligations accessoire et principale ou qu'on les appelle obligations conjointes sous l'6conomie de notre loi, quelle est la Brodeur nature du droit d'action que posskde le tiers Est-il oblig6, comme dans le droit anglais, de faire un choix, de poursuivre soit l'un ou l'autre, ou bien s'il a le droit de poursuivre les deux

Les obligations conjointes donnent au criancier le droit de poursuivre l'un et l'autre des d6biteurs. L'article 1108 C.C. le d6clare formellement:

Les poursuites faites contre l'un des co-d6biteurs n'empeche pas d'en exercer de pareilles contre les autres.

Je retrouve 6galement le mime principe 6nonc6 dans Pothier.

Je suis donc d'opinion que les d6cisions rendues en Angleterre invoqu6es par le jugement a quo n'ont pas d'application dans notre droit et que Desrosiers avait le droit de poursuivre non seulement McDonnell mais son mandant.

Pour ces raisons, I'appel doit 8tre maintenu avec d6pens de cette cour et de la cour inf6rieure.

M [GNAULT J.-Dans ses notes de jugement, I'honorable juge de la cour d'Echiquier (M. le juge Audette) s'est expriin comne suit:

I was, at the argument, referred to no jurisprudence of the Province of Quebec upon the subject in question, and after research I have been unable to find any. In the absence of the same, I take it that as Art. 1726 and 1727 are different from the Code Napoleon and are borrowed from both Pothier and the English law, that general principles of the English law governing such doctrine should also be adopted in questions flowing from such doctrine and which are a sequence from the same, as Strong J. seems to have found in the case above mentioned.

Avec toute d6f6rence possible, qu'il me soit permis de dire que je ne partage pas l'opinion du savant juge. Si les articles 1716 et 1717 du code civil 6taient emprunt6s la fois de Pothier et du droit anglais, ce ne serait pas une raison de dire que les principes g6ndraux du droit anglais doivent 6tre adopt6s pour r6soudre les questions auxquelles ces articles donnent lieu. Je ferais plut6t pr6valoir la doctrine de Pothier et de l'ancien droit frangais, d'autant plus que les codificateurs ne disent pas que ces articles sone emprunids au droit anglais, mais, au sujet de Particle 1727 C.C., ils font remarquer que cet article est bas6 sur l'expos4 de la doctrine de Pothier, laquelle, ajoutent-ils, est d'accord avec les lois anglaise, 6cossaise et ambricaine. Il me semble respectueusement qu'il est temps de r~agir contre l'habitude de recourir, dans les causes de la province de Qu6bec, aux pr6c6dents du droit commun anglais, pour le motif que le code civil contiendrait une r6gle qui serait d'accord avec un principe du droit anglais.

Sur bien des points, et sutrtout en matiare de mandat, le code civil et le common law contiennent des ragles semblables.

Cependant le droit civil constitue un systhme complet par lui-mime et doit s'interpr6ter d'apres ses propres rbgles.

Si pour cause d'identit6 de principes juridiques on peut recourir au droit anglais pour interpr6ter le droit civil frangais, on pourrait avec autant de raison citer les monuments de la jurisprudence frangaise pour mettre en lumi're les rigles du droit anglais.

Chaque systime, je le r6pite, est complet par lui-mime, et sauf le cas oi un systime prend dans l'autre un principe qui lui 6tait auparavant 6tranger, on n'a pas besoin d'en sortir pour chercher la ragle qu'il convient d'appliquer aux espaces bien diverses qui se pr~sentent dans la pratique journalibre.

L'espce que nous devons juger est int6ressante. L'appelant avait vendu du foin A un nomm6 McDonnell. Ayant purusuivi ce dernier en recouvrement du prix, McDonnell d~clara h l'enquetA qu'il avait achet6 le foin pour le gouvernement impirial. L'appelant ne se d6sista pas de son action, mais obtint jugement contre McDonnell. II allige qu'apris le jugement il put retracer certains 616ments de preuve tendant A 6tablir les relations de McDonnell avec la Couronne. II pr6senta alors une pitition de droit devant la cour d'6chiquier, et la Couronne objecta qu'ayant fait option d'exercer son recours jusqu'A jugement contre le mandataire, I'appelant ne pouvait maintenant pourusuivre la Couronne.

Cette objection a t maintenue et la p6tition de droit de 'appelant a 6t6 renvoy6e.

DA le pr6sent appel.

Il s'agit des articles 1716 et 1727 du code civil, qui ne se trouvent pas au code Napoleon et qui se lisent comme suit:

Comme je l'ai fait remarquer, les codificateurs disent que l'article 1727 C.C. qui compl~te l'article .1716 C.C. est bas6 sur la doctrine de Pothier. Ils citent aussi, sous l'article 1716 C.C., Story, on Agency, no. Recourons done A ces deux auteurs, car ils fournissent le meilleur conmentaire de ces deux articles et indiquent quelle a td l'intention du ligislateur. Pothier dit, dans son trait6 du Mandat, no 88: Quoique ce soit pour l'affaire qui fait l'objet du mandat, et en se DEBROSIERS renfermant dans les bornes du mandat, que le mandataire a fait quelques contrats avec des tiers; lorsque c'est en son propre nom qu'il a contract6, et non pas en sa seule qualit6 de mandataire d'un tel, pro- Mignault j. cureur ou fond6 de procuration d'un tel, c'est, en ce cas, le mandataire qui s'oblige envers ceux avec qui il a contract6; c'est lui qui se rend leur d6biteur principal. Mais il oblige conjointement avec lui son mandant, pour l'affaire duquel il paralt que le contrat se fait; le mandant en ce cas, est cens6 acc6der A toutes les obligations que le mandataire contracte pour son affaire; et de cette obligation accessoire du mandant, natt une obligation qu'on appelle utilis institoria, qu'ont contre le mandant ceux avec lesquels le mandataire a contract6 pour l'affaire du mandant.

