St. Lawrence Bridge Co. v. Lewis

Per Anglin and Mignault JJ.-In order to ascertain the "average remuneration" of the injured man, evidence must be adduced (and the trial judge's findings on these points are entitled to the greatest weight) 1st, of the period during which the injured man was employed; 2nd, of the workmen doing the same class of work in the establishment daring that period irrespective of their salary; 3rd, of the respective periods of employment of each of such workmen (per Anglin J. making deduction from the number of days comprised therein for loss of time which is exceptional and involuntary, whether ascribable to a cause personal to the employee or to non-operation of the establishment); 4th, of the total amount of the earnings of each of such workmen during the period. By adding together the earnings of all these workmen and dividing the total by the sum of the number of days included in their respective terms of employment added together, the average daily wage of the workmen during the period in question will be ascertained.

If the quotient thus obtained be multiplied by 261 (the number of days comprised between the 19th April, 1917, and the 5th of January, 1918) the product will be the average total earnings during that period of a workman of the category to which the injured man belonged; and, this average added to the sum of $295.60 earned by the injured man during his actual employment will be the basic annual remuneration on which his right to recover will depend and his annual rent must be computed.

.-The manner of computing compensation is as follows: the average of aggregate earnings of employees of the class to which the injured man belonged at the time of the accident for each week during the statutory period preceding the accident should be taken and these averages averaged; and there is sufficient proof that upon this basis, the respondent is not entitled to relief under the statute.

V* APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of King's

Bench, appeal side, province of Quebec, modifying the judgment of the trial court and maintaining the respondent's, plaintiff's, action.

The material facts of the case and the questions in issue are fully stated in the above head-note and in the judgments now reported.

.-The enactment. R.S.Q.

7328, by which in the last analysis the rights of appellant are to be determined under the "Workmen's

Compensation Act," reads as follows:- The wages upon which the rent is based shall be, in the case of a workman engaged in the business during the twelve months next before the accident, the actual remuneration allowed him during such time, whether in money or in kind.

In the case of workmen employed less than twelve months before the accident, such wages shall be the actual remuneration which they have received since they were in the business, plus the average remuneration received by workmen of the same class during the time necessary to complete the twelve months.

If the work is not continuous the year's wages shall be calculated both according to the remuneration received while the work went on, and according to the workman's earnings during the rest of the year.

If the computation designed by this reaches a result whereby it becomes clear that the injured workman has been earning over $1,200 for the year, then he does not fall within the class which the Act was designed to protect according to the scale in force when the accident here in question occurred.

79089-371

.

The above quoted section in the first sentence thereof does not directly touch upon what we have to deal with but incidentally both it and the third sentence help to illuminate what the draftsman had in -view and gives room for a consideration of the total possible earnings of respondent in both classes of work and a comparison of the totals in both classes of work in trying to reach a conclusion as to the average wage that is to be had in view to apply to the remainder of the twelve months. But that will not help respondent unless we go a step further and unsettle things by discarding the rule the court below in previous ones had settled.

I regret to say that I am unable to put upon the above quoted part of said Act any such interpretation and construction as will when applied to the relevant facts bring the respondent within the provisions of the Act. And such seems to have been also the unanimous opinion of the Court of King's Bench.

A majority of that court saw its way to give relief independently of the said Act, although the prayer of the declaration is exclusively confined to the claim made in virtue of said Act.

I should not feel much difficulty if the case had clearly been fought out upon all the facts relative to either alternative as the legal basis for recovery, and been heard by a tribunal that the parties had clearly adopted as competent and satisfactory to them for such purpose.

But for the purposes of the "Workmen's Compensation Act" there can be no trial by jury.

How can I say that appellant by silence or conduct waived in any way that right, when it was thus bound by the provisions of the Act to a trial without a jury of the case made by the declaration and confined by the conclusions thereto so made ?

That does not seem to allow the trial of the two alternative claims in one action.

I agree with the reasons assigned by Mr. Justice

Carroll.

And though- driven to the conclusion that the appeal. should be allowed with costs if appellant insists thereon, I hope it will not insist on costs.

J. (dissenting).-The appeal, I think, should be allowed.

The manner of compensation in my judgment is this. The average of aggregate earnings of employees of the class to which the respondent belonged at the time of the accident for each week during the statutory period preceding the accident should be taken and these averages averaged.

The evidence is not specifically pointed to this;

but I think there is sufficient in the record to shew that upon this'basis the appeal must succeed.

J.-The questions for determination on this appeal are whether the Court of King's Bench properly held the appellants liable at common law in this action for damages for personal injuries sustained by the respondent on the 19th of April, 1918, while in their employment, and, if not, whether the respondent, nt epnet as he claimed and as was held by the learned trial judge (Mr. Justice Guerin), is entitled to recover under the "Workmen's Compensation Act" of Quebec (R.S.Q., 1909, Arts. 7321 et seq., as amended), and, if so, on what basis.

The action was brought and relief claimed distinctly and solely under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The trial was conducted on that footing. Liability at common law does not appear to have entered the mind of either party. That issue was not tried. No evidence was directed to it. The trial judge found the plaintiff entitled to a rent under the "Workmen's Compensation Act," based on an annual remuneration of $960, but his judgment unfortunately leaves us in the dark as to the means or method by which he computed the hypothetical earnings under paragraph 2 of Art. 7328, R.S.Q. for the portion of the twelve months mentioned therein during which the plaintiff was not in the defendant's employment. Barret c. Socidtd, etc. (1) (49e espce).

