the judgment of the Superior Court and dismissing the appellant's action to set aside a valuation roll of the corporation respondent.
The material facts of the case are fully stated in the reasons for judgment of the Registrar of this court on a motion to affirm jurisdiction, which motion was granted.
*PRESENT:-Idington, Duff, Anglin, Brodeur and Mignault JJ THE REGISTRAR.-This a motion to affirm jurisdiction.
The facts shortly are as follows:- An action was brought by Andrew H. D. Breakey et al. against the corporation of Metgermette-Nord M "m"BEE in which the plaintiffs alleged:
1. Les demandeurs sont contribuables de la corporation d6fenderesse, portis au rble d'6valuation comme propri6taires bien-fonds imposables, pour une valeur consid6rable, et sont les plus grands propri6taires fonciers de la corporation d6fenderesse, sans tenir compte des biens-fonds ci-dessus mentionnds, et sont sp6cialement int6ress~s dans les affaires municipales de la d6fenderesse et sp6cialement dans le r8le d'6valuation en vigueur.
2. La corporation d6fenderesse a actuellement un r8le d'6valuation sur lequel elle se base pour faire ses repartitions pour taxes municipales et qui sert A la r6partition des taxes impos6es par la corporation scolaire du m~me endroit;
Au mois de juillet dernier, les estimateurs de la corporation d6fenderesse pr6pardrent un rble, qui fut homologu6 au mois de septembre suivant et qui sera produit, en vertu duquel rble la corporation d4fenderesse a tax6 et impos6 et a mis susceptible d'Atre tax6s et impos6s et a mentionn6 sur le dit rble, comme appartenant aux demandeurs propri6t6, les lots suivants, savoir:
Rang lots et rang lot 25; rang lot 33; rang 2, 34; rang 2, lot 35; rang lot 16; rang 3, lot 58; rang lot rang lot 2; rang lots 8 et 9; rang 6, lot 5; rang 6, lot 6; rang 6, lot rang lot 8; rang 6, lot rang 6, lot 9; rang lot 9; rang lot 29; rang lot
4. Les demandeurs n'ont rien A faire sur ces lots et du rang 2, n'6tant pas propri6taires, ni du fonds, ni de la coupe du bois. Les demandeurs ne sont pas propridtaires des lots et 34 du rang 2, ni du fonds, ni de la coupe du bois.
Les demandeurs ne sont pas propri6taires du lot rang n'ayant qu'un droit de flotter le bois.
Les demandeurs ne posshdent qu'un demi-acre, comme propri6taires sur la partie nord-est du lot 35, rang dont la coupe sur balance.
8. Les demandeurs n'ont rien A faire avec le lot 33 du rang n'ayant ni la coupe ni le fonds.
9. Quant aux autres lots ci-dessus d6sign6s, les demandeurs ne sont propri6taires que de la coupe de bois.
Les .demandeurs n'ont aucun droit de possession, ni d'occupation, et n'ont rien A faire sur ces lots qui leur sont compl~tement 6trangers, A part que ci-dessus mentionn6.
11. La d6fenderesse pr6tend que les demandeurs sont propri6taires de la coupe de bois qui existe sur ces lots et elle a port6 ces diff6rents lots au r6le d'6valuation, pr6tendant avoir le droit d'6valuer les coupes de bois, s6par6ment du fonds, de consid6rer immeubles, au point de vue municipal, les susdits lots, en vue de taxer les demandeurs comme propriftaires de ces coupes de bois.
12. En portant les demandeurs comme propribtaires de ces lots au r6le d'6valuation, sachant que les demandeurs ne l'6taient pas, mais pensant avoir le droit de taxer et d'6valuer, au r6le d'6valuation, des coupes de bois s6par6ment des fonds, la d6fenderesse a agi ill6galement sans droit et exc6dant ses pouvoirs.
To this the defendant pleaded:
1. Ignore le paragraphe 1, la d6fenderesse d6clarant
'en tenir au rble d'6valuation.
2. Admet le paragraphe 2.
3. La paragraphe 3 est ni6, sauf quant A l'existence et la 16galit6 du r6le.
4. Ignore les d~clarations mentionn6es au dernier paragraphe du paragraphe 3, et les paragraphes 4-5-6-7-8-9-10.
5. Nie les paragraphes 11 et 12 de l'action.
6. Aucune plainte n'a t6 portde par les demandeurs lors de I'homologation du r6le; les demandeurs sont des absents qui n'ont nomm6 personne dans la municipalit6 d6fenderesse et ni les 6valuateurs ni la d6fenderesse ne peuvent se renseigner aupr~s d'eux dans la preparation de leur rble.
The motion was argued before me on the basis .that the question to be decided was whether or not a right to cut wood upon lands in the Province of Quebec had the effect of making the person having the privilege the owner of an immovable and therefore liable to be placed on the valuation roll as such owner; it would seem to me, however, that as to certain lots the plaintiffs distinctly allege that they have been placed upon the roll where they have not even a right to cut timber (see paragraphs 4, 5, 6), and as the plea neither admits nor denies these allegations, it would appear to me that we hAve here a distinct issue raised as to the title to these lots and the court has jurisdiction by virtue of sec. 46 (b) of
the Supreme Court Act.