Et Story, Agency, no 266, dit:

In the next place, a person contracting as agent will be personally responsible, where, at the time of making the contract, he does not disclose the fact of his agency; but he treats with the other party as being himself the principal; for, in such a case, it follows irresistibly that credit is given to him on account of the contract.

Thus, if a factor or broker, or other agent, buy goods in his own name for his principal, he will be responsible to the seller therefor in every case where his agency is disclosed.

But we are not therefore to infer, that the principal may not also, when he is afterwards discovered, be liable for the payment of the price of the same goods; for, in many cases of this sort, as we shall hereafter abundantly see, the principal and agent may both be severally liable upon the same contract.

Il en est autrement dans le droit anglais, et 1A on d6cide que celui qui a trait6 avec un mandataire contractant en son propre nom sans d~voiler le nom de son mandant, peut poursuivre l'un ou l'autre, mais non pas les deux, et que s'il prend un jugement contre le mandataire, il ne puet ensuite exercer un recours contre le mandant: Priestly v. Fernie. (1) C'est sur l'autorit6 de cette d6cision que l'honorable juge Audette a renvoy6 la p6tition de droit de l'appelant.

Le raisonnement de Lord Bramwell dans cette cause et de Lord Cairns dans Kendall v. Hamilton, (2) est certainement trbs fort, et j'aurais 6t dispos6 (1) 3 H. & C. 977 at p. 982.

4 App. Cas. 504.

bl'accepter comme raison 6crite si aprs mure r6flection, je n'tais arriv6 A la conclusion que le texte meme des articles 1716 et 1727 C.C., interprdtd A la lumibre des passages de Pothier et de Story que j'ai cit6s, ne permet pas d'accueillir la solution que le droit anglais adopte.

Ainsi l'article 1716 dit que le mandataire qui agit en son propre nom est Tesponsable envers les tiers avec qui il contracte, "sans pr6judice aux droits de ces derniers contre le mandat".

Donc le recours du tiers contre le mandataire ne pr6judicie pas h son recours contre le mandant. Et Pothier et Story indiquent clairement que l'un et l'autre sont d6biteurs envers le tiers qui, dans ces circonstances, a trait6 avec le mandataire.

L'article 1727 C.C. contient une expression qui demande A entre bien entendue.

It rend le mandant responsable envers les tiers pour tous les actes de son mandataire faits dans l'exdcution et les libnites du mandat,

En effet, il va sans dire que la-convention peut rendre le mandataire seul responsable A I'exclusion du mandant, mais dans les cas ordinaires ou le mandataire contracte en son propre nom, pas plus que dans l'espce' cette stipulation expresse ne se trouve pas au contrat.

Feu Sir Francois

Langelier, dans son Cours ee droit civil, tome 5, p. 304, enseigne que dans le cas de l'article 1716 C.C., le tiers peut poursuivre le mandant et le mandataire.

IL dit:

mais peuvent-ils aussi s'en prendre au mandant? Notre article rdpond dans l'affirmative.

Les tiers peuvent-ils alors poursuivre et mandant et le mandataire?

L'affirmative ne me paralt pas douteuse. D'abord il n'y a pas de doute que les tiers peuvent poursuivre le mandataire, Mignault J. puisque notre article le dit en toutes lettrcs. Et comme ce meme article leur r6serve leur recours contre le mandant cela veut dire qu'ils peuvent poursuivre les deux, et pour le tout.

L'appelant cite aussi une d6cision de la cour de revision dans une cause de Huot v. Dufresne, (1) ou se trouve le motif suivant:

Consid6rant que celui qui contracte avec un mandataire qui agit personnellement, a recours contre ce mandataire, mais que, s'il d6couvre ensuite que mandataire agissait pour un autre, il a aussi recours contre tiers, pour qui mandataire agissait, et ce, sous les dispositions dudit article du Code Civil.

Il y a, dans le droit anglais, une raison de d6cider qui manque dans le droit civil, car celui qui poursuit l'un des deux d6biteurs conjoints et obtient un jugement contre lui ne peut ensuite poursuivre *1'autre d6biteur.

Rien de tel n'existe dans le droit civil. Pour ces raisons je crois que c'est A tort que la p6tition de droit de l'appellant a t renvoyde. J'infirmerais done le jugement dont est appel avec d6pens, et je renverrais la cause A la cour d'6chiquier pour y etre proc6d6 sur p6tition de droit de l'appelant. Appeal allowed with costs.