Majority
The appellant was tried for murder and found guilty. The victim had been killed by the appellant's son, at the instigation of his father. The son, having had his trial previously, had been found guilty of manslaughter.
Held, that the appellant could be convicted of murder.
The trial judge in his charge, after reading section 259 Cr. C., explained to the jurors th nature of murder and instructed them that they could find one of three verdicts against the accused, murder, manslaughter or acquittal. While he did not read section 262 Cr. C. which refers to manslaughter, in discussing provocation and the defences set up by the appellant of self-defence and protection of the home, he explained under what circumstances the verdict might be one of manslaughter.
Held, Brodeur J. (dissenting)
, that the trial judge sufficiently instructed the jury as to what in law constitutes the offence of manslaughter. Per Brodeur J. (dissenting).-There was sufficient evidence to justify the jury in finding a verdict of manslaughter, if they had been properly instructed.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of King's Bench, appeal side, Province of Quebec, dismissing an appeal by the appellant relating to questions of law arising on his trial for murder and upon a stated case.
*PRESEN'r:-Idington, Duff, Anglin, Brodeur and Mignault JJ. 1- The appellant was charged with having murdered one Morissette and found guilty.
Morissette was killed as the result of a rifle shot which was fired by the son of the appellant at the victim, who had called late at night under peculiar circumstances. The trial of the son was held first upon an indictment of murder; and he was found guilty of manslaughter. At the trial of the appellant the judge, in his charge to the jury, explained the nature of murder, quoting section 259 Cr. C. He also cited section 261 Cr. C., on the defence of provocation, section 53 Cr. C. dealing with self defence against assaults and section 60 Cr. C. on the defence of dwelling-house at night. The judge did not read section 262 Cr. C. as to manslaughter. The two questions submitted to the courts were: 1, as the son was convicted of manslaughter, the appellant, as aider and abettor, could not be found guilty of murder; and 2, the charge was illegal as the jury were not sufficiently instructed as to the distinction between murder and manslaughter. N. K. Laflamme K.C. and M. A. Lemieux K.C. for the appellant.
Aim6 Marchand K.C. and Lucien Cannon K.C. for the respondent.
J.-The appellant was indicted for murder and convicted therefor.
The Court of King's Bench has, with the exception of Mr. Justice Guerin, so answered the questions submitted in a reserved case relative thereto as to maintain the conviction.
The pith of the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
Guerin in said court which gives appellant the right to come here, and is the measure of our jurisdiction to interfere, is that because appellant's son on another indictment for murder, resting on same killing, had on his trial been only found guilty of manslaughter, therefore the appellant cannot be found guilty of any greater offelice than that of manslaughter.
The contention is a most remarkable one and seems to me to have been so well and effectually answered by the several opinions of the other judges in the court below writing opinions with which I substantially agree, that I do not feel at liberty to repeat same here.
Some of them illustrate the unfounded nature of such pretensions as made, by various alternatives.
I only add another and that is if this case, as it might have been in law, had been tried before the other, despite what appellant's counsel suggests is customary in such cases, how could he have invoked the pretension of law now set up?
The appeal should be dismissed.
J.-I have carefully considered the charge of the trial judge and I am by no means satisfied that he instructed the jury insufficiently touching the elements of the offence of manslaughter and the distinctions between that offence and murder.
I am unable to perceive any force in the argument founded upon the verdict and judgment against the younger Remillard.
J.-In my opinion this appeal fails. The fact that in another trial another jury passing upon evidence which may have been somewhat different decided that the offence committed by Rom6o R~millard in killing Lucien Morissette amounted .only to manslaughter is wholly irrelevant to the question whether Joseph R6millard could rightly be put on trial for, and could upon proof that he had aided, abetted or instigated, the homicide, be convicted of murder.
As between Romeo Rdmillard and the Crown the verdict of the jary who tried him is no doubt conclusive as to the nature of his 'crime. As between Joseph R6millard and the Crown it determines nothing.
The character of the offence actually committed by each must be decided by the jury charged with - the disposition of the indictment gainst him.
