Montreal Tramways Co. v. Girard

The respondent, an employee of the company appellant, when injured, was returning from his work to his home in a tramcar on which he was entitled to be carried free under certain provision in the company's regulations.

Held that the respondent had a right to compensation under the Quebec Workmen's Compensation Act, as the injury was occasioned "by reason of or in the course of (his) work" within the meaning of article 7321 R.S.Q.

Judgment of the Court of Review (Q.R. 57 S.C. 394) affirmed. APPEAL from the judgment of the Superior Court, sitting in review at Montreal, Province of Quebec (1), affirming the judgment of the trial court and maintaining the- respondent's action with costs.

The material facts of the case and the questions in issue are fully stated in the above head-note and in the judgments now 'reported.

*PRESENT:-Idington, Duff, Anglin, Brodeur and Mignault JJ. (1) Q.R. 57 S.C. 394.

If so, then there is ample authority for holding that, under the circumstances in question, including the implied engagement of appellant to transport men in their employment to and from their respective places of abode free, of charge on the occasion of going to or quitting work, the respondent, by reason of the accident in question, is entitled to recover.

J.-I am of the opinion that this appeal should be dismissed with costs.

J.-This action is brought under the "Workmen's Compensation Act" of Quebec (R.S.Q. 1909, Arts. 7321 et seq. and amendments) and the plaintiff holds a judgment for $2,280, affirmed by the Court of Review, against which the defendant appeals. These grounds of appeal are advanced:

(1) that the plaintiff's disability is not .due to the fall from which he avers it has resulted;

(2) that the compensation awarded is excessive; and

(3) that the injury was not suffered in the course his work.

There is abundant evidence to sustain the finding in the plaintiff's favour on the first ground and no case has been made for interference with the amount of -the compensation awarded.

The third ground- of appeal presents the only debatable question, viz., whether the injury in respect of which the plaintiff claims compensation was occasioned "by reason of or in the course of (his) work"- "par le fait du travail, ou A I'occasion 'du travail"within the meaning of Art. 7321 of the R.S.Q. 1909. When injured the plaintiff was returning from his work to his home in a tramcar of the defendant company on which he was entitled to be carried free, under the following provision in the company's booklet of "Instructions to Conductors and Motormen." Although it was not expressly made a term of the formal contract between the defendant company and its employees that the latter should be carried free between their homes and the company's sheds in going to and returning from their work, the evidence leaves little room for doubt that this privilege was recognized as an established custom of the defendants and that the right to enjoy it really formed part of the consideration for which the employees gave their services.

I extract the following paragraph from the judgment of the Superior Court:- Co. Consid6rant en droit, attendu que suivant la coutume suivie et les rfglements m~mes de la compagnie d6fenderesse qu'elle remet A ses employds, il est permis A tout employ6 b la conduite de ses tram- Anglin J. ways de monter gratuitement sur tout tramway pour se rendre A son travail ou en revenir; que cette disposition est & 1'avantage de la d6fenderesse en lui assurant une plus parfaite exactitude de la part de ses employds en lui procurant des employds frais, en leur exemptant la fatigue qu'il r6sulterait de se rendre A pied pour leur travail aux hangars de la compagnie ou en revenir, et que cette disposition est aussi

1'af'antage des employds en leur fournissant une espice de surplus de salaire en outre du prix en argent qu'ils recoivent; qu'il semble done que l'aller et retour dans les voitures de la compagnie d~fenderesse pour effectuer le travail requis du demandeur fait partie du louage de services entre lui et la d6fenderesse, que dans ces circonstances l'accident survenu au demandeur est arriv6 , 1'occasion du travail et qu'ainsi il y a lieu d'appliquer les dispositions de la loi du travail.

The evidence supports the conclusions of fact in this passage.

