Collins v. The King

Per Idington J.-The appellant, having previously renounced any desire for a speedy trial and having later pleaded to the indictment without raising any objection, had waived any right he had to elect for a speedy trial.

PRESENT:-Idington, Duff, Anglin, Brodeur and Mignault JJ. Per Duff and Brodeur JJ.-The right of the appellant to elect to be tried summarily had been taken away by the requirement by the CoLNs Attorney-General for a jury trial, the preferment of the indictment by the Attorney-General under sect. 873 Cr. C., constituting such requirement within the meaning of sect. 825, s.s. 5, as enacted by 8-9 Ed. VII, c. 9, s. 2.

Per Anglin and Mignault JJ.-The application made on behalf of the accused for a postponement of the trial to permit him to re-elect was not an election for a speedy trial; and, therefore, there was no refusal to grant ace of an option made by the accused. Held, also, that, in not discharging the six additional jurors, the trial judge exercised a discretion conferred on him by art. 3459 R.S.Q., and moreover, the appellant, under the circumstances, did not suffer any substantial wrong on that account.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of King's Bench, appeal side, Province of Quebec, dismissing an appeal by the appellant relating to questions of law arising on his trial and upon a stated case. The material facts of the case and the questions in issue are fully stated in the above head-note and in the judgments now reported.

IDINGTON J.-The accused having when charged before the magistrate expressly renounced any desire for speedy trial without jury and later notwithstanding pleaded to the indictment without raising any sort of objection thereto, in my opinion, had waived any legal right he had up to that time to elect for a speedy trial.

Such was the settled state of the law until the decision of this court in the case of Giroux v. The King (1).

(1) [1917] 56 Can. S.C.R. 63.

I am not quite sure in light of that decision, what the law so laid down really is, but when applied to this case which is, as it were, the counterpart of that, I think it has no application.

If that decision should, necessarily, govern in regard to the point I raise, I would bow to it, though I dissented therein, but it does not, I think, and therefore I hold the pleading to the indictment, under the attendant circumstances, fatal to the appellant's contention herein.

There the accused was allowed, even after plea to an indictment, to withdraw his plea and elect to go to trial before a judge without a jury.

I thought then there was no jurisdiction in the courts to so proceed.

This case is quite distinguishable from the case of Minguy v. The King (1), where the accused had indicated his desire to elect, as he was entitled to have done, for a trial without a jury before he was forced to plead to an indictment and thereby, as I held, improperly deprived of his right to elect.

I am, notwithstanding the doctrine laid down in the case of Giroux v. The King (2), unable to see that it necessarily governs this case.

I therefore would answer the first question of the stated case in the negative.

And as to the second question I am of the opinion that, under all the attendant circumstances, the error if any, which is disputed, would not necessarily be fatal to the validity of the trial, and therefore answer it also in the negative.

The appeal therefore, in my opinion, should be dismissed.

J.-The appeal, in my opinion, should be dismissed.

1st.

As to the constitution of the panel. In this respect no substantial prejudice was suffered by the accused.

It is unnecessary to repeat the observations contained in the case as stated and signed by the Chief Justice of the Superior Court and in the judgment of Mr. Justice Martin with which I concur. 2nd.

As to the right of the accused to elect to be tried by a judge. Admittedly the accused had that right under sections 826 and 827 of the Criminal Code unless by virtue of a requirement by the Attorney- General under s.s. 5 of sec. 825 Cr. C., that right was taken away. In Minguy v. The King (1) I concurred in the opinion of the Chief Justice of this court that where the Attorney-General prefers a bill of indictment under sec. 873 or where the bill of indictment is, by the special direction of the Attorney-General, so preferred that in itself constitutes a requirement that the case should be tried by a jury within the meaning of section 825, s.s. 5. I am not at all impressed by the argument that the power given by section 873 is a different power from that given by s.s. 5 of sec. 825.