But dealing with the matter on the basis of the arguments of counsel, the question for determination then is: Does the issue involve any title to lands or tenements, annual rents or other matters or things where rights in future might be bound?
A determination of this requires that certain articles of the codes should be construed. Art. 16, subarticle
27 of the Municipal Code reads as follows:
Art. 649, Title XXII and following, of the Municipal
Code, provide for the duties of the assessors in preparing their valuation rolls and amongst other things they are told that all immovable property is taxable property with some exceptions not of moment here.
They are also told they must draw up the valuation roll setting out the particulars required by title XXII of the Municipal Code.
By Art. 654 of title XXII the assessors are directed to enter on the valuation roll in separate columns, amongst other things, the real value of every taxable immovable or part of an immovable and 6th, the name and surname of the owner of every immovable or part of immovable, if known.
It is further provided in the same title that after the roll is prepared, it is to be deposited in the office of the. corporation, certain notices must be given, and after complaints have been adjusted, the roll becomes homologated.
Title XXIII of the Municipal Code provides for the imposition of taxes based upon the taxable property as set out in the valuation roll.
The Municipal Code also contains provisions for appeal, but the law is well established that where the complaint is that the authority has exceeded its powers and its act is therefore ultra vires, a person complaining on this ground is not precluded from taking proceedings in the Superior Court to obtain redress.
The defendants rely upon the interpretation of immovables as defined in Art. 381 of the Civil Code as amended by 2 Geo. V. ch. 45 which reads as follows:- It may well be that the interpretation they place upon immovable is correct and includes the right to cut timber in the present instance, but that is a question of the merits of the appeal. What I have to determine is: Is there jurisdiction in the Supreme Court to hear the appeal?
Or in other words: Does the matter in controversy in the appeal involve matters or things ejusdem generis with titles to lands where rights in future may be bound?
I am of the opinion that it does.
Gilbert v. Gilman, (1); Foster v. St. Joseph (2).
Counsel for the defendants claims that the action is premature and that the valuation roll has no such finality as would warrant an action to have it annulled, but it appears to me clear from the terms of the Municipal Code that the preparation.of the valuation roll is a necessary part of the machinery by which the rates are imposed upon the owners of inimovable property and I do not see why it cannot be attacked after homologation, which the declaration alleges to have taken place, as readily as later on when all proceedings have been completed and the municipal council proceeds to fix the rate to be imposed upon the property included in the valuation roll.
The plaintiff relies upon the jurisprudence of the court particularly Stevenson v. City of Montreal
The facts of that case are not on all fours with the present but the difference I do not think is material.
The fact that in the Stevenson Case (1) a by-law was passed for the widening of a street and the valuation roll was based upon the by-law, does not,
I think, give the valuation roll any higher standing:
than the roll which has to be prepared under the provisions of the municipal code.
I am of the opinion therefore, as I have said, that the Supreme Court of Canada has jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
If I am wrong in my conclusions, the defendant is not precluded by my order from movinglater on to quash the appeal for want of jurisdiction as nothing I do can have the effect of conferring jurisdiction upon the court if otherwise it has none.
The application is granted, costs in the cause.
See-Canadian Pacific Railway Co. v. Rat Portage
Glenwood Lumber Co. v. Phillips
McPherson Temiskaming Lumber Co. (4).
Romeo Langlais K.C. for the motion to quash.
Louis St. Laurent K.C., contra.
J (dissenting)-The basis of assessment in Quebec distinguishes between real and personal property.
The Court of King's Bench has decided that appellants' title, which is admitted and, as such, is no way in dispute, gives him a property of which the quality is such that it must be classified as real property and hence liable to be assessed as such.
The resultant tax, it is admitted, cannot by any possibility reach the sum of two thousand dollars. Hence that basis for an appeal here fails.
So long as the title, as such, is beyond dispute, the question of the quality of property which is held thereby does not, in my opinion, fall within the meaning of this subsection.
I, therefore, think the motion to quash should be allowed with costs.
J. concurs in dismissing the motion with costs. J.-I concur with Mr. Justice Mignault. J.-I concur with Mr. Justice Mignault. J. The appellants seek to have a valuation roll of the respondent set aside as to a large number of properties which are entered in the roll as belonging to the appellants and subject to being assessed against them for municipal and school taxes, and allege that as to some of these properties they own neither the soil, nor the right to cut timber, and as to others they own merely the right to cut timber. They further complain that the respondents have undertaken to value the. right to cut timber separately from the soil and to assess the appellants as owners of such right.
Superior Court but dismissed by the Court of King's
Bench, and the appellants appeal to this court. They succeeded in having the jurisdiction of this court affirmed by the Registrar and the respondent now moves to have the appeal quashed for want of jurisdiction.
I am of opinion that we have jurisdiction.
As to some of the properties mentioned in the declaration, the issue is -whether the appellants own either the soil or the right to cut timber thereon, and this raises a question as to the title of these properties.
As to the others, the issue is whether the appellants can be assessed in respect of the right to cut timber independently of the right of ownership in the soil.
The right to cut timber perpetually or for a limited time is an immovable right (Art. 381 C.C.).
Future rights of the appellants in respect of this immovable right and its being subject to assessment are therefore involved.
The motion to quash should be dismissed with costs.
Motion dismissed with costs.
Statutes and regulations cited