Not only is the judgment of the Court of King's Bench awarding $1,825 as damages at common law ultra petita, but it condemns the appellants upon a claim never presented, which they have had no opportunity to meet, and which, if presented, might have been tried by a different tribunal. With respect, I entirely concur in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Carroll on this branch of the case. The judgment rendered by the Court of King's Bench cannot stand. Indeed, the principle of the recent dismissal of the plaintiff's action by that court in Canadian Steel Foundries v. Stychlinsky (the converse case) appears to be opposed to it.

But should the plaintiff recover under the "Workmen's Compensation Act ?" That depends on whether his yearly remuneration, calculated as contemplated La by that statute, exceeded $1,200 (8 Geo. V., c. 71, s. 4). AnJ. If not, his right to compensation under the statute is reasonably clear. The difficulty in the case arises from the facts that the plaintiff had been in the defendant's employment only a little over three months (5th of January to 19th of April) when injured, and that between the 5th of January and the 1st of April he had been employed as a machinist helper, at 32Y2 cts.

an hour, and from the 1st to the 19th of April as an "operator," being paid in that capacity 15 cts. per shell-a somewhat higher rate of pay.

Art. 7328 of the statute reads as follows:- The wages upon which the rent is based shall be, in the case of a workman engaged in the business during the twelve months next before the accident, the actual remuneration allowed him during such time, vhether in money or in kind.

In the case of workmen employed less than twelve months before the accident, such wages shall be the actual remuneration which they have received since they were employed in the business, plus the average remuneration received by workmen of the same class during the time necessary to complete the twelve months.

If the work is not continuous the year's wages shall be calculated both according to the remuneration received while the work went on, aid according to the workman's earnings during the rest of the year.

The plaintiff's work having been continuous, the case falls within the second paragraph of the articles.

The ascertainment of the plaintiff's actual earnings from the 5th of January to the 19th of April presents no difficulty.

They amount to $295.60.

Whether the average remuneration received by workmen of the same class during the time necessary'to complete the twelve months exceeded $904.40 (the balance of $1,200) is the problem presented. What is the proper construction of the statutory language just quoted ?

A comparison of their provisions shews that the French Act of the 9th of April, 1898, and the statute first passed in Quebec in 1909 (c. 66) are couched in .

substantially the same terms.

The latter was, no doubt, taken from the former. In the particular clause under consideration, just quoted, the language of both Acts is identical. The phrase of the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the French Act of 1898 is reproduced verbatim in the French version of Art. 7328 of the Quebec Revised Statutes. That phrase was replaced in France, in 1905, by the words Although Loubat says it seems to me that the average earnings actually received by a group of workmen during a given period may differ materially from the average earnings that the same group might have received in the same period. In the one case time lost through causes attributable to the workmen themselves and not to their employer is included in the number of hours, days, or weeks on which the average is computed. In the other it may not be.

But, however that may be, subject to allowances for exceptional and involuntary loss of time, as hereinafter explained, it is actual earnings-not possible earnings-that the Quebec statute prescribes as the basis of computation. The text of the statute does not explicitly require that the category of workmen whose average wages or earnings is to serve as the basis of calculation should be confined to employees of the establishment in which the injured workman was employed.

(Loubat, No. 668).

In many cases-for instance, where an industry has been recently started, or where there is no other workman of the same class employed in the establishment-that basis is not available and resort must be had to the earnings of workmen of the same class in other establishments. (ibid).

Indeed there is not a little to be said for the view that the hypothetical remuneration of the injured man "for the time necessary to complete the twelve months" should be computed upon the average earnings of all workmen of a similar class in the community during that period. But the French commentators-Loubat, in the work cited No. 668, and Sachet (L6gislation sur les Accidents du Travail, 6d. No 854)-seem to make it clear that the contrary view had been well established in France before the Quebec statute was passed-that where there were other workmen of the same class as the injured man in the establishment to which he belonged it was the average earnings of those workmen on which his complementary hypothetical remuneration should be computed and that it is only where there are not such earnings available that the average earnings of outside workmen should be resorted to. In adopting the French Act as part of the law of Quebec the legislature may well be taken to have intended that the construction so placed upon it in France should likewise be adopted.

I had occasion recently, in Arnold v. Dominion Trust Co. to refer to the authorities bearing on this aspect of the case.

Nor is it unreasonable that an employer should be in a position to ascertain from his own records the basis on which the compensation of an injured workman should be calculated.

Moreover, it is that workman's probable earnings which have to be established and is not unlikely that what the legislators .

had in mind was what he would have earned had he been in the same establishment during the period for which the estimate is to be made.

Another question, which has been somewhat debated, is whether the class or category intended is that to which the workman belonged at the time he sustained his injuries, or that in which he was placed when he first entered the establishment, or some average of any two or more classes in which he may have worked while there.

But when it is borne in mind that the matter to be estimated is the average earnings of workmen of the same class during the period necessary to complete "the twelve months next before the accident"-that the statute is merely intended to provide an artificial rule for cases in which during a part of the twelve months' period the facts necessary to bring the plaintiff within the first paragraph of the article do not exist-it seems fairly clear that resort should be had to the average earnings of workmen of the class in which the injured man was first employed.

The law would seem to contemplate it to be probable that had he spent the preceding three, six or nine months (or whatever the time may be) necessary to complete the twelve months' period in the establishment in which he was injured, he would have been employed in that class, though it may well be that if engaged sooner his advance to a higher grade of employment would have come earlier.

The view that the original class of employment determines the category is taken by Cabouat ("Accidents du Travail, Vol. 2, No 581") and has the sanction of a decision of the' Cour de Cassation, Bourdis c. Villard (1) The Court of Review in Pelletier v. Montreal Locomotive Works took the same view.

A contrary opinion of the Court of Appeal at Dijon in Compagnie des Mines de Blanzy Rose (2), is adversely criticised Anln by the reporter (n. 1) although favourably received by Sachet (Nos. 847 and 856).