They are not the same power, no doubt; but it does not follow that each must be exercised by an independent proceeding. A proceeding under sec. 873 may and prima facie does import a determination that the accused shall be tried by jury, a determination negativing his right to be tried without a jury and at all events, in the absence of some qualifying declaration it is an exercise of the authority given by sec. 825, s.s. 5.

I may add that the decision in Giroux v. The King (2) (a case in which the judges who took part in it proceeded upon diverse grounds) is not an authority having any relevancy to this question. I think that in this case there is sufficient evidence and there was sufficient evidence before the trial judge that the Attorney-General had required that the case should be tried by a jury within sec. 825, s.s. 5. It is important, I think, to add that had it not been for s.s. 5 of sec. 825 of the Criminal Code, I should have been constrained to hold that in the language sec. 1019 Cr. C., "something not according to law was done at the trial" and consequently that the conviction must be set aside. The accused, as I have already said, was entitled, in the absence of action by the Attorney-General under sec. 825, to have the benefit of the procedure provided by sections 826 and 827. Through no fault of his own but through the default of the officers of the Crown he was put upon his trial without being given the opportunity to take advantage of those provisions; and had it not been for the intervention of the Attorney-General he could not, I think, have been tried legally in these circumstances. It is not so much a question of jurisdiction. The Court of King's Bench had jurisdiction to decide whether or not the accused could legally be tried as it had jurisdiction to decide all other questions of procedure and substantive law touching the liability of the accused to be tried and convicted of the offence with which he was charged.

The point is that the trial of the prisoner in such circumstances would not have been a trial according to law; an objection which could properly be raised by way of stated case and dealt with on appeal under the provisions of the code.

For the reasons given I am of opinion, however, that these last-mentioned considerations are without application in the present case.

J.-Two questions are submitted by the reserved case granted the appellant:

(1) Although the argument travelled over the whole field of the rights of a person committed for trial to elect for a speedy trial-the duties of the sheriff and the judge, under secs. 826-7, to accord him an opportunity to make such an election being specially dwelt upon as imperative and as such affording a basis for the contention that because those sections had not been complied with, the Court of King's Bench lacked jurisdiction to try the appellant-the first of the two questions actually presented for decision lies in a very much narrower compass.

The only thing approaching "an option made by the accused for a speedy trial" of which the record contains any evidence is to be found in the following extract from the procedure book of the Court of King's Bench:

The only application made to the court was for a postponement of the trial to the next assizes to permit the accused to re-elect, if he should think fit. That J. motion was simply refused.

Apart from the fact that there had been no previous election and the case was therefore not one for re-election, what took place at the assize court certainly did not amount to an election for a speedy trial. There was not even an intimation that such an election would be made if the postponement asked for were granted. There was therefore no refusal "to grant acte of an option made by the accused for a speedy trial."

He had made no such option and an acte of such an option therefore was not and could not have been sought or refused. The first question must be answered accordingly. It is not within our province, as was held by a majority of this court in the recent case of Scott v. The King (24th of Feb., 1921), materially to modify, qualify or enlarge the scope of a question in a reserved case merely because it does not cover the ground of appeal which counsel presents to the court, although that should appear to be what the appellant conceives to be his substantial grievance.

(2) In not discharging the six additional jurors over the required panel of 60 (R.S.Q., Art. 3438) the court exercised a discretion conferred on it by R.S.Q., Art. 3459. The six additional jurors having been lawfully retained I am not satisfied that their names were not properly placed in the panel box (Crim. Code, s. 927), from which the names of the petit jury were drawn.

As is pointed out by Mr. Justice Martin, only sixty jurors answered the roll call on the day of the trial. Six were absent. No juror called for the trial was in fact challenged by the appellant. The only objection taken on his behalf on this branch of the case which appeared to be of moment, viz., that the proportion of peremptory challenges which he was entitled to exercise was disturbed by the presence of the six additional jurors, thus appears to be lacking in substance.

