Curley v. Latreille

13f1 DAME ANNIE CURLEY (PLAINTIFF) APPELLANT; i2J1 *Nov. AND

OSMOND LATREILLE (DEFENDANT) RESPONDENT. *Feb. 3. ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH, APPEAL SIDE, PROVINCE OF QUEBEC.

the judgment of the Superior Court sitting in review, *PRESENT.-Idington, Duff, Anglin, Brodeur and Mignault JJ. (1) Q.R. 28 K.B. 388.

79089-912 to which the case had been submitted by the trial judge, sitting with a jury, and dismissing the appellant's, plaintiff's, action.

The material facts of the case and the questions in issue are fully stated in the above head-note and in the judgments now reported.

J.-My appreciation of the facts presented in evidence herein leads me to the conclusion that the learned trial judge misdirected the jury, if our decision in the case of Halparin v. Bulling (1), is to be followed as good law.

The misdirection accounts for the inconsistencies that exist in some of the answers to the questions submitted.

The Court of King's Bench in accord with the interpretation which it has adopted of these findings has seen its way to their reconciliation, as it were, and in doing so apparently suggests there has, arising from such misdirection, been only a misapprehension of the verdict.

I am not prepared to deny either their right or duty to do so in this particular case and say they have erred. A new trial would be the only alternative and under a proper direction that would seem to be a hopeless expedient as far as plaintiff's ultimate success would be concerned.

With great respect, I cannot agree with the law as laid down by the Court of Review, and do agree in the main with the opinions of the judges in the Court of King's Bench in favour of allowing the appeal there and dismissing the action.

I therefore think this appeal should be dismissed with costs.

J.-I am of the opinion that this appeal should be dismissed with costs.

J.-The facts out of which this action arises appear in the report of it in the Court of King's Bench, (1) and in the opinions of my brothers Brodeur and Mignault, which I have had advantage of reading.

While they differ in their conclusions both my learned brothers hold the view that the question of law which is presented, viz., the scope of the restriction upon the responsibility of masters for injuries caused by their servants implied in the words of Art. 1054 C.C. "in the performance of the work for which they are employed."-"dans l'ex6cution des fonctions auxquelles ces derniers sont employ6s"-must be determined not upon the authority of cases decided in English courts dealing with the question when a servant or workman will be deemed to have acted "in the course of his employment" but in the light of civil law authorities which deal with them and with the corresponding words of the C.N. Art. 1384 "dans les fonctions, etc.".

English decisions can be of value. in Quebec cases involving questions of civil law only when it has been first ascertained that in the law of England and that of Quebec the principles upon which the particular subjeot matter is dealt with are the same and are given the like scope in their application, and even then not as binding authorities but rather as rationes scriptae: and it is only on that footing and for-purposes of comparison that I shall refer to them. I therefore cannot accede to the view that his case is concluded against the appellant by our recent decision in Halparin v. Bulling It must not be forgotten however that modern French authorities hold much the same position. But the articles of the Quebec civil code dealing with offences and quasi-offences (1053-1056) having been based on the Code Napoleon (Rap. des cod. Vol. 1 p. 16) in considering their purview and determining their interpretation, French authorities dealing with the corresponding articles of that Code-at all events those ante-dating the enactment of the Quebec civil' code, and especially those cited by the codifiers as the foundation on which they worked-must undoubtedly be given great weight.

Yet in dealing even with these authorities it must be borne in mind that they

I do not find in the verbal differences between the French version of Art. 1054 C.C. (dans I'ex6cution des fonctions) and Art. 1384 C.N. (dans les fonctions) support for the view that it was intended that the scope of the master's responsibility in such a case as that now before us should be more restricted under the former than it is under the latter. Pothier in dealing with this subject uses the phrase "dans l'exercice des fonctions" (Obligations, No. 121) and that is the meaning ascribed to the somewhat elliptical words of the C.N. (dans les fonctions) by all the authors who discuss it. The phrases "I'exercice des fonctions" and "I'ex6cution des fonctions" in themselves express very much the same idea.

It may be however that the English version which in this instance appears to have been the original text (Preface to McCord's Civil Code 1 ed. p. ix) under which the authorities are cited by the codifiers (1st Rep. p. 61) and which is at least of equal authority with the French text, by its terms "in the performance of the work for which they are employed" unequivocally indicates a restriction of the master's responsibility to injuries resulting from acts done by his servant "in the course of his employment"-("au cours de l'ex~cution de ses fonctions" 3 Langelier p. 479, "dans le cours de ses fonctions" S. 1861.1. 439) as that limitation is understood and applied in English law. The codifiers in their report (1st Rep. p. 16) allude to the departures in. Arts.. 1053-1056 C.C. from the text of the French code stating but we are not informed what these objections were and I find nothing in the works of our commentators which throws light on this important point.

We are met at the threshold of this case by the fifth finding -of the jury that the chauffeur Lauzon at the time of the accident was although, in answer to the 7th question, they also found that he was

In the view of the scope and effect of the last paragraph of Art. 1054 C.C. taken by the Court of Review and by my brother Brodeur, there would probably be no difficulty in maintaining the fifth finding; Lauzon was engaged by the defendant as chauffeur and was undoubtedly driving his master's car. But it is. scarcely reconcilable with the interpretation given to that paragraph by the Court of King's Bench and by my brother Mignault; "joy-riding" was not work for which he was employed.

The 7th finding is supported by a body of testimony of which the weight and reliability is above suspicion. Lauzon's whole evidence, on the other hand, is most unsatisfactory.

The 6th and 7th findings of the jury would seem to imply the view that he told a fairy talethat he was not testing the automobile at all, but. simply "joy-riding."

The only corroboration of his story relates to its later stages and comes from the witness Leblanc, one of the companions of his "joyride," whose testimony appears to be even less trust-, worthy than that of Lauzon himself. In crossexamination he is involved in a series of contradictions. The majority of the judges in the Court of King's. Bench disbelieved Lauzon's story where it is in conflict with that of the witnesses Gauthier and Desenfants, who say that he brought the defendant's automobile into the Laurier garage about 9.15 o'clock on the evening in question. Falsus in uno falsus in omnibus. They regarded his story as so highly improbable that they found little difficulty in discrediting it. After carefully reading all the evidence, although a verdict can be considered as against the weight of evidence only if it is such as a jury viewing the whole of the evidence could not reasonably find (Art. 501 C.C.P.), I am not prepared to say that the learned appellate judges below were not well advised in reject- J. ing Lauzon's account of the evening's occurrences and taking the view that he returned with the defendant's automobile to the garage as directed by the defendant's son, that he subsequently took it out again in violation of his master's orders and purely for his own purposes and that he was engaged in so using it when he killed the plaintiff's son: or, assuming the law of Quebec to be as stated by the majority of the Court of King's Bench, that they erred in setting aside or ignoring the 5th finding of the jury and directing the entry of a judgment under Art. 508 (3) C.C.P. different from that rendered by the Court of Review on the reserved case.

I cannot but think that the jury was led to make its 5th finding by the concluding direction of the learned trial judge, in reply to the question of a juror, quoted by Cross and Carroll JJ.:

Le jur6; si le jury est d'avis que Lauzon avait pris la voiture sans permission du d6fendeur, d'aprbs vous, dans ce cas-1d, il ne remplissait pas les fonctions pour lesquelles il 6tait engag6. Est-ce que je dois comprendre que c'est cela que vous dites?

Le juge: Le chauffeur, malgr6 qu'il n'ait pas le consentement de son patron et agisse contrairement A ses instructions, peut encore Atre dans 'exerciae de ses fonctions.

Mtre Duranleau: Le jur6, dans sa question au juge, a pos6 le cas suivant: le chauffeur, apris avoir conduit la machine au garage, la reprend, sans permission et contrairement aux instructions de son patron, pour faire une course pour ses fins personelles; le patron est-il responsable?

Le juge: Si une personne p6natre dans un endroit ferm6 oi une auto est gard6e, et, sans autorit6 de la part du propri6taire et hors sa connaissance, s'en empare, ou bien si elle s'empare de la machine lorsqu'elle est sois la garde d'une tierce personne et cause des dommages, dans l'usage de cette machine, le propri6taire dans cc cas n'est pas responsable. des dommages; mais si l'automobile est encore sous le controle du chauffeur et qu'il s'en sert pour ses fins personnelles contrairement aux instructions de son patron, il abuse de ses fonctions, mais je suis d'opinion que dans ce cas le propri6taire est responsable. There can be little doubt that that direction was understood by the jury as implying a statement of the law such as is involved in the following illustration given by Acting Chief Justice Archibald in delivering the judgment of the Court of Review.

Where an owner of a car leaves his chauffeur in possession and in a position to use the car as he may deem fit, the result would be different because the owner of the car is responsible for the conduct of the man whom he is supposed to know. Take for example as an illustration that the owner has a private garage, and he instructs his chauffeur that his car is to be within the garage and the door locked by ten o'clock each evening but the owner leaves the chauffeur in possession of the key; the chauffeur, taking advantage of that, opens the garage, takes the car out, and damages result. The owner might easily have demanded of his chauffeur that he should deposit the key with him at night. I think there is no question that the owner would be responsible in such a case.