The use of the conjunction "or" in the Quebec statute in lieu of the conjunction "and" in the English "Workmen's Compensation Act" ("arising out of and in the course of the employment") will not have escaped attention. The use of the disjunctive in the French statute of 1898, from which the Quebec law is taken, was deliberate and purposeful (Cabouat, Accidents du Travail, Vol. 1, p. 186), and although a commentator in Rec. des Assurances, 1918, at p. 38, says pour qu'il y ait accident du travail, il faut que celui-ci se soit produit au cours du travail, et soit en rapport direct de cause A effet avec lui, the jurisprudence seems clearly to establish that il n'est pas ncessaire que (l'accident) survienne par le fait m~me du travail de la victime; il suffit qu'il se produise A 1'occasion de ce travail: (D.1900.2.181)-que l'accident se rattache par un lien plus ou moins 6troit A l'exercice de la profession de la victime.

Otherwise the effect of the two statutes in regard to the matter under consideration appears to me to be the same. I regard "by reason of" as the equivalent of "out of," and "in the course of their work" as identical in effect with "in the course of the employment" and I am prepared to accept as applicable to both statutes the view expressed by Buckley L.J., in Fitzgerald v. Clark & Son that

It follows, I think, that while some cases which are within the Quebec Act may not be covered by the -English Act, since it requires that both conditions must be fulfilled, any case within the English Act must necessarily fall within the Quebec statute, which will ex facie be satisfied if the accident either arises by reason of, or arises in the course of, the work or employment.

While in view of such decisions as Davies v. Rhymney Iron Co. (2); Walters v. Staveley Coal & Iron (3) Nolan v. Porter & Sons (4); Edwards v. Wingham Agricultural Implement Co. (5); Philbin v. Hayes (6); and Gilbert v. Owners of Steam Trawler Nizam the question whether upon a state of facts similar to those of the case at bar an injured employee would be held to fall under the provisions of the English Act may be regarded as debatable, authoritative statements as to the scope of the statute in recent cases such as Armstrong-Whitworth & Co. v. Redford (8); Stewart v. Longhurst (1); Marsh v. Pope & Pearson, Ltd. (2); Wales v. Lambton & Hetton Collieries (3); Thom v. Sinclair (4); Walton v. Tredegar Iron & - co. Coal Co. (5); and Mole v. Wadworth (6); and in such earlier cases as Gane v. Norton Hill Colliery Co. (7); Angln J. Cremins v. Guest, Keen & Nettlefolds, Ltd. (8); Blovelt v. Sawyer (9); Holmes v. Great Nor. Rly. Co. (10); Hoskins v. Lancaster (11); and Moore v. Manchester Liners Ltd. (12);

and the reasoning in Whittall v. Stavely Iron & Coal Co. (13), rather incline me to think that under circumstances such as those of the preseit case an employee of an English company, injured as the present plaintiff was, would be held to be within the purview of the English statute.

As put by Warrington L.J. in the case last cited:

The real question that the Court has to ask itself is: Was it an express or implied term of the contract of service that the workman should do, or should be entitled to do, that which he is doing at the time when the accident happened?

And as Bankes L.J. said in the same case:

is necessary to inquire when deciding whether the accident arose in the course of the employment, whether the accident took place upon a way which the workman was using as of right, because then it would be a term either expressed or implied of his engagement that he was to be at liberty so to use it.

It seems to me that, upon the findings of the trial judge, which the evidence warranted, the case at bar falls within the principle of the decisions in Cremins v. (1) [1917] A.C. 249.

(8) [1908]1 K.B. 469.

(2) [19171 86 L.J.K.B. 1349.

(9) [190411 K.B. 271.

(10) [1900]2 K.B. 409.

(4) [1917] A.C. 127.

(11) 3 B.W.C.C. 476.

(12) 2 B.W.C.C. 87.

(13) [1917186 L.J. 985.

(7) [1909]2 K.B. 539.