To the first question in the reserved case the only possible answer was in the negative. The learned judge, in my opinion, sufficiently instructed the jury as to the three verdicts which may be rendered on an indictment for murder and as to the distinction between murder and manslaughter. He discussed adequately and correctly all the relevant grounds on which in this case the culpable homicide charged to have been aided, abetted or instigated by Joseph R6millard might possibly have been reduced from murder to manslaughter.
Having read to the jury the definitive provisions of s. 259 of the Criminal Code dealing with murder, he instructed them that, if the homicide were not excusable, their verdict should be guilty of manslaughter, unless the facts proved warranted a verdict of murder.
That was equivalent to a reading to them of s. 262 of the Codethe omission of which from the charge was made the subject of serious complaint.
The learned judge also read and explained s. 261, which deals with the effect of provocation, and discussed the several matters suggested in the course of the defence by way of excuse and in palliation. Without characterizing the charge as a model presentation of the case to the jury, with Mr. Justice Carroll I regard it as fulfilling the requirements of the law and not warranting interference by an appellate court on any ground covered by the reserved case.
The second and third questions should, in my opinion, be answered as they were by the Court of King's Bench.
(dissenting).-Trois questions principales nous ont 6t6 soumises.
La premi~re porte sur la validit6 d'un verdict de meurtre contre un complice quand I'auteur de 1'homicide n'aurait 6t6 trouv6 coupable que de manslaughter. Par les deux autres questions on nous demande si le juge qui pr6sidait au proc~s a suffisamment expliqu6 la diff6rence entre le meurtre et le manslaughter.
L'appelant est accus6 d'avoir tu6 un nomm6 Morissette, et il a 6t6 trouv6 coupable de meurtre. Ce n'est pas lui cependant qui a tir6 le coup de fusil qui a 6t6 malheureusement fatal, mais c'est son fils Romio. L'accus6 dans la pr~sente cause n'a 6t6 que le complice de l'infraction.
Certains timoins, qui, je le suppose, ont 6t crus par le jury mais dont le t6moignage est contredit par d'autres t~moins, ont d6clar6 que le phre, I'accus6 en la pr6sente cause, avait incit6 son fils A tirer sur la victime.
C'est A raison de cette circonstance, je suppose, que la Couronne a persist6 tout de m~me A proc6der sur une accusation de meurtre contre le complice quand I'auteur lui-m6me du crime n'avait 6t6 trouv6 coupable que de manslaughter.
L'article 69 du code criminel justifie cette proc6dure, vu qu'il met sur le mime pied I'auteur et le complice d'une infraction et il les d6clare tous les deux coupables de l'offence elle-m~me. Celui qui aide, provoque ou conseille un assassinat peut done 6tre trouv6 coupable de meurtre lui-m~me, malgr6 qu'il n'ait pas perp6tr6 lui-mime le fait qui a produit la mort.
Nos lois criminelles depuis leur codification ont fait disparaltre cette classification un peu subtile des accus6s en principaux au premier degr6, en principaux au deuxi6me degr6 et en complices avant le fait. Elles ont mis tous ces criminels sur le meme pied. Chacun d'eux peut 6tre poursuivi pour l'offense principale elle-mime, quand bien mime il n'aurait qu'aid6, assist6 ou conseill6 l'auteur du forfait (Russell on Crime, 6 me 6dition, pp. 176-177).
Ainsi dans le cas d'assassinat, celui qui a simplement provoqu6 une personne 1 tuer peut 8tre mis en accusation de meurtre comme s'il avait port6 luimeme le coup qui a terrass6 la victime.
Hawkins, "Pleas of the Crown,"86me 6dition, vol. 2 p. 439, d6clare que, mime dans un cas d'homicide, le complice pourrait 6tre trouv6 coupable de meurtre lorsque l'auteur lui-mime du crime ne serait coupable que de manslaughter.
Dans le cas actuellement devant nous le jury pouvait rendre un verdict de meurtre meme si I'accus4 n'eut t6 que le complice et n'eut pas port6 lui-mime le coup fatal.
Chaque cause pouvait 6tre jug6e suivant son propre m6rite et suivant la preuve- qui serait faite dans chacune d'elle sur la nature de l'offense.