Mr. Justice Pelletier who delivered the opinion of the majority of the Court of King's Bench also adopted it.

He says: With respect, in this particular, I prefer the interpretation of M. Cabouat and the Cour de Cassation and in regard to this matter also it may fairly be said that the legislature in adopting the French statute intended that the same interpretation should be placed upon it as had already been sanctioned by the highest court of France.

There remains the question how the average remuneration of workmen in the defendant's establishment in the same category with the plaintiff during the required period (i.e., from 19th of April, 1917, to the 5th of January, 1918) is to be computed.

The Court of King's Bench followed the method which it had itself formulated in St. Maurice Paper Co. v. Marcotte (3), stated in the headnote of that case as follows:

This mode of calculation was again approved by the same court in Canadian Steel Foundries Co. v. Stychlinsky

With great respect, I cannot think J it is correct.

By making the divisor the number of hours during which the men actually worked, the element of lost time being entirely ignored, the result attained is not the actual average earnings of the workmen during the entire period but what they might have earned, had there been no loss of time. The court would appear to have read. "qu'ils ont reque" as the equivalent of "qu'ils auraient pu recevoir."

The divisor should have been not the number of hours during which the men actually worked but the number of working hours during the period in question, assuming that all the men were in the defendants' employment for the entire period. The method prescribed by Sachet (No. 854) is to add together the earnings of the workmen of the same class during the complementary period and divide the total by the number of men engaged.

Where all these men have been in the employment of the establishment during the entire period this method would be absolutely fair and would carry out the intent of the statute.

Cabouat (Vol. 2, No. 580) prescribes the same method, adding, however, that the earnings of the workmen should be calculated

But it cannot be used where the workmen have been employed, some for shorter, some for longer portions of the period in question. That would seem to be the case here as the following table (prepared by Francis Dockrill, the defendant's accountant) of the earnings of each of fifteen men employed by the defendant company at the rate of 3212 cents an hour as machinist helpers during the period from the 19th of Angin J. April, 1917, to the 5th of January, 1918, would indicate. - $211.50

$

It may be that all the machinist helpers in the defendants' employment who could fairly be held to be in the same category as the plaintiff were paid 3212 cents an hour. Sachet defines the category as including ceux qui dans un 6tablissement industriel ont A peu pris le mime emploi et touchent le m~me salaire que la victime.

Loubat's definition ignores the element of equality in wages.

It is:- Ceux qui font le m6me travail ou un travail analogue.

No 667. M. Louis Sarrut in a copious note in D. 1917.1.5. says: Les ouvriers de la m~me cat6gorie, ce sont ceux qui exercent le m~me m6tier, la m~me profession que 'ouvrier victime de 1'accident. Cabouat, Vol. 2, No. 581, says:

Des explications donn6es par M. Poirier, il r6sulte que lon doit entendre par ouvriers de la mame cat6gorie que la victime, ceux qui exercent une fonction correspondante A la sienne ou exdcutent un m~me travail sans tenir compte d'ailleurs des in6galit6s d'aptitude professionnelle susceptibles d'entrainer des in6galit6s de.salaire * * * On this point I respectfully agree in the interpretation of the three last mentioned authors adopted by the late Chief Justice of Quebec in St. Maurice Paper Co. v. Marcotte (1).

If it might be assumed that the fifteen men whose gross earnings Dockrill gives were (1) Q.R. 27 K.B. 394, at p. 396.

the only employees of the defendant company in the same category with the plaintiff during the period in *.

question it would still be necessary to have information as to how long each of them remained in the company's employment as a machinist helper.

Unfortunately the record does not contain that information.

Moreover, Mr. Dockrill states that there were quite a number of other machinist helpers engaged at different rates of pay. His computations of averages are all based on the erroneous view that to ascertain the actual average earnings per hour of a class of workmen, during a given period it is only necessary to divide their total earnings during the period by the number of hours of work which they have actually put in, instead of by the number of hours which they might have put in had there been no involuntary and exceptional loss of time.

The burden was on the plaintiff to furnish to the court the information necessary to enable it to determine the average salary of workmen of his class during the period necessary to complete the twelve months. Pelletier v. Montreal Locomotive Works

He has not done so.

There is nothing to shew that the lacking information cannot readily be obtained.

On the contrary Mr. Dockrill's testimony rather indicates that it can. There is in my opinion no justification for taking either the wages earned by the plaintiff himself while engaged with the defendants as machinist helper or his earnings in other employment during the rest of the twelve months' period as the basis on which to compute his hypothetical earnings for that time.

I agree with Mr. Loubat when he says (No. 666):

666. La loi n'admet aucun 6quivalent A cette seconde partie du salaire annuel.

D~s lors, sous aucun pr~texte, les tribunaux ne sauraient lui substituer un autre terme de comparaison, par exemple, le salaire CO. que l'ouvrier aurait regu pendant le temps ndcessaire pour compl6ter les douze mois, 6valu6 d'apris la r6mun6ration effective depuis son entr6e dans 1'entreprise (contra, Alais, 5 Janv. 1900.

Gaz. Pal. 1900.1.

Anglin J. Ce proc6d6 a t, du reste, condamn6par le rejet d'un amendement dans ce sens, pr6sent6 par M. F61ix Martin au S6nat (S6n., 28 oct. 1895; J. off., p. 870).

Le salaire que 1'ouvrier aurait gagn6 doit done 6tre d6termin6 uniquement d'aprbs le salaire moyen des ouvriers de la m~me cat6gorie, c'est-1-dire d'apris la moyenne des salaires des cuvriers de la meme cat6gorie pendant la p~riode ndcessaire pour compl6ter les douze mois.

Cabouat, (Vol. 2, No. 575) clearly expresses the same opinion.

