Grand Trunk Railway Co. v. Labrèche

The appellant company would only be liable in case of negligent or unreasonable use of its statutory right to operate its trains, of which there was no evidence in this case; moreover, upon the evidence, the determining cause of the accident was the act of respondent's husband in projecting himself in front of the coming train. Idington and Brodeur JJ. contra.

APPEAL from the judgment of the Court of King's Bench, appeal side, Province of Quebec, affirming the judgment of the trial judge with a jury, and maintaining the respondent's action.

The plaintiff's husband, Hector Sarrazin, was killed on the 1st August, 1920, about 6.19 p.m., in the Turcot yard of the defendant company, by a fast express train which had come from Ottawa and was then travelling at about 25 miles an hour-its usual *PRESENr:-9ir Louis Davies C.J. and Idington, Anglin, Brodeur and Mignault JJ.

speed at that place. Sarrazin was engaged as a repair mechanic. He had been working at a car standing on a track to the north of the two main tracks passing through the yard and had crossed over to them to the south, presumably to procure a steel knuckle which he required.

In returning he passed between two freight cars standing. on the track immediately to the south of the main tracks, having apparently climbed over the coupling. He was first seen by the only eye-witness of the accidentthe engineer of the incoming express train-jumping from between the two freight cars towards the main tracks, about 25 feet in advance of the oncoming locomotive, the buffer beam of which struck him on the left shoulder. The space between the southerly main track and the next track to the south was about six feet wide.

The plaintiff charged that the defendants were negligent in not moderating the speed of the express train while passing through the Turcot yard and in placing the car which the plaintiff was required to repair on one of the principal tracks towards the centre of the yard instead of on an outside track. By amendment, made towards the close of the trial, it was also alleged that where the accident occurred was a thickly peopled portion of the City of Montreal, that the tracks were not fenced or protected according to law and that the speed of the train therefore contravened s. 309 of the "Railway Act" (9 & 10 Geo. V., c. 68).

The action was tried by a jury who found that the death of Sarrazin was caused solely by the fault of the defendant's servants, consisting "dans la vitesse du train A cet endroit."

Sarrazin was acquitted of contributory fault.

In his charge the trial judge barely alluded to the allegation of excessive speed apart from the requirement of s. 309.

He dwelt at some length on that section and discussed the evidence as to the number of houses in the neighbourhood and the character of the fencing of the right of way. Judgment was entered in the Superior Court on the jury's finding for $8,000 damages and this judgment was unanimously affirmed in the Court of King's Bench on the ground that there was evidence on which the jury could reasonably find that the cause of Sarrazin's death was the speed of the train and that such speed was so excessive as to amount to fault.

Sec. 309 does not apply to a railway yard. There is no evidence that the locality of the accident was a thickly populated portion of the city or that the fencing was insufficient.

The locality was thickly populated and the fencing defective, and therefore s. 309 applies and a speed over 10 miles an hour was illegal.

u-s

Had the speed been less, Sarrazin might have escaped. There is evidence to warrant the jury's finding of fault.

THE CHIEF JUsTIcE.-For the reasons stated by my brother Anglin, with which I fully concur, I would allow this appeal.

J. (dissenting).-The respondent herein sued for damages caused to herself and children by the death of her husband and their father whilst working in the Turcot yard of the said railway company. The case was tried by the court with a special jury. The learned trial judge submitted to the jury a number of questions of which the three following and answers thereto are all that call for our consideration on this appeal:- The answer to the first is most stoutly denied by the appellant's factum herein which seeks to attribute the sole proximate cause of the accident to the act of the deceased going from where he was working to the car standing on a track on the other side of the main tracks, to get a pin needed for use in the repair work he was engaged in and on his return therewith jumping down from between said cars without waiting till the main lines were clear.

It is alleged that had he taken due care he would not have jumped as he did and no accident would have happened. There is something to be said for this contention.

It might have had more force with fair minded men if the appellant at the trial had not Idin J. pressed rather far its contention that the deceased was entirely in the wrong and without excuse in attempting to get the pin from the place he did.

The alleged printed notice on which appellant so rested what it calls absolute prohibition of such an appropriation was only in English and not liable thereby to have been brought home to the mind of deceased.

And when read it impliedly permits under stress of circumstances the very act complained of, for it directs if done it must be returned or rather replaced by another.

