Majority
Per Sir Louis Davies C.J. and Duff J.-The requirement signed by the Attorney-General was in compliance with section 825 Cr. C., .as amended by 8-9 Ed. VII, c. 9. s. 2.-Idington J. contra and Anglin J. semble.
Per Anglin, Brodeur and Mignault JJ.-The election for a speedy trial made by the appellant before a district magistrate was not valid, as it should have been made before the residing judge of the sessions of the Peace, according to section 827 Cr. C.
Per Idington J. (dissenting)
.-The election by the appellant for a speedy trial, contained in his letter to the sheriff, was valid, as being made in conformity with s.s. 2 of s. 828 Cr. C., and any subsequent irregularity could not affect the appellant's rights. Judgment of the Court of King's Beuch affirmed, Idington J. dissenting. *PRsEr:-Sir Louis Davies C.J. and Idington, Duff, Anglin, Brodeur and Mignault JJ.
1- APPEAL from the judgment of the Court of King's Bench, appeal side, Province of Quebec, affirming the judgment of the trial judge, Desy J., with a jury and dismissing the motion made by the appellant for a stated case.
The material facts of the case and the questions in issue are fully stated in the above head-note and in the judgments now reported.
Fernand Choquette for the appellant.
Lucien Cannon K.C. for the respondent.
THE CHIEF JUSTIE.-At the close of the argument on this appeal, I was of the opinion that the only arguable point requiring consideration was to the effect that the Attorney-General had not complied with the amendment to section 825 of the Criminal Code, 8-9 Ed. VII., Ch. 9, which enacted that It was admitted that the offence charged in the indictment came within this section.
After examining the indictment filed with the record, it seems to me quite clear that there is nothing in this objection.
The indictment appears first to have been signed by the crown prosecutors on behalf of the Attorney- General under section 873, but in addition to this the Attorney-General personally signed a requirement -on the back of the indictment that "it should be brought before the grand jury."
It was so brought, a true bill was found and the prisoner tried before a -jury and found guilty.
It seems to me therefore that the amending section of 825 has been fully complied with.
I would dismiss the appeal.
J. (dissenting).-The appellant was brought before the magistrate of the District of Quebec upon the accusation of an offence which entitled him to a right of election to be tried by a judge or jury, and he elected the latter, on the 28th April, 1920.
Thereupon he was duly committed for trial accordingly.
On the 5th of May, following, whilst still in custody of the sheriff, he availed himself of the privilege given by subsection 2 of section 828 of the Criminal Code, which provides as follows:- The sheriff duly notified the judge of the sessions of this election.
Some question is now raised, for the first time, as to whether the judge to whom the notice was delivered. in fact was a judge of the sessions..
. That, to my mind, is, quite immaterial. When once the accused has duly made his election in the manner prescribed, by the statute, he has duly established his right to be tried by a judge, unless by virtue of some other provision in the statutes that right has been overruled, or taken away.
There is no pretence herein that any such overruling of his election as was possible, under subsection 3 of the said section, was seriously considered and determined against him. No such contention has been set up. And if any mistake arose in the delivery of the sheriff's notice, when properly addressed as the record before us shews or in the proceedings thereon the prisoner must not suffer for that.
What is relied upon with more assurance is that contained in the Criminal Code Amendment Act, 1909, which, amongst other changes, amended section 825 as it theretofore stood by adding subsection 5, which reads as follows:- Under this sub-section undoubtedly the Attorney- General for the province can overrule the appellant's election.
The sole question with me herein is one of fact. Did the Attorney-General deliberately decide, in light of the foregoing facts, that the appellant should be deprived of his prima facie right of election to trial by a judge instead of by a jury?
Curiously enough the opinion judgment of Mr. Justice Martin seems expressly to admit that the indictment upon which the appellant was convicted by the jury was
And Mr. Justice Pelletier in like manner attributes such action as the Attorney-General took to have been done pursuant to same article 873 of the Criminal Code. That article reads as follows:part If what was done by the Attorney-General in way of the preferment by the indictment in question is attributable to the operation of said section, then, what was done by such preferment certainly does not fall within the meaning of the amendment of section 825, by adding subsection 5 above.