The case must therefore be remitted to the

Superior Court to obtain the information necessary to permit of the requirements of the statute being complied with.

In computing the period of service of each workman deduction must be made for loss of time b3 him which is exceptional and involuntary-"ch6mages exceptionels non-volontaires"-whether ascribable to a cause personal to him or to non-operation of the establishment.

Thus absence due to serious illness, injury or military service should be allowed for, but not absence attributable to laziness or caprice or to mere casual indisposition such as ordinarily befalls workmen from time to time.

So allowance must be made for loss of time occasioned by extensive repairs,

(grosses rdparations) destruction of premises by fire, total or partial, and unusual depression in business, or any other abnormal cause.

These allowances are specifically provided for by paragraph 4 of Art. 10 of the French Act of 1905, stated by Sachet (No. 869) merely to embody the effect of decisions on the French law of 1898, which, like the Quebec

Act, did not specifically provide for them. An admirable note of M.Planiol, (D.1904.1.289),deals with this subject.

The determination of the trial judge as to the deductions to be made for loss of time, and likewise his finding as to what workmen should be. classed as belonging to the same category as the plaintiff will be entitled to the greatest weight.

Under the French system such matters "appartiennent au juge du fait souverainement."

In the Superior Court proof must be adduced (1) to establish what persons engaged as machinist helpers by the defendants during the period from the 19th of April, 1917, to the 5th of January, 1918, were in the same category as the plaintiff, i.e., doing the same class of work, unless the evidence of Mr. Dockrill should be accepted as sufficient proof that it comprised the 27 men of whom he speaks and no others;

(2) the number of days during that period for which each of these workmen was in the defendants' employment as a machinist helper, i.e., from the commencement of the period or the later date at which he entered the establishment or was put in that class until he left it or was discharged or the period expired. (From the period of his employment, however, must be deducted any exceptional and involuntary loss of time of the workman as above indicated); and (3) the total amount of his earnings while so employed. By adding together the earnings of all these workmen and dividing the total by the sum of the number of days included in their respective terms of employment (computed as aforesaid) added together, the average daily wages of the workmen during the period in question will be ascertained.

If the quotient thus obtained be multiplied by 261 (the number of days comprised in the period between the 19th of April, 1917, and the 5th of January, 1918) the product will be the average earnings during that period of a workman of the chtegory to which the plaintiff belonged. The result will be practically the same as if working days a merely had been made the basis, of computation in *. both cases, and the method adopted has the advantage of simplicity. The sum of the amount thus ascertained and the $295.64 earned.by the plaintiff between the 5th of January and the 19th of April, 1918, will be the basic annual remuneration on which, if less than $1200 (as I incline to think it will turn out to be), the rent to which the plaintiff is entitled under the provisions of Arts. 7322 and 7326 of the Workmen's Compensation Act must be computed.

In the result the defendants' appeal must be allowed. While the plaintiff cannot have the restoration of the judgment of the Superior Court sought by his crossappeal, because it is impossible to tell whether in computing the basic annual remuneration at $960 the learned trial judge proceeded as I understand the statute to require (the respondent suggests in his factum that for the complementary period he took the plaintiff's earnings in other employment-but I find nothing in - the record to warrant the statement that a course so contrary to the provisions of the statute was in fact adopted), his action should not be dismissed, as the appellants ask, but will be referred back to the Superior Court to permit of the additional facts being established, knowledge of which is necessary to ascertain, in the manner indicated above, the basic annual remuneration on which the plaintiff's rights must be determined.

Should such annual remuneration be found to exceed $1,200 the action must be dismissed with costs throughout.

Should it be found not to exceed $1,200, the plaintiff should have judgment for such amount as the Superior Court may thereupon find him entitled to, with costs of an action in that court. If the amount La of the judgment ultimately entered should not be less than that of Mr. Justice Guerin's former judgment, inasmuch as the plaintiff has been needlessly put to all the subsequent costs-those of the appeals to the Court of Appeal and to this Court-he should also recover these costs in addition as well as any extra costs in the Superior Court occasioned by the second enquete now directed which that court may allow him. In no event, however, for the reasons indicated by my brother Brodeur, can the respondent have any costs of his factum on the cross-appeal to this court. Should the ultimate recovery, however, be of an amount less than that originally awarded there should be no costs to either party of any of the proceedings subsequent to the judgment of Mr. Justice Guerin.

J.-La presente poursuite a t institu6e en vertu de la "Loi des accidents du travail" (arts 7321 et suivants, S.R.P.Q.).

Nous avons A d6cider si le demandeur intim6 avait un salaire de plus de $1,200, car s'il avait une r6mundration plus 6lev6e il tomberait sous le coup de la loi commune et ne pourrait pas invoquer la loi des accidents du travail.

II nous faut A cette fin interpreter les dispositions de l'article 7328 qui se lit comme suit:

La partie que j'ai soulign6e est celle qu'il nous faut particulibrement examiner.

Je dois ajouter que cet article 7328 est la reproduction textuelle de l'article 10 de la loi frangaise de 1898 et qu'en cons6quence la jurisprudence et la doctrine frangaise peuvent nous guider dans l'inter- .pr6tation de notre texte.

Les faits sont les suivants:

Dans l'ann6e qui a prc6d 1'accident, le demandeur a 6t6 d'abord environ neuf mois occup6 comme d6bardeur dans le port de Montrial A raison de 35 cents de l'heure. Ensuite il a travaill6 du 5 janvier au ler avril 1918 comme aide-machiniste dans l'usine de la d6fenderesse A raison de 32Y cents de l'heure; et enfin pendant 19 jours il a travail6 comme tourneur A la piice pour la d6fenderesse, ce qui lui rapportait environ $26 par semaine.

y a donc eu trois p6riodes diff6rentes qu'il s'agit de considdrer: 10 celle du 19 avril 1917 au 15 janvier 1918; 20 celle du 5 janvier 1918 au ler avril 1918; et enfin celle du ler avril 1918 au 19 avril de la meme anne.

