Archibald v. Maher and Cook

the judgment of Weir J. and dismissing the appellant's action.

The action was instituted by the appellant to have certain propetty declared affected by an architect's privilege for a sum of $7,851.

In October, 1912, one Maher, who had bought the property from the respondent, instructed the appellant to prepare *PRESEr:-Sir Louis Davies C.J. and Idington, Duff, Anglin Brodeur and Mignault JJ.

(1) [18191 Q.R. 29 K.B. 364.

15780-30 plans and specifications for a ten story building. The work was commenced but discontinued about May, 1913, owing to lack of funds on the part of Maher.

On September 1st, 1916, the property was retroceded by Maher to the respondent. After May,

1913, some work was done for protection from the weather of the part of the buildings erected. In November, 1916, the respondent leased the property to one Chadborn who erected a garage on it between December, 1916, and May, 1917. On September 14th, 1916, the appellant registered his claim against the property, and on March 31st, 1917, also addressed a notice, to the registrar as well as to Maher and the respondent, claiming $7,851 for his services as architect and he registered this notice on April 13th, 1917.

THE JUSTICE.-I am to dismiss this appeal with costs and concur in the reasons for judgment stated by Mignault J.

J.-I think this appeal should be dismissed .with costs.

DUF J.-I concur in dismissing this appeal for the reasons given by Brodeur J.

J.-I concur with Mr. Justice Mignault. BRODEUR J.-La question que nous avons A d6cider dans cette cause est de savoir si un architecte peut r~clamer le privilige qu'il a, en vertu des articles 1695 et 2009 du code civil, contre un tiers acqu6reur, dans le cas oii l'enregistrement de son privilkge est post6rieur A l'enregistrement du titre de ce tiers acqu6reur.

La question se complique du fait que les travaux de l'6difice pour lequel l'architecte avait fait des plans avaient dfi Atre abandonn~s par l'ancien propri6taire, faute d'argent, et que l'6difice n'4tait pas termin6 quand le tiers acqu~reur a t mis en possession.

La Cour Sup6rieure a d~cid6 que le privil~ge de l'architecte primait le droit du tiers d6tenteur, mais jugement a 6t renvers6 par la Cour d'Appel (1)

pour le motif que l'enregistrement du privilge n'avait pas 6t fait en temps utile, c'est-h-dire dans les trente jours qui ont suivi la cessation des travaux.

Le privil~ge de 1'ouvrier a subi des contretemps dans la l6gislation des trente dernibres ann6es, surtout depuis la loi qu'on est convenu d'appeler la loi Aug6.

qui a 6t6 adopt6e en 1884. Mais cette 16gislation avait trait plut6t aux conditions dans lesquelles le privilige pouvait 4tre exerc6 qu'A l'existence du privilige lui-meme.

Le privilge de l'architecte est de droit bien ancien.

Il repose sur ce principe d'6quit6 qui veut que ceux qui aient un privilige sur la. plus-value de l'hritage qui rdsulte de son travail. Domat, vol. 3, 6dition de 1822, p. 448; Pothier, 6d. de 1844, vol. 17, Des crides, no 129.

467- Ce privilige a 6t6 port6 dans notre code par les codificateurs dans les articles 1695 au titre du Louage, 2009 et 2013 au titre des Priviliges et Hypothiques, et 2103 au titre de l'Enregistrement.

DeLorimier, Bibliothbque du code civil, vol. 17, pp. 384 et 404; vol. 18, pp. 235 et 236.

A l'exception de 'article 1695, tous ces articles ont 6t6 amendbs par la loi Aug6 et la 16gislation subs6quente, c'est-h-dire par les statuts suivants: 1894, 57 Vict., ch. 46; 1895, 59 Vict., ch. 42; 1904, 4 Ed. VII., ch. 43; 1916, 7 Geo. V, ch. 52.

Sous l'ancien droit fratugais le privilige existait sans enregistrement, et il en 6tait de m~me au Bas-Canada jusqu'en 1841 lorsque l'ordonnance de l'enregistrement a 6 promulgu6e par le Conseil Special qui a d6cr6t6 que les architectes, constructeurs ou autres ouvriers employ6s A la construction d'une bitisse devaient faire enregistrer leur privilige en faisant faire des proc~s-verbaux de l'4tat des lieux avant les travaux commeneds et apris les travaux termin6s. Cette dernibre disposition de la loi a 6t6 incorpor6e dans l'article 2013 du code civil (DeLorimier, vol. 17, p. 404).