Le verdict dans l'une ne devait pas ncessairement Stre adopt6 dans l'autre cause. La premibre question qui nous est soumise devrait done recevoir une r6ponse negative.
Quant aux deux autres questions qui ont trait aux instructions du juge au jury, je ne puis pas en venir A la meme conclusion que la Cour du Banc du Roi. La question dans la cause 6tait de savoir d'abord s'il y avait eu homicide coupable.
L'accus6 a tent6 d'6tablir que l'assassinat avait 6t commis sous l'effet d'une provocation et qu'il 6tait accidentel. Ces deux moyens de d6fense auraient pu lib6rer de toute offence criminelle s'ils avaient t6 prouv6s. Le juge, dans son allocution aux jur6s, s'est attach6 A d6montrer que la provocation n'6tait pas suffisante pour justifier Romeo Rmillard de faire l'acte qu'il a commis et que le coup de feu qui a 6t6 tir6 ne pouvait pas 6tre rang6 dans la cat6gorie des accidents. Apris avoir lu soigneusement toute la preuve, je me suis convaincu moi-meme que la provocation qui a 6t invoqu6e n'6tait pas suffisante pour pouvoir justifier "'homicide; et je ne crois pas non plus que les circonstances le coup de feu a 6t6 tir6 peuvent ranger I'acte accompli dans la cat6gorie d'actions qui, purement accidentelles, peuvent lib6rer compltement l'auteur de l'acte ou ses complices.
Il y a done, suivant moi, homicide coupable.
L'homicide n'6tait pas justifiable ni excusable.
Mais cet homicide 6tait-il volontaire ou involontaire? En d'autres termes y a-t-il eu meurtre ou simplement manslaughter?
Le juge malheureusement ne parait pas avoir fait ressortir suffisamment la distinction entre ces deux offenses de meurtre et de manslaughter.
L'honorable juge Carroll qui pr6sidait la Cour du Bane du Roi et qui a d6cid6 contre l'appelant, aprbs avoir d6clar6 dans ses notes que l'allocution du juge J. est 16gale dans son ensemble, ajoute cependant qu'elle a pu
Dans ce cas, peut-on dire que le juge a suffisamment renseign6 le jur6 sur les faits de la cause dans leurs rapports avec le crime de manslaughter? Il n'y a pas de doute, suivant moi, comme je l'ai dit plus haut, que la provocation et le caract~re accidentel du coup de feu ne pouvaient pas empcher l'accus6 d'6tre coupable d'homicide; car quand bien mime des personnes auraient jug6 A propos de venir faire visite A sa femme A une heure indue de la nuit, I'accus6 n'aurait pas justifiable de prendre un fusil et de les tuer. La provocation n'6tait pas suffisante pour cela.
Mais si dans le but de protdger son foyer contre la mauvaise r6putation que la visite nocturne de ces jeunes gens peut lui imputer et si prenant un fusil il tente de leur tirer dans les jambes et si comme r6sultat de l'excitation ou par maladresse le coup va porter sur une partie vitale de l'un de ces visiteurs, sans aucune intention de sa part de causer la mort, n'y a-t-il pas lieu alors pour le juge de bien faire la distinction entre l'offense qui constitue un meurtre et celle qui constitue un manslaughter?
C'est ce qui n'a pas 6t fait dans cette cause-ci. L'allocution, au contraire, a port6 sur ces incidents comme 616ments du crime de meurtre, lorsque la preuve d6montrait plut6t que les jurbs 6taient en pr6sence d'un crime de manslaughter.
II me parait 6vident, pour ma part, qu'il n'y avait pas intention de tuer mais simplement de faire une d6monstration qui emp~cheraient ces visiteurs de rip6ter leurs visites nocturnes et de les forcer, eux et leurs semblables, de respecter le foyer de l'accus6.
Sa pauvre femme 6tait malheureusement victime de la boisson et ses moeurs, comme il arrive d'ordinaire dans tous ces cas, 6taient un objet de scandale pour sa propre famille.
Alors l'accus6 a voulu la prot6ger contre ceux qui seraient tentis de profiter de ces faiblesses pour dishonorer son foyer.