Les deux dernibres p6riodes qui se sont 6couldes depuis le 5 janvier au 19 avril n'offrent pas de difficult6s.

La loi (art. 7328) nous dit que le salaire qui sert de base est celui que l'ouvrier a effectivement regu depuis son entr6e dans l'entreprise.

Or, comme Lewis a regu pendant cette 4poque-lA $295.60, il n'y a pas de contestation et ce chiffre est accept6 par les deux parties.

-583 Toute la difficult6 est de d6terminer le salaire de base pour la premire p6riode, c'est-h-dire du 19 avril ~--Lapmirprie,'st-dedu1ari

1917 au 5 janvier 1918, environ neuf mois.

Est-ce le salaire que le demandeur a eu comme d6bardeur c'est-h-dire le salaire qu'il avait retir6 en dehors de l'entreprise oct I'accident a eu lieu ? En d'autres termes, devrions-nous appliquer les dispositions du 3 me paragraphe de l'art. 7328 qui dit que si le travail n'est pas continu, le salaire annuel est bas6 sur la r~mun6ration reque pendant la p6riode d'activit6 et sur le gain de l'ouvrier pendant le reste de l'ann6e ? L'appelante dans son factum nous dit que l'honorable juge de. la cour supbrieure

Il est possible que cette affirmation soit exacte mais malheureusement nous n'avons pas de notes de l'honorable juge, et dans le jugement nous voyons simplement sur ce sujet le motif suivant:

Part. Il est assez difficile alors pour moi de dire quelle est la r6mun6ration dont il s'est servi pour arriver A ce r6sultat. A tout 6v6nement, je suis d'opinion que le cas actuel est l'un de ceux oct nous ne devons pas appliquer le troisibme paragraphe de l'article 7328. Un examen des trois paragraphes de cet article me confirme dans cette opinion.

Le premier paragraphe, il est bien 6vident, rif~re A l'ouvrier qui a r6gulibrement travaill6 toute 1'ann6e dans l'entreprise; car il y est d6clar6 positivement que le salaire est celui effectivement pay6 h l'ouvrier qui Ce premier paragraphe ne peut pas 4tre invoqu6 dans la cause actuelle, parce que Lewis n'a t employ6 qu'environ trois mois dans l'entreprise.

Le deuxi~me paragraphe de 1'article parle des Brdr J. ouvriers "occupis pendant moins de douze mois" dans l'entreprise.

C'est bien le cas de Lewis, vu qu'il n'a t dans l'entreprise que quelques mois. Alors le salaire de base doit comprendre, outre la r~mundration effective qu'il a reque depuis son entre, une somme suppl6mentaire qui est repr6sent6e par la r6mun6ration moyenne qu'ont reque dans la meme entreprise pendant la p6riode n6cessaire pour compl6ter les douze mois les ouvriers de la meme cat~gorie. Le troisibme paragraphe de l'article pourvoit au cas le travail n'est pas continu; et alors il permet d'ajouter A la r6mun~ration reque par l'ouvrier dans l'entreprise les gains r~alis6s par lui dans l'anne. Or cette disposition vise exclusivement les ouvriers occup6s dans l'entreprise depuis plus d'un an mais d'une fagon intermittente.

(Dalloz, 1903-1-598; Sachet, 6dition de 1909, vol. ler, no 862; Loubat, 4d. 1906, nos 673 et suivants).

Ce troisi~me paragraphe, par consequent, ne couvre pas notre cas.

C'est donc le second paragraphe quis'applique A notre cas, alors la premibre question qui se pose est de savoir A quelle cat6gorie d'employbs il faut avoir recours pour fixer le salaire de base. Est-ce la cat6gorie des tourneurs 1 laquelle Lewis appartenait lors de l'accident, ou bien celle des aides-machinistes dont il faisait partie A son entree dans l'usine.

La solution de cette question est des plus importantes,car si c'est le salaire des tourneurs qui doit servir de base, alors le montant sera plus &1ev4 que la somme permise pour se pr6valoir delaloi des accidents du travail. Si, au contraire, c'est le salaire desaides-machinistes,Lewis peutprobablementr6clamer. Les auteurs sont divis~s sur ce point. Quelquesuns disent que si 'indemnitaire a appartenu succes- V sivement A plusieurs categories distinctes, c'est d'apris la r6mun6ration de la cat~gorie dans laquelle il a 6 rang6 A son entr6e dans '6tablissement et non d'apr6s la cat6gorie A laquelle il appartenait au moment de l'accident (Cabouat, Accidents du Travail, vol. 2, no 581: Baudry-Lacantinerie, vol. 21, no 2090).

Sachet, au contraire, pr6tend que le salaire gagn6 au moment de l'accident doit servir de base.

(Sachet, 6dition de 1909, nos 847-856).

Sirey, 1901-2-293. Il y a cependant un jugement de la Cour de Cassation qui tranche la question.

Ce jugement est rapport6 dans la Gazette du Palais (1) et d6cide que

La Cour de Revision, dans une cause de Pelletier v. Montreal Locomotive Works a jug6 dans le mime sens. Ces jugements me paraissent bien fondds. En effet, pour d6terminer la rente annuelle due A la victime, on recherche le salaire gagn6 par lui dans l'ann6e qui a pr6c6d6 l'accident.