With great respect, I venture to agree with Mr. Justice Cross that this is "plainly a mistake."

I have outlined the view of the facts bearing on the vital question on which the Court of King's Bench proceeded.

To complete the statement of what seems to be material, however, I should add that upon the evidence it was part of Lauzon's duty to have placed the defendant's automobile in its proper position on the second floor of the garage when he brought it in, and that until he had done so it could scarcely be said that it had passed from his custody into that of the proprietor of the garage. When the automobile was in the garage from about 9.15 until 9.40 on the evening in question it remained on the ground floor. In view of these latter circumstances it is perhaps not of great moment, except as affecting his credibility, whether Lauzon actually brought the car into the garage or not, or whether he started on his promenade d'agr6ment (joy-ride) from the garage or from a point distant some 200 yards from it. In either case he certainly set out "on a frolic of his own" in the sense of that term as used by Baron Parke in Joel v. Morrison and adopted by Jervis C.J. in Mitchell v. Crassweller (2), or as put by Cockburn C.J. in Storey v. Ashton (3) he

On the other hand it is equally clear that according to the opinion of the Cour de Cassation in Picon c. Peltier (4), Lauzon having been ordered to take the automobile to the garage

As put in the text of the Arrit,

The French court extends the doctrine of the English deviation cases such as Venables v. Smith (5); (see also Williams v. Koehler & Co., (6); and Chicago Consolidated Bottling Co. v. McGinnis (7)); and treats as merely an abuse of the employment what would in England be regarded as something clearly outside its course, there having been, to quote from the syllabus of the latter American case,

139, In the direction of Erskine, J., in Sleath v. Wilson (1), disapproved in Story v. Ashton (2), views somewhat similar to those which prevailed in Picon c. Peltier are expressed.

The case at bar is indistinguishable from the French case.

Storey v. Ashton (1) and Mitchell v. Crasweller (3), on the one hand, and Picon c. Peltier, on the other, illustrate the distinct cleavage between the views of the limit on the master's responsibility for misconduct of his servant in England and France.

It is interesting to compare the recent case of Irwin v. Waterloo Taxi Cab Co. (4).

Responsibility for damage caused by a thing which he has under his care (Art 1054 C.C. par. 1) arises only when the occurrence is due to the thing itself, not when it is ascribable to the conduct of the person by whom it is put in motion, controlled or directed, D. 1918, 2. 7; D. 1912, 2.255.

See too, D. 1907, 2.17. The finding of negligence against Lauzon is unchallenged and unchallengeable.

It is equally clear that there is no evidence of any want of care on the defendant's part in engaging him such as might render him liable under Art. 1053 C.C.; and, in so far as the sixth finding of the jury imputes absence of reasonable supervision to the defendant, it is likewise without support in the evidence.

On the contrary he has, in my op'inion, discharged any burden of proof which the Quebec statute, 3 Geo. V., 19, may have cast upon him in this regard by shewing that his supervision of Lauzon was all that could reasonably be expected in the absence of any ground to suspect him of misconduct.

I agree with the comments upon that finding made by Cross and Pelletier JJ. and my brother Mignault.

Failure by the defendant to exercise due supervision over his chauffeur was in no sense the proximate cause of the plaintiff's son being killed. No supervision that could reasonably be exacted would have prevented Lauzon joy-riding on the night in question.

On the other hand to a claim under the concluding paragraph of Art. 1054 C.C., the most vigilant supervision would not avail as a defence except perhaps in regard to the burden of proof on the actual facts. Sec. 3 of 3 Geo. V., 19, which replaced Art. 1406 of the R.S.Q., affords the plaintiff no assistance.

The head note in Woo Chong Kee v. Fortier (1), cited by the respondent is misleading.

As pointed out by Mr. Justice Greenshields, at p. 361, 3 Geo. V., 19, s. 3, was not in force at the date of the accident there in question.

As soon as it appeared that the defendant owned the automobile driven by Lauzon the amended statute put upon him the onus of proving either that the accident was not attributable to any fault of Lauzon or facts sufficient to establish that Lauzon was not engaged at the time in the performance of work for which he was employed. But see Boyle v. Ferguson (2), on the latter point. The real difficulty with which we are confronted is to determine whether, on the facts as above stated, Lauzon was, as a matter of law, engaged "in the performance of the work for which he was employed."- "au cours de l'ex~cution de ses fonctions"-when he killed the plaintiff's son.

In view of the verbal differences between the Quebec code and the C. N. already adverted to, Quebec authority on the question under consideration would be of exceptional value. Unfortunately there is a dearth of it. The particular aspect of the master's responsibility presented by the case at bar does not seem to have directly engaged the attention of the Quebec Courts in any reported case brought to our notice, and the commentators do not discuss it. But such passing allusions as we do find seem to indicate a tendency to interpret the restrictive words of the Quebec code as the equivalent of the phrase "in the course of their employment as servants" as used in such English cases as Story v. Ashton rather than in the sense given to the words "dans les fonctions, etc." of the C.N. by the Cour de Cassation in Picon v. Peltier (2).

Thus in Turcotte v. Ryan (3), the liability of the master, Desjardins, was upheld by Fitzpatrick C.J., delivering the judgment of this court, on the view that the plaintiff had been injured by his co-defendant Turcotte while the latter was in Desjardins' service and "during the course of his employment", and by Lavergne J., speaking for the majority in the Court of King's Bench

And in Trudel v. Hossack (1), the immunity of the master from liability under Art. 1054, C.C. was rested by Wurtele J., who delivered the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench, not on the fact that the J. servant Frenette was not engaged as a driver or even that lie had taken his master's horse out surreptitiously, but on the ground that he "was not in the performance of any work for his master."

In the authorities cited by the codifiers (1st Rep. p. 61) we find little to throw light on this question. Thus Pothier merely says that. masters are not responsible for d6lits ou quasi-dblits (of their servants) qu'ils commettent hors de leurs fonctions;

(Obligations, No. 121).

In Mass6 et Verg6, sur Zachariae, No. 628, we are told that:

En principe, la responsabilit6 des maitres et des commettants, A '6gard du dommage caus4 par les domestiques ou prdposis, n'est pas limit6e au cas o4 les actes dommageables rentraient dans les termes du mandat ou de la fonction; pour que le mattre ou le commettant soient responsables, il suffit que les actes dommageables du domestique ou du pr6posg se rattachent A l'objet de leur mandat, et qu'ils aidnt eu lieu A l'occasion de son ex6cution.

Orldans, 21 d6c. 1834, S. V. 55, 2, 661; Cass. 13 d6c. 1856, S. V. 57, 1. 442, et Paris 8 oct. 1856, S.V. 57, 2, 445.

Toullier says:

C'est commander une action que d'y employer un domestique ou de charger tout autre pr6pos6 de la faire pour soi. L'action devenant alors le fait du matre ou des commettants, il en doit rdpondre comme de son propre fait.

I have read all the French authorities cited in the judgments below, by my learned colleagues from Quebec, and in the factums, and a great number of others. There is no doubt that the tendency in recent years of the French courts and the text writers has (1) Q.R. 4 Q.B. 370, at p. 373.

been to hold the master answerable for any wrong committed by his servant while in his employment, unless the act complained of be wholly foreign to his functions as servant.

They hold the master liable if the servant's act be in any way connected with his employment.

Sainctelette in his work "Responsabilit6 des Propri6taires d'Automobiles", p. 223 thus sums the matter up:

And the modern authorities which the learned writer cites certainly go far to bear out his conclusion. I have already referred to Picon c. Peltier (1). In Paterson c. Bibien (2) a chauffeur who, contrary to orders, had taken his master's automobile out for his own purposes by his negligence in driving caused injury to one Bibien, a comrade whom he had taken for a drive. The Cour de Cassation, reversing the Cour d'Appel, held the owner not responsible-but solely on the ground that Bibien knew that the chauffeur was driving for his own purposes and not on account of his master and had entrusted himself to the care of the chauffeur personally and individually and not in his capacity as the servant of Paterson. The court treats the case as one of "I'exercice abusif du mandat," and expressly states that the court below was well advised in refusing to relieve the master on that ground.

In the foot note, however, the editor of the report says:

Faudrait-il donner la m~me solution si le dommage avait 6t0 caus6 A un tiers compl~tement 6tranger au pr6bos? Par exemple, en se plaant dans les hypothqses de laprisente espbce, faudrait-il d~charger le mattre de toute responsabilit6 si l'accident avait 6t6 caus6 par le conducteur de l'automobile, non pas A un camarade qu'il emmenait en promenade, mais A un passant qu'il aurait renverse?

La question parait plus delicate et cependant il semble que-d'aprbs la jurisprudence-la solution doit tre la m~me dans les deux hypoth6ses. Referring to the same case the reporter in his foot note to Picon c. Peltier (1) says:

Dans ce cas en effet on ne pouvait consid6rer que le mdcanicien accomplisait un acte de son service.