Cela ne saurait justifier un droit cependant de prendre une arme h feu et de tuer ces visiteurs. Mais si, comme dans le cas actuel, le juge doit insister pour dire aux jurds qu'il y a crime, il doit le faire de fagon
A leur faire bien comprendre ce qu'est le meurtre, qu'est le manslaughter. Prenant la phrase que j'ai d6tach6e de l'opinion du juge Carroll, je dis que si
1'allocution du juge a pu produire chez les jurds l'impression qu'aucun autre verdict que celui de meurtre pouvait 6tre rendu, il doit y avoir un nouveau proces.
Le juge ne doit pas se contenter de citer g6n6ralement le texte du code qui nous dit que sur une accusation de meurtre un accus6 peut Atre trouv6 coupable de meurtre, de manslaughter, ou acquitt6; il ne doit pas non plus donner une d6finition plus ou moins vague de ces deux offenses, mais il doit consid6rer ces deux offenses A la lumibre des faits prouv6s et dire aux jurds d'une manibre claire et pr6cise les relations des faits prouvbs avec le crime de meurtre et de manslaughter. Le but de l'allocution du juge aux jur6s est de leur expliquer la loi qui gouverne la cause, de montrer les points essentiels qui doivent 6tre prouv6s de cot et d'autre, les relations de la preuve aux points en litige. Aussi dans un cas oi les faits prouv6s sont tout h la fois susceptibles de produire un verdict pour deux offenses diff6rentes, il devient n6cessaire pour le juge de d6terminer qu'il y a criminalit6 et aussi de J montrer clairement le degr6 de cette criminalit6 en rapport avec les offenses dont l'accus6 peut 4tre trouv4 coupable.
Le juge doit d6finir le crime imput6 A l'accus4 et il doit 6galement expliquer la diff6rence entre ce crime et tout autre dont il pourrait Atre trouv6 coupable.
Le d6faut pour le juge de renseigner le jury sur le meurtre et le manslaughter a t jug6 suffisant dans la cause de The King v. Wong On (1), pour ordonner nouveau proc~s.
Sir James Stephen, dans son ouvrage "General View of Criminal Law,'? 26me 6dition, p. 170, dit ceci: Une cause A peu pr~s semblable a la pr6sente a t d6cid6e en Angleterre il n'y a que quelques annies; c'est celle de King v. Hopper (2).
II s'agissait, dans cette cause de Hopper, d'une accusation de meurtre; et l'accus6, comme dans la pr6sente cause, plaidait provocation et accident. Au prochs, le juge a fermement exprim6 l'opinion que c'6tait un cas de meurtre ou d'acquittement. Il n'a pas voulu d6clarer que la provocation et l'accident pouvaient etre tels que l'offense pftt 6tre consid6rde conme manslaughter. Lord Reading, qui a rendu le jugement de la Cour d'Appel,* a d6cid6 que les circonstances prouv6es pouvaient justifier un verdict de manslaughter et que le juge aurait dd instruire le jury en cons6quence.
Dans le cause actuelle, le juge, il est vrai, n'a pas t6 aussi positif que dans la cause de Hopper; mais il a tout de mime laiss6 le jury sous l'impression que le seul verdict qui pouvait Atre rendu 6tait celui de meurtre.
Je suis d'opinion, pour ces raisons, que les instructions du juge au jury 6taient incompl6tes et par cons6quent ill6gales.
I devrait y avoir un nouveau prochs et l'appel devrait Atre maintenu.
J.-The appellant having been tried at
Quebec on an indictment for the murder of one Lucien
Morissette before Mr. Justice D6sy and a jury, was found guilty and death sentence was passed on him.
The learned trial judge refused to state certain questions for the opinion of the Court of King's Bench sitting in appeal, but on appeal to the latter court, he was ordered to state for the opinion of that court the following questions:
jury
After hearing counsel, the Court of King's Bench answered the first question in the negative, the two branches of question two in the affirmative and the two branches of question three also in the affirmative.
Mr. Justice Guerin dissented and would have answered question one in the affirmative, the first branches of question two and three in the affirmative and the second branches of these questions in the negative.
This dissent permitted the further appeal which has been taken to this court, and, in view of its terms, the whole case is open for review.