Cette loi cependant 6dictait une proc6dure tellement compliqu6e et dispendieuse que l'entrepreneur et l'architecte seuls pouvaient s'en pr~valoir et qu'elle donnait peu de confort au pauvre ouvrier ou journalier qui, avec son salaire alors peu r6mun6rateur, ne pouvait se payer le luxe d'un avocat pour s'adresser aux tribunaux et faire nommer des experts pour faire la visite des lieux.

Alors la loi Aug4, du nom de son auteur, a 6t0 adopt~e en 1894 pour venir au secours de l'ouvrier en d6clarant que le journalier, I'ouvrier, le fournisseur de mat6riaux et le constructeur ne seraient pas tenus de faire faire des rapports d'expertise que leur privilege subsisterait sans enregistrement pendant la dur6e des travaux, mais qu'ilS devaient enregistrer leur privildge dans les 'trente jours qui suivraient le parachivement des ,travaux ou la cessation de l'ouvrage.

J. L'architecte 6tait omis dans cette nomenclature. Les articles 2009, 2013 et 2103 du code civil, qui le d6signaient nomm6ment, 6taient rappel6s et remplac6s par d'autres articles oa son nom n'apparaissait pas, et d'autres articles, soit 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2013d et 2013e d6signaient la proc6dure A suivre pour les conditions de 1'existence du privilge, son rang et les droits du propri6taire dans le cas de notification du privildge. Par contre, cependant, l'article 1695 subsistait toujours qui d~clarait:

II est possible que la loi Aug6 n'ett pas pour effet de faire disparattre le privil6ge de l'architecte, car les termes g6ndraux de certains articles aux titres des Priviliges et de l'Enregistrement auraient pu permettre l'enregistrement de ce privilige si formellement 6nonc6 par Particle 1695.

Mais la lgislature a 4videmment cru qu'il pouvait y avoir lieu A des incertitudes et alors elle a, en 1895, rappel6 entibrement la 16gislation de 1'anne 1894 et lui a substitu6 une nouvelle l6gislation oA cette fois l'architecte reparalt dans les articles 2009, 2013, 2013a, 2013c et 2103. Le fournisseur de mat~riaux, qui avait 6t en 1894 d6sign6 nomm6ment avec le journalier, I'ouvrier et le constructeur dans les articles 2009, 2013, 2013a, 469' 2013b, 2013c, 2013d et 2103, disparait de ces articles; et le lgislateur adopte six nouveaux articles, 2013 (g) 2013 (1) il indique une procdure A suivre pour donner au fournisseur de mat6riaux

L'architecte par cette l6gislation de 1895 reprenait incontestablement son rang parmi les privil6gi6s; et, par contre, le fournisseur de matdriaux, qui, antirieurement au code civil, avait un privildge, ainsi que le declare Domat (loc. cit. p. 448), se trouvait soumis A un regime particulier qui participait de la saisie-arret, de l'hypothbque et du privilige tout A la fois.

Plus tard, en 1904, (4 Ed. VII, ch. 43), on a r6tabli le fournisseur des mat6riaux parmi les privil6gi~s des articles 2013 et 2013a du code civil tels qu'amendds en 1895, mais on ne l'a pas d6sign6 A l'article 2009 qui inumbre les cr4ances privil6gi6es sur les immeubles.

Je ne puis m'empicher aussi de signaler la r6daction de l'article 2013a qui, avec l'amendement fait en 1904, se. lit maintenant comme suit:

Il est 6tonnant qu'on n'ait pas jug6 A propos de mentionner dans la premidre partie de l'article le fournisseur de mat6fiaux, comme on a fait pour les autres.

C'est qu'il y a des oublis bien 6vidents et qui nous d4montrent bien que toute cette l6gislation a t r~dig6e bien hitivement et qu'elle donne lieu A certain doute et A une certaine ambiguit6 qui doivent nous faire rech~dcher l'intention du l6gislateur (art. C.C.).

Dans cet ordre d'id6es, je remarque que l'article J. 2009, tel qu'6dict6 par la loi Aug6 de 1894, en 6numbrant les creances privil6gi6es sur les immeubles, donne au paragraphe 7me sujette aux dispositions de l'article 2013.

L'article 2013 alors adopt6 en 1894 disait que ce droit de pref6rence de ces quatre priviligids s'exercerait sur la plus-value; et dans l'article 2013b, il 6num6rait encore ces quatre privil6gi6s et d~clarait que leur privilige existerait sans enregistrement pendant les travaux et avec enregistrement apris les travaux terminds.