In the report of this case in the Gazette du Palais (2), the reporter in his foot note cites as in point the case of Daubert c. Salles (3), where it was held that: Le mattre n'est pas responsable de l'usage nuisible fait par son domestique d'une chose qui lui appartient, alors que, d'une part, le mattre n'a commis aucune faute en laissant cette chose A la disposition du domestique, et que, d'autre part, le domestique, en faisant usage de cette chose, n'a point accompli un acte de ses fonctions.

A mistress had directed her servant to take some wine from her table and throw it away because she found it unfit to drink. The servant took it to the kitchen and there gave some of it to a visitor to drink.

The wine was poisoned and killed the visitor. In an action by his widow against the mistress the latter was held not liable on the ground that the servant had acted outside the scope of her functions as such, and the decision was upheld by the Cour de Cassation. Although the case would seem to have been one of pure accident, actionable fault on the part of the servant appears to have been assumed. The fact that the wine of which she made use belonged to her mistress and was entrusted to her to be thrown out and was (1)

1. 351.

1. 140. (3)

1. 439.

79089--10 therefore in her lawful custody as servant, the purposes for which it was given her not having yet been accomplished, did not suffice to render the mistress liable.

Laurent in commenting on this case says:

Neither is joy-riding work for which a chauffeur is engaged.

The principle underlying the decision of this case very closely approaches, if indeed it is not precisely that upon which the respondent would maintain the judgment of the Court of King's Bench in the case at bar. What connection was there between "the work, for which (Lauzon was) employed" (la fonction A laquelle il 4tait employ6) and what he was doing when he killed the plaintiff's son except the fact that it was his master's automobile that he was using for his own purposes, having taken advantage of its being in his custody to do so?

It is interesting to compare with these cases the decision in The Coup6 Co. v. Maddick (1), where the defendant having hired a carriage and horses from the plaintiff, his coachman, instead of taking them, as was his duty, to the stables, drove for his own purposes in another direction and in so doing negligently injured the horses and carriage. The master was held liable, but for breach of contract as bailee.

In Sanderson v. Collins (2), however, while the decision in Coup6 Co. v. Maddick (1) was regarded as not maintainable on the ground above stated (compare Arts. 1767, 1769, 1200, 1150, 1071 and 1072 C.C.), it was suggested by Collins, M.R., with some doubt (p. 632), that it might perhaps be upheld on the ground that the act done was within the scope of the coachman's authority since

In Sanderson v. Collins (1) the master was held not liable, however, for an injury negligently done to a borrowed carriage by his coachman who had taken it out for his own purposes without his master's knowledge because in doing so the coachman had not been acting in the course of his employment.

The driver was held to have been acting in the course of his employment and the plaintiff therefore recovered against the company. This case might not have been so decided in England 50 or 60 years ago.

Both Vaughan Williams L. J. and Fletcher-Moulton L. J. dwell on the fact of the driver's belief that he was discharging his duty; he knew nothing of the limitation on the manager's right to use the company's cars.

Compare an arret cited by Demolombe, Vol. 31, No. 617, where the court gave some weight to the fact that the servant could not have supposed he was acting dans ses fonetions. A contrary view appears to have prevailed in Clark v. Buckmobile Co. (3).

In a case which Sainctelette cites at p. 219 from the work of Imbrecq "L'automobile devant la Justice" (which is not in the Supreme Court Library) a master was held responsible where, having sent his chauffeur to drive a friend from Paris to Rouen, the chauffeur after reaching Rouen killed two persons while using the automobile in joy-riding with some companions. The court, however, laid some stress on the facts that the return journey from Rouen to Paris would have taken at least two days and that the accident happened on the second day of the stay at Rouen, wherefore the chauffeur should be regarded as having been still "dans l'exercice de ses fonctions."

Some French authors state the master's responsibility in very broad terms. The passages from Baudry-Lacantinerie et Barde (Obligations No. 2911) quoted by my brother Mignault, and from Dalloz (1874. 2. 52) quoted by my brother Brodeur, are examples.

Larombibre tells us that:

et The same author (Art. 1384 C.N. par. 10, in fine) Other writers are inclined to give a wider scope to the restrictive condition imposed by the code and to treat as "en dehors des fonctions" acts which the former would regard as merely "l'exercice abusif des fonctions."

Demolombe in discussing Art. 1384 of the C.N. (Vol. 31 No. 617) cites with approval a decision of the "Tribunal Civil de la Seine" in which the important statement is made that the responsibilities imposed by this article on masters and employers "sont de droit 6troit."

See also S. 1875. 2.36. J. learned author jso says:

Toujours faut-il que le fait ou I'acte quelconque du domestique ou du pr6pos6 rentre dans la nature des fonctions auxquelles il est employd et qu'il 'ait commis comme tel, en sa qualit6 de domestique ou de pr6pos6.

On this statement of the law the vital question in the present case would appear to be: Was Lauzon at the moment of the accident in control of the car in the capacity of servant to the defendant.

Laurent (Vol. XX, No. 582) says:

L'article exige une condition pour que les commettants soient responsables du fait de leurs prdpos6s, c'est que le dommage ait 6t6 caus6 dans les fonctions auxquelles ils les ont employds.

De suit que si le dommage a 6t6 caus6 en dehors de ces fonctions, les commettants cessent d'6tre responsables.

Cette condition est une cons6quence du motif sur lequel la responsablit6 des commettants est fond6e.

Ils choisissent un pr6pos6 pour remplir certaines fonctions; c'est en accomplissant ce service que le pr6pos6 cause un dommage par un d6lit ou quasi-ddlit; la loi pr6sume que le dommage est caus6 par la faute du commettant, parce qu'il a fait choix d'un pr6pos6 malhabile, inprudent ou mdchant. La prdsomption de faute et, par suite, la responsabilit6 du commettant supposent done que c'est dans le service que le dommage a 6t6 caus6.

Si le pr~pos6 a caus6 le dommage en dehors de son service, la raison de la responsabilit6 du commettant cesse, on ne peut pas lui reprocher d'avoir fait un mauvais choix, car le dommage caus6 n'a rien de commun avec le service pour lequel le commettant a choisi le prdpos6 et ds qu'il n'y a plus de pr6somption de faute, la responsibilit6 de I'article 1384 n'a plus de raison d'4tre.

Un seul et m6me fait peut done engager la responsabilit6 du commettant ou ne pas I'engager suivant qu'il est commis dans le service ou en dehors du service.

A writer in the Revue Trimestrielle, 1917, at pp. 134-5 Le pr~pos6 rend le patron responsable s'iI fait un acte m~me abusif ou d61ictueux dans le sens de la fonction.

Mais lorsque le prdpos6 va contre sa fonction, le patron n'est plus responsable. Laurent (Vol. XX No. 586) cites with approval the following passage from a judgment of the Court of Appeal of Paris (D. 1852,2. 240):

Une seule condition existe A cette responsabilit6 dcs mattres et commettants, c'est que le dommage ait 6t6 caus6 par leurs domestiques et pr6pos6s dans les fonctions auxquelles ils les ont cmploy6s, ce qui doit s'entendre surtout des abus commis dans l'accomplissement de ces fonctions, quasi-d6lits, d6lits ou crimes m~me. Pourvu que le fait dommageable se rattache A la fonction, qu'il n'en soit qu'une extension abusive, la condition de la loi existe et la responsabilit6 des mattres est encourue.

But since the only limit on the responsibility of the master is that implied in the condition that the damage must arise in the performance of the work for which the servant is employed (Toullier Vol. XI No. 282) he is at all events entitled to insist that this condition of a responsibility admittedly severe shall be really fulfilled.

Fuzier-Hermann,

Rep.

vbo.

Responsabilit6 Civil, No. 718; S. 1904, 2. 298.

M. Wahl in an article in Revue Trimestrielle, 1908, at p. 14, says that the ground of the decision in Picon c. Peltier (1) was that at the moment of the accident the master "n'avait pas abdiqu6 son devoir de surveillance."

The learned writer had, however, stated his own view in these terms:

Mais Particle 1384, cesse d'6tre applicable lorsque le conducteur en se servant de I'automobile agissait A l'insu de son patron et (n son nom personnel.

Dans ce cas le patron n'est pas tenu des cons6quences de l'accident qu'il n'a pu empcher et qui n'est pas arriv6 dans l'exercice des fonctions du conducteur.

But the authority cited for this proposition is Paterson c. Bibien (2) above referred to.

The value of the French decisions as authorities is much weakened by the prevalent view that whether a servant is or is not acting "dans les fonctions" is (2)

(1)

regarded as a pure question of fact to be conclusively determined by the "juges du fond."

Thus we read in Baudry-Lacantinerie et Barde, Obligations, No. 2195. A The same view is expressed by Laurent,Vol. XX, No.585. See also S. 1904, 2. 298, note (4-5); Garsonnet Trait6 de Procedure, XL, Vol. 1, p. 162; Labori Rep. Vbo. Resp. Civ. No. 174.