II avait n6cessairement espoir qu'A I'avenir il continuerait A toucher, s'il restait dans

'entreprise, un salaire plus 61ev6 et correspondant A celui qu'il avait lors de 'accident. Cependant les salaires de base ne sont pas la r6alisation des projets d'avenir, mais la repr6sentation des salaires payds dans le pass6, soit A l'ouvrier lui-m~me, soit A ses compagnons de travail.

Dans le cas actuel si Lewis avait travain6 pendant tout le temps pour la d6fenderesse, il aurait requ comme aide-machiniste pendant onze mois et dix jours 322 cents de l'heure. Pendant les derniers 20 jours, il aurait t6 pay6 comme tourneur A raison de 15 cents la pice. II aurait certainement gagn6 dans son annie moins de $1,200, en tenant compte des ch6mages ordinaires et 16gaux.

Alors ces jugements de la Cour de Cassation et de la Cour de Revision ne font que mettre A execution le principe qui doit servir de base A la d6termination du salaire effectivement pay6. Il me semble juste qu'on alloue A Lewis le salaire des aides-machinistes et non pas le salaire des tourneurs avec qui il a travaill6 dans les derniers vingt jours. Je suis oblig6 alors de diff6rer d'opinion avec la Cour d'Appel qui, par 'entremise de l'honorable juge Pelletier, a dit que pour d6terminer le salaire de base

Le jugement de la Cour d'Appel a donc fait erreur en appliquant ce principe.

Maintenant la cat6gorie d'aides-machinistes doitelle comprendre, en outre des quinze personnes gagnant le m~me salaire que Lewis, c'est-A-dire 322 cents de l'heure, aussi les aides-machinistes gagnant un salaire diff6rent?

Si nous consultons la discussion qui s'est faite sur ce point au sinat frangais, et que nous retrouvons dans Dalloz, 1898-4-74, note 12, il me paratt 6vident que les ouvriers de la m~me cat6gorie s'entendent de ceux qui ont le m~me salaire, car le s6nateur Scheurer-Kestner, qui est industriel, dit, en parlant des tourneurs qu'il prit pour exemple, qu'il y a plusieurs categories et que cette expression se comprend bien facilement par ceux qui sont dans l'industrie et que ce sera facile A appliquer.

Ce qui fut dit ensuite par le rapporteur sur le sujet 6lucide J la question. En effet, il a clos la discussion en disant: Sachet, au no 854 de son ouvrage, 6dition de 1909, rapporte cette discussion du s6nat et ajoute:

rsulter Je croirais done que dans le cas actuel la moyenne du salaire des ouvriers de la m6me cat~gorie serait celui des quinze aides-machinistes qui recevaient le meme salaire que Lewis.

Maintenant quelle est la moyenne des salaires pay6s dans l'usine de la d6fenderesse aux aides-machinistes appartenant A la cat6gorie du demandeur depuis le ler avril 1917 au 5 janvier 1918?

La preuve A ce sujet n'est pas trbs satisfaisante. Tous les aides-machinistes 6taient employds A l'heure; et il me semble que la d6fenderesse aurait dti avoir en sa possession le nombre d'heures que chaque employ6 avait travaill6 A l'usine, afin d'6tablir une moyenne de la r6mun6ration reque par chacun d'eux.

Mais le comptable de la compagnie d6fenderesse nous informe qu'il lui est impossible de fournir cet 6tat.

II a bien cependant d~clar6 dans une autre partie de son timoignage que la moyenne que tous les aidesmachinistes avaient reque 6tait de $25.85 par semaine et que des tourneurs avaient eu $32.64 par semaine. Comment en est-il arrive A ce r6sultat?

Je ne puis pas facilement m'en rendre compte et ce n'est pas clair dans son t6moignage.

D'abord qu'entend-il par semaine? Est-ce 6 jours ou 52 jours?

Chaque jour comprend-il dix heures, neuf heures ou huit heures? Il ne nous le dit pas.

S'il a proc6d6, comme je le crois, A prendre le temps de chaque homme puis A additionner tout ce temps pour dire: Cela constitue tant de semaines; c'est lI une base de calcul errone, car ce n'est pas la moyenne de la r~munbration qu'il nous donne.

D'ailleurs ce calcul demanderait plus de renseignements qu'il nous en a donnis. De plus, il est assez 6tonnant, s'il a proc~d6 de la manibre que je le suppose, qu'il n'ait pas t capable de dire le nombre d'heures que chacun a travaill6.

Son calcul ne me parait pas suffisant pour asseoir un jugement.

Il se trouverait alors A 6liminer tout ch6mage.

(Dalloz, 1901-2-178; Sachet, 56me 6d. no' 853-868).

Cependant les ouvriers dans cette entreprise ont dd avoir des interruptions de travail, car. il nous donne le salaire pay6 aux quinze ouvriers aides-machinistes et aucun n'a regu plus de $380.90. Or par sa m6thode de calcul cet ouvrier aurait dd recevoir le double de cela.

Comme la d6fenderesse n'est pas en position de fournir des renseignements pr6cis sur la moyenne de la r6mundration dans son entreprise, nous devons avoir recours aux pr6somptions qui peuvent nous guider dans un cas de cette nature. Je serais dispos6, pour ma part, A suivre la d6cision de la Cour de Cassation qui, en examinant un cas semblable, c'est-h-dire un cas oa on a de la difficult6 it 6tablir avec pr6cision le total reel des salaires de tous les jours de travail, a d6cid6 qu'on pourrait prendre pour base le salaire que le demandeur a gagn6 dans 1'entreprise. Dalloz,1902 1-381. Le salaire gagn6 par le demandeur comme aidemachiniste du 5 janvier 1918 au 23 mars 1918 (nous LS.

navons pas son salaire comme tel du 23 mars au ler avril 1918) a 6t6 de 197.20. Cette p6riode repr6sente pour les soixante-dix-huit jours qui se sont 6coul6s un salaire de $2.53 par jour. Voilh la moyenne de sa r6mun6ration pendant qu'il travaillait.