15780-2

Guest, Keen.& Nettlefords where the workman was held entitled to recover upon a finding that it was an implied term of his contract of service that the train upon which he was being carried should be provided by the employer and that employees should have the right to travel to and fro upon it without charge with the result that the employment was taken to begin when they entered the train in the morning and to cease when they left it in the evening, and in the similar case of Walton v. Tredegar Iron & Coal Co. (2), in which there was a like result notwithstanding a special indemnity contract with the employers, rather than within the decision in Davies v. The Rhymney Iron & Coal Co. (3), where the contrary view was taken although the workman had availed himself of facilities given by his employer to go home, the court there regarding the service rendered by the employers as purely gratuitous. ,The decision in Coldrick v. Partridge, Jones & Co. (4), is also in point.

Lord Cozens-Hardy, M.R., laid it down in Read v. Baker (5), that

On the other hand Lord Buckmaster said in Stewart v. Langhurst (6):

The facts in the very late case of Armstrong, Whitworth & Co. v. Redford bear a curiously close resemblance to those in the recent French case of Masson v. L' Urbaine Seine (2).

In both cases the employer provided, a canteen for the exclusive but optional use of its employees.

In each the canteen had no direct connection <with the factory premises and access to it was by a separate entrance. and a stairway. In each the employee was injured by falling on the stairs when returning from the mid-day meal to resume work. In the English .case the employer was held liable by the House of Lords (Lords Sumner, Parmoor and Wrenbury), on the ground that the employee might be regarded as "in the course of the employment" while descending the stair-case to th'e actual spot where the work. lay. Viscount Finlay and Lord Dunedin dissented. In the French case the Tribunal Civil de la Seine (46me ch.) dismissed the action on the ground that the accident had occurred during an interruption 'of the employment and was "sans relation avec le travail." Giving to the decided cases the consideration and weight to which I consider them to be entitled it seems to me that the plaintiff may fairly be regarded as having been,- when injured, doing something which an implied term of his engagement "entitled him to do"-that he was. on the tramear solely by virtue of his contract of his service-that he was making use of the means provided by his employer to convey him to his home-that he was doing something ancillary or incidental tQ the work for which he was employed (Davidson v. McRobb) and that the accident which befell him may therefore fairly be said to have "arisen out of and in the couise of his employment."

But we are not without French authority directly bearing on the subject which, for the reasons stated in the recent judgment delivered in this court in St. Lawrence Bridge Co. v. Lewis is entitled possibly to even greater weight. The idea that injury sustained by a workman while being taken to and from his place of work in a conveyance provided, by his employer as a term of the contract of hiring should be regarded as part of the risk involved in his employment has received judicial approval in- France both before and since the enactment of the law of 1898, D. 1886, 2.123; Gaz. du Palais, 1886.2.66; Loubat, No. 464, Sachet, Nos. 322-4.

Under the law of 1898 and subsequent legislation, in this respect similar, there have been several applications of this doctrine. Thus in Lafaye v. Chemins de fer l'Est the company was held liable for injury sustained by a workman while proceeding, after his work had been finished, to take his place in a train provided by the company to carry him gratuitously to his home in fulfilment of a term of his engagement.

Again in a case before the Cour d'Appel de Grenoble, reported in the Gaz. des Tribunaux, 1904.2.204, and in D.

1905.2.83, the holding was that

The return journey was regarded as part of the period of employment for which the workman's wages were paid. In a recent case in the Cour de Cassation, D. 1917.1.23 (326me esp~ce), a workman en route to his work injured while- unnecessarily crossing some railway tracks in proceeding by a shortcut, which he had, with the knowledge and tacit consent of his employers, been accustomed to use, was held entitled to recover, the court finding that and that

But in 1910 the Cour de Cassation (Ch. des Req.) decided the case of Veuve Dauvert v. Comp. Tramways de Cherbourg which seems to me to be indistinguishable from the case at bar. Dauvert, an employee of the company, was killed by falling from a platform of a tramcar on which he was being taken from the car-sheds to his home. By a general rule of the company employees coming to and leaving their place of employment (the company s car-sheds) were permitted to ride gratuitously in the tramcars between their homes and the car-sheds. The trial court had taken the view that this rule had been passed with a view to ensuring reglilarity in service and that it secured moreover an advantage for the employees which constituted a veritable addition to their salaries and which thus presented indisputable characteristics of a stipulation in the contract of employment. The Cour de Cassation found no error in the conclusion of the court that the accident which had caused the death of Dauvert occurred "A l'occasion du travail," and his widow's recovery was upheld. I think we may safely follow the precedent which the last cited case establishes and in the case at bar uphold the judgment of the Court of Review confirming that of the Superior Court in favour of the plaintiff.