Up to the time of this express amendment the Attorney-General could not, nor could any one on his behalf, take away the right of election given the accused, though the learned judge or prosecuting officer before him, had long had the power, under section 828, subsection 3, of refusing to allow the exercise of the right of re-election in special cases whenever they deemed it would not be in the interests of justice. The occasion for this, by some mischance I am inable to understand, possibly never arose.
A possibly accidental absence of the judge qualified to act is one surmise if, as suggested in argument, he who did act was not, but then that could not deprive accused of the election he made by his letter to the sheriff and forwarded by the sheriff's letter to the right judge. Be all that as it may, if the accused was not brought up before the right judge, as the statute requires, that was the fault of the prosecuting counsel, else we should not have the judicial assent indorsed on the sheriff's letter, and that did not take away this right of the accused, and due regard should have J. been had to the fact, on the motion to quash the indictment. Any irregularity on the part of the local authorities -in the matter could not, as appears by Reg. v. Burke affect the appellant's rights. With great respect, neither of these learned judges in appeal seems to me accurately to have distinguished that which may rest upon section 873 from that which must rest upon section 825, subsection 5, added by the amendment of 1909. I agree with them that section 873 was all that parties acting had in mind. The former is intended to govern the right to go before a grand jury to prefer an indictment, which right at common law was possessed by all the King's subjects but, by later legislation, was cut down to what the Attorney-General might permit, or the learned judge presiding might, on application to him, permit or order.
That modern way of restricting and regulating proceedings before a grand jury was first introduced, so far as I can find, into Canada by the Act respecting Criminal Procedure of 1869, 32-33 Vict., Ch. 29; sec. 28, confined to something like half a dozen offences. Needless to trace how this at one time known as relating to vexatious indictments was developed until the restriction became complete and was subjected to the requirements of said section 873, just quoted. It is, however, imperatively necessary to bear in mind herein the origin and purpose of that section and its requirements as distinguishable from the origin and purpose of the later enactment of 1909, upon which the decision of this appeal should turn.
The mode in which the numerous attorneys general of different provinces carried out the earlier enactment might vary in minor details and, especially in the method of expression adopted for causing those concerned to know and understand that required assent, no doubt differed.
That would, speaking generally, be a matter of minor consequence.
It is a very different object that is to be attained by the action of the Attorney-General upon the new section 825, subsection 5, quoted above, which involves the taking away of a right of election given to an accused person and implies the exercise of a kind of judicial power or authority which the Attorney- General is, I submit, expected by the amendment to specially direct his mind to in each case coming up for action.
The power is expressly one given to him alone and cannot be transferred to another.
I am unable to see on this record any clear exercise of any such power. What does appear therein seems to me more aptly attributable to the provisions of section 873 as, by two of the learned judges below, seems to have been inferred.
What possible reason could exist for the exercise of such a power relative to what seems, at first blush, a very ordinary sort of offence?
And again, if the Attorney General really intended to take away the right from an accused of trial before a judge, I should have expected I respectfully submit, to find it expressed by apt language which would have left no room for argument, and that which we are referred to does not express anything but what is consistent only with a direction under section 873.
Moreover how could there have been left in the mind of any one concerned in the motion to quash the indictment, before accused was forced to plead thereto, any doubt or difficulty, for if in fact the fiat indorsed was in truth intended to mean what is contended for, surely in the City of Quebec, above all places, that could easily have been set at rest by an affidavit or otherwise.
Those accused of crimes may, in the majority of cases, be at bottom in some minds entitled to very little consideration.
But we must guard their rights as sacredly as possible, and remember that society is not well served by the conviction of any man unless by due process of law strictly adhered to.
I think the appeal should be allowed, for the reasons I have assigned, and that the right to have a case stated should have been given him and, by reason not only of default thereof but under and by virtue of the powers assigned in such event by sections 1018 and 1024, respectively, to the Court of King's Bench and this Court, the conviction should be quashed, or, if the majority of the court so conclude; referred back to the learned trial judge to state such case as he should have stated.
See The King v. Hibert (1), and Reg. v. Hogarth (2), as well as Reg. v. Burke (3), already cited.