With respect, the question is one of mixed law and fact-a question of fact only within certain limits. Addison on Torts (8th ed.) p. 122.

What work was the servant employed to perform, what was he actually doing, and for whose benefit or on whose account was he acting; are no doubt, questions of fact. But, these facts being ascertained-and their ascertainment usually presents comparatively little difficultywhether what the servant actually did was "in the performance of the work for which he was employed" depends entirely upon the proper interpretation of these latter words;

and that is a question of law. prciser If there be no conflict in the evidence the question whether a servant whose wrongful act caused injury to a stranger was acting within the scope of his employment, is for the court; but, if there be conflict, then the question is for the jury. Barmore v. Vicksburg, etc. Ry. Co. (1).

But whether the act causing injury is so connected with the course of the employment as to engage the responsibility of the master or is such a departure from it as relieves him, must as a question of degree be determined by a jury properly instructed by a judge who correctly directs himself.

Clark and Lindsell on Torts (Can. ed. p. 76).

See, however, Joseph Rand v. Craig (1). It may be of some assistance in determining how far English cases may be helpful as affording rationes scriptae to compare the views taken by the French and English courts of some comparatively elementary phases of the subject under consideration though not directly bearing upon the point immediately * before us.

The basis on which the liability of the master rests is substantially the same in both countries. Although

Demolombe's view was that it depends solely on the master's faculty of choice of his servant (Vol. XXXI, Nos. 610-611), nearly all the other authors base it as well on the master's right of control by orders and instructions;

and this double basis of responsibility is now well established in the French courts.

S. 1887. 1. 456, and note.

See, too, 1893, 1. 217. note (3); Sourdat, t. 2. No. 887; Baudry-Lacantinerie et Barde (Oblig.) No. 2912;

Turcotte v. Ryan (2), per Lacoste C.J.

Since the decision in Limpus v. The London General Omnibus Co. (1) as pointed out by Fletcher-Moulton L.J. in Smith v. Martin and Kingston-upon-Hull Corporation (2):

Anglin The real question is whether it was an act done in the course of the (servant's) employment and not whether it was within the scope of the authority given to her.

The question is not one of authority: Smith v. North Metropolitan Tramways Co. (3).

Blackstone indicated the same test in his commentaries (Lewis 1 ed. Vol. 1, p. 4321), when he said: If the servant by his negligence does any damage to a stranger, the master shall answer for his neglect; but the damage must be done while he is actually employed in his master's service, otherwise the servant shall answer for his own misbehaviour.

In Lloyd v. Grace, Smith & Co. (4), Lord Macnaghten The expressions "acting within his authority," "acting in the course of his employment," and the expression "acting within the scope of his agency" (which Story uses) as applied to an agent, speaking broadly, mean one and the same thing. What is meant by those expressions is not easy to define with exactitude. To the circumstances of a particular case one may be more appropriate than the other.

Whichever is used it must be construed liberally, and probably, as Sir Montague Smith observed, the explanation given by Willes J. is the best that can be given.

Blackstone (Lewis ed.) Vol. 1, p. 430, states the principle in these terms:

As for those things which a servant may do on behalf of his master, they seem all to proceed upon this principle, that the master is answerable for the act of his servant, if done by his command, either expressly given or implied; nam qui facit per alium facit per se. See, too, Wood, Master & Servant, No. 279.

But if delegation of authority is to be taken as the basis of the master's liability, by liberality of (1) 1 H. & C. 526.

(3) 55. J.P. 630.

(2) [1911] 2 K.B. 775, at p. 782.

(4) [1912] A.C. 716 at p. 736. construction, implied authority must be made to cover all acts in the course of the employment.

Wood, Master & Servant, No. 280.

J.

The House of Lords, by its decision in Lloyd v. Grace, Smith & Co. (1), dispelled the notion that it is also essential that the servant should be acting "for his master's benefit."

Joseph Rand v. Craig, (2). Appropriate as these words are in some cases, "in a general statement of the law they are out of place," says Lord Macnaghten.

His Lordship proceeds to point out that in the very case in which Willes J. had used the phrase "for his master's benefit," Barwick v. English Joint Stock Bank (3), that eminent judge also said:

In all the cases it may be said as here, that the master had not authorized the act. It is true he has not authorized the particular act, but he has put the agent in his place to do that class of acts and he must be answerable for the manner in which that agent has conducted himself in doing the business which it was the act of his master to place him in.

The master's faculty of choice is here plainly indicated as a basis of liability, as it was in the classic passage from the judgment of the same distinguished judge in Bayley v. Manchester Rly. Co. (4), subject to the qualification that what was done by the servant, however wrongful, was done not from any caprice of the servant but in the course of his employment. Wood, Master & Servant, No. 288.

As put in Marion v. Chicago Railway Co. (5). The mere purpose of the employee to serve his employer has not a tendency to bring the act within the scope of his employment. Compare D. 1860.1.49.

(1) [1912] A.C. 716.

(3) L.R. 2 Exch. 259. (2) [1919] 1. Ch. 1. at p. 6.

(4) L.R. 7 C.P. 415. (5) 59 Iowa, 428.

In Quarman v. Burnett (1) Baron Parke put the liability of the master for the consequences of the servant's negligence on the ground that it was See, too, ,Smith on Master & Servant (5 ed.), p. 2S4, Addison on Torts (8 ed.) pp. 122 and 129, Duncan v. Findlater (2) per Lord Brougham.

In France and England, therefore, the applicability of the maxim respondeat superior in these cases would appear to rest on identical grounds.

It arises out of the legal relation between the master and the servant.

The master is liable in both countries alike, notwithstanding that he was unable to prevent the particular act which caused the injury (31 Demolombe, No. 611; 20 Laurent, No. 584; 4 Aubry et Rau, No. 447; Fuzier-Hermann,

Vbo. Resp. Civ. No. 480; Marcad6, Art. 1384, No. 3;

1885.1.21;

Smith on Master and Servant (5 ed.), p. 284; Pollock Torts (10 ed.), pp. 88-9); because he selected the servant (Fromageot "De la Faute," pp. 145, 150) and although the act was done in direct violation of his orders as to the manner in which the work should be performed-(31 Demolombe, 612; Sourdat, Responsabilit6 (4 ed.) t. 2, No. 888; Bayley v. Manchester, etc. "If the servant is acting within the scope of his employment, however much he may have abused his authority, however improperly and blunderingly he may have acted, the defendants are liable"; per Black- burn J. (1); Limpus v. Gen. Omnibus Co. (2); Whitehead v. Reader (3); Whatman v. Pearson) (4); and is an illegal or even criminal act.

S. 1873. 2. 42; S. 1851, 2. 359; Dyer v. Munday (5).

But there is no liability in either country where the illegal or criminal act is done wantonly for some purpose of the servant himself and not in the discharge of his duties; S. 1885, 1. 21: 20 Laurent No. 582, 2nd paragraph.

In France the owner of a public conveyance was held civilly liable for a criminal assault committed by his driver on a girl of 13 sent in his carriage from a railway station to a convent (D. 1873. 3, 7).

This decision appears to have been rested on breach of a contract to conduct the girl directly to the convent as well as on the ground that the act of the servant was "dans l'exercice de ses fonctions." The owner of an apartment was likewise held responsible where his concierge had aided in the seduction of a young girl by receiving letters for her and introduding young men into her room (S. 57. 2.445).

Larombibre, however, condemns this latter arrit (Art. 1314, No. 9) as does also Demolombe (Vol. 31, N. 618).

In England the master would probably have been held not liable in both these cases on the ground that the wrongful acts were committed "exclusively for the servant's private ends."

Pollock (10 ed.), p. 99; Richards v. West Middlesex Water Works Co.

But it would be otherwise if the act, though actually forbidden, were done in the master's interest. Mousell Brothers, Ltd., v. London & North Western Rly. Co. (2). Compare S.73.2.42, where a railway company was held liable for its servant's act in smuggling tobacco for his own purpuses,

The master is likewise liable in both countries if the particular act causing damage, though not actually one for which the servant was engaged, is connected with (se rattache aux fonctions) and was committed while the servant is occupied in performing (A l'occasion de) work for which he was employed.

Mass6 et Verg6 sur Zachariae, par. 628 (2); 20 Laurent, No. 583; Fuzier-Hermann, Rep. vbo. Resp. Civ. No. 669. But curious differences have developed in the application of this ground of liability.

A fire caused by the carelessness of a workman in throwing a lighted match on the floor while smoking at his work, has been held in France to render the master liable on the ground that smoking while working in a place where he was surrounded by inflammable material was "une grave imprudence" and the damage was caused "dans les fonctions."