Dans la loi de 1895, on fait disparattre dans l'article 2009 le fournisseur de mat6riaux et on le remplace par l'architecte;

de m~me, dans les articles 2013 et 2013a. Mais quand on vient alors A r6diger l'article 2013b on ne mentionne plus l'architecte mais simplement le journalier, l'ouvrier et le constructeur.

Pas un mot de l'architecte. Est-ce par inadvertance, comme dit l'honorable juge-en-chef de la Cour d'Appel? C'est bien possible, car, comme pour le constructeur, ses services acquibrent de jour en jour pendant .la construction une plus grande valeur.

Sa cr6ance augmente au fur .. et A mesure que les travaux progressent et alors je comprendrais qu'il ne filt pas oblig6 d'enregistrer au cours des travaux.

L'ordre-en-conseil qui 6tablit les honoraires d'architectes et qui a 6t0 produit dans la cause nous d6montre que les honoraires de l'architecte sont susceptibles !8 d'augmenter avec le progrbs des travaux.

Il est donc fort possible que ce soit un oubli du l6gislateur de ne pas avoir mentionn6 l'architecte parmi les personnes qui 1'article 2013b ont un privilige sans enregistrement. Mais la Cour d'Appel, dans une cause de Carrire v. Sigouin semble avoir dispos6 de cet argument. s'agissait dans cette cause de savoir si le privilige du fournisseur de mat6riaux existait dans le cas oa il n'avait pas donn6 l'avis exig6 par 1'article 2013g. L'honorable juge Demers, en 6tudiant la l6gislation alors existante, disait sur l'article 2013b:

Cette opinion de l'honorable juge Demers est bien d6cisive: c'est que 'article 2013b ne peut pas s'appliquer au fournisseur de matbriaux, parce qu'il n'est pas mentionn6.

Alors il en serait donc de mime pour l'architecte, puisqu'il n'en est pas question non plus dans cet article 2013b. Cette cause de Carribre v. Sigouin (1) ne devrait pas 4tre invoquie comne autorit6 pour d6cider, comme la Cour d'Appel l'a fait dans la pr6sente cause, que l'architecte doit enregistrer dans les trente jours de la cessation des travaux. Je partage l'opinion du juge Demers que le fait du 16gislateur de ne pas avoir mentionn6 l'architecte dans l'article 2013b d6montre que cet article ne peut pas 4tre invoqu6 par l'architecte ou contre lui. Quand, en 1895, le l6gislateur a voulu parler de l'architecte, il l'a nomm6ment d6sign6, et notamment aux articles 2009, 2013, 2013a et 2013c.

Ce dernier article surtout rend pour moi la chose 6vidente qu'il n'y a pas eu inadventance en r6digeant P'article 2013b. J'en suis venu A la conclusion que le demandeur ne devait pas rdussir pour les raisons suivantes:

Par l'article 1695 du code civil, le privilfge de l'architecte est soumis aux r~gles contenues au titre des Privil~ges et Hypotheques et au titre de l'Enregistre- J. ment des Droits rdels. Les dispositions des articles 2013, 2013b et 2103 du code civil, tels qu'ils existaient en 1916 quand Cook est devenu tiers d6tenteur de l'immeuble, ne sont pas tris claires et peuvent porter A controverse, comme je viens de le dire: mais, par contre, les articles 2082, 2083 et 2084 du code disposent des droits des parties dans le pr6sent litige.

D'abord Particle 2082 nous dit que l'enregistrement des droits r6els leur donne effet et 4tablit leur rang suivant les dispositions contenues au titre de l'Enregistrement.

L'article 2084 nous indique les droits rdels qui sont exempts des formalit6s de l'enregistrement: et il inclut notamment les privilfges mentionn6s en premier, quatri~me, cinqui~me, sixibme et neuvibme lieux dans l'article 2009.

Il en r~sulte donc, en raison de la r~gle expressio unius est exclusio alterius que le privi- 1oge de l'architecte, qui est mention6 A l'alinda 7me de 1'article 2009, doit 6tre enregistr6.

Suivant l'article 2083, les droits reels soumis A la formalit6 de 1'enregistrement ont effet du moment de leur enregistrement A l'encontre des autres crdances dont les droits n'ont t enregistrds que subs~quemment.

.

Dans le cas actuel, I'appelant n'a enregistr6 son privilfge que post~rieurement A la date oii Cook a fait enregistrer son titre de propri~taire.