It should be remarked, as to questions two and three, that the five judges were of opinion that it was the duty of the trial judge to direct the jury in the manner stated in the first branches of these questions, the majority of the learned judges being of opinion that the trial judge had sufficiently instructed the jury on the points referred to.
First question. Briefly stated the contention of counsel for the appellant is that the learned trial judge should have told the jury that inasmuch as Romeo R6millard, the appellant's son, who fired the fatal shot, was previously tried on an indictment for the murder of Lucien Morissette, and found guilty of manslaughter only, the appellant, if in the opinion of the jury he was an aider and abettor, could not be convicted of the crime of murder, but that the only verdict that could be rendered was one for manslaughter or acquittal.
The circumstances under which the jury found a verdict of murder against the appellant are not mentioned in the reserved case, and cannot be perfectly ascertained by reading the charge to the jury, in which the learned trial judge commented on facts well known to the jury. I think however that we have only to deal with the facts assumed in question one, that is to say that Romeo R6millard was the author of the crime, and was previously convicted by another jury of manslaughter.
We must also assume that there was evidence upon which the jury could find that the appellant was an aider and abettor in the crime committed by Rom6o R6millard.
Assuming these facts, in order to determine Whether it was the duty of the learned trial judge to direct the jury that the only verdict they could find against the appellant was one for manslaughter or acquittal, it is necessary to consider certain sections of the Criminal Code. The old distinction between accessories before the fact and principals has been abolished, and section 69, paragraph 1, of the Criminal Code enumerates those who are parties to, and guilty of, an offence. Paragraph (a) of subsection 1 applies to Romdo R6millard, who actually committed the offence, and the other paragraphs comprise those who formerly were termed accessories before the fact, and who are now, equally with the perpetrator, parties to and guilty of the offence.
If the jury were of the opinion that the appellant was an aider and abettor in the offence committed by Rom6o R6millard, they could undoubtedly find him a party to and guilty of this offence.
To aid or abet is defined as follows in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, vol. 1, p. 64:
unwittingly encourage another in fact by his presence, by misinterpreted words or gestures, or by his silence or non-interference:-or he .
may encourage intentionally by expressions, gestures, or actions intended to signify approval. In the latter case he aids and abets; Mijnault j. in the former he does not.
It is no criminal offence to stand by a mere passive spectator of a crime, even of a murder.
Non-interference to prevent a crime is not itself a crime. But the fact that a person was voluntarily and purposely present witnessing the commission of a crime, and offered no opposition to it, though he might reasonably be expected to prevent it and had the power so to do or at least to express his dissent, might, under some circumstances, afford cogent evidence upon which a jury would be justified in finding that he wilfully encouraged, and so aided and abetted.
But it would be purely a question for the jury whether he did so or not (per Hawkins, J., The Queen v. Coney
It is obvious here that it was for the jury to determine whether a case of aiding and abetting was made out.
But it is contended that the offence committed by Rom6o R6millard was manslaughter, as shewn by the verdict rendered against him and which must be taken to have been justified by the evidence, and that therefore they could not find the appellant guilty of the greater offence, that of murder.
This reasoning necessarily implies that the verdict found in another trial against Rom6o R6millard is conclusive evidence in the trial of Joseph R6millard of the nature of the offence committed by the former, of which offence question one assumes that the latter could be found to have been an aider and abettor. I think that this shews the fallacy of the appellant's contention, for what was decided in Rom6o R6millard's case was entirely irrelevant in the trial of his father, and the learned trial judge would have erred had he told the jury that because the son in another case had been found guilty of manslaughter, the father, when separately tried, could not be convicted- (1) [1881] 51 L.J.M.C. 66, at p. 78.
of the greater offence of murder, for that would have been giving to the verdict in the Rom6o R6millard case a conclusive effect in the Joseph R6millard trial; in other words, treating it as res judicata, which it certainly is not. Unless the provisions of sect. 69 Crim. Code are borne in mind, confusion may be caused by treating the one as the actual perpetrator, the other as the aider and abettor, and measuring the guilt of the latter by the guilt of the former. Both are principals or rather parties to and guilty of the offence committed (sect. 69), that is to say culpable homicide, and culpable homicide is murder when committed with intent actual, or presumed in the cases mentioned in section 259, subsection (b), (c) and (d), to cause death, and manslaughter when that intent does not exist.