I imagine the rather unfair use of such a notice did appellant more harm than good.

The circumstance of the deceased having jumped down was perhaps no more than an error of judgment.

It was however entirely a matter for the jury to determine whether so or not, giving due heed to all the attendant circumstances.

No one saw him jump except the engineer on the eastward bound train from Ottawa who had his own work to engage his attention.

He tells that there would be six feet between the cars on that train and the cars on the next track from which deceased jumped.

If so it is quite conceivable that deceased had hoped, without being negligent but merely erring in judgment to so land in that six feet of space as to be entirely safe but possibly he stumbled slightly further than he expected, and was struck on the shoulder by a part of the engine of the incoming train. He certainly did not intend to jump or in fact jump across the six feet of space between the car he stood on and the main track and thus land in front of the train though his shoulder got so far.

I cannot therefore see how we can say the jury reached a conclusion, that no nine reasonable men could reach, that he was negligent.

I thus eliminate the answers to questions three and five as deserving here of no further consideration. Indeed that to question five, for evident reasons, was not seriously pressed by either side.

The answer to question four in assigning its answer of fault "dans la vitesse du train A cet endroit" is a most comprehensive one and may cover both the illegal conduct of running a train at more than ten miles an hour in a thickly populated locality contrary to the provisions of section 309 of the "Railway Act" and the running of a train at too high a rate of speed consistent with the safety of others in passing through such a busy railway yard as that in question.

There is evidence tending to shew to those conversant with the locality that both grounds were conceivably supportable in favour of the respondent. One, if well grounded, is sufficient.

It seems qulite clear that appellant had been habitually offending against said section 309, if not at the exact point of the accident perilously close to it and hence would not likely have been running at twentyfive miles an hour there but for this disregard of the statutory prohibition.

Of course it is not what was done on other occasions than the one in question, but that on the latter alone which must govern what is in question herein. I regret to say that the evidence was not presented on either side in such a way as to render quite clear to my mind the conditions and surrounding circumstances and bearing thereon.

Yet I imagine a jury from the district which paid as close attention as this one did to the case before it, as evidenced by very many pointed questions they put, could find a stronger case on that ground than I can by a perusal of the evidence with such a defective plan such as presented by appellant.

On the ground that passing through such a yard two trains at the same time, and the one in question, at all events, moving at the rate of twenty-five miles an hour, the case is one for the - jury to determine whether or not appellant was guilty of fault.

And certainly, at all events, it is not, I submit, for us to interfere and reverse the unanimous judgment of the Court of King's Bench better situated in many ways to determine the bare question of whether or not there was evidence to submit to the jury.

I observe that there was no motion at the trial to dismiss the action on that ground.

I think the appeal here should be dismissed with costs.

J.-It is quite impossible to know whether the jury dealt with this case as falling within s. 309 of the "Railway Act" or intended to find excessive speed amounting to fault quite apart from that provision. It will therefore be necessary to examine the case in both these aspects.

I doubt whether upon the evidence it can be said that the locality through which the train was passing when it struck Sarrazin was thickly populated. But, if that fact be assumed in the plaintiff's favour, having regard to the conditions as to fencing shewn by the evidence, it would probably have been incumbent on the defendants to restrict the speed of their train at that place to 10 miles per hour. Granting this, however, it does not, in my opinion, entitle the plaintiff to recover, because the excess of speed over 10 miles per hour was not the cause of Sarrazin being killed, and probably also because s. 309 was not passed for the protection of yard employees of the railway company whose duties require them to be within the fences erected along the right of way.

The evidence in my opinion leaves no room for doubt that the determining cause of Sarrazin's death was not the speed of the train but his own act-whether culpable or wholly innocent is on this issue quite immaterial-in projecting himself almost immediately in front of the Ottawa express.

That fact of course likewise affords a peremptory answer to the plaintiff's case if the jury's finding should be taken to mean that the speed of the . train at 25 miles per hour in Turcot yard amounted to fault although s. 309 of the Railway Act did not apply. Moreover such a finding of fault in my opinion could not be maintained.

There are no circumstances in evidence which indicate that there is any greater danger, or need for reduction in the speed of the trains, in the Turcot yard than exists in any other railway yard. I am not prepared to accede to the view that in the absence of proof of such special circumstances a jury may fix the standard of what is or is not a proper speed for express trains passing through such a yard. There may no doubt be special circumstancessuch, for instance, as the known presence of some unusual concourse of people in the yard-which would render the running of a train through it at 25 miles per hour sheer recklessness.