The appeal should be dismissed with costs.

J.-C'est une poursuite sous la loi des accidents du travail de la Province de Quebec. Le demandeur intim6 6tait A l'emploi de la compagnie appelante comme wattman ou garde-moteur. avait fini son travail et avait remis6 sa voiture vers deux heures du matin;

il 6tait mont6 sur un autre tramway de la compagnie d~fenderesse pour retourner chez lui, et en se levant pour descendre, il tomba lourdement sur le parquet glac6 et glissant du tramway. Cette chute lui occasionna des douleurs dans la rigion de l'abdomen.

Il revint tout de m6me reprendre son travail le lendemain aprbs s'6tre appliqu6 des bandages. Mais les douleurs devenant plus difficiles A supporter, il alla consulter son m6decin qui, aprbs examen, constata qu'il souffrait de hernies.

L'une d'elles paraissait 6tre gu6rie lors de l'enquite; mais l'autre subsistait encore et lui causait une incapacit6 partielle et permanente.

La principale question qui se pr~sente est de savoir si l'employ6 d'une compagnie de tramways qui est Victime d'un accident lorsqu'il est transport6 gratuitement en revenant de son travail peut invoquer la loi des accidents du travail.

La preuve constate que les employ6s de la compagnie appelante regoivent, en entrant h son service, un livret intitul6 "Instructions aux conducteurs et garde-moteurs"

et 1'article 36 de ces raglements comporte que les employds de, la compagnie revitus de leur uniforme pourront -voyager sur tous les tramways de la compagnie pour se rendre A leur travail B ou en revemr.

L'appelante pretend que cette disposition des r~glements ne constitue qu'une simple faveur qui ne saurait constituer aucune obligation.

Je considbre que ce passage gratuit que la compagnie donne h ses employ6s est h l'avantage non-seulement de son pr6pos6 mais aussi d'elle-mAme. Cela lui assure, comme le dit si bien l'honorable juge Lafontaine, une plus parfaite exactitude de la part de ses employds qui peuvent alors se mettre au travail frais et dispos, vu. qu'ils s'exemptent de la fatigue de se rendre h pied A l'endroit oii ils devront pirendre leur tramway. D'un autre cot, cela constitue un supplement qui fait partie de la r6mun6ration que la compagnie est tenue de payer.

Et elle violerait certainement ses obligations si elle refusait A son employd de le transporter pour aller A son travail ou en revemr.

On voit par ces r6glements que ces employds qui prennent ainsi passage sur un tramway sont soumis, sous certains rapports, aux ordres du conducteur de ce tramway et ne peuvent jouir de ce privilige que dans certaines conditions.

La responsabilit6 qui risulte de la loi des accidents du travail a pour fondement l'6tat de d6pendance oft se trouve plac6 A '6gard du patron l'ouvrier qui est victime d'un accident.

Cette responsabilit6 est subordonnie h la condition qu'il existe un contrat de louage.

L'ouvrier qui irait chercher son salaire aprbs son travail termin6 aurait bien droit h une indemnit6 s'il lui arrivait alors un accident. II devrait en 4tre de mime du garde-moteur qui monte dans une voiture de la compagnie pour y jouir d'un passage gratuit qui fait partie de son salaire.