So between two parties, within the meaning of sect. 69, to a culpable homicide, it is conceivable that one may be shewn to be guilty of murder and the other of manslaughter.
And on the trial of the appellant, the jury could certainly determine what was the crime committed and, if the evidence justified the verdict, find the appellant guilty of murder, notwithstanding the fact that Romeo R6millard in another trial was, for the same culpable homicide, convicted of manslaughter.
My opinion therefore is that question one must be answered in the negative.
Question two.
I would answer both branches of this question in the affirmative.
It is common ground that it was the duty of the learned trial judge to tell the jury that three verdicts could be rendered upon a charge of murder, to wit, murder, manslaughter, or acquittal, and the learned judge did so.
Question three. The appellant's counsel greatly insisted on this question, contending that the evidence was such as would have rendered a verdict of man- J slaughter possible, and that the jury were not sufficiently instructed as to what constitutes the offence of manslaughter.
I have twice read the learned judge's charge. He very particularly explained to the jury the nature of murder, quoting the different provisions of the code which deal with this crime. There is no definition in the code of manslaughter, and section 262, stating that culpable homicide, not amounting to murder, is manslaughter, even if it could be regarded as a definition, was not read to the jury. However, at different parts of his charge, while discussing the defences urged by the appellant, the learned judge referred to manslaughter.
Thus, on the defence of provocation, the learned judge cited section 261 of the code, the effect of which is that culpable homicide may be reduced to manslaughter where death is caused in the heat of passion occasioned by a sudden provocation. After reading the first and second paragraphs of section 261, he said:
And after reading the third paragraph of this section, he adds:
Further on, the learned trial judge quoted from Russell on Crimes, vol. 1, p. 693, translating as follows
KING. Mignault J. Pour r4duire le crime de meurtre A 1'homicide involontaire, la provocation, il faut que les circonstances justifient la conclusion que l'acte fait avec l'intention de causer la mort ou des blessures corporelles graves, n'a pas 6t6 le r6sultat d'une d6cision froidement prise aprbs d6lib6ration et d'une malice r6flective, et n'est imputable qu'A la faiblesse de la nature humaine.
And the learned judge thus commented on this passage:
Vous vous demanderez si la preuve d6montre en dehors de tout doute que le projet qui a 6 ex6cut6 entre minuit et une heure du matin le vingt-huit janvier n'6tait pas un projet qui avait commenc6 A se former et A s'ex6cuter graduellement depuis la veille au matin. Vous examinerez les faits et gestes, pas et d6marches de l'accus6 A la barre, les d6clarations qu'il a faites, vous examinerez toute sa conduite et vous donneres la r6ponse A cette question.
Immediately following the passage I have quoted, the learned trial judge instructed the jury as to the claim made that the accused was justified in using force to prevent the breaking into of his house at night. He said:
L'article 60 du Code Criminel dit:
Quiconque est en paisible possession d'une maison d'habitation, et quiconque lui pr6te 16galement main-forte ou agit sous son autorit6, sont justifiables d'employer la force n6cessaire pour emp&cher L'effraction de cette maison d'habitation, de nuit, par qui que ce soit, s'il croit, pour des motifs raisonnables et plausibles, que cette effraction est tent6e dans le but d'y commettre quelque acte criminel.
Est-ce que dans ce cas ici aucune personne a essay6 A commettre une effraction chez l'accus6 A la barre?
Est-ce qu'il n'est pas prouv6 hors de tout doute aue Morissette apr6s avoir d6pass6 de quelques pieds la maison de R6millard en se dirigeant vers chez les Baker, et 6tant dans le doute que la maison de Baker ffit r6ellement cc qu'elle 6tait et basant cc doute sur le fait que Baker ne les avait laiss6s qu'une demi-heure avant et qu'il n'y avait pas de lumire dans la maison de Baker puisqu'il y en avait dans la maison de R6millard, est-ce que, dis-je, il y a eu effraction de la part de Morissette?