In such a case the railway company would in vain invoke its statutory right to operate its trains. Columbia Bithulitic Ltd. v. British Columbia Electric Ry. Co.

Statutory authorization affords a complete immunity for injury caused by the J. use of the powers so conferred so long as they are exercised without negligence. Canadian Pacifc Ry. Co. v. Roy (2).

But the statute does not sanction or protect negligent or unreasonable use of the rights it confers.

East Fremantle Corporation v. Annois (3). Here there is nothing of that kind.

On the other hand the running of fast express trains at high speed on the main tracks passing through railway yards is such a well known feature of our railway traffic that resultant danger to persons employed in such yards may well be regarded as a risk of such employment assumed by them, so long as there is no negligence either in the management of such trains or in the direction or control of the persons so employed, which increases the danger.

In my opinion not only is the finding that there was fault on the part of the defendants which caused the death of Sarrazin unwarranted but appellant-defendant.

Art. 508 (3) C.P.C.

I would therefore allow this appeal; and, pronouncing the judgment which, in my opinion, the Court of King's Bench ought to have rendered ("Supreme Court Act," s. 51), I would dismiss the action, with costs throughout if the defendant company should see fit to exact them.

.-Cette cause pr6sente de srieuses difficultis; mais, apr~s avoir soigneusement consid6r6 les points en litige, j'en suis venu A la con- L clusion que l'appel de la compagnie devrait 6tre renvoy6.

La compagnie a pr6tendu dans sa plaidoirie devant nous qu'elle pouvait donner A ses convois la vitesse qu'elle jugerait A propos, A moins qu'ils ne soient dans la partie populeuse d'une ville ou d'un village. Je me puis pas acquiescer A une telle proposition.

Je reconnais bien que l'endroit oA 'accident a eu lieu n'6tait pas de ceux que l'article 309 de "I'Acte des Chemins de Fer" vise quand il d6clare que la vitesse ne doit pas y d6passer dix milles A l'heure.

Mais en vertu de la loi qui s'applique A tout le monde, les compagnies de chemins de fer sont tenues en tout temps et en tout endroit d'agir avec prudence et avec soin.

La question de faute d~pend des faits et des circonstances de chaque cas. Ce serait, suivant moi, un cas de n6gligence de sa part si dans une de ses cours oh il y a une multitude d'employds au travail, elle se permettait d'y faire traverser ses convois A une vitesse immod6rde.

La situation particulibre de ses voies principales dans cette cour Turcot en fait un endroit excessivement dangereux. Et alors pr6tendre que ses trains pourraient y passer A n'importe quelle vitesse me paralt contraire aux principes 416mentaires de la saine prudence.

ED dehors de toutes dispositions statutaires, la vitesse d'un train doit 4tre conforme A la prudence requise pour la adret6 de ceux qui ont le droit d'6tre sur la voie. Il y a des circonstances particulibres qui imposeront l'obligation de ralentir la vitesse des trains A certains endroits, comme dans une cour, par exemple, ou encore lorsque le m6canicien voit qu'une personne est sur la voie ou en train de la traverser.

C'est done une question de fait qui doit Stre laiss6e au jury. Il me semble que son verdict dans cette cause, qui a td unanimement confirm6 par les cours ne devrait pas 6tre renvers6.

L'appel devrait tre renvoy6 avec d6pens.

J.-L'intim6e a obtenu, sur verdict d'un jury, jugement contre l'appelante pour $8,000.00, dont $3,000.00 pour elle-m~me et $5,000.00 pour ses cinq enf ants mineurs, A raison de la mort de son mari, le nomm6 Hector Sarrazin, bless6 par une locomotive de l'appelante, et ce jugement a 4t6 confirm6 A l'unanimit6 par la cour d'appel. L'appelante demande l'infirmation de ce jugement et la cassation du verdict. Il n'y a aucune contradiction quant aux faits saillants de la cause.