1847. 2. 283; See also S. 1896. 1.91. In England under the like circumstances the master was held not liable (Williams v. Jones (3), by the majority of the Court of Exchequer (Erle C. J. Keating and Smith JJ.) on the ground that the lighting of the pipe was not in any way connected with the work for which the servant was employed. Mr. Justice Keating suggests that the firing of squibs or matches indulged in as a pastime during working hours would not be more clearly unconnected with the employment. But Blackburn J., dissenting, viewed the case as one of negligence in the course of the employment imputable in law to the master and entailing liability upon him. Mellor J., also dissenting, viewed it as negligence in the use of the shed where the workman was engaged, which had been loaned by the plaintiff to the defendant.

The view taken by the majority however, prevailed in Woodman v. Joiner (1). Again in France it has been held that the servant's act which causes injury must arise directly out of his employment and the master was held not liable where one workman mischievously flashed the sun's rays from a mirror in the eyes of another, who in his annoyance broke the mirror, whereupon the former threw some of the pieces of broken glass at him and thus destroyed his right eye.

Inadequate supervision was the basis of the claim; but the court held that the workman's act which had caused the damage

On the other hand in England it has been held that where a clerk using a lavatory intended for employees failed to turn off a tap after washing his hands upon quitting work and thus caused a flood, the master was liable because although washing his hands may not have been within the scope of the clerk's employment it was incident thereto. Ruddiman v. Smith (2). In an earlier case where a clerk had caused similar damage in using a lavatory which he was not permitted to use, the master was held not responsible; Stevens v. Woodward

But Grove J. expressed the opinion that if a housemaid, whose duty it was to attend the lavatory and wipe out the basin, but who was expressly forbidden to use it, had done so and left the tap open,

In France the fact that in order to commit the act causing injury the servant was obliged to enter a chamber to which his duties did not take him and to open a movable not belonging to him has likewise been held to preclude the master's responsibility; S. 1894. 2.16.

An act of the kind sanctioned but done beyond the limits of the property upon which the servant was authorized to perform such acts has been held in both countries not to entail liability on the master: Bolingbroke v. Swindon Local Board (2); S. 1873.2.8.

I confess my inability to appreciate what substantial ground of distinction relevant to the course of the employment or "'ex~cution des fonctions" exists between the case where the master loans his conveyance to his servant to use for his own purposes and that in which the servant,, taking advantage of the opportunity afforded by his custody of or access to it, surreptitiously appropriates it.

Indeed there would almost seem to be more reason for holding the master liable in the former class of cases than in the latter, since he was privy to the servant's use of his property. Yet in Narcisse c. Boisin (3) it was held that:

To the same- effect is the decision in Cormack v. Digby although the servant who had borrowed his master's horse and carriage for the day voluntarily brought home some meat from town for the master. Compare Rayner v. Mitchell. (2).

But in Patten v. Rea (3), where the horse and rig were being used in the master's business, the fact that the servant was at the same time going on private business of his own did not avail to relieve the master from liability. In Boyle v. Ferguson (4), where the master was held answerable, the servant had general authority to use his master's motor-cars for his own pleasure as well as for the master's business and a jury was allowed to infer user for the latter purpose.

On the other hand Sainctelette, at p. 219 of his treatise, cites the case of a workman employed in a garage who fraudulently took out an automobile at night to amuse his friends and while so doing killed a policeman.

The master was held liable.

The identity of the ground of liability of the master for damages caused by fault of his servant in the French and the English law and the similarity of the principles on which this branch of the law is administered in the two countries point to the conclusion that, notwithstanding some differences in the views prevalent in each as to the degree of connection with the work assigned which is requisite and as to when an entry on an enterprise of the servant's own will be deemed a mere deviation from the strict execution of duty and when it will amount to such an interruption of the course of employment as to put the servant en dehors de ses fonctions and the master's responsibility in abeyance, in seeking the true interpretation of the provision of the Quebec code under discussion one may not improperly take into consideration, in a case such as that before us, the reasoning on which the English courts have dealt with analogous cases. After careful comparison of all the authorities available the only reasonable conclusion seems to me to be that the limitation of the master's responsibility which it was intended to impose by the words "dans les fonctions auxquelles ils les ont employbs" was intended to be substantially the same as that which English courts understand to be imposed by the restriction which they formulate in the phrase "in the course of the employment."

The Cour de Cassation formerly held that a domestic servant in the house of his master should be conclusively reputed to be acting in the course of his employment (dans ses fonctions): S. 1860. 1.1013.

But it has since abandoned this doctrine, which created a legal presumption of responsibility entirely outside the text of the code, and has recognized that the master cannot be held responsible for a wrongful act committed in his house by his servant when not "dans l'exercice de ses fonctions"; S. 1885, 1.21.

In a more recent decision it has been held that domestic servants in the house of their master are prima facie reputed to be acting "dans l'exercice des fonctions auxquelles ils sont exploybs"; 1893,

2.296.

Compare Boyle v. Ferguson (1); Stewart v. Baruch (2).

It would almost seem as if the same court, impelled no doubt by the motive which has prompted legislation in Quebec and elsewhere subjecting owners of automobiles to special burdens greater than the common law would impose, has been disposed to hold the owner of an automobile liable for any use made of it by his chauffeur taking advantage of the control which his duties give him, however foreign to the work for which he is actually employed and however contrary to orders which in an English court would be regarded as limiting the sphere of the employment.

It is possible, although unlikely, that there may be a reaction in regard to this particular application of Art. 1384 C.N., and that the French Courts may ultimately reach the conclusion that the imputation of responsibility to the master in a case such as Picon c. Peltier (1) is "en dehors de toute texte" and involves legislative rather than judicial action. But it must be conceded that if the text of the Quebec code were identical with that of the Code Napol6on and we were bound in interpreting it to treat modern decisions of the Cour de Cassation as binding us in cases arising under the civil code, as we do judgments of the Privy Council and House of Lords in cases from the other provinces, we would probably find ourselves compelled to allow this appeal.

We find not a little support, however, in French authors and jurisprudence for what seems to me the more reasonable view taken by the English courts in regard to the particular phase of the master's responsibility under consideration, as illustrated in such cases as Story v. Ashton (2), and Rayner v. Mitchell (See also McCarthy v. Timmins, (2); Cavanagh v. Dinsmore, (3).

Thus it is not disputed that the responsibility imposed by Art. 1054 C.C. is "de droit 6troit" and that the condition attached to it must actually exist in the case of the master:

A 6tat As Demolombe puts it the act for which the master may be held must be committed by the servant "comme tel en sa qualit6."

It must either be committed in discharging, or be directly connected with, the work for which he is employed, 1904, 2, 298.

The master is not responsible when the servant "va contre sa fonction."

Rev. Trim. 1917, 135-where the servant "en se servant de l'automobile agissait A l'insu de son patron et en son nom personnel."

M. Wahl Rev. Trim. 1908, p. 14.

Notwithstanding the comparatively recent decision in Picon c. Peltier (4) and what has been stated in some of the other recent French cases, I am not satisfied that it is even yet conclusively settled in France that when a chauffeur, who takes advantage of the fact that he has the custody of his master's automobile to start out with it without'his master's knowledge and contrary to his orders "on a frolic of his own," while so using it by his fault injures a third person, the master is responsible for the damage.

In English law he certainly is not.

The case at bar must be determined in the last analysis, however, upon the interpretation of the provision of Art. 1054, of the Civil Code of Quebec, which admittedly states the condition of the defendant's responsibility. I find no ambiguity or uncertainty in the phrases "in the performance of the work for which they are employed" and "dans l'ex6cution des fonctions auxquelles ils sont employds," when they are read together, as they must be.

As applicable to this case both alike exclude the defendant's liability. Lauzon was acting neither "dans 1'exercice de ses fonctions" nor "A l'occasion de cet exercice" but "en dehors de ses fonctions"-"en dehors de son service"during his joy-ride on the night in question.

So far as they may be considered, English authorities uphold this conclusion and French modern authorities, even were we bound by them, although on the whole adverse, are not uniform in forbidding it.. I rest my conclusion, however, upon my opinion that according to its "plain letter and express provision" Art. 1054 C.C. excludes the defendant's liability and that recourse to authority should therefore be unnecessary, Herse v. Dufaux (1).

I would dismiss the plaintiff's appeal.

J. (dissenting).-Cette cause pr~sente une int6ressante question concernant la responsabilit6 de la faute d'autrui.

Il s'agit de savoir si un propridtaire d'automobile est responsable d'un accident caus6 par son chauffeur qui, ayant requ l'ordre de reconduire la voiture au garage, s'en est servi pour faire une promenade d'agr6ment au cours de laquelle cet accident est survenu.

Le jury a 6 favorable A la demande.

La cour de r6vision a maintenu le verdict du jury et a condamn6 le propri6taire de l'automobile.

La cour d'appel (1) a renvers6 ce jugement en se basant principalement sur la cause de Halperin v. Bulling (2), d6cid6e par la Cour Supreme au sujet d'un accident survenu dans des circonstances A peu pros semblables et oii nous avons jug6 que, suivant la d6cision rendue en Angleterre dans la cause de Storey v. Ashton, (3), le propri6taire de l'automobile n'6tait pas responsable. J'ai dit dans cette cause de Halparin v. Bulling (2) que je me consid6rais li par la jurisprudence anglaise, vu que cette cause provenait du Manitoba, mais que notre d6cision ne devrait pas 4tre consid6r'6e comme un pr6c6dent dans Quebec, vu que la responsabilit6 du maitre en droit civil repose sur des principes diff6rents.