N'est-il pas vrai que Morissette a fait comme tout homme bien 6lev6 qui arrive dans une maison respectable; qu'il a sonn6 A la porte avant d'entrer?
Est-ce qu'il n'est pas prouv6 qu'il a enlev6 son chapeau et qu'il a pos6 poliment une question A la personne qui lui j.
ouvrait la porte?
Again the learned judge, referring to the suggestion of the defence that the prisoner's wife was a prostitute and that the deceased and his companions had come to the prisoner's house at night in order to commit adultery with her, quoted from some unnamed authority as follows:
Si un homme en trouve un autre commettant 1'adultbre et le tue ou le tire dans le premier transport de sa passion, il n'est coupable que d'homicide involontaire, car la provocation est grave et la loi pr6sume que le mari n'a pu se contrtler.
Mais celui qui tue 1'adultbre d6lib6r6ment et par vengeance est coupable de meurtre. Ainsi, si un pare voit quelqu'un commettre avec son fils un acte contre nature et le tue instantan6ment ce ne sera qu'un homicide involontaire. Mais s'il en entend parler seulement, recherche ensuite cette personne et la tue, ayant eu le temps de reprendre ses sens, ce sera un meurtre. And as to the claim made that the accused had acted in self defence, the learned judge said:
Si une personne recevant un coup se revenge immbdiatement avec une arme ou autre instrument qui lui tombe sous la main, I'offense ne sera qu'homicide involontaire, pourvu que le coup ait 6t6 port6 sous le coup de la col~re r6sultant de la provocation, car la colire est une passion N laquelle sont sujets les bons comme les m6chants. Mais la loi exige deux choses:
1. Qu'il y ait eu provocation; que le coup puisse clairement 6tre attribu6 A 1'influence de la passion r6sultant de la provocation. Y a-t-il eu assaut dans le cas actuel?
Le coup a-t-il t tir6 sous le coup de la col~re, colbre provoqude par cet assaut, le tout & la connaissance de 1'accus6 en cette cause? Si vous en arrivez A la conclusion que ce drame s'est d6rould sous l'influence soudaine de la passion, vous devrez appliquer la loi que je viens de vous exposer, mais si vous en arrivez N la conclusion que 1'accus6 d'abord a fait quelques actes d'omission ou de commission conform6ment aux principes de la loi que je viens de vous citer, et qu'il a agi ou refus6 d'agir sans 6tre sous 1'influence soudaine de la passion, mais bien sous l'influence de cette disposition d~prav6e et de ce mauvais esprit que la loi nomme "malice" dans la d6finition du meurtre, alors l'offense ne sera pas l'homicide involontaire mais ce sera le meurtre.
In view of all this I cannot come to the conclusion that the learned trial judge did not sufficiently instruct the jury as to what in law constitutes the offence of manslaughter, at least in so* far as was necessary to decide upon the different defences relied on by the accused, and as to these defences the learned judge told the jury under what circumstances, if they thought them established, a verdict of manslaughter could be returned.
Such a method of instruction was probably more useful to the jury than citing to them sect. 262 of the Criminal Code, or theoretically explaining the differences between murder and manslaughter. The charge as a whole was a strong one against the prisoner and may have given the jury the impression that the proper verdict to return was a verdict of murder, while leaving them entirely free to appreciate the evidence and come to their own conclusions thereon. Even if I thought that this amounts to misdirection, and I cannot say that, I would not be justified in setting aside the verdict unless I felt convinced that some substantial wrong or miscarriage was occasioned by the judge's charge (sect. 1019 Criminal Code).
I cannot come to this conclusion after carefully reading the learned judge's charge and the circumstances there referred to as far as disclosed, and if the learned trial judge's comments on the facts are fair, and no objection thereto was taken at the trial, my opinion is that no substantial wrong or miscarriage was occasioned, even if the impression was left on the minds of the members of the jury that the proper verdict to return was one of guilty of murder. I would therefore answer both branches of question three in the affirmative.
As a result the appeal must be dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
Statutes and regulations cited
-
Unresolved citations
- section 259
- section 262
- section 261
- section 53
- section 60