Le ler aocit 1920, vers six heures du soir, Hector Sarrazin et un compagnon nomm6 Lamer faisaient l'inspection de trois convois de marchandises qui devaient partir le m~me soir, le but de leur inspection 6tant de constater si tout 6tait en bon 6tat et de faire les petites reparations ndcessaires. Ce travail se faisait dans la cour Turcot, qui est une grande cour de chemin de fer dans les limites de la cit6 de Montreal, longue d'environ deux milles, avec plusieurs voies tant au nord qu'au sud des deux voies principales circulent les trains de l'appelante. Aucun chemin public ne traverse cette cour.

Imm~diatement avant I'accident, Sarrazin et Lamer travaillaient sur une des voies lat6rales, 6tant la deuxibme au nord des voies principales.

A part ces voies principales qui 6taient libres, les autres voies 6taient occupbes par un grand nombre de wagons de marchandises qui devaient plus tard 6tre exp6di6s A leur destination.

Pour faire leur ouvrage et se procurer les outils n6cessaires, le d6funt et son compagnon n'avaient qu'd rester du c6td nord ohi se trouvaient les chantiers de l'appelante et oA il n'y avait aucun * danger provenant de la circulation des trains.

Cepen- Mnut J dant, pour une raison qu'on ne peut s'expliquer que par conjectures, Sarrazin quitta l'endroit oA il travaillait, traversa les deux voies principales et se rendit au sud de ces dernibres, avec l'intention sans doute de revenir A son ouvrage qui n'6tait pas achev4.

Quelques instants plus tard, pr6cis6ment A 6 h.19, le temps 6tant beau et clair, le train rapide d'Ottawa A Montr6al arrivait A une vitesse de 25 A 30 milles A l'heure, qui est sa vitesse ordinaire A cet endroit.

Le seul t6moin de l'accident, le nomm6 Weston, ing6nieur de la locomotive, 6tait A son poste.

11 dit:

Q.-Did you see the man Hector Sarrazin, the plaintiff's husband, when you were crossing Turcot Yard.

A.-Coming into Turcot Yard?

Q.-Yes.

A.-Yes.

Q.-In what spot did you see him.

A.-Well, when I saw him first he was jumping between the cars that way (indicates).

Q.-What.

A.-He jumped out from between the cars in front of the engine. Q.-I understand you to say that he jumped between two cars. A.-Yes, he jumped from between two cars.

Q.-From the side.

A.--On to the track.

From the side on to the main line. From the siding on the same side of the track on to the main line in front of me.

I am coming in here (indicates) he jumped out from the cars on that side right immediately in front of the engine.

Weston appliqua imm6diatement les freins et r6ussit A arreter le train dans un espace de 500 pieds, mais rien au monde ne pouvait sauver Sarrazin qui fut frapp6 par la locomotive et eut le crine fractur6. Il mourut le lendemain.

Le jury fut d'opinion que Sarrazin 6tait exempt de toute faute et que l'accident 4tait arriv6 par la seule faute de l'appelante.

A une question qui demandait en quoi consistait cette faute, le jury r6pondit: "dans la vitesse excessive du train A cet endroit." Le verdict n'indique pas pourquoi la vitesse du train 6tait fautive A cet endroit.

Il est 616mentaire de dire que si rien dans la loi ni dans les circonstances de 1'esp~ce n'exigeait une vitesse moindre, il ne pouvait pas y avoir faute A conduire ce train A une vitesse de vingt-cinq A trente milles A l'heure ou m~me davantage. La faute, par d6finition, est un manquement A un devoir.

S'il o'y a pas de devoir, si on exerce un droit, il n'y a pas de faute. Or, je le r6pate, si rien dans la loi ou les circonstances de 'espice n'imposait une vitesse moindre, le jury ne pouvait raisonnablement dire que la vitesse du train A cet endroit 6tait une faute.

Je ne vois dans la preuve aucune circonstance qui ait exig6 une r6duction de vitesse A cet endroit, 6loign6 de quatre milles et demi du terminus le train se rendait. Il n'y avait pas de groupements de travailleurs, meme la preuve ne fait voir & cet endroit-I que Sarrazin et son compagnon. Et c'est I'acte de Sarrazin lui-m~me, en se jetant au devant de la locomotive, qui a caus6 sa mort. Quand il parut tout A coup, il n'y avait pas de possibilit6 d'6viter l'accident. La loi, non plus, ne prohibait pas cette vitesse. Vers la fin de l'enqu6te la demanderesse obtint la permission d'amender sa d6claration en all6guant que l'endroit 'accident est arriv6 est

Le but de l'amendement 6tait d'invoquer l'article 309 de "I'Acte des chemins de fer," qui, dans un tel endroit, veut que la vitesse des trains ne d6passe pas dix milles A l'heure.