J.-I concur with the Chief Justice.
J.-Only one of the objections to the validity of his conviction taken on behalf of the defendant calls for consideration.
It is that based on the alleged absence from the record of anything which establishes the exercise by the Attorney-General of the power conferred on him by s.s. 5 of s. 825 of the Criminal Code (8-9 Ed. VII, c. 9, s. 2) to require that a person charged with an offence punishable by imprisonment for a period exceeding five years shall be tried by a jury notwithstanding that he has consented to speedy trial by a judge.
The jurisdiction of the Court of King's Bench in proceeding with the trial of this case is thus challenged.
If there was a valid election by the accused for a speedy trial, the jurisdiction of that court was thereby superseded (ss. 825, 827 and 833, Cr. C.; Reg v. Burke (1); Rex v. Bissonnette (2), per Lamothe C.J.) and could be re-established only by the Attorney-General personally exercising the special power conferred on him by s.s. 5 of s. 825.
Being a condition of jurisdiction the fact that the authority had been exercised should appear on the face of the proceedings.
The ordinary presumption in favour of the jurisdiction of a superior court scarcely covers such a case.
The law does not prescribe any particular method in which the Attorney-General is to act.
Neither is notice to any person or body required.
Nor is it necessary that the Attorney-General should make his requisition in open court. I am satisfied that the indorsement over his signature on the indictment- of his authorization for its presentment, provided it is couched in terms -which unmistakably imply action under s.s. 5 of s. 825, will suffice.
But s. 873 Cr. C. likewise provides for the preferring of indictments by or on behalf of the Attorney-General before a grand jury. The power which that section confers, however, should not be exercised where the accused has already elected for speedy trial, and he may so elect after an indictment has been preferred under it. Giroux v. the King (1).
This latter step was not taken in the present case, counsel for the prisoner relying on what he assumed to have been a valid election for speedy trial already made in the Court of Sessions of the Peace, and the case appears to have proceeded in the Court of Appeal on the footing that such an election had been duly made. Counsel for the Attorney-General very frankly stated, in answer to a direct question put by me, that if the indictment now before us had been preferred under the authority of s. 873 it would have been in its present form and might have carried precisely the indorsement found upon it, namely:
In other words, so far as the proceedings shew, the action taken by the Attorney-General in regard to the presentation of this indictment is referable quite as readily to s. 873 as to s.s. 5 of s. 825. It is therefore impossible to say that it imports a requisition under the latter provision. Under these circumstances, if there had been a valid election for speedy trial, in my opinion it would be extremely doubtful, to say the least, whether the conviction could stand and whether the motion to quash the indictment made on behalf of the accused before plea should not have prevailed.
But I find it unnecessary to determine this question since, in addition to relying on the indorsement on the indictment as sufficient evidence of the exercise of the power conferred by s.s. 5 of s. 825, counsel representing the Attorney-General now insists, as it is quite within his right to do (a respondent may support the judgment a quo on any ground), that there was no valid election for a speedy trial because the attempt of the accused to make such an election did not take place before the judge of the Sessions of the Peace as contemplated by s. 827 Cr. C. Election before the prosecuting officer (s.s. 2) is not suggested.
The District Magistrate, Corriveau, before whom the record shews the accused was brought to make his election, was without jurisdiction to receive it because there was at that time a Judge of the Sessions of the Peace for the District of Quebec (s. 823 ii) as appears in the record and is admitted by counsel for the appellant.
I cannot accede to the suggestion that the notice to the sheriff, not required in this case (s. 826), but provided for in other cases by ss. 825 (6), 828 (2), and 830 (2) itself constitutes an election. Where it is made part of the procedure, that notice is a preliminary step leading to the accused being given an opportunity to make his election by being brought before the proper officer for that purpose. But the statute makes it very clear that the election itself must take place before the judge or the prosecuting officer ss. 825 (7), 826 and 827.
It follows that, the jurisdiction of the Court of King's Bench never having been superseded, its re-establishment by action of the Attorney-General under s. 825 (5) was not neces- J sary.