Cet enregistrement est tardif et ne peut pas constituter un privilge qui pourrait 6tre oppos6 A Cook.

Sans adopter les motifs de la Cour d'Appel, j'en confirmerais, pour les raisons ci-dessus, le dispositif avec d6pens.

J.-This is an action by the appellant to have it declared that he has, as architect, a privilege for $7,851 affecting subdivision 7 of lot No. 1339 and lot No. 1340 of St. Antoine Ward in the City of Montreal belonging to the respondent.

One James H. Maher had purchased these lots from the respondent in October, 1912, for $110,000 of which $20,000 was paid in cash and the balance, $90,000, was secured in the respondent's favour by a vendor's privilege and was- payable by instalments. Immediately after the purchase, Maher instructed the appellant's firm, Saxe and Archibald, in whose rights the appellant now is, to prepare plans and specifications for a ten story building on this property. Tenders were then called for and that of one Deakin for $192,500 was accepted by Maher and a contract made between him and Deakin for the construction of the building, stipulating that it should be completed in September, 1913.

The work was commenced and continued until May, 1913, when Maher became financially embarrassed and the work was stopped. On the 31st of July, 1913, a contract was made between Deakin .and Maher, which had been drafted by the appellant, whereby it was agreed that the building operations would be postponed until March 1st, 1914; that the value of the building as it stood was $33,550 on which $25,000 had been paid, leaving a balance of $8,550; that there was a balance of $9,135 due the contractor for which Maher gave his note; that the contractor would proceed with the work, on March 1st, 1914, on receiving 20 days previous notice, provided he was guaranteed that the necessary financial arrangements to complete the work had been made; and that should the construction not be proceeded with by March 1st, 1914, the contractor would then be entitled to claim the balance due him to date. No notice to continue the work on March 1st, 1914, was given by Maher to Deakin, nor were the necessary financial arrangements made.

No work was done save what was necessary to protect the part already built, which was nothing more than the foundations and reached the level of the sidewalk.

On September 1st, 1916, Maher, being unable to pay the respondent the balance due on the purchase price of the property, reconveyed it to the latter, represented by his brother, Mr. J. W. Cook, K.C., in consideration of the balance he owed him, $90,000, for which the respondent gave him a discharge. This deed of sale was registered on September 2nd, 1916. On September, 14th, 1916, the appellant addressed a notice to the registrar of Montreal West and to Maher, stating that he claimed $7,851, and demanding that his claim be registered against the property. This notice was registered on December 16th, 1916. On March 31st, 1917, the appellant also addressed a notice to the registrar as well as to Maher and the respondent, claiming $7,851 for his services as architect and required that it be registered against this property, This notice was registered on April 13th, 1917. It may be observed that although the appellant stated that the building was then being erected, the work had been stopped since May, 1913, except what was done for the protection of the work from the weather, and the idea of any further construction 8!

The Court of King's Beich (1) reversed this judgment, rejecting, and I think rightly, the first and somewhat technical ground, to which I will not further refer, the more so as it was not urged before this court, and as to the registration of the appellant's privilege holding as follows in the formal judgment:

ds In effect, and indeed in terms, this decision is that the appellant could not register his privilege more With respect, I am of opinion that no such term as 30 days after the work is deemed to have terminated or to have ceased is to be found in this frequently amended and somewhat unskilfully drafted legislation. The case of work abandoned before completion is clearly a casus omissus in these articles, as is likewise the case of an architect or contractor dismissed during the course of the building operations.

It appears unnecessary to go into the history of this legislation, for we are only concerned with its proper construction as it existed at the time the appellant's services were rendered.

Articles 2013 cooK. (first paragraph), 2013a, 2013b and the first paragraph J. of article 2103 were then as follows:- 2013. The labourer, workman, architect, builder and supplier of materials, have a right of preference over the vendor and the other creditors, on the immovable but only upon the additional value given to the immovable by the work done.

2013a. For the purposes of the privilege, the labourer, workman, architect, builder and the supplier of materials rank as follows: 1, the labourer; 2, the workman; 3, the architect; 4, the builder; 5, the supplier of materials.

2013b. The right of preference or privilege upon the immovable exists, as follows:- Without registration of the claim, in favour of the debt due the labourer, workman and the builder, during the whole time they are occupied at the work or while such work lasts, as the case may be; and, with registration, provided it be registered. within the 30 days following the date upon which the building has become ready for the purpose for which it is intended.

But such right of preference or privilege shall exist only for one year from the date of the registration, unless a suit be taken in the interval, or unless a longer delay for payment has been stipulated in the contract.