La loi des accidents du travail (art. 7321 S.R.Q.) ne couvre pas seulement l'accident survenu par le fait du travail mais aussi A 1'occasion du travail, c'est-hdire celui qui sans avoir pour cause directe le travail de la victime a 6t d6termin6 par un acte connexe au travail et plus ou moins utile A son accomplissement. (Cabouat, vol. ler, no 150; Aubry & Rau, vol. 5, par. 372 bis, pp. 477-480; Dalloz, 1900-2-181.)

Comme on-le sait, la loi frangaise est ridigde dans les mmes termes que celle de Qubbec.

Le fait est que notre 14gislation de 1909 est la copie presque textuelle de la 14gislation frangaise de 1898. Or il a t6 d6cid6 en France par la Cour de Cassation, dans une cause de La Compagnie des Tramways de Cherbourg v. Veuve Dauvert que l'employ6 qui vertu d'un raglement gn6ral d'une compagnie de tramways qui permet aux employds venant prendre ou quittant leur service de circuler gratuitement dans les tramways entre leur domicile et le d6p6t, peut invoquer la loi .des *accidents du travail s'il est victime d'une chute de la plateforme du tramway qui le ramenait de son d6p6t A son domicile.

Revue judiciaire des accidents du travail vol. ann6e 1910.

Gazette des Tribunaux, 1910-1-143.

La Cour de Cassation nous enseigne que dans ce cas-lk, l'accident est survenu A l'occasion du travail.

Une d6cision au meme effet se trouve dans la meme revue pour l'annie 1913, A la page 143.

Il me semble bien 6vident alors que le demandeur dans la prdsente cause a le droit de r~clamer sous la loi des accidents du travail.

L'appelante pr6tend que la maladie dont il souffre -deuj ne provient pas de l'accident.

C'est 1 une question de fait. La preuve d6montre que l'employ6, aprs I'accident, a ressenti des douleurs qui, aprbs examen par son m6decin, justifiaient ce dernier de dire que l'accident avait caus4 la hernie qui a r~duit sa capacit6 de travail. Je ne me croirais pas justifiable de modifier la d6cision des deux cours inf6rieures sur cette question de faits.

Pour ces raisons, I'appel doit 6tre renvoyd avec d6pens.

J.-D'aprbs les constatations de fait du premier juge, I'appelante, tant par les r~glements qu'elle remet A ses employbs que par la coutume suivie, permet A ses employds de monter gratuitement sur ses tramways pour se rendre I leur travail ou pour en revenir, ce qui est un avantage pour l'appelante en lui assurant une plus grande exactitude de travail et des employds plus frais et dispos, et pour les ouvriers en leur fournissant une sorte de suppl6ment de salaire.

Dans l'espbce, Girard revenait de son travail dans une des voitures de l'appelante lorsqu'il fit une chute qui, encore par les constatations de fait du premier juge, causa une incapacit6 partielle et permanente de travail, lui donnant, dans l'opinion de la cour sup6rieure et de la cour de revision, droit d'action d'aprbs la loi des accidents de travail de Qubbec.

L'accident en question est-il survenu "par le fait du travail ou A l'occasion du travail" (art. 7321, S.R.Q., 1909) de l'intim6?

Les deux cours out rdpondu dans. I'affirmative et I'appelante nous demande maintenant d'infirmer les jugements rendus contre elle. J'ai eu l'avantage de lire l'opinion trbs travaill6e de mon honorable coll~gue, M. le juge Anglin. 'd6montre que les tribunaux anglais et frangais admettent dans ce cas la responsabilitk du maitre sous la loi, tant anglaise que frangaise, concernant les accidents du travail.

Mon honorable collogue, M. le juge Brodeur, est de la meme opinion, mais se base sur la jurisprudence frangaise uniquement, et, du reste, puisque la loi des accidents du travail de Quebec est copide, du moins pour ce que je viens d'en citer, sur la loi frangaise, on trouve, dans la jurisprudence frangaise, un guide tras utile pour son interpretation. Toutefois j'avoue que je n'ai pu me d6fendre de quelques doutes, car le but du *lgislateur est de protkger l'ouvrier contre les accidents dont son travail est la cause ou du moins l'occasion directe, et ici, malgrb que le privilige que l'appelante accorde A ses employds de voyager gratuitement dans ses voitures pour se rendre A leur travail ou en revenir soit dans l'intirit des ouvriers et de la compagnie, on peut se demander en quoi un accident arriv6 au cours du transport gratuit a pour cause ou occasion directe le travail de l'ouvrier.