The indictment can be supported under s. 873. I regard this rather as a case of first election within s. 826 (7), than as a case of re-election within s. 828. Section 830 (2) would be applicable, however, if the accused upon withdrawing his original election for a summary trial had elected to be tried by a jury and the warrant of committal for trial had so stated. That warrant is not in the record, and the election which preceded it is stated in the proceedings to have been merely to proceed by preliminary investigation in lieu of summary trial.
There was evidence on which a jury could find the defendant guilty of the charge laid against him. Taken as a whole as it must be, the charge is not open to the objections raised.
The sentence imposed, while apparently severe, was within the jurisdiction of the court.
It is not within our province to review its propriety.
The defendant may have a real grievance in that he was not given the opportunity to which he was entitled of making an election for a speedy trial before a competent judicial officer.
But I know of no redress for that grievance which it is open to us to accord him in this appeal.
s'agit d'un appel sous les dispositions de l'article 1024 du code criminel.
La question qui nous est soumise est de savoir si la Cour du Banc du Roi avait juridiction pour juger. I'appelant.
Ce dernier alligue qu'ayant 6t6 accus6 sous l'article
446a du code ciminel, il a opt6 pour un prochs exp6ditif et que plus tard, malgr6 son option, il a T-s t amen6 par acte d'accusation devant la Cour du Banc du Roi, il a 6t6 jug6 et condamn6 h quinze ans de p6nitencier.
La Couronne pretend que l'appelant n'a jamais fait d'option valable et que, mime s'il en a fait une, le
Procureur-Gn6ral avait le droit de le poursuivre par acte d'accusation devant la Cour du Banc du Roi sous les dispositions de l'article 825, s. 5 du code criminel.
A cela l'accus6 r~pond que le Procureur-G6n6ral ne parait pas avoir r~gulibrement fait la demande dont parle l'article 825, s. 5.
Y a-t-il eu option d'un prochs exp6ditif par l'accus6?
Les pikces que nous avons devant nous ne sont pas tris claires sur ce point.
II est bien 6vident cependant que l'accus6 desirait avoir un proces exp6ditif sous les dispositions de la partie 186me du code criminel.
En effet, apr~s que le magistrat de district qui avait fait l'enquete pr6liminaire, eut, le 5 mai 1920, jug6 la preuve suffisante pour lui faire subir un prochs (art. 690)
et 'ei't envoy6 en prison pour y tre d6tenu en attendant son prochs, les avocats de ce dernier ont notifi6 le sh6rif, qui avait la garde de 'accus6, qu'il optait pour un proc~s exp6ditif et qu'il fut amen6 devant
Le sh6rif, le 6 mai, informe par lettre le Juge des
Sessiofis, suivant les dispositions de 'article 826 du code criminel, que Minguy d6clare faire option pour "un prochs exp6ditif". Cette lettre du sh6rif est vers6e au dossier et nous y voyons sur le dos de la lettre 1'entr6e suivante:
Bro-r J Le mois n'est pas mentionn6, mais les parties reconnaissent que c'est le mois de mai et que les initiales T. et G. sont celles de Talbot et Gendron, Greffiers de la Paix.
Nous voyons ensuite sur le dos de la mime lettre l'entrie suivante:
6tant Les initiales M.D.D. signifient Magistrat de district et celles D.G.P. signifient Dput6 Greffier de la Paix. Ces deux entr6es que nous retrouvons sur la lettre du sh6rif me paraissent peu explicites et correctes. D'abord le 5 mai il n'a pas pu y avoir d'option pour proc~s exp6ditif, car A cette date l'accus6 n'avait pas encore t amend devant le Juge des Sessions. La lettre du shirif adress6e au Juge des Sessions n'a envoybe que le 6 mai et ce n'est que le 7 que le privenu comparait devant un juge, qui n'est pas, cependant, le Juge des Sessions mais un Magistrat de district, celui-lh m~me qui avait condamn6 l'accus6 A subir son prochs. Il est admis par les deux parties qu'il y a un juge des sessions h Quebec.
En vertu du code criminel (Partie XVIII), les options pour prochs exp6ditifs doivent avoir lieu (art. 827) devant le juge qui est d6fini par l'article 823 comme 6tant le Juge des Sessions.