Il s'est soulev6 dans la pr6sente cause quelques difficultis sur l'interpr6tation du verdict du jury et sur la question de savoir si le chauffeur 6tait "dans l'ex6cution des fonctions.auxquelles il 6tait employ6". Mais en prenant la version la plus favorable au d6fendeur intim6 Latreille, c'est-A-dire celle donn6e par la cour d'appel, (1) je considbre qu'il a engag6 sa responsabilit6.

Voici ce que dit la cour d'appel (1) pour arriver A sa conclusion que le chauffeur Lauzon n'6tait pas dans l'exercice de ses fonctions:proved.... Il est admis de tous que le nomm6 Lauzon 6tait 1'emploi du d6fendeur comme chauffeur de son automobile et qu'il d6sob6issait aux ordres de son patron quand il a fait la course au cours de laquelle I'accident est survenu.

Ces faits prouv6s et admis, il reste A savoir s'ils constituent en droit un cas de responsabilit6 pour le propri~taire.

C'est la question que nous avons A d6cider.

Je considbre que la cour d'appel a fait erreur en s'autorisant d'une d6cision anglaise pour juger la pr6sente cause.

Les textes du droit civil et de la jurisprudence anglaise peuvent paraitre A premibre vue avoir beaucoup de similitude.

Mais il est toujours dangereux d'aller chercher dans le droit anglais des autoritds ou des d6cisions qui se seront inspir6es d'un systime propre A ce corps de loi mais qui seraient absolument 6trangbres aux principes g6ndralement suivis dans le droit civil.

Voici, nous dit-on, deux textes de loi indentiques.

Le maitre est responsable des actes de son serviteur "in the performance of the work", dit l'article 1054 du code civil.

Les auteurs dans le droit anglais disent "in the course of his employment in his master's service" (Smith, Master & Servant, 6th Ed. p. 263) et la jurisprudence anglaise dans la cause classique de Barwick v. English Joint Stock Bank (1), jug6e en 1867, se sert de l'expression "in the course of the .service and for the master's benefit".

On pr6tend que les termes sont identiques et qu'alors la cour d'appel a bien jug6 la prdsente cause en appliquant notre d6cision de Halparin v. Bulling (2).

Si les termes sont identiques, si la loi est la mime dans les deux pays, comment s'expliquer alors cette diff6rence considerable dans l'application des mimes textes au suj et du compagnon de travail (fellow servant). En Angleterre et dans les provinces anglaises, on ne donne pas de recours contre le patron quand un employ6 est bless6 par son compagnon de travail; et cependant ce compagnon de travail est bien dans l'exercice de ses fonctions, "in the course of his employment and in his master's service".

Smith, op. cit. p. 263.

La cause de Priestly v. Fowler (1) 6nonce cette jurisprudence qui est encore suivie en Angleterre et dans les provinces anglaises du Canada o'i il n'y a pas de droit statutaire.

Celui qui oserait invoquer une telle jurisprudence sous notre droit civil serait bien mal venu h ce faire, car elle est entibrement oppos6e aux principes 616mentaires de la responsabilit6. Aubry 9 Rau, 46me. 6d., vol. 4, p..760. Cependant les textes sont A peu pris dans les m~mes termes.

Alors pourquoi cette difference dans les deux pays?

C'est que la thdorie de la responsibilit6 de la faute d'autrui repose en Angleterre et dans Quebec sur des principes bien diff6rents.

En Angleterre une personne est responsable de sa propre faute, mais ce n'est qu'h une p~riode assez r~cente (1867) que l'on a donn6, dans des termes que Pollock considare classiques, les cas of' le patron est responsable des actes de son employ6.

On ne s'est pas d6parti dans le droit commun de la doctrine du "common employment" 6nonc6e dans Priestly v. Fowler (1).

La responsablit6 du patron pour la faute de son employ6 n'est appliquie qu'avec r6ticence et circonspection, l'on dirait presqu'A regret.

a fallu l'intervention du Parlement, sur la pression des organisations ouvribres, sous forme d.'Employers Liability Act" et de "Workman's Compensation Act" pour 6tendre la responsabilit6 du maitre. Mais oit ces actes n'ont pas 6t6 adoptis et quand il ne s'agit pas d'ouvriers industriels, on est encore r~gi par les vieux principes de la doctrine du "common employment" ou "fellow servant", principes qui rdpugnent A notre id6e de la responsabilit6 sous le droit civil.

Maintenant sur quoi cette jurisprudence anglaise est-elle bas6e?

Pollock on Torts, 86me 6dition, p. 77, discute cette question et dit:

Si nous consultons, au contraire, la doctrine du droit civil sur la matiare, nous voyons quelle est la raison de la responsabilit6 du maitre pour les actes de son serviteur. Elle repose sur le principe que le maitre ne doit employer que de bons serviteurs, Pothier, dans son Trait6 "Des obligations," No. 121, dit que la responsibilit6 a 6t6 6tablie

Nous retrouvons le mime principe 6nonc6 dans Demolombe, vol. 31, No. 610, Colmet de Santerre, vol. 5, No. 36, et dans Laurent, vol. 20, No. 582. Les auteurs du Code Napoleon ont consacr6 cette doctrine.

Ils sont mime plus s6v6res A l'6gard des mattres qu'A I'6gard du pore de famille.

Ce dernier, sous 1'empire du Code Napoleon et sous notre code (Art. 1054 C.C.) peut 6viter d'Atre tenu responsable des fautes de son enfant en prouvant qu'il n'a pu emp~cher le fait qui a caus6 le dommage.

Nous trouvons dans Locre, Vol. 6, p. 280, les raisons pour lesquelles les auteurs de Code Napoleon frappaient plus sivrement le maitre que le pare dans le cas de la responsabilit6 de la faute d'autrui.

La responsabilit6 du maitre existe en France et dans Qu6bec, meme dans le cas le serviteur a agi de son propre mouvement, sans ordres ni instructions de son maitre.

Aubry & Rau, vol. 4, 46me 6d., p. 759; Touillier, vol. 11, p. 284; Larombibre, art. 1384.

Cette responsabilit6 existe 6galement dans le cas oii le serviteur a abus6 de ses fonctions.

C'est la pr6sente cause.

Demolombe, vol. 31, 614; Lau-, rent, vol. 20, No 506; Revue Trimestrielle, 1917, p. 134. Comme dit Demolombe, qui a 6crt toujours avec la plus grande mod6ration, la responsabilit6 du maitre ne cesse que dans le cas oa ou, comme dit Dalloz, 1874, 2, 52,

Quelles 6taient les fonctions de l'employ6 Latreille? C'6tait d'6tre chauffeur de son automobile. II en avait la conduite et le contrble.

Il est vrai qu'il avait, le soir en question, d6sob6i A ses ordres; mais cette d6sob6issance n'enlevait pas la responsabilit6 du maitre. Pourquoi?

Parce que ce serviteur 6tait un mauvais serviteur; et alors, comme disent Pothier et les autree auteurs, le maitre a eu tort d'engager un mauvais serviteur et de lui confier une machine dont son serviteur pouvait se servir pour ses propres fins. Des d6cisions ont t rendues en France sur des cas analogues.

Je citerai entr'autres celle rapport6e dans Dalloz, 1908, 1, 351, qui a 6t6 rendue par la Cour de Brodeur J. Cassation dans la cause de Picon v. Peltier. Le jug6 est come suit:- Les maltres ou commettants sont responsables non seulement du dommage caus6 par leurs domestiques ou pr6pos6s dans 1'exercice normal ou r6gulier des fonctions auxquelles ceux-ci sont employ6s, mais encore du dommage r6sultant de l'abus de ces fonctions. Civ. 1384.)

Ainsi le propri6taire d'une voiture automobile est civilement responsable d'un accident caus6 bar le fait du m6canicien pr6pos6 par lui A la conduite de cette voiture, dans le cas m~me ofi ce m6canicien, ayant regu de son mattre Fordre de reconduire la voiture au garage, s'en est servi pour faire une promenade d'agriment au retour de laquelle 1'accident est arriv6.

Le note publibe sous cette decision n'est pas signde; mais elle est fort int6ressante.

Les citations qui y sont faites d~montrent que cette d6cision de la Cour de Cassation est conforme h la jurisprudence et A la doctrine.

Sainctelette, qui est un auteur recherch6, a 6crit tout un trait sur la "Responsabilit6 des propridtaires d'automobiles."

Voici ce qu'il dit aux num6ros 188 et 189 de cet ouvrage:- Ainsi, je donne 1'ordre A mon chauffeur de m'attendre A la porte d'une maison od je viens d'entrer; en d6pit de mes instructions il profite de mon absence momentan6e pour faire avec ma voiture une course personnelle ou un tour de promenade.