Maintenant il ya260 jours du 19 avril 1917 au 5 janvier 1918. En multipliant ces 260 jours par $2.53 nous arrivons A $657.80.

En ajoutant A ces $657.80 le salaire gagn6 par le demandeur du 5 janvier 1918 au 19 avril 1919, soit $295.60, nous arrivons A un total de $953.40, c'est-Adire pratiquement au meme montant que celui de $960 trouv6 par la Cour Sup6rieure.

La Cour d'Appel avait trouv4, au contraire, que le montant aurait du' Atre de plus de $1,200; et, par cons6quent, le demandeur, suivant elle, n'aurait pas eu le droit de poursuite sous "I'acte des accidents du travail" (art. 7326); mais tout de meme elle aurait donn6 jugement pour le demandeur en se basant sur le droit commun.

Le demandeur a fait un contreappel et a demand6 le r6tablissement du jugement de la Cour Sup6rieure.

Pour ces raisons, I'appel devrait 4tre renvoy6 et le contre-appel maintenu, le jugement de la Cour Sup6rieure r6tabli et celui de la Cour d'Appel modifi6 et rendu conforme h celui de la Cour Sup6rieure. L'appelante devra payer les frais dans toutes les cours, moins les frais de factum sur le contre-appel devant cette Cour.

Voici pourquoi les frais de ce factum ne devraient pas etre tax6s:

.590

J'ai remarqu6 durant l'argument que les avocats de l'intim6 avaient cit6 Sachet comme 6tant favorable leurs pr6tentions, et ils avaient A cette fin donn6 la

L . premibre partie du 856 de l'ouvrage de cet auteur il donnait un r6sum6 du jugement ci-haut mentionn6 et rapport6 dans la Gazette du Palais (1906-1- 437); mais en v~rifiant j'ai trouv6 que cette citation

6tait incompl6te et que de fait . Sachet, . la fin du no

856 d6clarait que cette d6cision de la Cour de Cassation devait 6tre accept6e avec r6serve, et virtuellement il la combattait dans un autre paragraphe.

Dans ces circonstances, je suis d'opinion que les avocats de l'intim6 n'auront pas le droit de r6clamer de frais ou d'honoraires pour ce factum.

J'avais 6crit l'opinion ci-dessus quand j'ai vu que deux de mes coll~gues 6taient d'avis que le demandeur devait ftre d6bout6 de son action et que mes deux autres colligues 6taient d'opinion que la cause devrait

6tre renvoy6e en Cour Sup6rieure pour faire compl6ter l'enquete et 61ucider certains faits qui auraient dfi

6tre clairement prouv6s. Comme l'opinion de ces derniers est plus conforme A mes vues, j e suis pr~t A m'y rallier afin qu'un jugement final puisse 6tre rendu.

Sans approuver entibrement 'opinion de mon collfgue

Anglin, je suis dispos6 cependant A adopter pour les fins de la prbsente cause les conclusions de son jugement.

Le dossier devra done 6tre renvoy6 en Cour

Sup6rieure pour y 6tre proc6d6 de la manibre indiqu6e dans son opinion.

J.-Les opinions tris travailldes de mes honorables colgues, MM. les juges Anglin et Brodeur, me permettront de m'exprimer avec quelque bribvet6.

La "loi des accidents du travail" de Qu6bec (art. 7321 et suiv. S.R.Q., 1909) est presque la copie de la loi frangaise du 9 avril 1898.

Il y a cependant une diff6rence notable entre les deux lois, car la loi frangaise r6git tout ouvrier dans ses rapports avec son patron, quelque 6lev6 d'ailleurs que soit son salaire (art. 2), tandis que la loi de Qu6bec, telle qu'elle se lisait lors de l'accident en question, ne s'applique pas A un ouvrier dont la r6mundration annuelle d6passe $1,200 (art. 7326). Ainsi la loi frangaise exclut absolument l'action de droit commun contre le patron, quelque soit le salaire de l'ouvrier, alors que cette action n'6tait 6cart6e, dans la province de Qu6bec, que pour les salaires ne d6passant pas $1,200, et ce chiffre, cette ann6e, a t6 port6 A $1,500.

Qu'entend-on par "r6mun6ration annuelle" dans le dernier alin6a de l'article 7326? Est-ce la m~me chose que le salaire dont parle l'article 7328, et qui, selon le mode de calcul que cet article impose, est soit la r6mun6ration effective reque par l'ouvrier pour douze mois de travail continu dans l'entreprise, soit, quand 'ouvrier n'y a t occup6 que pendant un terme plus court, la rdmun6ration effective qu'il a reque, plus la r6mun6ration moyenne payee aux ouvriers de la meme cat6gorie pendant la p6riode n6cessaire pour compl6ter les douze mois, soit, quand le travail n'a pas 4t6 continu, la r6mun6ration reque par 'ouvrier pendant la p6riode d'activit6 et son gain ailleurs durant le reste de l'ann6e?

Nous ne pouvons nous aider ici de la loi frangaise, car elle ne contient pas une disposition semblable A celle du deuxisme alin6a de 'article 7326.

Cependant je ne puis croire que la r6mun6ration annuelle dont parlent les deux alindas de l'article 7326 soit une r6mun6ration autre que celle qui sert ih la fixation des rentes.

Done s'agit-il de savoir quelle r6mun6ration annuelle 6carte l'application de la loi des accidents du travail, ou quelle r6mun6ration forme la base du calcul des rentes, il faut s'en rapporter h l'article 7328 J pour la d6terminer.

Autre question.