Le magistrat de district, suivant ce dernier article, n'a juridiction que dans le cas oft il n'y a pas de juge des sessions. Le magistrat de district, M. Corriveau, n'avait done pas juridiction dans le district de Qu6bec oft il y avait un juge des sessions. Par cons6quent, le pr6venu n'a done pu faire d'option valable pour un proc6S D'ailleurs a-t-il fait une option qui enlevait A la Cour du Banc du Roi toute juridiction?
L'entrie qui est sur la lettre du sh6rif, en date du 7 mai, d6montre qu'il n'y a pas eu d'adjudication sur I'option du pr6venu pour proc~s exp6ditif.
L'entr6e n'exprime probablement pas correctement ce qui a eu lieu.
A raison de ce qui est survenu subsiquemment, je serais port6 A croire que ce jour-1h, le 7 mai, la Couronne a fait une demande ou bien a manifest6 l'intention d'avoir un proces par jury, et que la question est rest6e en suspens de savoir si l'accus6 serait jug6 A la Cour des Sessions ou A la Cour Criminelle. Avant I'amendement de -1909 (8 et 9 Ed. 7, ch. 9, s. 2), le privilige de l'accus6 de choisir un prochs exp6ditif 6tait absolu; et du moment que son consentement pour un prochs exp6ditif 6tait inscrit au dossier, son prochs devait avoir lieu conformdment aux dispositions de Ia partie XVIII du code criminel (art. 825, s.s. 2, 3 et 4 code criminel, S.R.C. 1906) c'est-Adire devant le Juge des Sessions de la Paix.
Les amendements de 1909 ont ajout6 plusieurs autres sous-sections A l'article 825, et notamment une A leffet que le Procureur-G6n6ral peut faire une demande que le prochs ait lieu devant un jury. Il me semble que cette demande, si elle ne peut pas tre refus~e, ainsi que le pretend l'intim6, doit tre au moins consigne au dossier de la cause afin d'6voquer Ia cause devant Ia Cour du Banc du Roi ou bien d'enlever au Juge des Sessions toute ju-idiction. Dans la cause actuelle, je suis d'opinion que l'accus6 a bien d6sir6 opter pour un prochs expiditif: mais son consentement n'a pas t fait devant le juge comp6tent.
Alors le Procureur-G~ndral pouvait, sous l'article 873 du code criminel, porter un acte d'accusation devant le Grand Jury.
L'appelant se plaint aussi de l'ill6galit6 des instructions du juge au jury, mais il n'y a rien dans ces instructions qui violent aucun principe de droit. Quant aux faits nouveaux qu'il pr6tend avoir d6couvert depuis le prochs et quant A la s6v6rit6 de la sentence, ce sont des questions qui ne sauraient justifier notre intervention.
L'appel doit 6tre renvoy6.
J.-Il y a deux questions A examiner sur cet appel, car les autres griefs d'appel, dans mon opinion, sont mal fond6s; L'appelant a-t-il riellement opt6 pour un proc~s exp6ditif;
20 S'il y a eu telle option, l'acte d'accusation (indictment) sur lequel le prochs a eu lieu d6montre-t-il que le procureurg6n6ral de la province de Qu6bec exergait le pouvoir que lui conf~re le paragraphe 5 de 1'article 825 du code criminel, ou bien celui de l'article 873 du m~me code, qui permet au procureur-g6n6ral ou A ses repr6sentants de soumettre un acte d'accusation au grand jury? Le pouvoir exerc6 sous l'article 825, al. 5, est d'une port6e plus consid6rable que celui que confire 1'article 873, car il rend sans effet I'option pour un prochs Mais lorsque telle option n'a pas 6t6 valablement faite, il va sans dire que l'acte d'accusation pr6sent6 par le procureur-g6n6ral sous l'op6ration de l'article 873, confire pleine juridiction. A la cour qui juge le prochs.
Du reste, dans l'espice, le magistrat de district avait fait 'enquite pr61iminaire et avait d6clard qu'il y avait lieu de faire subir un procs au pr6venu, de sorte que l'acte d'accusation aurait pu 6tre soumis au grand jury sans F'ordre du procureurg~ndral.