Ou bien supposons que je charge mon m6canicien de conduire dans ma voiture un de mes amis A une ville voisine, et que je lui recommande de revenir aussit~t; mon chauffeur, une fois la course faite, s'attarde dans cette ville, y m~ne joyeuse vie, prom~ne ses amis dans mon automobile et finit par causer un accident. Ou bien encore je suppose que, devant m'absenter de chez moi pour faire un voyage, je d6fends A mon chauffeur de sortir avec l'automobile durant mon absence; A peine suis-je parti qu'il viole la d6fense que je lui ai faite. Enfin, supposons qu'A la fin de la journ6e, n'ayant plus besoin de la voiture, j'enjoigne A mon m6canicien de la reconduire au garage; il en profite pour faire une promenade d'agr6ment au cours de laquelle il cause un accident.

Suis-je, dans ces diff6rents cas, responsable du fait de mon micanicien?

Autrement dit, a-t-il agi dans l'exercice de ses fonctions, ou bien, au contraire, 1'accident s'est-il produit en dehors de ses fonctions?

Notons bien que le chauffeur n'avait pas requ mandat de servir de la voiture et que s'il 'a fait, c'est A l'insu de son mattre, et Brodeur J. parfois au m6pris d'une d6fense formelle. Peut-on dire, dans ces conditions, que la faute commise par le pr6pos6, en dehors de tout travail command6 et mame en violation d'instructions reques est r6put6 se rattacher aux fonctions au point d'engager la responsabilit6 du commettant?

189.-La jurisprudence pose un principe que les mattres ou commettants sont responsables, non seulement du dommage caus6 par leurs domestiques ou pr6pos6s dans 1'exercice normal et r6gulier de leurs fonctions, mais encore de celui qui r~sulte de l'abus de ces fonctions. Le dommage qui ne se rattache aux fonctions que par un abus qui en est fait engage la responsabilit6 du commettant. Il s'en suit que ce dernier est responsable lorsque le prbpos6 a agi non seulement sans autorisation, mais encor au m6pris d'une d6fense formelle qui lui aurait 6t6 faite. Dans ces cas la responsibilit6 civile du commettant d6coule, en droit, de cette id6e qu'il a mal choisi son pr6pos6 ou qu'il n'a pas suffisamment veill6 A la bonne ex6cution de son ordre ou au respect de la d6fense qu'il a faite.

Il me semble qu'il vaut bien mieux pour nos cours dans Qu6bec suivre ces opinions que celles qui ont 6t 6nonc6es dans une jurisprudence oi A regret on semble reconnattre aux victimes du serviteur quelques droits contre son maitre, et oi 'on declare encore que le maitre ne saurait etre responsable de la faute du compagnon de travail qui l'aurait bless&.

Mais, on dit, P'article 1054, C.C. n'est pas absolument dans les m6mes termes que l'article correspondant du Code Napolon. II n'y a pas de diff6rence en tant que le sujet qui nous occupe est concern6. On dit dans le Code Napol6on que les maitres sont responsables du dommage caus6 par leurs domestiques dans les fonctions auxquelles ils les ont employ6s. Notre article dit "dans 1'6x6cution des fonctions." Je ne vois pas dans ces termes une diff6rence qui puisse influer sur le litige actuel.

Le serviteur dans notre cas est chauffeur d'automobile.

C'est IA sa fonction et c'est dans l'exercice de cette fonction qu'il a caus6 l'accident.

Les auteurs en France d'ailleurs en discutant le sujet se servent presque toujours de l'expression "dans I'exercice des fonctions." Voyez Demolombe, au vol. 31, No. 614, qui, en donnant la premibre condition sous laquelle on peut r6clamer dit

On a discut6 en France la question de savoir si un dommage caus6 A l'occasion des fonctions pouvait engager la responsabilit6.

Mourlon est d'avis que non. Laurent, Beaudry-Lacantinerie et Aubry & Rau sont d'une opinion contraire.

Mais l'accident qui nous occupe n'a pas eu lieu A l'occasion, comme dans le cas souvent cit6 du cocher qui par malice frappe quelqu'un avec son fouet, mais je suis d'opinion que Lauzon a commis sa faute dans l'exercice de ses fonctions comme chauffeur d'automobile.

Nos codificateurs se sont inspirs du Code Napoleon pour r6diger notre article 1054, comme ils le disent dans leur rapport dont voici le texte- On r6fare 6videmment au mot "pr6pos6s" qui se trouve au Code Napoleon et que l'on a remplac6 dans notre code par le mot "ouvriers".

Pour toutes ces raisons, je crois que la Cour d'Appel (1) a err6 en basant son jugement sur une d6cision rendue sous le droit anglais et sous un systime qui n'a pas pour le mattre la mime s6v6rit6 que le code civil. II s'agit dans notre cas de bien se p~n6trer de l'esprit de la loi, de ses motifs et de son but. On les trouve dans le caractbre et l'opinion de ses r6dacteurs et dans les esprits de ses jurisconsultes.

Nous avionS J. tout cela dans Pothier, dans le Code Napol6on, dans les conmentateurs, dans le rapport de nos codificateurs, et dans notre code m~me, qui a t6 pr6par6 avant que la jurisprudence anglaise avec ses termes plus ou moins certains et d6finfs ait d6termind le cas oa le serviteur pourrait engager la responsabilit6 de son mattre.

Nous savons dans le droit francais sur quoi repose la responsabilit6 du mattre; et Pollock enseigne, au contraire que dans la jurisprudence anglaise

N'est-il pas plus rationel, dans ces circonstances, de suivre la jurisprudence frangaise telle qu'6noncie par la Cour de Cassation en 1908? Je remarque avec une certaine appr6hension la tendance qui existe de juger les causes de Qu6bec A la lumibre des pr6c6dents anglais.

Les remarques que je viens de faire dans la pr6sente cause et I'esprit de la loi dans les deux syst~mes nous d6montrent combien il est dangereux de sortir d'un systime pour aller chercher dans un autre des pr6c6dents qui reposent parfois sur des principes assez faiblement reconnus et parfois opposes, malgr6 que le texte put paraitre A peu pris identique.

Pour ma part, je prdfbre baser ma decision sur la d&cision de la Cour de Cassation, parcequ'elle a 6t6 rendue sous une loi que nos codificateurs d~clarent eux-mimes avoir adopt6e.

L'appel devrait 6tre maintenu avec d6pens et le jugemerit de la Cour de Revision r6tabli.

J.-Il y a dans cette cause une question intressante quantA la port6e du dernier alinda de l'article 1054 du code civil qui se lit comme suit: L'alinda 3 de 1'article 1384 du Code Napoleon dit: On enseigne en France que les dispositions qui rendent une personne responsable du fait d'un autre 6tant fonddes sur une pr6somption l6gale de faute, doivent par cela m~me recevoir une interpr6tation stricte.

Beaudry-Lacantinerie et Barde, Obligations, No. 2938.

Il y a quelques diff6rences d'expressions entre notre article et la disposition correspondante du code frangais.

Ainsi le mot "ouvriers" n'a pas, dans le langage ordinaire, un sens aussi 6tendu que l'expression "pr~pos6s."

Ajoutons qu'alors que l'article 1384 C.N. dit "dans les fonctions", &c., notre article emploie une expression un peu moins g6n6rale en disant "dans l'ex6cution des fonctions" &c., sens que la version anglaise rend encore plus pr6cis en disant: "in the performance of the work for which they are employed".

Je viens de signaler les diff6rences d'expressions entre le dernier alin6a de notre article 1054 et l'alinda 3 de l'article 1384 du code civil frangais.

Il importe maintenant de determiner si notre article doit recevoir la m~me interpr6tation que l'article 1384.

En d'autres termes, pouvons-nous, avec notre texte, accueillir ici les solutions de la doctrine et de la jurisprudence frangaises fond6es sur le texte du Code Napol6on? Ces solutions peuvent se r6sumer briavement. Ainsi MM. Baudry-Lacantinerie et Barde, (Obligations, t. 4 NO 2914), disent:- Mignault J. Mais ces expressions "dans les fonctions auxquelles ils ont t6 employ6s" ne signifient pas que les faits A raison desquels les mattres et commettants peuvent 8tre d6clar6s civilement responsables doivent constituer 1'exercice m~me des fonetions des domestiques ou des prdpos6s.

La condition exig6e par la loi se rencontre lorsque les faits dommageables ont 6t0 accomplis soit dans l'exercice de ces fonctions soit m6me A 1'occasion de cet exercice, et alors meme que le dommage r~sulte d'un abus des dites fonctions.

Et au num6ro 2911, les m~mes auteurs enseignent que

Le mattre ou le commettant serait responsable m&me du fait dommageable que le domestique ou le pr6pos6 aurait commis non seulement & son insr et sans son ordre, mais aussi malgr6 sa d6fense la plus formelle. Le motif de la loi conduit 4cette solution, car la circonstance que nous supposons maintenant ne fait point disparattre la faute dont le mattre ou le commettant s'est rendu coupable en choisissant mal son domestique ou son pr6pos6.