2103. I. The privilege of the persons mentioned in article 2013 dates, in the cases mentioned in the first clause of article 2013b, only from the registration within the proper delay, at the registry office of the division in which is situated the immovable affected by the insc ription of a notice or memorial drawn up according to form A, with a deposition of the creditor, sworn to before a justice of the peace or a

Commissioner of the Superior Court, setting forth the nature and the amount of the claim and describing the immovable so affected.

The learned judges of the Court of King's Bench appear to have considered that through some inadvertence the paragraph of Art. 2013b commencing with the words "without registration" omitted any mention of the architect, and that during the continuance of the work superintended. by him the architect could claim a privilege without registration. I have been unable so to construe this article, nor do I think it competent for the court to supply an omission which appears to have been intentional. It was no doubt condidered that inasmuch as the labourer, the workman and, to some extent, the builder have claims which become payable at fixed times as the work progresses, it would, especially in the case of the two first, be inconvenient to require them to register a series of claims payable day by day or week by week for varying amounts. In the case of the architect there is no exemption from registration during the progress of the work and there is no provision allowing him to assert a privilege while the work progresses, unless his claim has been registered.

A careful reading of article 2013b shows that this difference was clearly intentional.

"The right of preference or privilege upon the immovable" which "exists" is obviously the "right of preference" mentioned by Art. 2013, and is that in favour of the labourer, workman, architect, builder, and supplier of materials. Therefore the right of preference referred to in the first line of Art. 2013b is the right of the five classes enumerated in article 2013 and also in article 2013a. Then article 2013b states how this right "exists," and it exists:

(a) without registration of the claim, in favour of the debt due the labourer, workman and the builder, during the whole time they are occupied at the work or while such work lasts: and

(b) with registration, provided "it," that is to say the right mentioned in the first line of article 2013b, be registered within the 30 days, etc.

If it had been intended that the words "in favour of the debt due the labourer, workman and the builder" should apply to and govern the two clauses above indicated as (a) and (b) respectively, they would have been placed in the introductory clause immediately after the verb "exists."

Placed as they are, their restrictive effect is confined to the phrase "without registration, etc.," leaving the phrase "and with registration, etc.," unrestricted and applicable to the entire subject of the verb "exists," thus embracing in clause (b) the architect and the supplier of materials as well as the other three classes.

No valid reason has been advanced for rejecting this plain graminmatical construction.

There is no accidental omission to supply.

The architect is deliberately left out of the first clause and equally deliberately included in the second.

The architect's right of preference. or privilege "exists,"

"dates,"

or "takes effect" only from the date of registration, in view both of article 2013b and of art. 2103, and also by virtue of the general rules applicable to the registration of real rights (arts. 2082, 2083), unless it be expressly exempt from registration (arts. 2013b and 2084), which it clearly is not.

It is true that article 2013b grants a delay of 30 days for the registration of the architect's privilege; but this is in case the work has been completed, for the starting point of this delay is the date when the building has become ready for the purpose for which it is intended.

If the building operations are not completed, but, as in this case, abandoned in course 'of prosecution, there is no delay for registration, for there is no date fixed by law from which this delay. could be computed.

It follows that, in such a case, although the architect must register his claim, he is granted no delay for registration and his right of priority as to other registered claims can only count from the date of the registration of his own claim (art. 2083).

I may now cite art. 2013f for it leads to the consideration of the legal principle upon which the dismissal of the appellant's action should in my opinion be supported.

It follows that the sale of the immovable to a third party will be conclusive against the architect if the latter has not complied with the requirements of the articles here mentioned, and therefore, in a case like this where the work has been stopped and abandoned and the building has never become ready for the purpose for which it is intended, if the property be sold to a third party who registers his deed of sale before the architect registers his privilege, the architect's claim cannot be asserted against the immovable.

I may add that there is no suggestion of bad faith on the respondent's part, and the appellant must stand or fall on his strict compliance with the provisions I have cited. It is unnecessary to express any opinion upon the question whether the appellant could have effectively registered his claim either on the 16th of December, 1916, or on the 13th of April, 1917, had Maher remained the owner of the property.

I make no reference to the amendments made to this legislation by the statute 7 Geo. V, ch. 53, because it came into force only on Dec. 22, 1916, at which date the respondent was the registered owner of the property, and any work done by the appellant had been finished long before its enactment.

For these reasons I would dismiss the appeal with costs.Mignault

Appeal dismissed with costs.