His right of challenge was not in fact affected. Even if there was something done at the trial not according to law, the right of challenge not having been interfered with, s. 1019 of the Criminal Code precludes the granting of a new trial since no substantial wrong or miscarriage was occasioned. J.-Il s'agit d'un appel dans une cause criminelle.

Deux questions nous sont soumises. La premiere a trait A la juridiction de la cour qui a condamn6 l'accus6.

La seconde est de savoir si le petit jury a t6 validement constitu6.

L'accus6 avait t6 arret6 pour vol A main arm6e sous la disposition de l'article 446 du Code criminel. II a 6t6 amen6 devant le juge des Sessions de la Paix le 18 septembre 1920, pour y subir sommairement son prochs: mais, comme il en avait le droit, il a opt6 pour un prochs devant la cour du Bane du Roi (arts. 777-778), c'est-A-dire, un proces par jury.

Le juge des Sessions de la Paix a alors proc6d6 A l'enqubte prdliminaire et l'accus6 a 6t6, le 12 octobre, condamn6 A subir son proces.

Le dossier constate qu'avant la d6claration du juge qu'il y avait matibre A prochs (commitment) 1'accus6 s'est 6vad6 de la prison il 6tait incarer6.

Le 13 octobre, un acte d'accusation (indictment) fut pr6sent6 au grand jury par les avocats de la Couronne, qui l'avaient sign6 comme suit:

Cet acte d'accusation portait en outre sur le dos l'inscription suivante sign6e de la main du Procureur-G6n~ra1 1ui-meme:

L'acte d'accusation fut rapport6 comme fond6 le meme jour par le grand jury et de suite l'accus6 fut mis en jugement (arraigned) et il plaida non-coupable. Le 15, au moment oA son proc6s devait commencer et avant que l'on proc6dit A choisir le petit jury, I'accus6 par son avocat a demand6 verbalement A la cour A

La Couronne s'y est object~e et le prochs a eu lieu et l'accus6 a t6 condamnd.

II pr6tend maintenant qu'iI a t6 illigalement priv6 du droit d'opter pour un procs exp6ditif et que lorsque les petits jur6s ont 6t tires au sort il y avait dans la botte oA les cartes 6taient d~posbes soixante-six noms, c'est-h-dire six de plus que le nombre d6termin6 par la loi.

Ce dernier point ne parait pas avoir soulev6 en temps utile.

D'ailleurs rien ne d6montre qu'aucun texte de loi ait t6 viol6.

Le sh6rif, sous les dispositions des articles 3438 et 3455 des statuts revis6s de Qu6bec, avait le pouvoir d'assigner plus que soixante jurbs. Et si aprs avoir examin6 les demandes d'exemption des jurds il reste plus de soixante jurds pr6sents, le juge peut renvoyer le surplus.

La loi ne lui en fait pas une obligation: au contraire, elle paralt laisser cela A sa discr6tion. II peut arriver, en effet, que le terme soit bien charg6, qu'un grand nombre de causes aient A Atre d6cid6es et jug6es: et alors, suivant sa discr6tion, le juge peut garder plus de soixante jur6s.

C'est ce qui a 6t6 fait dans le cas actuel. Le juge n'a done viol6 aucun texte de loi: mais il a simplement exerc4 une discr6tion qu'il pouvait exercer. L'autre question qui nous est soumise touche A la juridiction de la cour et a trait au droit de l'accus6 d'opter pour un prochs exp6ditif.

La Cour du Banc du Roi avait certainement juridiction pour juger l'accus6.

L'offense qui lui 6tait imput6e d6signait ce tribunal comme ayant le droit de juger l'accus6.

Un acte d'accusation a 6t port6 contre l'accus6 et le grand jury a rapport6 cet acte d'accusation comme bien fond6.

Sur le dos de cet acte d'accusation on trouve la signature du procureur-g6n6ral d6clarant.que cet acte d'accusation avait 6t6 pr6sent6 au grand jury sur ses instructions formelles.