Quelle est la "cat6gorie"

dont parle le deuxiame alinia de larticle 7328? Je n'ai pu me d~fendre d'une certaine h6sitation A cet 6gard, mais en vue de l'interpr6tation que la cour de cassation

(Gazette du Palais, 1906, ler semestre, p. 437) donnait h l'alinia 2 de l'article 10 de la loi frangaise, lors de l'adoption de cette disposition par la L6gislature de

Qubbec, je crois que la mime interpr6tation s'impose

Lors done, pour citer presque textuellement cette d6cision, que l'ouvrier accident6, employ6 depuis moins d'un an, a, dans cette p6riode, occup6 dans l'entreprise des emplois inbgalement r6tribu6s, on doit, pour compl6ter fictivement les douze mois de travail, prendre en consid6ration le salaire aff6rant A la premitre cat6gorie d'ouvriers dans laquelle le demandeur avait, tout d'abord, 6t6 admis, lors de son embauchage, et non celui qu'il touchait au jour de l'accident.

Reste le mode de calculer le salaire de l'ouvrier dans les cas d'application du deuxi~me alin6a de lParticle

J'adopte ici le mode indiqu6 dans l'opinion de mon collague, M. le juge Anglin.

On prend d'abord le nombre total de jours de l'engagement (pendant la p6riode d'emploi du demandeur) de tous les ouvriers de la meme cat6gorie que le demandeur-et j'entends par I& les ouvriers faisant un travail similaire, sans exiger que leur salaire ait 6t absolument identique A celui pergu par le demandeur-et ensuite le montant total qui leur a 6t6 pay6 pendant le temps de leur engagement.

En divisant le deuxibme chiffre par le premier on obtient le salaire moyen par jour, lequel, ultipli par le nombre total de jours de la p6riode requise pour compl6ter les douze mois, donne le salaire que 1'article 7328, al. 2, pr6sume que la victime aurait requ dans l'entreprise pendant cette p6riode. On tient ainsi n6cessairement compte du temps perdu par les ouvriers, et il importe peu que les dimanches et jours f~ri6s soient compris dans le chiffre total repr6sentant la durde de l'engagement de tous les ouvriers de la mime cat6gorie, car ils sont aussi compt6s dans le chiffre reprdsentant la p6riode requise pour compl6ter les douze mois, et le calcul se fait sur la meme base.

Il suffit d'indiquer ce mode de calcul pour les besoins de cette cause. Il y a bien la question du ch6mage extraordinaire ou forc6 que traite mon honorable collgue, M. le juge Anglin.

Je reconnais bien qu'il peut y avoir, dans chacun des cas vis6s par 'article 7328, des ch6mage extraordinaires et nullement voulus par les ouvriers, et qu'il ne serait pas juste, dans l'6valuation du salaire de l'ouvrier accident6, de tenir compte de ces ch6mages pour r~duire d'autant le salaire qui sert de base A la fixation des rentes.

Je ne veux pas aller plus loin dans la pr6sente cause, car je ne vois au dossier aucun indice que de tels ch6mages aient exist6, et, tout en concourant dans les instruction que mon coll6gue croit que nous devrions donner A la Cour Sup6rieure au sujet de ces chomages, je ne le fais que pour les besoins de cette cause et pour permettre qu'elle soit finalement jug6e sans autres appels, et je me r6serve la plus entiare libert6 d'appr6ciation, si le d6bat se renouvelle devant nous, dans une autre cause, de tout cette question des ch6mages forces ou involontaires.

Les 616ments de preuve que nous trouvons au dossier ne nous permettent pas de faire le calcul du salaire d'apr~s la rgle du deuxibme talin~a de l'article 7328. Il y avait quinze employ6s, aides-machinistes, J. qui recevaient le mime salaire que le demandeur, mais il y avait en tout vingt-sept aides-machinistes qui 4taient in6galement r6tribu6s.

II aurait fallu tenir compte de tous les ouvriers de la m6me cat6gorie, sans s' arrAter rigoureusement A l'identit6 de salaire.

Nous n'avons nulle part le terme de l'engagement de ces aides-machinistes, bien que nous ayons le chiffre total qui leur a 6t pay6. Du reste, Dockrill, dans sa liste des quinze ouvriers qui recevaient 3212 cents de l'heure, fait voir de telles in6galits, qu'il est 6vident que certains de ces quinze ouvriers ont dd Atre employ6s un temps beaucoup moins long que les autres. Dans ces circonstances, et vu que l'honorable juge de premibre instance n'a pas indiqu6 la base de son calcul, nous n'avons d'autre alternative que de renvoyer la cause A la Cour Sup6rieure pour y etre proc6d6 confom~ment aux r6gles indiqudes plus haut.

Je puis ajouter que le jugement de la Cour d'Appel ne peut Atre soutenu, car l'action, 6tant clairement intent6e sous l'empire de la loi des accidents du travail, ne pouvait 6tre transform6e en une action de droit commun. Je favorise les amendements autant que possible, mais un tel amendement ne pourrait etre permis, car il changerait la nature de l'action (art. 552 C.P.C.).

La loi des accidents du travail fait voir que le recours en vertu de cette loi et le recours sous le droit commun ne peuvent coexister entre les memes personnes, patron et ouvrier. Ils sont inconciliables, et si on les incluait dans une mime action contre le patron, le demandeur serait forc6 d'opter entre eux (C.P.C. art. 177, paragraphe 6).

L'appel doit done etre maintenu et la cause renvoyde la Cour Sup6rieure pour y 6tre proc6d6 suivant les instructions contenues dans l'opinion de M. le juge - Anglin.' Je concours dans l'adjudication des frais de la cause faite par mon honorable collgue.

Appeal allowed, new trial ordered.