Cependant, la jurisprudence admet le recours en ce cas et I'espice jugde par l'arrkt de la Cour de cassation du 9 juin 1910, que cite mon coll6gue, M. le juge Anglin, et qui est rapport6 dans la Gazette des Tribunaux, 1910, 2 me semestre, premibre partie, p. 143, est h peu pros identique h l'esp~ce -qui nous occupe, car les constatations de fait du premier juge nous permettent de dire que c'6tait une condition au moins implicite du contrat Co. de louage d'ouvrage que l'intim6 pourrait .voyager gratuitement dans les voitures de l'appelante en se mignault J. rendant A son travail ou en revenant chez lui, sa journbe finie. . Cette d6cision peut done justifier le jugement dont l'appelante se plaint.

11 sera intkressant de citer ici les observations de I'arr~tiste qui rapporte la d6cision de la cour de cassation b laquelle je viens de faire allusion:

En principe, un ouvrier n'est pas prot6g6 par la loi de 1898 sur les accidents du travail lorsqu'il est victime d'un accident pendant qu'il se rend de son domicile A son travail ou r~ciproquement, c'est-A-dire avant que la journde de travail soit commencie ou apris qu'elle terminde.

C. Douai, 25 novembre (Gaz. des Tribunaux, janvier 1903); de cassation, 25 f6vrier 1902 (Rec. Gaz. des Tribunaux, 2me sem., 1.6; Dalloz, 1902.1.273); mars 1903 (Rec. Gaz. des Tribunaux, me sem., 1.61; Dal., 1903.1.273).

Il en est autrement, et l'ouvrier b6ndficie des dispositions de la loi de lorsque, par suite de la nature du travail on de l'6loignement du chantier, le patron a pris A sa charge le transport des ouvriers. En pareil cas,

'accident survenu A un ouvrier, au cours du transport, constitue un accident du travail. C. de Caen, 25 juin (Rec. Gas. des Tribunaux,

26me sem., 2.421); C. de Grenoble, 27 mai 1904 (Rec. Gaz. des Tribunaux, 1904, 26me sem., 2.204; Dal., 1905.2.83).

Cette m6me exception subsiste-t-elle lorsque, ne s'agissant plus d'un transport A la charge du patron, celui-ci a simplement accord6 A ses ouvriers la facult6 d'un transport gratuit?

C'6tait la question que posait le pourvoi dans l'esp~ce ci-dessus. La Chambre des requbtes r6solue affirmativement.

Au point de vue juridique, cette solution est peut-ktre admissible, 6tant donn6s les pr6c6dents de la jurisprudence sur la question, quand 1'ouvrier rendant au travail est bless6 au cours d'un transport fait pour le compte du patron.

Au point de vue pratique, on peut se demander si l'arr6t que vient de rendre la Chambre des requ~tes ne confirme pas 1'opinion de ceux qui pensent que lorsque la protection d6passe une certaine mesure, elle aboutit A des r6sultats inverses des effets bienfaisants que l'on attendait. Il ne serait pas 6tonnant, en effet, que, comme conaiquence de cet arrat, la compagnie de tramways demanderesse au pourvoi eat retird A ses employds la facult6 du parcours gratuit, ne voulant pas, sans doute, que cette autorisation ifit pour elle une source de charges.

Accident survenu au cours du transport gratuit, m9*. accident du travail?

Soit. Plus de transport gratuit.

Mfnaut J.

Je suis absolument de cet avis.

L'appel devra done Atre renvoy6 avec d6pens. Appeal dismissed with costs.