Avant l'amendement du code criminel de 1909, un accus6 d'une offense comme celle qui est impute A

Collins avait le droit absolu de demander A subir son prochs devant le juge des Sessions de la Paix: mais par l'amendement de 1909 ce droit lui est refus6 lorsque

(825-5) le procureur-g6n6ral requiert que le procs se fasse devant un jury.

La loi ajoute que le Procureur

G6n6ral peut faire cette demande bien que l'accus6 ait consenti A 'tre jug6 par le juge des Sessions.

Il me semble que la signature du procureur-g6ndral sur l'acte d'accusation constitue cette demande dont parle l'article 825-5 du code criminel.

Je serais enclin A croire d'un autre c6t6 6galement que du moment que le procureur-g6n6ral, sous l'article 873, porte devant la grand jury une accusation, qu'il y ait eu enquite pr61iminaire ou non, d~s ce moment-lA la cour du Banc du Roi est ddment saisie de la cause et qu'elle peut la juger et en disposer.

Nous n'avons pas

A examiner ce qui s'est pass6 antdrieurement; et si l'accus6, comme il 1'a fait dans le cas actuel, demande un prochs exp6ditif, la cour a parfaitement le droit de lui refuser ce privilege et de proc6der A faire juger la cause par un jury.

Dans le cas actuel, je considbre que l'action du procureur-g6n6ral en signant lui-meme l'acte d'accusation d6montre d'une manibre explicite qu'il requdrait -que la cause ftt jug6e par un jury (825-5 C.C.). C'est IA un droit absolu de la part du procureur-g6n6ral, et il a suffisamment exprim6 le d6sir d'exercer ce droit pour qu'on ne puisse pas pr6tendre que la cour soit sans juridiction.

Il serait d6sirable cependant que cette r6quisition fftt ins6r6e dans le dossier originaire afin d'enlever au juge des Sessions toute apparence de juridiction.

Nous ne pouvons pas mettre de c6t6 une condamnation, mime s'il t6 fait quelque chose de non conforme A la loi et si des instructions erronbes ont t donn6es, .1 moins qu'il n'en soit r~sult6 un tort rdel ou un d6ni de justice. Je suis incapable de trouver dans la cause actuelle aucune illigalit6 qui ait pu constituer un d6ni de justice (art. 1019 C.Cr.). La Couronne avait le droit de requdrir que l'accus6 subisse son procks devant la Cour Criminelle; la cour, dans sa discr6tion, 6tait justifiable de refuser A l'accus6 un ajournement; le choix des petits jur6s ne s'est pas fait ill6galement. La condamnation qui a 6t6 infligde A l'accus6 doit 6tre maintenue.

L'appel doit 6tre renvoy6 avec d6pens.

J.-This appeal comes to this court on two questions as to both of which Mr. Justice Greenshields dissented from the majority judgment of the Court of King's Bench:

First question.

The appellant's counsel argued this question as if it were quite a different question, namely, whether under section 826 et seq., Criminal Code, he should have been brought before a judge and the statement required by sect. 827 made to him, at which time and on which statement being made to him he would have been afforded the opportunity of exercising, if he saw fit, an option for a speedy trial or to be tried in the ordinary way. I think I sufficiently stated in Minguy v. The King what procedure should be followed in cases like this one. But this is not the question we have to answer. And I propose to reply to the question submitted in the negative because the appellant never made an option for a speedy trial, and therefore there was no option of which acte (to use the language of the question) should have been granted.

This does not necessarily mean that I disagree with what Mr. Justice Greenshields said on this first point, but under the question put to the court there is no necessity of expressing any opinion on this point. Second point.

I would also answer this question in the negative for the reasons given by Mr. Justice Martin in the Court of King's* Bench, which are entirely satisfactory to me.

The appeal should be dismissed.

Appeal dismissed.