Ainsi, en France, la responsabilit6 du maitre est engagde dans la plupart des cas oti la faute de son domestique ou prdpos4 cause un tort h autrui, et le maitre n'4chappe A cette responsabilit6 que lorsqu'il appert que le fait incrimin6 est entibrement 6tranger aux fonctions du domestique ou pr~pos6.

Etant donn6 que l'interpr6tation stricte s'impose en cette matibre, je ne puis me convaincre que le texte de notre article nous autorise A accueillir toutes les solutions que je viens d'indiquer.

Ainsi, dans la province de Qubbec, le maitre et le commettant sont responsables du dommage caus6 par leurs domestiques et ouvriers dans l'exdcution des fonctions auxquelles ces derniers sont employds, ou, pour citer la version anglaise de 'article 1054, C.C., in the performance of the work for which they are employed. Ceci me parait clairement exclure la responsabilit6 du mattre pour un fait accompli par le domestique ou ouvrier A l'occasion seulement de ses fonctions, si on ne peut dire que ce fait s'est produit dans 1'excution de ses fonctions.

II peut souvent 6tre difficile de d6terminer si le fait dommageable est accompli dans l'ex~cution des fonctions ou seulement A leur occasion, mais s'il appert r6ellement que ce fait n'a pas t accompli dans l'ex6cution des fonctions du domestique ou ouvrier, nous nous trouvons en dehors de notre texte. L'abus des fonctions, si le fait incrimind s'est produit dans 1'ex6cution de ces fonctions, entre au contraire dans ce texte et entraine la responsabilit6 du maitre. II va sans dire que le maitre ou commettant ne peut, comme les autres personnes mentionnes en l'article 1054 C.C., repousser la responsablit6 en faisant voir qu'il n'a pu empecher le fait qui a caus6 le dommage. Dans la r6daction du dernier alinda de 1'article 1054 C.C. les codificateurs me paraissent s'Atre inspirds de la doctrine de Pothier (6dition Bugnet) "Obligations," No. 121, qui dit:- On me permettra de faire encore une observation g6n6rale parce que plusieurs des honorables juges de la cour d'appel me paraissent avoir assimild notre droit, quant A la responsabilit4 des mattres et commettants, au droit anglais sous 1'empire duquel on dicide que le maitre est responsable du fait dommageable accompli par son serviteur "in the course of his employment", expression qui, dans leur opinion, rend la mime ide que "dans I'exercice des fonctions auxquelles ces derniers. sont employ6s" ou, pour citer encore la version anglaise de l'article 1054 C.C. "in the performance of the work for which they are employed". Et ayant constat6, A leur avis, une identit6 de signification, les savants magistrats ont cit6 quelques d6cisions anglaises, et notamment I'arr~t rendu par cette cour dans la cause de Halparin v. Bulling (1) qui venait de la province du Manitoba. Il est quelquefois dangereux de sortir d'un systime juridique pour chercher des pr6c6dents dans un autre systime, pour le motif que les deux systimes contiennent des rigles semblables, sauf bien entendu le cas oil un syst~me emprunte A l'autre une rigle qui lui 6tait auparavant 6trangbre.

Alors m~me que la rigle est semblable dans les deux, il est possible qu'elle n'ait pas t6 entendue ou interpr6t6e de la in6me maniare dans chacun d'eux, et, comme l'interpritation juridique-je parle bien entendu de celle qui nous oblige-fait r6ellement partie de la loi qu'elle interpr~te, il peut tr~s bien arriver que les deux ragles, malgr6 une apparente similitude, ne soient pas du tout identiques.

Je ne fonderai donc pas les conclusions que je crois devoir adopter en cette cause sur aucun pr6c6dent tir6 du droit anglais, pas m6me sur la cause de Halparin v. Bulling (1), mais je me baserai uniquement sur le texte de l'article 1054 C.C.

La revue trbs compl~te que mon honorable colligue,

M. le juge Anglin, fait de la jurisprudence tant frangaise qu'anglaise d6montre combien il vaut mieux s'en tenir au texte de notre article, texte qui ne prite aucun 6quivoque, que de chercher A d6gager une r6gle ou un principe d'une infinit6 d'arrets d'espice. Il me semble d'ailleurs bien inutile de chercher cette r6gle, puisque nous l'avons en des termes tris clairs dans notre code civil, et si la jurisprudence frangaise et les opinions d'auteurs qu'invoque mon honorable collfgue, M. le juge Brodeur, vont au del de cette ragle, c'est la rigle elle-mime, et non cette jurisprudence et ces opinions, que nous devons suivre et appliquer. Dans l'espice, je suis d'opinion que Lauzon n'6tait pas dans 1'ex6cution des fonctions auxquelles il 6tait employd quand il a tu6 Elliott.

La rdponse du jury A la question 5 est une r6ponse que le jury ne pouvait raisonnablement donner en examinant toute la preuve (art. 501 C.P.C.).

Le t6moignage de Lauzon porte le cachet de l'invraisemblance et m~me de 'absurdit6, et malgr6 ma r6pugnance A intervenir dans une matibre de ce genre, je suis force de dire qu'aucun jury- ne pouvait dans 'espace raisonnablement arriver A la conclusion que Lauzon, lors de l'accident,

Il ne s'agit pas ici d'un cas d'abus, par le serviteur, des fonctions que son maitre lui a confi6es, mais d'un acte accompli entibrement en dehors de ces fonctions, et pendant qu'avec des copains semblables A lui, il se donnait le luxe d'un "joy-ride" A une vitesse effrinde A travers les rues de Montr6al. Pour cela, il a sorti l'automobile de son mattre du garage o'I il l'avait entr6e, et son pr6texte que, quand il a tu6 Elliott, il essayait, "testait", la machine, est une histoire absurde et invraisemblable que le jury ne pouvait raisonnablement croire.

Je n'ai pas perdu de vue la disposition de l'article 1406 des statuts revis6s, 1909, tel qu'amend4 par la Mignault J. loi 3 Geo. V. ch. 19, sect. 3.

Avant cet amendement l'article 1406 rendait le propridtaire d'un v6hiculemoteur responsable de tous accidents ou dommages caus6s par son v~hicule-moteur dans un chemin public ou place publique.

On a sans doute trouv6 trop rigoureux cet article qui cr~ait une responsabilit6 absolue A la charge du propri6taire, m6me dans le cas d'un pur accident, et I'amendement impose au propri6taire ou conducteur le fardeau de la preuve que la perte ou le dommage n'est pas d-a A la n6gligence ou A la conduite rdpr6hensible du propri6taire ou du conducteur.

Cette loi ne modifie pas A mon avis le droit commun quant A la responsabilit6 de sa propre faute (art. 1053 C.C.) ou de la faute d'autrui (art. 1054 C.C.) mais elle oblige le d6fendeur A prouver qu'il n'est pas dans les conditions d'oA d~coulerait d'apris le droit commun, sa responsabilit6 pour le fait dommageable.

Il est vrai que le jury, quand on lui pose la question 6: Was the said accident due to the fault and negligence or want of care of the defendant or his driver?

If so, in what did the said fault or negligence consist?

rdpond (je cite cette rdponse textuellement):

As no evidence was produced to the contrary, we find that the defendant was negligent in omitting to satisfy himself from time to time as to whether the chauffeur or driver had car out against orders; but particularly throw blame on the driver for his want of competence in the way of driving, as in his evidence he said that something was wrong with the car, and in spite of that driving on St. Lawrence Boulevard at excessive rate of speed, not stopping behind stationary street car and pass same on left hand side, all contrary to the vehicle laws of tha Province of Quebec.

79089-12"

Mais puisqu'il s'agit de savoir si le dfendeur 6tait persornellement en faute, il convient de dire que la faute que le jury reproche au d6fendeur, c'est de ne pas s'6tre enquis de temps h autre si le chauffeur avait sorti son automobile contre ses instructions, ce n'est pas d'avoir employ6 un chauffeur incomp6tent, et le jury ne trouve le d~fendeur coupable de cette faute que parce qu'aucune preuve au contraire n'avait t6 faite. Or la preuve constate que le d6fendeur a pris des renseignements au sujet de son chauffeur avant et apris l'avoir engag6 et qu'il a donna des instructions au propridtaire du garage de ne pas laisser sortir l'automobile aprbs dix heures du soir. Il n'y a rien au dossier, pas plus que dans les r6ponses du jury, qui fasse voir que le d6fendeur ait t coupable d'une faute ayant un rapport quelconque avec l'accident, et en supposant mime que la preuve constaterait que le d6fendeur n'a pas surveinl son chauffeur-et elle ne le constate pas-rien n'aurait justifi6 le jury A dire que la surveillance la plus compl~te aurait empech6 Lauzon de faire sa tourne folle le soir de I'accident.

Je suis donc d'avis de renvoyer l'appel avec d~pens. Appeal dismissed with costs.