Maintenant y a-t-il eu option du pr6venu pour un procks exp6ditif?
Si j'arrive A la conclusion que la r6ponse doit Atre dans la n6gative, je n'aurai pas besoin d'exprimer d'opinion sur la deuxibme question.
Il est hors de doute que l'appelant d6sirait avoir un proc~s exp6ditif, mais le d6sir ne suffit pas, il faut que l'option elle-meme soit faite devant une personne autoris6e A la recevoir.
A cet 6gard, les parties admettent qu'il y a A Qu6bec un juge des Sessions de la Paix, I'honorable M. Choquette.
Il y a aussi un magistrat de district, M. Phil6as Corriveau.
Aprbs son arrestation, I'appelant fut amend devant le juge des Sessions de la Paix, oft il fit option pour un procs sommaire.
II lui fut cependant permis plus tard de se d6sister de cette option, et de proc6der par enquete pr6liminaire. Cette enquite, si le magistrat trouvait matibre A prochs, pouvait, suivant son choix, le conduire soit A un prochs exp6ditif devant le juge des
Sessions de la Paix, soit A un procas devant la cour du Banc du Roi si6geant au criminel.
Pour le premier, le procds exp6ditif, il fallait une option du pr6venu:
pour le second, le procas devant la cour du Banc du
Roi, aucune option n'6tait requise.
Le 5 mai 1920, le magistrat de district d6clara, je
I'ai dit, qu'il y avait matibre A prochs.
Le mime jour les procureurs de l'appelant 6crivirent au sh6rif de
Qu6bec le notifiant que leur client d6sirait opter pour un prochs exp6ditif et le pribrent, en consequence, d'amener 'accus6 devant la cour des sessions dans le plus court d6lai possible afin qu'il pfit faire sa d~clara- MINGUY tion A cet effet.
Sur reception de cette lettre, le sh6rif, le 6 mai, 6crivit au juge des Sessions de la i- Paix, I'informant que l'accus6 d~clare maintenant faire option pour un procks exp~ditif.
D'apris le code criminel, article 826, paragraphe ler, Tout sh6rif doit, dans les vingt-quatre heures apris qu'un pr6venu ainsi que ci-haut est prdventivement incarc6r6 en attendant son prochs, informer juge par 6crit que ce pr6venu est ainsi incarc6r6, relatant son nom et ia nature de l'accusation port6e contre lui, sur quoi juge fait comoarattre pr6venu devant lui sons le plus court possible. Remarquons que par 'expression "juge," la loi entend, dans le cas du district de Qu6bee, le juge des sessions (art. 823 code crim.).
Lorsque le privenu est amend devant le juge, celui-ci, apris avoir pris communication des d6positions A la suite desquelles le pr6venu a t incarcer6:
fait connaitre au prisonnier quelle infraction est accus6 lui en a~crit la nature; et (b) lui explique qu'il peut, A son choix, subir son procds imm6diatement devant un juge sans l'intervention d'un jury, ou rester en prison on sous caution, selon que la cour en d6cide, pour subir son procks de la manibre ordindfire devant la cour qui a juridiction criminelle.
(Art. 827' code criminel.)
Si, lors de cette comparution devant le juge, le pr6venu consent A subir son prochs devant lui, sans l'intervention d'un jury, le prochs qu'on appelle exp6ditif se fait devant le juge.
D'apr&s 'article 828, paragraphe 2, tout prisonnier qui a opt6 pour oroces devant un jury, peut nonobstant I'option ainsi faite, en tout temps avant commencement du prochs, et soit qu'une accusation ait ou non port~e contre lui, notifier, an sh6rif, qu'il revenir sur sa decision; sur quoi le sh6rif et juge ou le fonctionnaire poursuivant doivent suivre la proc6dure prescrite par Particle huit cent vingt-six.
Cette notification au sh6rif se fait dans le cas oi un pr6venu, qui a opt6 pour le procks devant un jury, d6sire revenir sur sa d6cision, et alors le sh6rif et le juge doivent suivre la proc6dure prescrite par Particle 826 dont j'ai cit6 le premier alinia.. Dans 1'espice,
I'appelant n'avait pas opt6 en faveur d'un procs devant un jury; mais avait choisi une enquite pr6liminaire, laquelle, je l'ai dit, pouvait conduire soit au prochs exp6ditif devant le juge des sessions, soit au prochs ordinaire devant un jury.