Mais au lieu de prouver que l'endroit de l'accident filt populeux, on a prouv6 qu'il y a des rues et des maisons pros d'un mille de IA, en approchant de la station de St-Henri.

Sarrazin s'est fait tuer, il n'y a ni rues ni maisons; c'est un vaste terrain plat, termind au nord par une c6te 4lev6e au sommet de laquelle se trouve le chemin de Lachine, et au sud par le canal Lachine.. Prbs de IA, au sud, il y a les usines du Canada Car Company, s6par6es de la voie de l'appelante par le chemin de fer 6lectrique du Pare et de l'lle et une double cl6ture.

n'y a pas un t6moin qui pr6tende qu'il y a de la population Sarrazin a 6t6 bless6.

IL est par cons6quent 6vident que l'article 309 ne s'applique pas. Si done la loi ne d6fendait pas une vitesse de vingt-cinq A trente milles A cet endroit, et si rien dans les circonstances de l'espbce ne rendait cette vitesse imprudente, aucun jury ne pouvait raisonnablement trouver 1'appelante en faute A cause de Ia vitesse du train A cet endroit. Canadian Pacific Railway Company v. Roy (1).

Voici un homme qui se jette tout A coup au devant d'un train, un homme qui travaille depuis une ann6e dans cette cour et qui sait qu'il y passe de nombreux trains, quatre, dit-on, par heure. Et le jury r6pond que cet homme est exempt de toute faute. Au contraire, la d6fenderesse qui, en faisant circuler ses trains, exerce un droit que lui conf~re la loi, est, dit le jury, coupable de faute et responsable de la mort de Sarrazin.

Un tel verdict, pour citer le langage de 'article 501 C.P.C., est un verdict que le jury, en examinant toute la preuve, ne pouvait raisonnablement rendre. Dans un tel cas, la loi permet au tribunal de rendre un jugement diff6rent de celui qui a 6t rendu par le juge pr6sident au procs (art. 508 C.P.C.). L'intim6e, jeune more de vingt-quatre ans, ayant d6j& cinq enfants, le dernier posthume, se trouve dans une situation d6plorable.

Elle n'a eu, comme assurances, que $250.00 de l'association des employ6s de chemin de fer et $741 des Forestiers Ind6pendants. Cependant ce n'est pas une raison de lui allouer une indemnit6 aux d6pens de l'appelante, si aucune faute de celle-ci n'a 6t6 prouv6e et si Sarrazin, par son imprudence grossibre, a caus6 sa propre mort.

Sans doute, comme le font remarquer les honorables juges de la cour d'appel, le jury est souverain juge des faits; mais il n'en est pas moins vrai que sa d6cision doit Stre raisonnable.

L'honorable juge Martin dit que peut4tre Sarrazin aurait pu 6viter le coup qui l'a tu6 si la vitesse du train avait t6 moindre. En supposant que telle ait 6t6 l'opinion du jury, la forme de ses r6ponses nous r6duit aux conjectures, peut-on d6clarer fautive une vitesse que la loi permettait, surtout quand la voie 6tait droite et libre et que la victime de cet accident s'est subitement jetde au devant du train? Et est-ce une faute de n'avoir pas pens6 qu'un homme commettrait cette imprudence incroyable?

Le verdict du jury est entibrement pervers et d6raisonnable; et s'il 6tait maintenu le service des chemins de fer serait notablement entrav6 en ce pays.

I est bien regrettable que le salaire annuel de Sarrazin ait d6pass6 le chiffre qui donne lieu A l'application de la loi des accidents du travail. L'intim6e n'avait d'action que sous I'empire du droit commun, et elle ne pouvait rMussir sans prouver la faute de 'appelante. J'ai lu la preuve tris attentivement, CO.1apent.a mais je ne trouve rien qui puisse justifier le verdict. L'appel doit Stre maintenu et I'action de l'intim6e renvoy6e.

L'appelante a droit A ses d~pens dans toutes les cours si elle veut les exiger de l'intim6e. Appeal allowed with costs.