Le deuxitme alin6a de 1'article 828 suppose qu'il y a en choix d'un prochs devant un jury, choix que le pr6venu desire ritracter. Il y a une disposition au mime effet, et pour le m~me cas de r6tractation d'option, aux alinias 2 et 3 de 1'article 830.
Il y a
6galement une disposition semblable A 1'article 825, paragraphe 6, pour les accus6s sous caution, mais il n'y est pas question de r~tractation d'option, mais du choix d'un procks exp6ditif.
Apparemment on a proc6d6 ici comme si l'appelant avait choisi un proc~s par jury et voulait revenir sur ce choix, car c'est dans ce cas qn'on s'adresse au sh6rif lorsque le privenu est incarcr6.
Dans l'esp~ce, le sh6rif a inform6 par 6crit le juge des sessions que l'appelant d6sirait maintenant faire option pour un prochs exp6ditif.
Sur r6ception de cette lettre, le juge des sessions aurait faire comparaitre le pr~venu devant lui, et lui faire les dclarations exig6es par 1'article 827, et c'6tait alors le moment de faire l'option d'un prochs
Au lieu de cela, le 7 mai, on a fait comparaitre l'appelant devant le magistrat de district,
M. Corriveau, et une inscription au dos de la lettre du sh6rif-il semble au moins qu'on aurait dit faire une entr6e au registre-indique que, le pr6venu 6tant pr6sent, la d6cision pour son option pour prochs exp6ditif est ajourn6e au 10 mai.. En regard, on a 6crit: avec les initiales des greffiers de la paix au bas. Est-ce pour la raison que M. Fernand Choquette, avocat de l'appelant, nous a indiqude, de sa parent6 avec l'honorable M. Choquette, juge des sessions, dont il est le fils, que M. Corriveau, le magistrat de district, a si6g6 le 7 mai?
Les dispositions du code de proc6dure civile qui auraient emp&h6 M. Fernand Choquette de comparattre devant son pore en matibre civile ne s'appliquent
6videmment pas
A un procs devant une juridiction criminelle, et alors que j'appr6cie hautement le sentiment de d6licatesse qu'invoque le savant avocat de l'appelant, qui a tr~s habilement plaid6 cette cause, il est 6vident qu'on devait ici suivre la proc6dure qu'indique le code criminel.
Or malheureusement c'est devant le juge des sessions que devait se faire l'option d'un prochs exp6ditif, en r6ponse aux d6clarations que celui-ci devait faire au privenu au d6sir de 1'article 827; et comme il s'agit d'une matitre de juridiction de droit commun, et que la proc6dure par voie de prochs exp6ditif est de nature exceptionnelle, et exige le consentement du pr6venu devant le juge des sessions, je ne puis arriver A la conclusion que la Cour du Banc du Roi, sidgeant au criminel, qui est la juridiction de droit commun, a 6t6 dessaisie de la cause par ce qui s'est pass6 devant le magistrat de district. Les honorables juges de la cour d'appel paraissent avoir pris pour acquis qu'il y avait eu choix d'un proc~s exp6ditif.
Le fait qu'ils n'ont pas discut6 la question dont je viens de parler, me dispose A croire qu'elle a pu n'avoir pas t6 soulev6e devant eux.
Mais 6videmment cette question est prijudicielle, car s'iI n'y a pas eu choix r6gulier d'un prochs exp6- J. ditif, il n'importe nullement que le procureur-g6n6ral n'ait pas d6clar6 express6ment qu'il exigeait le prochs devant un jury malgrd l'option pour un procks exp6ditif. Je n'ai done pas A exprimer d'opinion sur la question que les honorables juges de la cour d'appel ont longuement discut6e.
Les .autres moyens invoqus par l'appelant, je l'ai dit, sont dans mon opinion mal fond6s.
L'appel doit done Atre renvoy6.
Appeal dismissed.